Russia as a new Iran

What will the Kremlin "Eastern turn" give? Discuss Leonid Isaev and Alexander Gabuev

Sergey Medvedev: The war in Ukraine unfolds Russia to the east. China and India have become the largest buyers of Russian energy resources. Russia is going to buy weapons from Iran. What will be brought to the Kremlin "Eastern turn"? Will Russia become a satellite of Beijing? Will it turn into a new giant Iran? With us, Alexander Gabuev , senior researcher of the Carnegie Foundation for the International World , and Leonid Isaev , political scientist-military person.

Video version of the program

Does Moscow focus on Beijing in its main strategic solutions? Was China theoretically able to stop this war?

Alexander Gabuev: China is not able to stop this war, because it has no experience and tools for influencing conflicts even directly on his periphery. Myanmar, North Korea, and so on: there are no examples where China would play a similar constructive role. For China, Ukraine is a peripheral crisis.

Moscow is trying to take into account some Chinese reactions, but this, of course, is not the main guideline for her. Vladimir Vladimirovich has his own ideas about the beautiful, necessary, about the vital interests of the country, and he takes and does. I think China will have a more serious opportunity to influence Russian foreign policy not now, but about five to ten years later, because the trend, which was before the start of the war, consisted in the fact that Russian-Chinese relations are asymmetric, China Russia needed less than Russia needed China. And the negotiation of China is increasing all the time, because it is a growing economy, more technologically complex, one of the global leaders, while Russia is stomping on the spot.

Moscow is trying to take into account some Chinese reactions, but this is not the main guideline for her

After February 24, the number of options that Russia has is sharply reduced: sanctions are affected, the Western oil embargo, which will begin to operate next year, affect. China has a lot of these options. Therefore, the negotiation power will more and more shift in the direction of China, and there will have a lever in China in order to influence Russian foreign policy. But, it seems to me, China will do this only on those issues that directly concern it, but will not get into Russian domestic policy.

Sergey Medvedev: In general, China can be considered as a beneficiary of all this new situation between Russia and the West?

Alexander Gabuev: I think yes. Of course, he would like to live in an ideal world, so that everything is as before. Before Trump, China was given to buy high -tech companies in the West, he could buy oil and gas where he wants, diversify and gradually accumulate power. But since the global situation is changing, including the American-Chinese relations, China is forced to strengthen through partnership with anti-Western orientation countries. Russia simply falls into his hands, because its space for the maneuver is limited. The main alternative to the Western relations are ties with China. And, again, here China still has a lot of cards in the sleeve, and Russia now has much less.

Sergey Medvedev: What is the tone of Chinese discussion regarding the Russian war in Ukraine? I'm not talking about political statements, but about the Chinese academic community, about articles in newspapers on this subject.

Alexander Gabuev: Newspapers and the official position in the media are subject to censorship. Here the war is covered rather from a pro -Russian position, but this is not so much sympathy for Russia as antipathy to America. For China, this is a proxy-war between the country that challenges the American world order, and American satellites-Ukraine plus US partners in NATO. Here, of course, sympathies are more on the Russian side. The Chinese do not really consider any humanitarian dimension and so on: well, war and war, the Americans started how many wars have begun, and in Yemen what does Saudi Arabia create? Therefore, the suffering of civilians are considered as a necessary evil of war.

As for the internal discussion, it is hidden from prying eyes. We can say that the Chinese, judging by the actions, see the benefit in this war. They perfectly understand the American lines and do not intend to cross them. They will not violate primary sanctions, will not supply Russia with military materials and weapons for the needs of the war, however, everything that is not prohibited is not prohibited, the Chinese do, thereby providing support to the Kremlin. Judging by the expert discussion with which I am familiar, the Chinese believe that Putin miscalculated greatly, that strategically, the war does not meet Russian national interests at all, as they would understand them, drives the country to a dead end. They also considered an absolutely illogical operation to join the Crimea if Russia wanted to maintain influence in Ukraine and the space for the geopolitical maneuver between the West and China.

The Chinese will not violate primary sanctions, but all that is not prohibited by sanctions, they do, providing support to the Kremlin

As for the assessment of the military situation, here the Chinese, of course, was striking, how much they diverged with the reality of their idea of the effectiveness of the Russian army. But many analysts made this mistake. Nevertheless, they believe that the long -term adapted goals of Russia can be achieved, that is, Ukraine is defunctional, with a much smaller population and unstable.

For China, the principle of sovereignty is important, because it applies to Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, that is, to those parts of the PRC that are controlled by Beijing, that part of the PRC that is not controlled by bee. And here there is a certain contradiction between what China makes in the South China Sea, and the letter of international law. But for China, this contradiction is not there, he says: "We have a sovereignty over these territories. We simply restore it. And the violation of someone else's sovereignty is bad, because we generally advocate the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter." In this discussion between the right of peoples to self -determination and sovereignty, China, of course, is on the side of sovereignty.

Sergey Medvedev: From this point of view, he should not maintain either Russia's invasion of Ukraine or the event of 2014?

Alexander Gabuev: Absolutely, just as he did not support the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and convinced the SCO partners not to succumb to the influence of Russia and not recognize these territories independent states. But this does not mean at all that he does not support Russia de facto, continuing to buy oil from it or using this situation for its selfish interests. But here, Russia and China have interests: it is important for Russia to receive export revenue, and it is important for China to buy oil somewhere with such a discount. While the balance of interests coincides, countries may well work.

Sergey Medvedev: Leonid Isaev joins us. Putin’s last visit to Iran , a tripartite summit - how much is this a gesture of despair in a very difficult geopolitical situation in which the Russian president found himself? Or is it really the rudiments of a new alliance?

Leonid Isaev: It can hardly be called a gesture of despair. Still, Russia has long been interacting with Turkey and Iran. In recent years, the interaction of the three countries mainly intensified in regional issues. Here we are talking about the fact that the worse Russia's relations with the West, the more Russia is forced to return to the Middle East, to Africa and, accordingly, to develop and deepen its relations, including with countries such as Iran.

Sergey Medvedev: Strategically with this three: Putin, Erdogan, Iran-are there any common interests other than confrontation with the West?

Leonid Isaev: In the short term, we can hardly talk about some Alliance, and even more so about one that, as, probably, Moscow could have opposed the West. Here we are, first of all, about following your national interests. And I would not say that the national interests of Turkey are to contrast themselves with the West, as this would like, for example, Moscow. And I would not say that the Iranians are just as ready to oppose themselves to the West in the long run. The Iranians have negotiations on the SVPD , the Iranian nuclear program. Of course, the probability that they will end well in the near future is not very high. But if suddenly the agreements on the SVPD are resumed, then I doubt that the dialogue between Russia and Iran will also go smoothly. Iran will try to get out of isolation as much as possible and try to use the capabilities that will be presented to him in terms of the abolition of sanctions.

I do not see the formation of a serious block, headed by Russia, which could withstand the West

The interaction of Russia with the countries of the Middle East and, by the way, now with the countries of Africa is largely based not so much on the fact that countries along with Russia to confront the West, but on the fact that Iran, Turkey and many other regions see the most acceptable strategy for diversification of their foreign policy relations. And, of course, it is more profitable for them that the world becomes more multipolar, so that the maximum number of players between whom could be balanced. Therefore, on this basis, I do not see any formation of a serious block at the head, for example, with Russia that could withstand the West. No one wants to spoil relations with the West.

Sergey Medvedev: Sasha, you recently had an interview in the Financial Times called "Russia as a new giant Iran of Eurasia." What did you mean?

Alexander Gabuev: Iran is a metaphor. A lot of similar and dissimilar scenarios. We lived in a closed country called the USSR, it played a completely different role in the international system, much more significant than Russia will play. Nevertheless, the country was internally comparatively stable, it lived for a long time behind the "iron curtain". I do not really see any prerequisites for the fact that the regime is destabilized. Therefore, he is similar and unlike Iranian: people will quite normally live in internal emigration, after more free than in Iran.

On the other hand, yes, it will be more isolated, it will have much fewer external partners. Nevertheless, this regime can create huge problems for its opponents, much larger than Iran, because Iran is working on the creation of a nuclear bomb, and Russia has it in the same amount as the Americans, and there is much more. Therefore, the deterrent of Russia for the Western world will turn into the basis of security, and we will return to a partly familiar scenario, but with some innovations of the 21st century.

Sergey Medvedev: In this sense, we can say that Russia, Iran, North Korea have similar strategies: I would say, trade in fear, the capitalization of the risks that the country can create?

Alexander Gabuev: Russia has much more self -sufficiency, unlike Iran and North Korea. Yes, we will have a much more primitive economy than it could be if it had not happened on February 24 and 2014. This will be the economy more simply arranged, a country more based on suppression and violence mode than on economic prosperity and, nevertheless, quite stable and self -sufficient. Fear will occur simply because Russia considers itself an opponent of the West and poses a threat, so it will be an object of deterrent.

Sergey Medvedev: Leonid, there are parallels for you, do you see Russia as a kind of Orthodox Iran?

The deterrence of Russia for the Western world will turn into the basis of security

Leonid Isaev: The country can be under sanctions for a long time: yes, in this regard I see. True, Russia a priori will pay much more attention than Iran, and many things that, even being under sanctions, allowed themselves to do Iran, Russia will not be allowed. On the other hand, Iran can still be isolated, and Russia is so difficult enough. Firstly, she has a place in the UN Security Council. Secondly, Russia is much more self-sufficient than Iran. Thirdly, Russia nevertheless, unlike Iran, is quite attractive to many states, especially in Asia and Africa, especially the narrative of the stability that it now carries. The narrative of the prevalence of security over reforms, and in democratization is in demand among many authoritarian regimes. I do not see Russia, at least now, as non -browning in Asia and Africa, as Iran could be. Russia has much more opportunities for maneuver and confrontation of this international sanctions pressure.

Sergey Medvedev: The war in Ukraine slightly shifted the focus from China. Now Russia is becoming an archivist for the United States, and China, using this window of capabilities, can intensify its activities, say, its military preparations in relation to Taiwan. Will he use this situation?

Alexander Gabuev: With Taiwan, I think, a basic preference in Beijing is still a peaceful integration. It is necessary to put the gun on the table, the gun should be really threatening, but to spread the island and receive the answer ... Taiwan’s capture will be absolutely not easy walking: thousands will die, if not tens of thousands of people, and this will push the world to very serious economic consequences. China, of course, does not want this. The question is how much the leaders in Beijing see that they still have a window of opportunities to solve the problem with the world on acceptable conditions.

The worst thing that can happen is if, for several weeks or months, Xi Jinpin comes to the idea: “One way or another, the Americans will continue to do what they are doing, so we need to prepare the Taiwanese problem in the foreseeable future, and if we have to solve it with the help of a military operation, well, that we have no other choice.”

Sergey Medvedev: I am listening to you, and in my head the system of argumentation of Putin in recent years in relation to Ukraine is scrolling in my head. There is parallelism here: Russia - Ukraine, China - Taiwan?

Alexander Gabuev: Yes, it looks like in this regard. The return of Taiwan and resentification are huge drivers of Chinese foreign policy. Since in recent decades the Chinese have convinced themselves through the school system and so on that the "centenary of humiliation" will not end until Taiwan completely return to the bosom of the country, they themselves drive themselves to a strategic trap.

There are parallels with Russia. If you think that Russia cannot be a great power without Ukraine, then you, one way or another, are forced to fight for it. You can ask a question: why do we need control over Ukraine, how should it look, how real it is in the country, which is already 30 years old and where the elite wants to have its own country, and not to be the Kremlin’s vassal? Since all these questions were not asked, there was no public discussion in Russia that would affect foreign policy, and we found ourselves in the situation in which we found ourselves.

Taiwan's return and resentification are huge drivers of Chinese foreign policy

Sergey Medvedev: Does the war in Ukraine feed these sentiments? If Russia does this, then why not do this to China?

Alexander Gabuev: I think China looks at it much more pragmatically, looks at the fact that Russia will be, will win this war or not, what is meant by winning and what price the West can make it pay. All these issues are open. China, as a system that loves to study someone else's experience, will continue to study this study and implement something from this into its policy.

Sergey Medvedev: It seems that Russia, which dreams of turning to the east and hopes, having lost allies in the West, to find them in the east, is very deeply mistaken: new strong competitors await it there.