The post-Kadyrov mirage

North Caucasus analyst Harold Chambers connects rumors about Chechnya’s dictator getting a new job to a years-long conflict between Grozny and Russia’s security elites

By Harold Chambers (@chambersharold8)

Last weekend, the head of Russia’s Chechen Republic teased his 2.4-million-person Telegram audience with a 98-second selfie video, where he pointed out that he’s now Russia’s longest-serving governor and remarked (not for the first time) that he’s “overstayed his welcome.” Ramzan Kadyrov soon walked back those comments, but the short clip occasioned another round of speculation about what might be next for Chechnya’s ruler. In a guest essay for Meduza, political and security analyst Harold Chambers explores what could become of the Kadyrov regime.

In a video shared late at night on September 3, the Putin-installed warlord of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, supposedly announced his retirement as the republic’s governor. The clip instantly sparked an onslaught of incredulity and attempts to rationalize his surprise “indefinite vacation.” Three days later, Kadyrov reneged on his declaration, claiming he was simply gauging public opinion with his prior statement.

Kadyrov’s history of hinting at his own retirement demonstrates the unreliability of these pronouncements. He’s spoken about stepping down many times before, raising the issue in 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2019, and denying rumors in early 2020 — all while remaining in office.

Shortly after last Saturday’s video was posted, three different sources confirmed Kadyrov’s impending departure to journalists at Meduza and Vyorstka. These informants — reportedly close to the presidential administration, the Defense Ministry, and the Federation Council — explained that Chechnya’s long-time ruler would be transferring to the leadership of Rosgvardia (Russia’s National Guard) and eventually replacing Director Viktor Zolotov. Adam Delimkhanov, Kadyrov’s cousin currently serving as in the State Duma, would supposedly step in as the Chechen Republic’s acting head.

Considering the excellent sourcing of these outlets, it is clear which narrative appears more reliable and worth considering.

Kadyrov’s departure as governor would certainly be an unexpected consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Realistically, the end of his tenure is several years away at the earliest, when his eldest son could be ready to take his place.

This personnel shift would have several implications, reverberating through Russia’s political establishment, threatening the Rosgvardia’s organizational cohesiveness, and accelerating the bureaucratic transition in Chechnya.

If Kadyrov is ever promoted to federal office, it would suggest Putin’s dissatisfaction with his top elites. The Russian president’s close, frequently characterized as paternal, relationship with the Chechen warlord exceeds his trust in other senior Kremlin officials. This has previously been evident in the broad autonomy given to Kadyrov at others’ expense. The closeness of the Kadyrov–Putin relationship, and Kadyrov’s resulting brazenness, has alienated the Chechen leader from others in the ruling class.

Russia’s renewed invasion in February, however, allowed Kadyrov’s administration to launder its reputation among federal politicians. Duma members and presidential officials now commend the actions of Chechnya’s leadership. This improved reception of Chechen officials has likely been forced, with the order coming from the very top. Whether and how such a reaction can be sustained under increased interaction is questionable, as Kadyrov and his subordinates have never been popular nationally. This dislike is even stronger in Russia’s security services.

Inside Russia’s National guard, the kadyrovtsy (forces loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov, mostly national guardsmen) are an explosive element; expanding their involvement (in senior positions no less) would risk destabilizing the entire organization. Though Kadyrov was promoted to the rank of Rosgvardia lieutenant-general while his forces struggled to take the Azovstal metallurgy plant in Mariupol, he’s widely viewed as never having been a real commander — a reality symbolically reflected in his Prada combat boots.

Inserting Kadyrov into the National Guard’s leadership would also give him an opportunity at last to co-opt many of the senior security officials who have opposed him since he replaced Alu Alkhanov as Chechnya’s president in 2007. Much of this bad blood goes back even further to the Second Chechen War, when federal security officials served as patrons for the different Chechen warlords allied with Russia. By eliminating the other paramilitary leaders, Kadyrov alienated their patrons.

Today, adversaries in the federal security agencies pose the greatest danger to Kadyrov’s survival in a post-Putin Russia, making it vital for him to neutralize this threat.

Should Kadyrov advance in the National Guard, he would likely promote Generals Alibek and Sharip Delimkhanov, who currently hold senior positions in the North Caucasian and Chechen Rosgvardia branches, respectively. This move would ensure that he has some trusted henchmen to aid him while he navigates new, turbulent waters.

Even before the February invasion, Kadyrov’s personal army had alienated itself from fellow national guardsmen. In 2021, for example, several kadyrovtsy tried to cheat their way to crimson berets, the Rosgvardia’s elite status symbol. After the attempt led to a brawl, and one of Kadyrov’s foundations rewarded the cheaters with Mercedes cars. In response to the scandal, the National Guard changed its testing environment by adding video recording.

Throughout Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine, there has been almost constant friction between Chechen Rosgvardia troops and their compatriots, in no small part due to the fact that Chechen national guardsmen have been tasked with preventing desertions. In other words, they’re under orders to shoot their fellow combatants. There are also numerous reports of alleged clashes between kadyrovtsy and Buryat troops over looting rights. When they’re not targeting their fellow countrymen, Kadyrov’s forces have allegedly sat back and done nothing at all, leaving the difficult fighting to others.

Suffice it to say, Kadyrov and his army are disliked among both the Rosgvardia leadership and the rank-and-file.

If more of Kadyrov’s troops enter the National Guard’s senior positions, the repression practices normalized in Chechnya will gradually spread, becoming more common and severe nationwide. The North Caucasus has long served as a testing ground for different strategies to oppress the general public, partly because many Russians dismiss the region and its problems.

Changing the status of Ramzan Kadyrov and Adam Delimkhanov would cause a domino effect of replacements throughout the Chechen government, accelerating a transitionary period already in motion. While the new generation of bureaucrats, comprised of the children of senior officials, isn’t yet ready to take office, the middle generation already at work will advance.

At the center of this advancement is not Chechnya’s governorship but Adam Delimkhanov’s seat in the State Duma — a crucial role in terms of both seniority and the informal responsibility of serving as an intermediary with the federal authorities.

The Kadyrov regime highly prizes the capacity to self-regulate ambition, which is why Delimkhanov’s position would likely be awarded to a subordinate, senior official like Chechen Parliament Speaker Magomed Daudov or “Akhmat” Special Rapid Deployment Force Commander Abuzaid Vismuradov.

Filling either Daudov’s or Vismuradov’s shoes would not be hard. Grozny Mayor Khas-Magomed Kadyrov and presidential advisor Umar Daudov — both young and loyal officials — are clear candidates for parliamentary speaker. “Akhmat” Deputy Commander Saidi Lorsankaev could succeed Vismuradov, as he has taken on increasing responsibility during the Ukraine invasion (even leading the “Yug” Battalion). Down the line, it would be even easier to find replacements for the positions vacated by this reshuffling.

The final, overarching question about moving Kadyrov to the National Guard is whether it would destabilize Chechnya itself. The risk is likely low because Kadyrov would presumably stay in Chechnya and travel to Moscow only when required, which is what he does already.

If he sheds his title as governor, Ramzan Kadyrov would retain powerful influence over local affairs. Even amid the rumors about his transfer, Kadyrov has remained fixated on dangers at home, signaling concerns about the recent reports of renewed insurgency. Whatever happens, his hold over Chechnya isn’t going anywhere.

Guest essay by Harold Chambers