Eurosociology of the Last Judgment

Political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky on how the Kremlin missed the change in European attitudes towards Russia

Today, the main objection to peace talks is their unacceptability to public opinion. It is not difficult to judge the public opinion of Ukraine and Russia, drawn into the battle. And what about Europe?

Europe is full of rage and indignantly demands the most severe anti-Russian sanctions. But unlike the Russian Federation, the institution of measuring public opinion has been preserved here. For some reason, Russia has destroyed its own and is piling up rows of figures that are no more useful than the bubbles of a drowning man. The public opinion of the European Union is the key to understanding the motives of European decisions, a difficult task for the Russian. Here we need intermediaries who know a lot about the neuroses of both civilizations. The Bulgarian expert Ivan Krastev undoubtedly belongs to these. Together with the European Council on Foreign Relations (Mark Leonard), he interpreted a number of pre-war and wartime surveys in June.

Their meaning is not theoretical. In the waves of emotions and military hatred, it is important to evaluate what is possible and what is impossible for politicians. When you want to stop a war, and not just dream about how one of the participants will “win” it, you need to find a mass basis for diplomacy. The basis may be the dynamics of European opinions over the past six months of the war. This is what the ECFR polls show.

8,000 respondents in ten European countries, from Poland to Sweden to the UK, decided that Europe had been declared war - and they accepted the challenge. It is precisely those classes and social groups that are so reluctant to take on a new economic burden that now agree to bear it - this is their war.

Insulting Europe

While the Moscow public is immersed in the hermeneutics of ratings, as they know, without foundation, the European sociology of the crisis is getting more and more curious. Attractive are two surveys conducted by the European Council of Foreign Relations at the beginning of the year and in May - before the war and in its midst. On the eve of the war, the Kremlin, a notorious devourer of sociology, missed the dangerous shift in European attitudes towards Russia. It turns out that last year's hassle of ultimatums to the West angered European societies - they terribly did not like the threat of war in Europe. The war has not yet begun, but by the beginning of 2022, the European has ceased to be a pacifist in relation to Russia. The most Russian-friendly European societies have changed course. Krastev writes that "German citizens have become much more predatory towards Russia." Putin's game of brinkmanship has undermined the Europeans' willingness to rely on Moscow's prudence. When planning a military operation in Europe, the Kremlin should have thought about it. That did not happen.

When, after February 24, “the Europeans surprised Vladimir Putin with their unity and determination,” it was the result of an insult, not Ukrainophilia. The lower classes strongly demanded a political turnaround from the governments. It began on a human level with an outburst of hospitality to millions of refugees, unusual for Europe. Identity was militarized, something that “post-heroic European societies” (Krastev) had avoided for so long. In the face of its citizens, Europe has been offended not as Brussels, but as Europe's superpower. An offended superpower is capable of surprises.

The May ECFR survey covers 8,000 respondents from all over Europe (from Poland and Romania to France, Germany and Italy, Portugal, Spain, Finland, Sweden and the UK). In all ten countries, citizens decided that war had been declared on Europe - and they accepted the challenge. It is precisely those classes and social groups that are so reluctant to take on a new economic burden that now agree to bear it - this is their war.

Everyone supports reducing economic ties with Russia and is in favor of sending troops to Ukraine, despite the fact that they are sure that the EU will inevitably lose financially.

What the survey showed

The consolidation of European societies on the issue of the culprit of the crisis is strengthening, not weakening. The culprit is Russia, as three-quarters of the respondents believe. Two-thirds see Russia as the main obstacle to peace (only Italy doubts). After Ukraine decisively proved that it can resist, solidarity with it has become a European consensus. The Ukrainian flag is a new European fashion (this was not the case after the two Kyiv revolutions of 2004 and 2014). Anti-Russian sanctions are beyond controversy, including oil and gas ones. They even approve of the deployment of troops in the eastern countries - NATO members.

Superpower Europe is ready to fight on the side of Ukraine, but is clearly divided on the issue of getting out of the war. The authors divided the Europeans into two dissenting communities - the camp of Peace and the camp of Justice or hardened Judges: the first 35%, the second 22%. Another fifth wavers between Peace and Justice - in terms of anti-Russian sentiments, they are closer to the Judges, and in terms of fear of a military escalation - to the Peace camp. The pollsters dubbed the hesitant "Kissingerian realists" - those who are hostile to Russia, but fear that the war will cost Europe too much. Judges and vacillators are in favor of severing cultural ties with Russia, peacekeepers are against it. Among the Judges, by the way, men predominate (62% with 38% women). Krastev notes "Zelensky's transformation into the unofficial leader of the Judges' camp" and "his strange ability to communicate with the European public."

The authors of the survey conclude that Europe's rupture with Russia is irreversible: "Europe has disengaged from Russia." Nobody here wants Russia to win. In the camp of Judges, the majority is not only in favor of abundant military supplies to Ukraine, but also the combat cover of its airspace, possibly with the sending of military contingents.

Of course, the picture looks very different in different countries of Europe, and it is very asymmetrical. Poland became the vanguard of the militancy of the European superpower (41% for Judgment and Justice, 16% for Peace). The Peace Camp is chosen in Italy (52%) and Germany (49%). In Germany, right-wing voters are leaning toward peace along with the centre-left Social Democrats (greens in vacillation). And in Finland, the opposite is true - the Social Democrats are committed to the Court, and the center-right is divided in half. Italy, especially its right-wing voters, is leaning towards the peaceful option.

All support the reduction of economic ties with Russia and are in favor of sending troops to Ukraine, despite the fact that they are sure that the EU will inevitably lose financially. The Judges camp agrees that although everyone will lose in this war, Russia should “lose worst of all” – in the Peace camp they fear that Ukraine will suffer more in this case. The Peace Camp looks set to grow as tough economic sanctions have not produced quick military results. Here they fear the escalation of the war and see a diplomatic way out of it as a way to prevent it.

In Russia, people think in terms of the "majority" and its "disintegration". It is unlikely that they will understand here that the clarification of positions does not weaken, but strengthens the opposition of Europe. In Moscow, they talk about the “disintegration of European unity” (a favorite topic of Moscow chatter). But before us is a living ensemble of European politics, which will continue to develop a strategy in relation to Russia and Ukraine in the debate. (The authors of the study, by the way, consider European talk “about a Ukrainian victory over Russia” to be harmful, although even those have already become a consensus.) Working out European consent will be a difficult problem until a new platform for a European exit from the war is formed - or its escalation. Nevertheless, for the first time in half a year, a stable democratic basis for peace negotiations is emerging in Europe - in alliance with the mass basis for the continuation and escalation of the war.