
Inside Russia, as far as one can understand from the outside, among intellectuals who consider it possible to maintain a leading war in one way or another, fierce disputes are undergoing about what new main ideology this state needs. The fears that such an ideology will soon appear also sound in conversations with those representatives of the intelligentsia who do not support the war, although they do not oppose it openly. Arguments explaining why ideology is needed are similar in both camps.
Firstly, the level of losses of Russia and satellites (the so-called DPR and the LPR) in Ukraine either approached the losses of the USSR Armed Forces in the Afghan war, or already exceeded them, including by the number of destroyed senior officers of the Russian Armed Forces. These losses cannot be explained to the “society” with blurry theses about denacification and “anti-Russia”. Something more significant is needed.
Secondly, repressions within the country are growing. Moreover, the political, as the arrests of the rector of the RANEPA, Vladimir Mau and the politician Ilya Yashin, and conditionally “household”, that is, demonstrations against ordinary citizens who opposed the war on social networks or on the streets of their cities. Repressions, supposedly, also need to be tied with a frame that significant for the “society”.
Thirdly, the upcoming structural changes in the lifestyle of Russian citizens. Not just a fall in income, deficiency or similar. In the fall, in Russia, warehouses made by companies that have left the market will run out, from cola to spare parts for cars and elevators. Not only the grocery set will begin to change, but also the way of life, expectations, and even wider - the territory that is inhabited by “society”. This new territory needs a new map, that is, a new ideology.
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