Imagine: Kadyrov is not

People who exaggerate rumors about the health of the Chechen chapter should think about what problems Chechnya will face in the event of a sad outcome

The speculation on Kadyrov’s health began in social networks at the end of last year and spread mainly by a net of Chechen telegram channels interconnected and administered by the same people. For the time being, only Ukrainian bloggers paid attention to these rumors. But in late February - early March, the theme of Kadyrov’s health suddenly became top.

On February 21, Ramzan did not appear in Moscow at the Federal Epistle of Putin. On March 3, Vladimir Putin unexpectedly met with the eldest son of the head of Chechnya-17-year-old Akhmat. Moreover, not Kadyrov himself accompanied him, but an adviser to the President of the Russian Federation on climate issues Ruslan Edelgeriev. From the commentary of the head of Chechnya himself, for some reason remaining on this day in the republic, it could be assumed that the meeting with Putin was a sort of original wedding gift (the next day, Akhmat Kadyrov really married). At the meeting itself, it was mainly about the historical role of the grandfather and namesake of Akhmat-the former mufti of the independent Ichkeria, who crossed the side of Russia, Akhmat-Haji Kadyrov. But the mention of Akhmat-Haji in this context caused many a direct association with another meeting of Putin: in 2004, after the murder of his father, the young Ramzan came to the Kremlin. The tracksuit, in which he arrived at the meeting with the head of state, was forever crashed into the historical memory of Russia. It was then that the political career of Kadyrov began.

Do we observe the sunset of this era and the transfer of power to the son-successor? This question in March 2023 was asked by many commentators. The anonymous note of the German tabloid Bilda added oil into the fire, offering the public a version of Kadyrov’s allegedly sick kidneys and who arrived in a formidable nephrologist from Abu Dhabi, since the head of Chechnya allegedly does not trust Russian doctors. On this basis, bloggers-conspirologists suggested that there was a poisoning of Kadyrov by Russian special services. The version was picked up by professional media, and they did it so together that on March 13, Ramzan Kadyrov was forced, as they say in that joke: at least a scarecrow, even a carcass, but fly to Moscow to meet Vladimir Putin.

After this meeting, Kadyrov finally commented on rumors about his health for the first time: “Those who amuse themselves with the hope that I am inconspicuously sick: I am sorry to upset you.”

By the way, the version of Kadyrov’s poisoning has much more grounds than the assumption about the visit of some doctor from Abu Dhabi and the completely inadequate conclusion of the German tabloid about the possible distrust of Kadyrov to Russian medicine.

Special operations with military poisonous substances, about which we learned a lot after the assassination attempt on Alexei Navalny, in Chechnya were practiced at least from the late 90s.

It can be safely argued that in many ways, it was on the Chechen militants that the special traffic police and filled their hand.

A former employee of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the North Caucasus Federal District of the times already forgotten, but playing a huge role in the Caucasus of General Zhelev, told me about the elimination of members of one Chechen Jamaat in exactly the same way as a decade later poisoned Navalny: through the special services agent, the militants were transferred to the Russian military uniforms treated with poison. Jamaat, including the agent itself, extinct in almost full force.

And two months after the group of poisoners processed the “novice” Gulfik Trusov Navalny, three people from this group visited Chechnya. They stayed in Grozny from November 1 to 5, 2020 (data on the geolocation of phones and information about the movements of these people are published by investigators of the attempt on Alexei Navalny). The purpose of their visit to the republic remained unclear.

However, all this has nothing to do with Kadyrov, because he is not a Chechen action movie, not a fabric from the FSB and not an opposition politician. That is, not an enemy, not a traitor and certainly not Putin’s political competitor. Kadyrov is a politician completely incorporated into the Russian system. And its possible loss from this system, especially at such a difficult moment, is not a fatal, but very problematic situation for the Kremlin.

A few years ago, the sources of Novaya Gazeta in the near Circle Kadyrov spoke of an allegedly serious disease that is poorly treated, and in 30% of cases ends death. For several years, the state of health of the head of Chechnya did not give visible reasons for concern, although he was gaining weight or just as rapidly. Regular examinations twice a year, as it should be Russian official “A”, Ramzan Kadyrov took place in Moscow, to the Central Design Bureau of the Office of the President of the Russian Federation during his leave. Sometimes his vacation was delayed for forty days, and sometimes he could be seen at working meetings with a catheter for intravenous infusion on his arm.

But since June last year, our sources say, serious changes have allegedly occurred.

This disease is life -threatening, because it can lead to insufficiency of other organs, primarily the kidneys and lungs (hence the most severe shortness of breath). This disease is accompanied by painful pain attacks, because of which a person cannot sleep. Even strong painkillers, which are usually prescribed by cancer patients in the terminal stage, do not help.

... In just six months, the external manifestations of the state of the Chechen chapter became more visible: Kadyrov markedly reduced his usually high activity, although his accounts in social networks and mixed this moment.

But the most obvious feature of the likely health distress was the sudden and active involvement of minor sons of Ramzan in the management of the Republic of Minor.

Since June last year, the Grozny CHGTRK began to regularly show three bored Chechen teenagers in its news stories: 16-year-old Akhmat, 15-year-old Adam and 14-year-old Zelimkhan Kadyrov. They were now present at many hours of meetings of their father, necessarily accompanied him on administrative trips to the republic, met with federal politicians and officials who frequented to the republic since the beginning of a military operation in Ukraine.

For a clear goal, to increase the recognition of the Kadyrov-Jr. at the federal level, their military tour was organized into the combat zone in Ukraine. While the boys were shot “in the trenches on the front line” with weapons in their hands and drove them to the Ukrainian prisoners of war, the eldest daughter of Ramzan Aishat handed out humanitarian aid to the residents of the “LPR” and “DPR”.

At first, the young Kadyrovs was accompanied and took care of their long-time mentor, coach and teacher-the famous Russian boxer and fighter of MMA Abdul-Kirim Edidilov. In February last year, the grateful Ramzan Kadyrov appointed the tutor of his children as deputy prime minister of the Chechnya government, which oversees sports and youth policy.

But in this position, Edilov did not stay long. In September, he was sharply excommunicated from the children of Kadyrov, and in November he was fired “of their own free will” from the Chechen government (he was simultaneously dismissed from the post of Minister of Sports and brother Edilov - Valid). The cause of disgrace was described by both Chechen bloggers and professional media, suggested that it could be associated with drugs and an accident in which people died. Sources of Novaya Gazeta also confirmed all the details of that really scandalous story. Well, in December, news came about the sudden death of a 32-year-old athlete.

But the Chechen bloggers in vain accuse Ramzan Kadyrov of this death: Edilov had an acute conflict with the nephew of the head of Chechnya - Khamzat Kadyrov.

It turns out that Edilov was friends with the same girls with whom Hamzat himself had closely communicated. Abdul-Kirim was actively interested in their compromise on the tribal of the head of Chechnya, he found out about this, and Edilov, who at that time had already completely lost the patronage of the head of Chechnya, was delivered to clarify the relationship to one of the Chechen police department ...

They say that when Ramzan Kadyrov learned about Edilov’s death, he was furious, but in the end he solved the issue of Chechen concepts. Everything was made up with the family, the brother of Abdul-Kirim-Valida Edilov-was returned to the near circle and appointed to a high position in the apparatus of the head of Chechnya.

And the sons of Kadyrov, more precisely, at the elder, Akhmat, meanwhile, a new curator-educator-adviser to the President of Russia on Climate Ruslan Edelgeriev appeared.

The adviser to President Putin Ruslan (in Chechnya, everyone calls him the second - the Chechen name - Abubakar) Edelgeriev became in 2018, before that he headed the Government of the Chechen Republic for six years. Ramzan Kadyrov, whose true ambassador of Edelgerias, is actually owes his advancement both in the republic and in Moscow.

Last September, the 11th grader Akhmat Kadyrov was appointed assistant to the head of Chechnya, and then declared the chairman of the Chechen branch of the Russian Youth and Students that was not even created at that time (the author of the idea-V.V. Putin).

Since the fall of last year, Edelgeriev has increasingly come to the republic, participating in many meetings of the head of Chechnya with federal politicians.

In these meetings, Edelgerias accompanies Akhmat Kadyrov, instructs him and smooth out awkward moments (either due to shyness, or due to problems with diction, the son of Kadyrov quite tongue-tied expresses his thoughts in Russian).

In addition, it is Edelgeriev who takes Akhmat to Moscow and is present with him at meetings of the level of federal ministers and their deputies.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing unexpected in the meeting of Vladimir Putin with Ruslan Edelgeriev and Akhmat Kadyrov, held on March 3,. This is the result of a stubborn high -speed and actually not covered political promotion of the heir Kadyrov. But if the reason for this development of events is understandable, then the goal is not very.

The head of Chechnya is not so naive to really believe that his 17-year-old son is capable of:

1. Get and

2. Hold power in the republic in the near future.

Firstly, he will not allow him to do this young age (and, therefore, the law). Secondly, it is very doubtful that in the case of a forced change in power in the republic, it will again reproduce the model of the region’s management unique for Russia on the principle of “state in the state”.

Therefore, the only sound explanation of Kadyrov’s frontal advance of his children to the highest level of the Russian government is their protection. Income demonstration to all interested parties of the highest guarantees of family integrity in case of the worst development of events.

Well, what awaits the Chechen Republic without Ramzan Kadyrov?

It seems to me that those who still dream about the independence of Chechnya should come to terms that Ichkeria has gone into the past irrevocably, turning into a beautiful, but little adapted to reality and therefore an unrealistic dream. There is no protest political potential both in Chechnya itself and in Chechen diasporas scattered around the world.

As for the candidacy of the next Chechen governor, I would first look not at personalities, but at the systemic problems that have to be solved in order to bring the Chechen Republic to a nationwide denominator.

And the first of these problems is the lack of any control over the spending of budget funds.

The budget sector accounts for a total of more than 40% of the gross republican product, and more than a third of the economically active population of the republic is occupied in this sector. That is, the driver of the Chechen economy is the process of knocking out and distributing the federal budget and state extra -budgetary funds.

But they are distributed so that it was the Russian budget, which Ramzan Kadyrov poetically compared with Allah, that is the main source of the capabilities of the head of Chechnya incredible for other Russian governors.

Although Kadyrov himself is trying, he cannot restrain himself, so as not to poke his wealth in the face once again. So, he made titanic efforts so that no one would know how much the wedding of his own son cost him - but he could not resist, so as not to boast of the cost of his horses stolen in the Czech Republic, which, according to Kadyrov, cost “at least 10 million dollars”.

But in Kadyrov’s declarations you will not find a mention of a back of a back. Until 2018, the declarations of the head of Chechnya did not at all correspond to his lifestyle (a very wealthy person).

And only since 2019, Ramzan’s declared income suddenly increased sharply (from 7.5 million rubles in 2018, they jumped to almost 143 million rubles in 2019 and up to 381 million in 2020), and then fell sharply (up to 26.5 million rubles in 2021). The source of income in the declarations is not indicated, but it becomes clear from them that Kadyrov had almost no new assets for the entire reign of the republic. With one and very indicative exceptions: in 2018, a plot of land began to appear in the declaration adjacent to the residence of the head of Chechnya in the center of Grozny. Actually, this site was originally included in the plan for the development of the residence as a park zone. But until 2018, the Chechen campaign of Grozny-City LLC was nominated by the park.

This is a clear example of how the Chechen economy actually arranges. Namely: according to the documents of Chechen assets, starting from the land on which the houses of Kadyrov and his closest associates were built, and ending with the development sector of the republic, cellular communications, the sale of cars, agricultural networks, restaurant networks, the removal of garbage throughout the republic, transport arteries, a significant part of Chechen oil and many others own, or manages to many others. Getting huge state contracts, a fairly narrow circle of Chechen businessmen and managers.

Their names (for example, Movsadi, Khalid and Khozbaudi Alviev, Yusup Gudaev, Bai Eli Edilgireev, etc.) do not say anything to the general public, although formally, on paper, these people are respected Chechen businessmen and managers. But they do not glow anywhere.

We could hardly find a single image of the iconic for the Chechen business of the Movsadi (in Chechnya know him as Movladi) Alviev, who is called the main developer of Chechnya and not only (the company has assets in other regions of Russia). His company LLC Grozny-City runs, that is, leases, all skyscrapers of the republic and what he does not do-investigations about the assets of Grozny-City LLC were published repeatedly and are in the public domain.

The Brothers Alviev Movsadi and Khozhbaudi - from the Centor, the family village of Kadyrov, and were friends with the father of Ramzan Kadyrov. Khozhbaudi has always been related to Chechen oil and in difficult war times, they say, even attached to the work of Kadyrov Sr.. Since 2007, when Putin appointed Ramzan by the President of Chechnya, to the year 2018, Khozbaudi Alviyu permissively headed Chechenneftekhimprom and, together with Kadyrov, fought against Sechin and Rosneft, lobbying for the return of this oil asset to the bosom of the republic (in 2018, Putin finally transferred his federal property to the republican all 100% of the shares OJSC "Chechenneftekhimprom").

It was the brothers of Alviev (authors of the idea of ​​creating one of the most opaque NGOs of Russia - the Kadyrov Foundation) themselves, among the narrow circle of close friends and villagers, the heads of Chechnya became his co -investors and, as a result, that the nominal, unknown owners or managers of a large number of Chechen businesses are publicly associated with Ramzan Kadyrov.

A great example is the world -famous Russian University of Special Forces (RUS) in Gudermes. The land on which this “university” was built is leased by the business structures of Movsadi Alviev, he is also the general director of the Master sports and training center. The owner of the “master” is the former special forces of the FSB Alexei Chudan, he is also the director of Rusa, registered according to the documents as a “sports club”. The scheme when the poor special forces of the FSB owns the company, and one of the richest and closest to Kadyrov businessmen Chechnya is its director, is typical of the republic and quite transparently hints at the true beneficiary of this brilliant business idea.

Over the past year, “Rus” has become almost the main business card of Chechnya, Kadyrov’s great personal pride and a symbol of how the image of Chechens in Russia has radically changed. Who dares to call them terrorists now?

But imagine: Kadyrov is not. What will happen to all these and other "unofficial" assets? Will go to the new owner of Chechnya? So simple?

We move on. Большие непрозрачные финансовые потоки в Чечне проходят через три весьма банальные институции: отделение Пенсионного фонда России, отделения Фонда социального страхования и территориального Фонда обязательного медицинского страхования. Всеми этими фондами руководят люди, безусловно, преданные Кадырову, которых он назначил в самом начале своего правления, защищал и никогда ни при каких ЧП не менял. Why? Вероятно, потому, что они знают все схемы и всех, кто кровно заинтересован в этих схемах в Москве.

А теперь представим, что Кадырова нет. Останутся ли эти люди на своих местах?

Есть у нынешней власти еще один важнейший внебюджетный источник финансов. Связан он напрямую с одной московской гостиницей — «Президент-Отель».

Именно там находится столичная база депутата Госдумы от Чечни Адама Делимханова, именно там целая команда прекрасных московских и чеченских юристов принимает решения, крайне болезненные для российских (и не только) бизнесменов.

А теперь представьте, что Кадырова нет. Где и, главное, как скоро окажется Адам Делимханов, невзирая на все свои госнаграды и золотые пистолеты, то и дело выпадающие из его карманов то в Дубае, то в коридорах Государственной думы?

Кстати, это еще один важнейший системный вопрос, который предстоит решить Кремлю в случае смены власти в Чечне. Связан он не столько с деньгами, сколько с фундаментальным принципом правления Кадырова, у которого были как минусы, так, оказывается, и свои плюсы.

Кадыров всегда правил чеченцами как единоличный хозяин. Только он мог их карать или миловать, защищать по всей России чеченских рейдеров, заказных убийц и одновременно — священные для мусульман писания, признанные российскими судами экстремистскими. Только Кадыров имел право отправлять чеченцев на войну или отменять мобилизацию в Чечне.

Собственно, прошлогодний конфликт с Министерством обороны возник у него как раз на этой почве: Кадыров просто-напросто не дал использовать чеченцев в Украине так, как рассказывают в многочисленных видео мобилизованные граждане со всей России.

И только чеченцы — вы заметили? — ни разу не пожаловались на то, что их бросают на «мясные штурмы», и не попросили помощи у своего грозного падишаха.

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За что на самом деле cражается Кадыров, который пожертвовал своей личной армией, чтобы чеченский народ «не получил ни одной повестки»

А теперь представим: Кадырова нет. Как быстро чеченских мужиков отправят на украинский фронт? И сможет ли новый губернатор Чечни, как все эти годы Кадыров, регулярно вставать в позу бешеного быка, с которым связываться — себе дороже?