
According to the latest data from Rosstat , in the III quarter of 2022, the average amount of cash income of the Russian amounted to 46,025 rubles per month. Thus, the real disposable income of people (minus the obligatory payments adjusted for inflation) decreased by 3.4% compared to the same period of 2021. At the same time, the decrease in income in July - September accelerated relative to the II quarter of the year: then it was minus 0.8%. In the first quarter, income decreased by 1.2%, in 9 months of the year - by 1.7% more than 2022.
Not everything is so bad, the Central Bank could object, which published "the main directions of the Unified State Monetary Policy for 2023 and the period 2024 and 2025." In this strategic document, the financial regulator explains its approaches to the implementation of monetary policy, and also presents the basic and alternative scenarios for the development of the economy for the next three years.
So, the basic scenario of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation promises the economy the rise next year. Moreover, this rise will provide precisely the growth of people's consumption.
According to the basic scenario of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, “according to the results of 2022, the reduction in GDP will be 3-3.5%. In 2023, the economy will be reduced by 1–4%, while in the IV quarter of 2023 a small increase will be observed, up to 1.5% in annual terms. In 2024, the recovery growth will continue, the increase in the IV quarter will be 0.5–1.5% in annual terms. In 2025, the economic growth rate was stabilized in the range of 1.5–2.5%. ”
This is very interesting, because only three months ago the Central Bank looked at the economy much less optimistic. In the project “The main directions of the unified state monetary policy for 2023 and the period 2024 and 2025,” published on August 11, 2022, the forecast was much more tough:
“The reduction in GDP will be 4-6%. In 2023, the economy will be reduced by 1–4%, reflecting the effect of the 1st quarter of 2022 and a more stretched output. At the same time, in the IV quarter of 2023, the economy will grow by 1.0–2.5%. In 2024, recovery growth will continue, the increase in the IV quarter will be 1.0–2.0% in annual terms. In 2025, the economy will return to the potential growth rate. ”
That is, against the background of “strengthening geopolitical tension”, “partial mobilization”, the prospects for “reduction of oil and gas revenues” the financial regulator saw some kind of economic growth factor, and significant.
What will become this growth driver that will support the economy?
You will not believe - household consumption.
According to the “Basic Scenario”, voiced by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in the project of August 11, “... the final consumption of households in 2022 will be reduced by 4.5–6.5%. In annual terms, moderate growth will begin in the III quarter of 2023, but in general, according to the results of 2023, a decline will still be recorded up to 3%. In 2022–2023, restrained growth rates will be associated with the ongoing adjustment of consumption to new conditions, which can be expressed in higher volumes of savings. ”
But the “basic scenario”, presented by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on November 2, already suggests that “... the costs of final consumption of households in 2022 will be reduced by 0.5–2.5% in annual terms. Moderate growth will begin in the second half of 2023, but in general, according to the results of 2023, a decline of up to 3%will still be recorded. ”
Of course, consumption, which decreased by 2%, and consumption, which decreased by 6%, is “two big differences”. The optimism of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, which promises the economy, is also clear. People will spend more - it means that everything will be fine.
However, not quite. People will spend, but the business will not invest. With difficulty everything is clear, but capital behaves completely differently. In relation to business behavior, the “basic scenarios” of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation suggest, let’s say, the opposite situation.
If in the August “basic scenario” the Central Bank of the Russian Federation reports that “... gross accumulation of fixed capital (NNC) in 2022 will be reduced by 3.5–7.5%. The main factor that supports the NNC in 2022 is additional budgetary expenses of a capital nature. In the future, the influence of this factor will decrease. In 2023, the decline in the NNC will be from 4.5 to 0.5% -investments will be restored more slowly than consumer demand, including due to a slower, compared with consumer, actual restoration of investment and intermediate imports. Unlike households, companies need more time to search for new suppliers of high -tech products, the formation of new technological partnerships. In 2024–2025, the growth rate of NNC will grow by a pace of 1.5–3.5%, ”then in the November“ Basic Forecast Scenarios ”the Central Bank of the Russian Federation involves a completely different business behavior:“ ... the gross accumulation of fixed capital in 2022 will practically not change regarding the level of 2021. The previously approved investment projects and additional budgetary expenses of a capital nature kept the NNC from the reduction. However , already in 2023, the reduction in the NNC can reach 3-7%-against the background of the uncertainty of 2022, many investment projects are adjusted for subsequent years, and the budget support factor will play a smaller role due to the gradual consolidation process. In 2024, the NNC will grow a restoration pace against the background of an increasingly stable restructuring of the Russian economy and in 2025 will stabilize in the range of 1-3%. ”
Translated into Russian - in 2022, budget expenditures replaced private investments, but in 2023 this will no longer happen, on the contrary, investments can be reduced, and significantly, while consumer demand will be maintained.
And what happens when investments do not have time for demand? That's right: either a deficit, or price increases.

A comparison of two “basic scenarios” of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation - August and Noyabrsky - illustrates the whole essence of the “structural transformation of the economy”, which is based on the launch of extremal taxation mechanisms - or “replacing” capital labor.
This replacement will be carried out in several ways:
This, in fact, is a tax increase;
Payment of “natural tax” - an increase in the operation of labor resources (“mobilization”). If you reduce the real incomes of people - this is the same as you are taxing them with an additional tax;
The situation of “economic uncertainty” provoking people to accumulate savings, and business to refuse investment. She, in principle, is also in the interests of the authorities, neatly dismantle the “consumer economy”, so that financial, material and labor resources are not distracted by all sorts of cars/jeans/toys there, let people carry money to the bank, and they will deal with them further!
Why does the government do this?
The authorities really want “transformation and modernization”, but ... does not want to do it at his own expense.
The economy of the Russian Federation is stomping on the spot for ten years now, Push GDP and consumption are not growing. The most rich Russians were in 2013. Then 4 years in a row was a collapse of income - in a total of 8.4%. In 2017–2019, their weak recovery, interrupted by a quarantine crisis, was outlined. And this year we again return to minimal levels.
And all this is explainable. The government perfectly understands that the growth of per capita GDP and the growth of people's incomes lead to the fact that people receive a resource that allows them to depend less on the authorities. Therefore, 10 years ago, growth was deliberately “frozen”.
But then another problem arose. If the per capita GDP is below some threshold (this threshold is different for different economies), then savings in the economy will not be enough to start rapid growth. And without an influx of capital from outside, stagnation is guaranteed to the economy. But the authorities now cannot count on the influx of capital. But she expects to “take” from people some additional resources “in accumulation” and use them in their interests.
Why is the authorities sure that everything will succeed?
Because it has already been! It was on this that "Stalin's industrialization" held on.
In the early 1920s, economist Yevgeny Preobrazhensky even formulated the "Law of the original socialist accumulation." In the idea of Preobrazhensky, the savings necessary for investment in industry development should be mobilized in the state budget through a decrease in the consumption of peasants. Why were the peasants had to put up with this? Therefore, Preobrazhensky argued that after the revolution the standard of living of the village grew up and a temporary return to the pre -revolutionary level will not be great injustice.
And now the authorities are arguing the same way: they lived more or less satisfying for 20 years-well, enough, and there is still far from a decrease in the standard of living for the 90th.
In the 1920s, it was supposed to overplay the peasants “tribute” (there was such a Stalinist expression) through transfer prices and current taxes (the state buys agricultural products cheaply, sells industrial goods expensive).
In the 2020s, from the point of view of macroeconomics, the government does the same: “state entrepreneur” buys your work “cheap” (cheaper than he could cost the market without “economic uncertainty”), and “goods of a domestic manufacturer” offers to buy you expensive.
What will happen?
In the 1920s, peasants responded with a reduction in sown areas and bread production.
In the 2020s, people respond to the authorities ... by a decrease in economic activity.
Statistics for September showed that after two relatively good months (July - August), the economy turned down again in September. The fall in GDP in September amounted to –5% of the gg. The reason for the weaker results was the failure of consumer demand (the effects of partial mobilization/emigration), as well as the weak results in the manufacturing industry, were manifested. According to the results of the third quarter of the Ministry of Economic Development, GDP is evaluated by Minus 4%.
At the same time, the official forecast of the Ministry of Economic Development of Annual GDP is minus 2.9% a year by the year.
To “meet” this forecast, the economy in the IV quarter should begin to grow, and it is impossible to wait, to put it mildly, to say this.
Why is it important?
Because budget revenues are calculated based on the forecast of the Ministry of Economic Development.
If the decline in the economy is more than 2.9%, then the budget revenues will be less, and the budget deficit will increase in comparison with calculations.
And this money will have to be taken somewhere (more precisely, from someone). And who could it be?