
The publication “ Re : Russia ” publishes an article by the scientific director of the “Levada Center” (included by the Ministry of Justice in the Register of NCO-Ino-Agents) Lev Gudkov “Three Phases of Adaptation” , in which the scientist analyzes changes in relation to the special operation.
“The anti -Ukrainian theme on federal television channels arose in parallel with the establishment of the“ sovereign democracy ”regime. Waves of hostility accompanied every elected period in Ukraine after the "Orange Revolution". <...> However, until 2008, the propaganda effect of these efforts was insignificant, since the convictions of propaganda focused on the topic of threats of "color revolutions" as an instrument of Western geopolitics. The Russian population did not occupy this too much, it did not see problems for itself here and attributed the anti -Ukrainian rhetoric of the Kremlin to fussy bustle on self -preservation of the authorities.
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The situation began to change after August 2008, when the Ukrainian leadership actually supported Georgia during the military conflict around South Ossetia. The release of Georgia from the sphere of influence of Russia caused a powerful wave of anti -Georgian propaganda, which reanimated the imperial representations of the population, which was indirectly reflected in mass relation to Ukraine. <...> However, the radical change in sympathy for antipathy occurred only after the Maidan and the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014. The patriotic euphoria, which covered the Russian society, not only restored Putin’s popularity in 2011-2012, but also stimulated imperial and militaristic sentiments. <...>
The failure of the Novorossiya plan demanded explanations and work with public opinion, putting forward the theme of "Ukrainian Nazism" as the main line of propaganda. From that moment on, anti -Ukrainian demagogy has closely intertwined with the traditional anti -shipping of the Russian bureaucracy. <...>
The rhetoric of the denunciation of “Ukrainian fascism” connected the main motive of the late Soviet ideology: the justification of the USSR and Stalinism by the victory over fascist Germany, turning this victory into the moral and symbolic capital of Russia as the heir to the USSR, into a key mechanism of national identity and self -affirmation. ”
The beginning of a special operation caused Russians extremely conflicting feelings. "Pride of Russia", "inspiration, joy" was experienced respectively 51 and 14 % of respondents. On the contrary, anxiety, horror, fear felt 31 %, shock, anger, indignation - 19 %, shame, depression and numbness - another 14 %. Some respondents at the same time experienced both fear and satisfaction. ”
Further, Gudkov fixes the growth of support for a special operation, which, according to him, cannot be “fully explained” by propaganda, increased censorship and repression. “It should be considered more important that the prolonged work of propaganda and other social institutions has led to the reproduction of deeply lying layers of the totalitarian political culture of the Soviet type, paralyzing the ability of a subjective opinion and assessments of the actions of repressive power. This is the inertia of Soviet consciousness, the thinking of man of the totalitarian state. We are also talking about mass identification with the "great power", its military power, values and recognition of its sovereign right to impose its will to other countries. "
And at the moment there were signs of routinization, indifference, addiction and weakening of interest in what is happening, especially in the youth negatively configured to the authorities, who felt that she could not affect the situation and the policy of the regime, and trying to find an excuse for her own opportunism. ”