Translated material
What is behind Russia's refusal to dialogue with the United States in nuclear weapons. Explains the military observer Alexander Golts
Trident II missile launch from the American submarine
US Navy/Global Look Press
Remember the old joke about the diplomat and girl? About the fact that if the diplomat says no, this is not a diplomat. Recently, the Russian Foreign Ministry defiantly said no. Just a few hours before the start of consultations with the United States appointed on November 29, the Russian side defiantly refused to participate in them. I must say that the date, place, and the agenda of these consultations for a long time and in detail were discussed by representatives of Moscow and Washington. So, the Russian side rejected Geneva, who was already familiar as the place of meetings with the Americans, considering Switzerland not enough friendly. As a result, Cairo was elected. It was no coincidence that the negotiations should have been occupied for a whole week. The parties have accumulated many complaints to each other.
Problems have accumulated
Judging by the media reports, the Americans intended to concentrate on the topic of inspections of nuclear weapons and its carriers. The fact is that in August, Moscow unilaterally refused to resume such inspections that were previously suspended due to Covid. After the start of the “special military operation” in Ukraine and the follow -up of Western sanctions, the normal air offense of Russia with the United States was discontinued, European countries closed their airspace for flying Russian aircraft, problems arose with obtaining transit visas for inspection groups and flight crews, as well as difficulties in making payments for services during inspections. All this, according to Moscow, made it impossible to conduct inspections in American territory. And, therefore, the inspectors from the United States have nothing to do in Russia.
However, in the context of the current unprecedented military-political crisis, Washington clearly would like to receive the maximum amount of information about the state of Russian nuclear forces. Moscow also has its concern. For several years, domestic diplomats have been in doubt about the integrity of the American “conversion” of nuclear weapons. I must say that the DNSV, in principle, resolves the re -equipment of strategic bombers and atomic submarines for ordinary ammunition and their withdrawal from the general shift. Currently, the Americans consider 41 heavy B-52N bomber, 56 launcher installations of ballistic missiles on submarines (BRP) Trident II, as well as four MBR launchers designed for training and renamed training mines.
B-52H
Airman 1st Class Zachary Wright / Keystone Press Agency / Global Look Press
“The Russian side cannot confirm the bringing of these strategic offensive weapons to a state unsuitable for the use of nuclear weapons of heavy bombers and the BPL, as provided for ... and also objects against the arbitrary retraining of the MBR ShPU, in the“ Training Mine category ”not provided for by the agreement,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said . The irony lies in the fact that the most effective way to remove these Russian concern is just to conduct inspections (18 per year), which Moscow itself stopped, announcing their implementation impossible.
It would seem that if Russia is so preoccupied with possible American violations of the contract, then consultations gave the perfect opportunity to get the required guarantees from the United States for the full resumption of inspections and, therefore, the final clarification of the truth. And literally on the eve of the consultations, Moscow transfers them for an indefinite period (from the same old joke: if the diplomat says “maybe”, this means “no”).
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