A party of silence. Where is the military enthusiasm of the Russian government?

Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, congratulating veterans on Victory Day, did not mention the word about what was happening in Ukraine - did not say about the ideological heirs of the Nazis, did not hint at the hostility of the West, did not call to rally around Vladimir Putin; I just congratulated on the holiday and that’s all, somehow I could avoid words mandatory these days. Perhaps we have not in front of the anti-war demarche, but the diversification of the highest nomenclature authorized by Putin, within which the premiere is allowed to be aloof from the military mainstream, bearing in mind, say, some future negotiations-it will obviously be easier for a person who is not burdened with a special operation. But even if Mishustin has some kind of secret, he hardly shared him with all down the vertical, and people see him the same as we-the power marchs in the Z-Colonne, and the prime minister does not march, and, therefore, the position of silence and non-participation is possible in principle, and, albeit understandable limits, but the system allows the possibility of choosing. When the Primorsky Governor Kozhemyako, having changed into camouflage, leaves for traveling along the Donbass with an automaton, it catches the eye, Kozhemyako with a machine gun indignant, delights someone, but those and others do not notice the main thing-if the gun picks up one governor, then several dozen of the rest are in their offices without weapons, they are engaged in their own weapons, they are engaged in their own Hopefully, no one will call them and, perhaps, hope that no one will call them and ask to follow the example of a coastal colleague.

Or maybe they just call them all. Maybe, to Kozhemyako (from left to right on the map), they got through after ten or twenty of its more hardwarely experienced and confident colleagues assured Moscow that they would be dressed in camouflage, take the machine gun and go, if not to Mariupol, then at least to Kherson, but, please, not today - sowing, forest fires, army draft. I’ll reconcile, and then - Moscow grunts into the phone and gains the next region. By the time of calling with a Kozhemyako, the mood is already completely in the line, and the Primorsky governor hears a completely angry voice on the phone, promising him in case of non-fulfillment not even a resignation (by resigning someone you are scared now-they all dream of a resignation first of all; how lucky Tomsk Zhvachkin -and whoever calls him a loser?), And the prison and all that. Curses and goes to war.

Russian officials, whose voice after February 24 is the most audible-, firstly, they can be counted on the fingers, and secondly-their list does not coincide with any of the famous near-Putin hierarchies. Medvedev , Kadyrov, Rogozin, Turchak, Volodin, a little Patrushev, a little Naryshkin, a little Kiriyenko - and after all, no one else. Those who have become more in the official news in these weeks - they may be trying to build up hardware influence (the same Rogozin - whether he wants to become the prime minister?), But even - perhaps not wanting it, - they cover those who prefer not to say anything and distant from the letter Z. Medvedev and Rogozin, therefore, is so deafening that it will be so noticeable that it will be different that it will be otherwise noticeable that it will be otherwise noticeable Silence hanging over the state, which state did not yet know. Some ministers, and the media-active deputies, and many governors, and the heads of state corporations, fell silent and even Sechin, have shared somewhere. Did anyone think that it would be possible to miss Sichin? Well, do not miss, of course, but his silence and the silence of many others look, of course, extremely intriguing. It does not seem formidable at all, it is silence. Perhaps confused, but rather - desperate and heavy. Already at the level of not a minister, but a relatively modest deputy of the uninstall, who loved to speak on TV before the war, and now not answering calls-you can imagine what pressure he withstands and how much effort does not put up the monument to his grandmother, so as not to put on the letter Z so as not to make any hazel-free speech.

For these incomplete three months, there were one and a half cases when not the first row officials expressed an almost anti-war position-there was Medinsky in Istanbul, there was a sand, both threw a Z-press and activists, both called the world party and almost national predecessors. But this is a measure of measurements with which it is better to approach the Russian nomenclature. If we consider Medvedev and Rogozin with the reference hawks (and they are really reference), you can see that military enthusiasm for the Russian elite is extremely atypical, you will not find the second Rogozin in it, no it. The elite frowned and is silent, no one knows what she wants, but if she wanted to fight, she would say. And she does not say.

Almost zero military enthusiasm of the Russian nomenclature is the best indicator of prospects of both war and the system itself. The circle of beneficiaries of war is odd and in any case small - there are much more those who risk or lose - what he went to power (including, of course, corruption capabilities; well, what?), The usual life, and the soil itself underfoot. The struggle for the world is usually treated as traditional civil activity - all sorts of rallies, statements, songs of protest - but intra -systemic sabotage and self -removal are obviously more effective from the point of view of the world. Vladimir Putin lost not only the situation at the front. He sold war to society as a subject of value struggle, even as something mystical at the junction of a pseudo -religious victorious cult and political superstitions - any rational calculation will be more convincing than slogans about grandmother and Nazis. Sociology does not matter here - obviously, the same Sechin has a completely different attitude to reality than the average viewer, and if Sechin is silent about the war for the third month, it can be assumed that he understands it differently than it should be within the framework of state patriotism. Not resoners-oppositions, for whom the war is nothing more than a continuation of the previous many years of confrontation, emotionally acute, but nothing, in general, not binding-not to them, but to the silent nomenclature are destined to seek Russia's exit from the war and the subsequent recreation of the world. No one has monopolies for anti -war sentiments, and the features of the future need to be sought behind the scenes, in silence - unless, of course, Russia has the future.