Life on the outskirts of China

Kitaevist journalist Alexander Gabuev published in Foreign Affairs an article by China's New Vassal. Here are the main theses:

China is one of the main beneficiaries of what is happening. Beijing <...> quickly adapted and took a comfortable sitting position not even on the fence, but on the Great Chinese wall: “Russia is a friend, but also Ukraine. We respect international law, Crimea - Ukrainian, DPR and LPR do not recognize. We are for the world, but we will not be intermediaries - well, we can sometimes call the Kremlin and talk how aggressive US is to blame for all world crises. At the same time, the sanctions of the West are illegitimate and destructive, but we observe them. Everything that sanctions are not directly prohibited, then we will do - if the price is suitable and risks are acceptable. ”

The Chinese are suitable for compliance with sanctions very carefully, so no “help” in the short horizon of Russia should not be expected. But at the same time, Beijing builds up the purchases of raw materials in the Russian Federation, rejoicing in discounts, and is preparing to gradually occupy niches released in the Russian market - import from the PRC for the first 7 months has grown (+5.2%), while imports from the EU are sharply reduced (although some of the flows, obviously, simply goes through Turkey and other countries). There is no directly investing in the Russian Federation in the Russian Federation. < ... >

On the horizon of 5-10 years, you can imagine a scenario in which over half of Russian foreign trade will account for China. The PRC will be both the largest market for raw materials and the main external source of some industrial products and technologies (and as a result, possibly, technical standards). Considering that after the termination of energy trading with the EU, Russia has practically no long -term alternatives (trade with India will not be, although growth from a low base this year is impressive), China’s negotiation position will significantly intensify. < ... >

Of course, Russia will not be the “vassal” of China and retain a large share of independence - after all, even foreign and domestic policy, Peking does not fully control the much weaker DPRK. But the strategic independence of the Russian Federation <...> will be reduced in favor of Beijing, and the Kremlin will not mind - after all, the strengthening of China with Russian resources, albeit on more favorable PRCs, will be considered in the context of the confrontation with the United States.