Putin-Collectiveman

Does not want Brezhnev, it cannot like Stalin

The defeat in the Kharkov region did not become the first great failure of the regime in the current war - it was a battle for Kyiv, lost back in March. The incompetence of the highest military leadership became obvious in the early days of the invasion. But even in his seventh month, the military minister and the head of the General Staff were not dismissed and even hore the ruler under the television cameras.

The security of Shoigu and Gerasimov, as well as the generals who advanced under their leadership, was obvious before the war. Putin was one of the few who did not know about it. But he is now aware of the progress of military operations and as the head of the regime is acutely interested in the leaders who are able to achieve successes. The livestock cleaning of the army leadership has long been ripened. However, it is still not. Only individual bosses are replaced, and, moreover, not the upper level.

It turns out strange.

Such a sacred, such long -estimated Putin war is completely different from what it is planned. And the leader, who has a reputation as a picky controller who is strokeing in all the details, puts up with the mediocrity of the closest subordinates.

References to negative selection and incompetence of all possible nominees explain the lethargy of the ruler only partially. Stalin, also surrounded by the end of the 1930s, initial generals, behaved very differently when he buried. The Finnish campaign of 1939-1940, which is often compared with the current attack on Ukraine, also began with a complete failure of a pre-drawn up plan. But a month later, a fool and Pustozhon Voroshilov (the then analogue of Shoigu) were removed from the leadership of the operation and Tymoshenko was nominated. He led the war to partial success and was made to the People's Commissar of Defense instead of his crushing chef. Less than six months passed between the beginning of the invasion of Finland and this purpose. Compare with "personnel stability" now.

Then, in the war with Germany, Tymoshenko failed and was pushed away in 1942, after the defeat near Kharkov. That is, in critical moments of Stalin’s manipulation, this leading frame, like all other ones, was determined by their professional successes and failures. The highest military power of the dictator was preserved as an inevitable evil, but at the same time he tried to put forward performers who could correct his mistakes. The cult of mediocrity bloomed only in peacetime.

For decades, Putin did not punish his subordinates for incompetence. This has become his business card.

Since time immemorial, Alexei Miller has been working as the head of Gazprom. Even his hottest sympathizers do not find professional virtues in him.

Twelve years, from 2008 to 2020, the Zitrezident, and then Dmitry Medvedev served as the ZICPREMER. Deprived of the abilities of the organizer and not having authority among bureaucrats, he held on the highest posts even when there was no need for his services. Putin still holds this political insect as if as a sign that business qualities for dignitaries do not matter his regime.

In fact, in one section they still matter. The ruler forgives their presence to former system liberals and other technocrats, ensuring the operation of complex control sectors from Sberblon to the Ministry of Finance. Apparently respects the incomprehensible.

But here, even if not to be, then it is a failure. The head of the Central Bank Nabiullina could convert in advance the gold and foreign exchange reserves in Yuan and Rupia and in this way to avoid the arrest of three hundred billion dollars and the euro. Of course, by an honest account, she is not to blame. After all, she was not warned of a big war. She imagined that some kind of not particularly large “operation” ahead, not entailing super-sankers. Only Putin does not reason by honest account.

In his eyes, the fact that she did not show vigilance is a powerful failure. But in February, he forgave her, as Shoigu forgives now over and over again. The question is, how long is this possible.

They say that since the beginning of the war, all links began to demand competence from officials. In the sense in which the upper authorities understand it, that is, so that they are sitting down to convince him that they “cope”. But there are no purges of the apparatus from “non -established” even now. The case is still reduced to the transition to the open stage of the inter -plane gear, as well as to the exposure of each other in insufficient fury and secret pacifism, as was manifested in the discussion of Prigogine with Beglov.

For more than twenty -odd Putin's years, the whole machine of power was used to a calm, reckless and irresponsible life, received as a reward for soullessness and lyzostanism. She was used to seeing Putin as a guarantor of these benefits. To sacrifice yourself and “cope” is something unusual and terrible for her. And the leader to master a new image when the eighth ten comes up, apparently also scary: suddenly it will not come out or, worse, something unexpected will turn out? Therefore, hesitates with cleaning, which would have to be started with the "non -established" generals.

Imagine the heated, accustomed to idle nomenclature of the Brezhnev era, which sees Stalin's shadow over it. The regime raised by Brezhnev at the end of his existence renounced the foundations of his founder that fell into the insanity, broke into the Afghan adventure and eventually collapsed. Something similar is planned now, but perhaps even less predictable consequences. In the third ten years of reign, Putin fulfilled his hidden dream and tries to fight and rule as Stalin, but at the same time having a civilian and military apparatus at the disposal of Brezhnevsky, and not owning the Stalinist technique of manipulation and terror. We wish that at least he did not master this.