‘Almost impossible to turn down’

How working in Ukraine’s occupied territories has become some Russian career officials' best shot at upward mobility

Story by Andrey Pertsev.Translation by Sam Breazeale.

For Russia to sell its official narrative about the war in Ukraine, it needs Ukrainian defectors to take high-ranking positions in its occupation governments. But the Kremlin has reasons to want a certain number of posts filled by Russians, too. Since patriotism alone is evidently not a strong enough force to convince Russian officials to move to Ukraine, the Kremlin often sweetens the deal with exorbitant salaries — and makes it clear the officials have stagnant careers to look forward to if they refuse. Meduza's Andrey Pertsev explains how moving to Ukraine became some bureaucrats' best option.

Since the start of summer 2022, an increasing number of Russian officials have been moving to Ukraine to fill government posts both in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” and in the “military civil administrations” in other occupied territories. And according to sources close to the Putin administration, there are more to come.

By Meduza’s estimates, more of these outsiders have come to work in the “DNR” than in any other occupied territory. Russia recently sent six officials to fill posts in the self-proclaimed republic’s government in a single day. The head of the “DNR” cabinet of ministers, for example, is Vitaly Khotsenko, who formerly served as a department head in Russia's Industry and Trade Ministry. His second-in-command is Yevgeny Solntsev, who previously worked as adviser to Russia's Construction, Housing and Utilities Minister. The “republic’s” education minister is Olga Koludarova, a former Russian Education Ministry official.

The number of Russians in the “LNR” government is slightly lower. The cabinet of ministers is led by Sergey Kozlov, who served in Ukraine’s State Emergency Service before defecting. Kozlov’s deputy is Vasily Kuznetsov, who previously served as the vice governor for Russia’s Kurgan region, and the "LNR" education minister is former Sevastopol University Vice Rector Ivan Kusov, who used to teach at Moscow State University.

Russians are being appointed to lower-ranking posts as well. For example, Ilya Bubnov, the deputy head of United Russia’s executive committee in Omsk, has been named Sports Minister in the “DNR,” while Alexander Kostomarov, formerly a vice governor in both the Lipetsk and Ulyanovsk regions, is the “DNR” government’s deputy chief of staff.

In recent weeks, as Russia has prepared to hold referendums on the Donbas “people’s republics” becoming part of Russia, appointments of former Russian officials to posts in the occupied territories have become more common. On August 18 alone, Vitaly Khotsenko appointed five Russian officials to various positions in the “DNR.” Khotsenko told TASS:

We’re strengthening our ties with Russia, so our key task is to ensure that the norms that have historically developed in the Russian Federation start to take effect here as well. And to get integrated into this system quickly and painlessly, we need experienced managers who have already gone through this process in Russia.

The Russian-backed administrations in the occupied parts of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv regions also contain Russian officials. For example, Anton Koltsov, the former vice governor of Russia’s Vologda region, has been named “prime minister” of the Zaporizhzhia region, while Sergey Eliseyev, former First Deputy Prime Minister of the Kaliningrad region, is heading Russia’s administration in the Kherson region. In the Kharkiv region, the Kremlin has declared former Krasnodar mayor Andrey Alekseyenko in charge. Koltsov and Eliseyev’s appointments were never officially announced, though Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov revealed Alekseyenko’s career change two days before the news was made official.

According to two sources close to the Putin administration, the heads of the occupied territories are chosen directly by the administration’s political bloc itself, while candidates for lower-ranking posts are chosen by presidential envoys.

The sources told Meduza that most of the candidates are chosen from the “school for governors” — a Kremlin and Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) program for training a personnel reserve — or from the pool of former “Leaders of Russia'' contest participants. Both the school and the contest were created at the initiative of First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko, who became Putin’s Donbas czar after the start of the full-scale war. According to two sources close to the Kremlin, Kiriyenko is eager to show that his projects are helping the Russian authorities “assimilate” the new territories.

Meduza’s sources said that turning down an offer from the Kremlin to work in Ukraine’s occupied territories is “almost impossible.” “One of the [government] heads currently working there didn’t really want to go, but it was quickly made clear to him that his chances of achieving future career growth were falling rapidly, and he got the message.”

The sources also noted that the Donbas positions are generally given to officials who are “motivated in their career” and who are counting on ascending Russia’s power vertical as quickly as possible in the future.

At the same time, the Kremlin isn’t just using the prospect of career growth to motivate the officials — it’s also using money. Two sources close to the Putin administration told Meduza that officials in Ukraine’s occupied territories can earn two to three times as much as they would in Russia. “For a mid-tier official at the level of a regional minister, the pay can be around 500,000 rubles (about $8,160) [a month]. Some especially valuable officials might be offered salaries of over a million [rubles] (about $16,320).

In addition to the “outsiders” going to Ukraine’s occupied territories to serve indefinitely, Russia has also tapped “shift workers," or Kremlin officials sent to the occupied territories for temporary assignments rather than for permanent positions. Their job is to “keep an eye on” the local officials working on the municipal level.

According to sources close to the Kremlin, this is usually done by officials from the regions that have taken "patronage" over each occupied territory; St. Petersburg officials, for example, are sent to Mariupol. Officials who take these temporary assignments are paid twice their regular salaries while in Ukraine.

Meduza’s sources said that the Kremlin doesn't plan to stop sending Russian officials to the occupied Ukrainian territories anytime soon. They cited two reasons:

• The Russian authorities don’t want to entrust the large amounts of money allocated for reconstructing the Ukrainian cities that have been destroyed by the Russian army to local officials.
• Many local residents don’t want to work for the occupation authorities — or, as Meduza’s sources claim, they’re afraid Ukraine will “find and punish them” for it.

Sources close to the Putin administration told Meduza that after the planned referendums, “all of the local heads and most of the ministers will be replaced” — including “LNR” head Leonid Pasechnik and “DNR” head Denis Pushilin.

The occupation authorities in Ukraine’s Kherson and Zaporizhzhia territories did not respond to Meduza’s requests for comment. Nor did the governments of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.”

Story by Andrey Pertsev

Translation by Sam Breazeale