Why aren't we leaving?

In order not to miss the main materials of "Cold", subscribe to our instagram and telegram .

First stage: those who left in the spring

This project started in the spring. In early April, I decided to talk to those who left Russia after February 24 and recorded 60 interviews with 26 men and 34 women. Most of them (37 people out of 60) noted that they had not thought about emigration before. The Putin regime for them in recent years was difficult, but quite tolerable, but in the new situation they could not stay in Russia.

They called their decision “ sudden”, “impulsive ”, “ expressive ”, talked about unfulfilled plans: “ No, I never thought about leaving ” ; " I was shocked "; “ I had plans to go to the Bolshoi Theater, and then everything was planned out ” - these are the typical answers of my respondents.

Even from this unrepresentative sample, it is clear that new emigrants differ from those who left in previous years in a number of ways. First, by the nature of emigration. Was: the desire to move to another country. It became: the desire to leave Russia. Secondly, according to the geography of departure. It was: USA, EU countries. It became: Armenia, Georgia, Türkiye, Israel. At the same time, in the past, the desires and possibilities of choosing a country basically coincided. Now - basically do not match. Another important factor is having arrangements to work or study in a new country. It was almost everyone. It has become: almost no one (with the exception of employees of relocated companies, mainly in the IT sector). Hence the changes in the dynamics of social status and income. It was: the desire to improve them. It has become: the desire to maintain or reduce is not very significant.

Finally, I was interested in how the intention to return to Russia is changing among those who have left. According to studies, those who emigrated before 2014 named Russia as one of the countries of their choice, depending on their career prospects. From 2014 until February 24, 2022, they wanted to come to Russia for various purposes, but mostly for a while. Today: it is worth returning to Russia only after the end of hostilities.

Those who left in the spring called the closure of borders and general mobilization their main fears.

Second stage: remaining in the spring

After completing this project (which turned out to be only a stage of the project), I realized that the majority of people from the group I was studying, let's call it " well-educated dissenters", still remain in Russia, and I decided to conduct a new survey . Not an interview, but a survey. I published a questionnaire on social networks, and in a day and a half, 500 people filled it out. It was clear that those who remained felt unrepresented in the public arena, isolated and unheard. They are under pressure from various actors in the socio-political process, they are looking for opportunities to speak out and find people like them - it is no coincidence that most of the study participants left their email address so that I could send the results of the survey to it. They wanted to compare their thoughts with those of people who hold close political views.

In their reactions to the outbreak of hostilities, the remaining did not differ from those who left: most often they experienced fear, shock, confusion, bewilderment and anger. Less than half of the respondents were firmly convinced that they would not leave Russia under any circumstances, many did not rule out the possibility of leaving or considered it highly probable.

Respondents believed that they could do a lot of useful things for Russia by staying at home: express their political views, participate in peaceful protests, engage in humanitarian activities, and promote the spread of values ​​close to them.

But on September 21, one of the most popular fears of my respondents came true: Putin announced mobilization. After waiting almost two months for people to decide on their future, I started a new survey among those who remained in Russia. Why are they still here?

Reaction to mobilization

When I launched the new survey, something happened that I did not expect. In two days, 1,300 completed questionnaires arrived - this is almost the same number of people as needed for federal, representative polls by VCIOM or the Levada Center. I am sure: if I had not closed the survey at this stage, in two days I would have had two and a half thousand questionnaires, then even more. I wouldn't be able to process that much data.

Let me clarify once again, I was interested in those who do not agree with the current policy of Russia, oppose the so-called special operation, but remain in Russia. Passport, that is, the first block of personality-identifying questions, showed that almost 70% of my respondents are residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg. These are people with a good education, of working age (more than half are under 50), who perceive information critically.

I asked if they expected to be mobilized - 73.3% answered yes. But from the rest of the answers, I concluded that they considered such a possibility hypothetically, admitted that anything could happen, but considered mobilization unlikely.

One of the proofs of this hypothesis of mine is the emotions that my respondents experienced on September 21st. The most frequent: fear, horror, despair, impotence.

It was obvious that in six months the situation, no matter how cynical it may sound, had settled down: little had changed - yes, hostilities continued, but it was far away, people were getting used to the new conditions. Some of those who left, with whom I kept in touch, returned to Russia, or at least came here on business and to visit relatives. In general, getting used to the new conditions came, but on September 21 an event occurred that created threats that were no longer hypothetical, but completely real.

Departure as the new normal

In each of my surveys and interviews, I was interested in how many acquaintances of my respondents left Russia. Back in the spring, I had a hypothesis that among people who do not accept the war, leaving has become the norm and the conventionally correct behavior in the current situation. Then this hypothesis was not confirmed, but after the announcement of partial mobilization, a turning point occurred.

Only 18% of the respondents answered that “practically none” of their friends and relatives (not just acquaintances, I emphasize, but relatives) had left Russia. Few left 32%, quite a few left 40%, and the majority left 8%.

This is a colossal amount. Emigration touched almost everyone in one way or another and turned into something natural in the circumstances. Then I asked if my respondents had to explain to their friends why they were staying in Russia. This is an important question: if you are forced to explain something, it means that this is not an obvious solution, it means that it becomes problematized. So, a little more than half of the respondents answered this question in the affirmative.

The totality of these answers quite convincingly proves to us that departure as a norm of behavior, if not formed, is certainly being formed.

Do those who remain agree with this norm? In other words, rather no. 62% strongly disagree, 10% find it difficult to answer, less than a third recognize or “rather recognize” this norm. At the same time, when I asked if they agree that people who stay in Russia are more responsible for what is happening than those who left, only 8% answered in the affirmative.

Answering direct questions, people defend their right to stay in Russia, refuse to recognize this decision as less correct than leaving, but in the following blocks they nevertheless betray the vulnerability of their position.

So, in response to the question about how mass migration affects Russia, the respondents wrote that the most educated, the strongest, the best are leaving. Those who remained highly appreciate those who left: both professionally and morally, they speak of them as an elite. The phrase “The best leave” was often met. These answers also tell us about the formation of the norm of departure and the "remaining complex". More than half admitted that the Russians who left offered or persuaded them to also leave the country.

Why are we staying?

So why do they stay? Approximately 15% answered: "This is my home, my country" and "The country is not equal to the state, I want to fight, I need it here." For the rest, the decision to stay is rather a forced measure. The most popular answer, with over 30%, is "No resources to leave." Now this figure is higher than in the spring. Why? I think the reason is precisely that the relatives and friends of those who remain have left. They see how those who came with work and money, and those who came without work and without money, settled down in a new place. More than 30% said that their fellow emigrants are having a "hard time". There is such a wonderful phrase that I very often met in questionnaires and in interviews: "they are IT people." Nothing more needs to be explained. "'They' are IT people, and I'm a social studies teacher at school - I have less chances."

The second most popular reason why people do not leave is the responsibility for loved ones, the presence of encumbrances. The formula in the answers that shocked me during interviews with those who left (although these were isolated answers): “Fortunately, my parents died.” In a November poll of about 50 remaining people, they said outright that they would leave after the death of their parents or pets.

As you know, there are a number of social taboos in society, one of the main ones is one's own death and the death of loved ones. So, in an extreme situation, this topic begins to detaboo. When the issues of life and death are actualized, people begin to speak directly about both.

At the same time, people, to a greater extent than in spring, admit that they will still leave Russia. There are those who are already literally collecting things. There are those who save money, looking for work, suitable conditions. Those who are determined to stay are a minority.

I can be useful in Russia

The vast majority of respondents believe that by staying, they can benefit, and not just wait out a difficult period.

Yes, six months after the first poll, there are far fewer references to political action. Open protest as an opportunity to express one's position was then talked about more often (“Civic and political participation in the life of the country” is the most popular answer among the rest, with whom I spoke in the spring). Now it is presented much less.

The fear of reprisals has become significantly higher and remains, perhaps, the only mass fear among those who are in Russia. The fears that were in March - for example, the closure of borders - practically do not appear among the answers. People also have little fear of poverty, hunger and unemployment. They are afraid of reprisals.

In this regard, it is interesting how the remaining Russians respond to the question about the benefits they can bring while in Russia. The most popular answer: "Just work" - so wrote almost 25% of respondents. Most often, people in the so-called helping professions answered this way: teachers, doctors, psychologists. In their opinion, regardless of what is happening, children should be taught, the sick should be treated, and so on. If this is not done, everything will fall apart much faster, and my respondents, given that they are in Russia, do not support the thesis “the worse, the better” and do not seek the collapse of the country.

A significant part of the respondents are involved in charity: they transfer money to refugees, participate in volunteer initiatives - this is considered useful, but not very dangerous.

At the same time, almost 20% wrote that they could not do anything. This indicates a very serious condition of these people.

Despair

Many people wrote that they got sick, that they had psychosomatics. Someone ended up in the hospital, there were suicidal thoughts. People do not deal well with long-term stress. September 21, like February 24, caused very powerful emotional reactions, and the more time passes, the worse people cope with the accumulated stress.

I have very intelligent respondents. And suddenly, when answering the question about mobilization, a lot of profanity went. This was not in the spring, and it came as a surprise to me - that is, people literally have no words to convey the emotions that overwhelm them.

Now it is difficult for people to take any action, the resource is small. And while they provide little to no explanation for their decision to remain a complex psychological state, this follows from other responses. I understand why my respondents do not say this directly: the last thing a fish would study is the water in which it lives. People do not reflect on their psychological state as the reason, but when we look at the questionnaires in their entirety, everything becomes clear.

One of the main reasons for this difficult condition is the disappearance of the planning horizon. People do not know what will happen to them next. As one departed respondent said in an interview: “I have a planning horizon like a mouse.” Approximately the same feelings are experienced by a significant part of the remaining dissenters.

People allow any development of events - this is also a sign of fatigue. Prior to February 24, few believed in the possibility of military action; mobilization, as I wrote above, was allowed, but rather theoretically. Now came a heavy realization: anything is possible. When asked about emotions, people more often answer that they have ceased to feel acutely, everything has burned out in their souls, it is no longer possible to worry.

I asked my emigrant interlocutors why they agreed to give an interview - they said that for them it was a confession, that they wanted to share their experiences. Approximately the same applies to those who disagree: they also want to tell about themselves, albeit in the form of a questionnaire.