Himars: New God of War

Putin's offensive burns in Ukraine along with warehouses of Russian ammunition

The first stage of the Russian war in Ukraine - for the capture of Kyiv in three days - has long been lost. As well as the second - to cut off Ukraine from the sea.

But many had illusions (or fears, or hopes) that the Russian army, inexorable and formidable, like a glacier, will crawl into Ukrainian positions in the Donbass, grinding the Ukrainian defense line with a fiery shaft and filling out what remains of it, cannon flesh.

That Putin, having the overwhelming superiority in units of equipment and ammunition (for each Ukrainian shell there are 20 Russian ones), will impose a war on exhaustion to Ukraine and win it.

The last week destroyed this illusion. The Russian front-or rather, its rear is 60-80 km in depth-all burns. The warehouse in the red beam is burning. Dozens of warehouses in Donetsk are burning. The technique at the airfield in Melitopol, warehouses in Kherson and New Kakhovka are burning, and Chernobaevka once again burns. The day after the capture of the Lisichan, a huge division warehouse in Popasnaya burned out - if he burned a couple of days before, they would not have taken Lisichansk - there would be nothing.

It is not warehouses burning - this is a Russian offensive. This is on by the Stalinist military strategy, adopted by the Generals of the Russian Federation: to advance with cannon fiery shaft, randomly, irregularly firing in the squares. After the capture of Lisichansk, the Russian troops went on the offensive on all fronts (this immediately after Putin announced the “operational pause”), but immediately choked. There were few shells.

The sighting Ukrainian shooting in warehouse missiles is a striking contrast with Russian shooting expensive missiles at residential complexes, shopping centers and squares.

A military expert and a former pilot, Colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in reserve, Roman Svitan estimates the number of destroyed Russian warehouses of 15-20%. Obviously, the Ukrainian army will not go on the offensive until it destroys all warehouses.

The warehouses, of course, are “Himars”, they are M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (Himars) mounted on the chassis of the standard American army truck M1140 with a launching installation for six GMLRS missiles. There is another option that allows, instead of six GMLRS, to release one ATACMS missile, which flies by 300 km, but they have not yet been supplied to Ukraine.

Himars has a number of colossal advantages. Firstly, it is mobile as an ordinary truck. This means that Himars rides along a regular road, travels to a position, releases missiles, and is immediately wound at a speed of 80 km/h. It is difficult to cover it in response.

Secondly, GMLRS missiles (G in this case means guideed, controlled) that Himars shoots, are guided by GPS and strike exactly on the target. This distinguishes him from the Russian “tornadoes”, “grades” and “hurricanes”, which are hit in the squares.

Thirdly, Himars, again, unlike the Russian “tornadoes”, does not need any launching installation. He just drives up to the place where a block with rockets lies on the ground, implements it - and Voila! You can work.

The use of Himars destroys all the logistics of the Russian army. The Russian army was used to fighting like this: it makes giant warehouses 60 km from the front and carries all these warehouses by trucks. “60 km of removal,” says the adviser to the presidential office, Alexei Armorovich , - these are three truck walkers per day, 90 are two, 120 - this is one. The offensive is possible for the Russian army only if the truck manages to do three walks per day. ”

The use of Himars confirms two theses that I have already formulated. First: a modern secondentric war always defeats the Stalinist concept of 1941 - a fiery shaft plus cannon fodder. And the second-no, Putin failed to turn this war into a positional one, as he wanted, because the positional war suggests that the enemy sees only the front line and cannot, with any acceptable accuracy, strike at the key objects of military infrastructure behind it.

“What kind of military car was Building Putin,” Ashtovich asks sarcastically, “if four Himars can end her?”

True, Himarsov is still not four. In a conversation with me, a military expert and former employee of the APU General Staff Colonel Oleg Zhdanov said that "American Himars and their analogues in Ukraine are 17 pieces." The same Arrestovich confirmed that they arrived not when it was announced, but "for a week earlier."

Those. Red beam, Stakhanov, snake island and S-300, destroyed under Kherson ten days ago-this is also Himars.

Himars were used by the United States in Afghanistan, and in Syria, and in Iraq, but their use did not have such crushing results. Why? Very simple. For the successful use of Himars, three things are needed: a clearly defined front line, good roads on one side of this line, and huge warehouses on the other. In Syria, there was neither roads, nor the front, nor the rear, to ride on what is, it was unsafe. And there were no goals either: the Igilovites did not hold gigantic warehouses of shells, preparing for the offensive with great manpower after the fire shaft.

Himars and the Russian method of war were created for each other.

Ukrainian Himars work mainly at night. In the afternoon, they are likely to stand in some hangars, where they are invisible to Russian "eagles". Work at night has another advantage. “At night, the risk that civilians will fall under the distribution,” says Roman Svitan. This also distinguishes the tactics of the Armed Forces from the Russian: Russian missiles arrive during the day.

How does Ukrainian intelligence find out where to aim Himars? How does she calculate the Russian warehouse? With the help of the same secondentric war. Military expert Pavel Luzin believes that the Armed Forces of Ukraine use simply ordinary commercial pictures of Maxar. “Maxar” takes a picture twice a day, and using special programs and Big Data you can calculate, where there are warehouses where military trucks go, ”says Pavel Lusin.

The question arises: why can Russia, in turn, cannot find out with the help of all the same space pictures, how are Himars go?

And here it is beautiful: Russia does not have access to Maxar and any other commercial pictures that would allow the second centric war. But Russia has its own satellites! - You exclaim. Yes, I have. These are military satellites who can take pictures every few weeks.

Russia also has a resource satellites who gathered with the help of Western components. These components of the United States were banned by the law adopted after interference in the American elections. As a result, all “resources” have developed a resource. The latter left orbit in December 2021. Russia also has three Bars satellites. This is simply not enough.

That is, Russia sucks goals from the finger, as we described in the previous article, and misses that.

In other words, Russia again loses not just the Western military system. And the Western military system in combination with civilian technologies. Maxar commercial satellites, which were not done at all, jokingly solve the problem that turns out to be unsolvable for the Russian orbital group, on which billions have been spent.

In the same way, the Civil Starlink Ilona Mask was invulnerable to Russian electronic warfare (REB), which billions were spent on. And the Ukrainian artillery fire control system “Kropyiv”, collected from civilian tablets, civilian radio and cheap civilian drones, increased exactly the effectiveness of Ukrainian artillery even when both sides used old Soviet guns and howitzers.

This can be called a manifestation of another trend: a trend, if you want, the fencing of military technologies.

The entire Russian military -industrial complex proceeds from the fact that there are some super -secret military technologies perfect, which have no parallels in civilian industry.

But the modern world is arranged differently. Its high -quality technologies, the highest quality devices and the highest quality solutions are those that exist in billions of copies. By definition, such technologies are civilian, because the military of billions of copies do not need. The military market is simply not so great. As a result, in the West, the line between civil and military technologies is erased. The 10 largest departments of Defense USA 54% of their products sell in the market . In Russia, companies that cannot compete in the market win closed contests for military deliveries. Their technologies are obviously uncompetitive. They simply lie about their achievements. And it becomes obvious only at X X-when their products are still forced to compete with the West in the most competitive of possible markets-on the battlefield.

This is what happened to the S-400 complex. The Russian Hurray-Patriotic press and the creators of the complex promised that it would shoot down Himars, like nuts from a branch. In short, it turned out to be a lie.

S-400 missiles cannot intercept Himars missile for several reasons. Rockets from the S-400 cannot intercept Himars missile for the simple reason that solid fuel of the latter is much more perfect. “She just flies faster,” says Pavel Lusin.

Secondly, Ukrainians in some cases can oversaturate Russian air defense-give too many goals at the same time. “They launch a package of Smerch or Hurricane and simultaneously launch Himars,” says Pavel Lusin.

The third reason, probably, is that the S-400 was created at a time when Igor Ashurbei was the head of Almaz-Antei. This amazing person in perestroika first crushed the Leningrad market under himself, then entered the board of Almaz Antei, whose premises began to lease as a utility room for market warehouses, and then built an all-caping S-400 for Putin. Experienced missilers in conversations with me expressed doubt whether a person who built a career in retail markets in the 1990s can create advanced missiles. Now Mr. Ashurbely is the king (!) Of the space state of Asgardi and, as such, even took the oath in Vienna in the UN mission.

In general, the S-400 King of Asgardia does not knock down Himars, but about which billions were also spent about the Russian electronic warfare, and it is ridiculous to talk. After all, Himars flies by 84 km, and the front stretched for 1400 km. You won’t attack such an area - it’s the same as trying to stop the fire in the taiga, watering it with water from the garden hose.

If in Russia the refrigerator finally lost to the TV, then on the battlefield in the Donbass the TV is equally finally loses to Himarsam.

Heroism and Himars can achieve much more than just heroism.

The main question: what exactly will Putin do when he understands that he is losing? So far, according to Roman Svitan, Russian pilots began to circle in Belarus in the sky, and there they constantly began to notice the A-50 Aviation Complex, the Russian analogue of Avax. At the same time, “Iskander” are pulled to the Belarusian border with Ukraine, which shoot to a depth of 500 km and are clearly designed to shell the deep rear.

“All this is like preparations for a large-scale missile and bombing, including bridges and infrastructure,” says Roman Sydan.