
Photo: Lev Fedoseev / TASS
This material was published in No. 86 (3096) of August 12, 2000. We published it in an anniversary issue. You can buy it here
On August 12, 2000, in the Barents Sea during the integrated combat training of the ships of the Northern Fleet on the Kursk nuclear submarine, a disaster occurred.
The first explosion sounded at 11 hours 28 minutes, at the very moment when the submarine was prepared for shooting a practical (without combat part) peroxide-water torpedo 65–76 “Kit”. The peroxide of hydrogen in the torpedo engine exploded. From an explosion with a capacity of about 200 kg in Trotyl equivalent, the members of the Kursk crew were killed in the first (torpedo) and second (command) compartments. The boat lost controllability and after 75 seconds hit the bottom of the bottom at a speed of about 7 knots (13 km) per hour. At 11 hours 30 minutes the second explosion sounded-at least 10 combat torpedoes exploded one after another (according to the official version-from a volumetric fire in a torpedo compartment, according to Vice Admiral Valery Ryazantsev, a member of the Government Commission, due to the circumstances of the death of the Kursk APRK, as a result of the blow of the boat on the soil, torpedo apparatus was deformed and detonated them in them in them. combat torpedoes).
The second explosion with a capacity of 5,000 tons in the TNT equivalent caused an explosive wave that terrifying power, which was recorded by the seismic stations in Norway.
The hydrodynamic wave even covered the Submarine of Karelia, which was 80 kilometers from Kursk, which at that moment was preparing to shoot a practical missile at the training ground in Kamchatka. After the missile shooting and surfacing, the Karelia commander Andrei Korablev reported to the command post of the Northern Fleet about presumably an underwater explosion and handed over his coordinates, which corresponded to the coordinates of the flooding of Kursk.
The flagship of the Northern Fleet, the heavy atomic missile cruiser Peter the Great, was much closer to the place of disaster than the submarine of Karelia. It was on him that he was supposed to shoot the Kursk practical torpedo. But instead of shooting acoustics at Peter the Great, two explosions were recorded, and Peter the Great himself shook as if it were a light longboat, and not a huge ship with a displacement of 26 thousand tons. From a hydrodynamic strike, the knees “bent” from the crew’s members. At the “Peter the Great” at that moment, Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, commander of the Northern Fleet, was leading the exercises. However, unlike the commander of Karelia, he was not interested in either the cause of “shaking” or the report of acoustics.
From the testimony of the hydroacoustics of the Tark “Peter the Great” Lavrinyuk: “... I reported to the combat information center, on the chassis and to the central command post. Immediately, at the time of flash and cotton from the speaker, I felt that a hydrodynamic blow was passed on the ship, which was expressed in the trembling of the “Peter Great” body. In my opinion, this effect in the form of trembling of the case from the inclusion of any equipment on the "Peter the Great" could not occur. It was an external dynamic blow ... "
During the interrogation in the prosecutor’s office, the commander of the Northern Fleet Vyacheslav Popov will deny the fact of the report of acoustics about the explosions recorded on Kursk, and the hydrodynamic blow, the shabby corps of the ship, will explain the “deployment of the radar antenna”.
95 out of 118 people on board the Kursk, died as a result of explosions. The explosive wave destroyed the bow of the boat up to the reactor compartments-5 and 5-bis.
But the members of the crew of Kursk survived in the 6th 7th and 8th compartments. In total - 23 people. They decided to move to the 9th compartment, the so-called “compartment of survivability”,
They took with them food and water, the personal means of salvation and the means of air regeneration, stacked the bulkhead between the 8th and 9th compartments to reduce the flow of water. They did everything to live on the sunken Kursk as long as possible in anticipation of salvation.
The disaster occurred during the exercises, in shallow water, in a clearly designated area of the Barents Sea with a large number of our ships. And therefore, submariners in the 9th compartment all the time gave SOS signals. They were sure that they would soon be discovered and heard.
And that's why. During torpedo shooting, the boat should be in touch three times. The first time she should report on the execution/failure of the shooting. The second is when practical torpedoes will find and raise. The third time the boat is in touch in order to report on the ascent and liberation of the region. In accordance with the “Rules for the use of the training ground” (a closed guiding document of the fleet regulating the rules of combat training), while the boat does not get in touch, the warships detachment have no right to leave the exercise. According to the plan of exercises, the limit time for the implementation of torpedo firing for Kursk is 14 hours 30 minutes. At 14.31 (the most extreme period, if the boat does not get in touch), it should have been announced in emergency and begin the search and rescue operation. But a detachment of warships, led by the flagship “Peter the Great”, without waiting for torpedo shooting, leaves the Kursk death area at 14 hours 12 minutes, and Admiral Popov flies away by helicopter in Severomorsk, where he gives a press conference.
He tells reporters that the exercises were regularly, all the combat missions were performed perfectly. At the very moment when the press conference is on, they already know in the Navy that an emergency happened to Kursk.
At 13.50, a record appears in the shift journal of the command post of the Northern Fleet: "Start acting as a worst option." But officially the boat will be announced in emergency and raised combat alarm only at 23 hours 30 minutes, 12 hours after the explosions. The official investigation in the case of the death of Kursk will “reduce” the time of criminal delay by three hours: “As a result of ignorance by Admiral V.A. Popov and his subordinates of a particular situation, non-fulfillment of the requirements of the leading documents of the Navy in the absence of a surfacing of the submarine at the established time in the surface position, as well as due to the adoption of erroneous decisions in the process of waiting for the submarine cruiser, he was declared emergency with a delay of 9 hours. "
The Mikhail Rudnitsky rescue vessel with two underwater vehicles on board-the search AC-32 and the search and rescue AC-34 “Prize”-will leave the base only at 1.04 at night on August 13. For almost 9 hours, he will need to get to the place of death of Kursk.
... Kursk compartments not damaged by explosions were gradually filled with water, the pressure in them increased. The 9th “Settings Settings”, designed in the regular time for only three people, is overlapped by almost 8 times. There is not enough oxygen. Submariners use regeneration plants (RDU) to produce oxygen. They had 3 installations and 25 B -64 cans with 25 regeneration plates in each. If you simultaneously charge all three rods (by a bank for each), then oxygen is just enough for 23 people for almost a day. They opened and used 9 cans ...
Two of the surviving submariners-Lieutenant Captain Dmitry Kolesnikov and Lieutenant Captain Sergey Sadilenko-record the situation. They made records on two sheets, obviously torn from the watch magazine.
In addition, Dmitry Kolesnikov and the senior midshipman Andrei Borisov wrote personal messages to their relatives. All notes, this is quite obvious, are made at different times and in different conditions. And, I suppose, on different days. The first entry was made on August 12 at 13.34 captain-lieutenant Dmitry Kolesnikov. "List of l/s 6, 7, 8, 9 of the SV, located in the 9th compartment after the accident on 12.08.2000" And below - 23 surnames of the survivors. The second record made in 13.58 indicates an increase in pressure in the 7th compartment. From the third entry made by the captain-Lieutenant Sergey Sadilenko, it follows that the situation in the “Experience of the Verseity” was very deteriorated. "13.15. The entire personnel of the 6, 7 and 8 compartments moved to 9. There are 23 of us here. Health is bad. Weakened by the action of carbon monoxide. The pressure rises. Regenerative cartridges end. When reaching the surface, do not withstand decompression. There are not enough belts on individual respiratory devices. There are no carbines on the stoppers. We will stretch no more than a day. ”
This record directly indicates that submariners used part of the regenerative plates, that is, they spent a long time in the 9th compartment. I am almost sure that this and all subsequent records were made on August 13; Perhaps the 14th.
The fourth entry marked with a temporary segment “15.15” was made by Lieutenant Dmitry Kolesnikov and is personal-he writes to his wife Olga.

The senior midshipman Andrei Borisov will write to his wife to Natasha and son Alexander.
And finally, the most famous part of these records, made by Captain-Lieutenant Andrei Kolesnikov. It is not indicated by any temporary interval. The handwriting is changing. The lines are sweeping and “dance” throughout the page, the letters are very large, then very small. “It’s dark here to write, but I’ll try to touch. There seems to be no chance: 10–20 percent. Let's hope that at least someone will read. Here is a list of personnel of the compartments that are in the 9th and will try to go out. Hello everyone, you don’t have to despair. Kolesnikov ".
Then Kolesnikov folds and hides in the breast pocket two precious fragile sheets of the A -4 format so that no element can destroy this evidence.
... They could not be saved on their own. Even the “wet method” of leaving the flooded boat (when the submariners themselves leave the “survivability compartment” and rise to the surface) provides for help from the outside-divers-rods and a rescue vessel, which will ensure on board and conduct decompression of submariners.
Captain-Lieutenant Sergey Sadilenko wrote in the record left by him: "We can’t stand decompression." This phrase says a lot: submariners sensibly assessed the situation and understood that when trying to get out of the compartment without arriving help, they threaten a painful death from the difference in pressure (in the compartment of the sunken boat it is much higher than on the surface).
... And all this time they continue to knock. The knocks of SOS or, in the language of the investigation, “an emergency signals made by a person with blows with a metal object on metal” will hear “upstairs”.
On August 21, 2000, in an interview with the Vremya program, the Minister of Defense Marshal Igor Sergeyev will say: “You know, there were knocks, the thirteenth and fourteenth. Even a special cartogram was compiled, on which we received a short and capacious answer: “SOS, water”. This was already an assessment of the state of people who were still alive, were in compartments. Obviously, water had already entered or seeped into the compartments.
Journalist: "When did these knocks stopped?"
I. Sergeev: "Well, after almost the fourteenth."
Knocks will be recorded on the audio carrier. An examination will be carried out on them. The examination will prove that people knocked on the intersectorative bulkhead of a flooded submarine. And then, when these knocks of SOS will turn out to be politically and legally unprofitable evidence against the authorities and guilty of this disaster, they will be turned first into “technical noises”. Later they will write that unidentified people knocked on with a ship not established by the investigation.

President Putin, who flew on August 12 on vacation in Sochi, found out about an emergency situation during the exercises only on August 13 at 7 a.m. of the Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev.
- The Minister of Defense called, said that we had lost the boat, but already discovered, now we are starting work. It was not clear that something tragic was happening, ”Putin recalled this report.
It was Sergeev who recommended that the president remain in Sochi, assuring that the search and rescue operation was even more promptly than the naval instructions are prescribed, and the resources available to the Navy at the disposal of an effective search and rescue operation.
The country learned about Kursk only on August 14. At 10.45, the head of the press service of the Navy Igor Dygalo told reporters: Kursk lay on the bottom in a square 69 degrees 40 minutes of northern latitude and 37 degrees 35 minutes of east longitude, the crew and electricity are supplied, the crew is supported, the nuclear reactor is drowned out. ”
On August 14, as soon as the Kursk is officially announced about an abnormal situation with Kursk, England, Norway and the USA offer Russia their help in a rescue operation.
But the Commander -in -Chief of the Navy Vladimir Kuroyedov refuses foreign assistance, and for the first time it is he who launches through a false, but incredibly tenacious version of the Cursk collision with a foreign submarine. According to him, there are "signs of a large and serious collision" on the underwater missile carrier. The prominent outcome of the rescue operation of the commander inhabitant of Kurozedov does not evaluate the chances of a successful outcome of the rescue operation.

On the evening of August 14, the Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, appointed by order of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 112-RS, makes a statement by the head of the Government Commission to investigate the causes of the incident since April Kursk. He says that Russia does not need the help of other countries, and the fleet has "technical capabilities at its level no worse than the American." Unlike the Commander -in -Chief, he evaluates the chances of saving the crew as good.
Meanwhile, rescue work continues in the disaster area. Rescue deep -sea vehicles (SGA) constantly break, putting the life of rescuers.
And when they manage to plunge, they cannot be attached to the hatch of the commander of the 9th compartment. On August 15, the SGA immersion was discontinued due to the storm. The only works that are carried out effectively and do not stop even due to the storm is an examination of the Kursk lying at the bottom and the fragments of the bow. The operation is carried out by the secret atomic deep-sea station of the 1910 Kashalot project (“Logarik”, or AS-12, which became the notorious in 2019 due to an accident with the battery, is a more modern modification of Kashalota). Podger records huge damage to Kursk.
“The nasal compartment is completely destroyed,” Egorov reports the commander of Kashalot.
On August 15, Russia's help to save the Kursk crew is offered by France, Italy, Germany and the UK.
On August 16, attempts are renewed to attach to the commander of the 9th compartment. Still to no avail.
In total, from August 13 to August 19, AS-32, AS-34 and AS-36 performed 8 dives and 13 landings on the commercial-rescue hatch of the 9th compartment of Kursk. It was not possible to sprinkle even once.
The reason is the constructive drawback: the supporting ring of the commander of the site was drowned in the deck of the superstructure. And it was supposed to perform at 5-10 mm. This became known much later. As, however, that during the running and state tests of the boat, no one checked the possibility of connecting a rescue apparatus with a commander of the Frequency on Kursk. The designer of the cruiser (TsKB RUBIN) and the fleet are equal for this.
On the afternoon of August 16, President Putin speaks by phone with US President Bill Clinton. At 16.00 it becomes known that Russia adopted the help of Great Britain and Norway. Early on the morning of August 17, the Normand Pioneer rescue vessel with the British rescue vehicle LR -5 (participated in 2005 in saving the Russian crew of the Autonomous Station AS -28) and the SEAWAY EAGLE, equipped with a GVK (deep -sea diving complex), emerging from the Norwegian port of Trondheim. On board Seaway Eagle-12 divers are deep-haired. On August 19, the chief of staff of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Mikhail Mozak, says that SOS signals came from Kursk until August 15. According to Mozak, the submariners asked to give oxygen and reported on admission to the water compartment. On August 15, the knocks stopped. “It is very likely that we will have to state the worst expectations. But the operation to penetrate the submarine will continue. Its main task is to find crew members alive or dead. ”
On August 19, all Russian rescue vehicles are out of order. The British LR -5 is replacing them, and on the night of August 20, Seaway Eagle is suitable for the flooding area of Kursk. After 13 and a half hours, the Norwegian divers-rods descend to Kursk and try to open the hatch of the 9th compartment. It turns out that for this you need a special tool, the manufacture of which takes the rest of the day and night from August 20 to 21. At 7.20 on August 21, Norwegian divers plunged and after 16 minutes they open the hatch of the 9th compartment of Kursk. The lock chamber of the compartment is filled with water. This means that the 9th compartment is completely flooded and there is some.
On August 23, Putin will make an appeal to the country. He will say that a connection was lost with the boat at 23.30 on August 12, and rescue work began four hours after the tragedy. It will be a lie. The connection with Kursk was lost in 11 hours on 28 minutes on August 12, rescue work began after 29 and a half hours, the first attempt to dock the 9th compartment commander only 43 and a half hours after the explosions.
Putin will say that the fleet had all the necessary rescue equipment and they were completely serviceable. This is also not true. The Northern Fleet had only one outdated rescue vessel Mikhail Rudnitsky and three rescue vehicles, all of them repeatedly broke during a rescue operation. None of the devices could do the docking with the hatch of the 9th compartment.
Putin will say that foreign assistance was accepted by sailors as soon as it was offered. This is not true.
The leadership of the Navy was against the adoption of foreign assistance and, insisting on his own, lost precious time. The decision to attract foreign rescuers was made by the President of Russia, and only when it became clear to him that the situation is critical, and the rescue operation was absolutely failed.
Putin said that delay in this matter was not fatal, since the Norwegian divers managed to open the hatch of the 9th edema only on the 6th day from the date of the adoption of foreign assistance. It was cunning. Norwegian divers managed to open the hatch in less than a day from the second attempt and in just 16 minutes from the moment of diving (for comparison: our AS-34 “Prize” needed more than two hours from the moment of immersion until the seating of the 9th compartment is directly filled).
Putin considered the absence of deep divers in the fleet the most important problem. But in this they lied to him. There were divers-divers in Russia-in the city of Lomonosov near St. Petersburg, the expeditionary emergency rescue detachment of the Russian Federation is based. 12 divers from this detachment two months later (in October 2000) will take part in the rise of 12 bodies of submariners from the 9th edema. They will only work together with Norwegian colleagues, and their work will be provided by the Norwegian rescue ship with a deep-sea diving complex (GVK). It is the absence of marine rescuers with the GVC that will become a critical circumstance of the non -surveying of the surviving crew of Kursk in August 2000.
After 20 years and a huge amount of money that the state allocated to create a marine rescue service, there is still no modern rescue ship with the GVK in the Northern Fleet.
Russian submariners, like their dead comrades in Kursk, continue to go to sea without any hope of salvation.
On August 23, 2000, President Putin promised the country: “The day before yesterday, Minister of Defense Igor Dmitrievich Sergeyev, and yesterday the commander in chief of the Navy and the commander of the Northern Fleet gave me reports about retired. These reports will not be accepted. I will not be accepted, I repeat, until a complete understanding of what happened, what are the reasons and whether there are guilty ones. Really guilty or is it just a combination of tragic circumstances. There will be no indiscriminate reprisals under the influence of emotional bursts and under the influence of a combination of circumstances. I will be with the army, I will be with the fleet and will be with the people. And together we will restore the army, the fleet, and the country. ”
On November 25, 2001, the Prosecutor General Ustinov laid on the table of Putin the expert opinion of a member of the Government Commission to investigate the causes and circumstances of the Kursk catastrophe Vice Admiral Valery Ryazantsev. In conclusion, the cause of the explosion of a practical peroxide-water torpedo was named.
In the course of his work, studying naval documents on the readiness of the boat and crew for the combat service, Admiral Ryazantsev discovered a number of official acts with fake signatures. Including he discovered fake signatures on the “act of verification and degreasing pipelines of the technical air of the K -141 Kursk Premier League. “The document was supposedly <was published in December 1999, signed by the senior assistant commander, the torpedists of the Kursk Premier League and approved by the submarine commander <Gennady Lyachin>.
For a long time and carefully I compared the signatures on this document with the signatures of the same persons on other documents of an earlier period and came to the conclusion that all the signatures are fake. ”
Why did it become fatal?
Explains Admiral Ryazantsev:
“In the watch documentation, which was found on board the sunken Kursk submarine, there is a person’s own recording commander of the combat mine-torpedo part of the following content:“ August 11, 2000, 15 hours 50 minutes. They measured the pressure (growth) in the oxidizing agent in 12 hours. The pressure increased to 1 kg/cm2. They knocked out the Air Force (high -pressure air) into the air tank up to 200 kg/cm2. "This short entry says a lot to the specialist submariner.
Firstly, this information refers to the peroxide practical torpedo 65–76 PV.
Secondly, the condition of the oxidizing agent of this torpedo for a long time, from August 3 to 11, 2000, was normal and did not cause any fears in the personnel.
Thirdly, in the peroxide practical torpedo, there were high-pressure microoproaches (air forces) through the leaks of the air line. This is not an emergency situation. In the torpedoes (combat and practical), the Replenishment of the APC is a regular technological operation ...
But air replenishment in torpedoes on strong oxidizing agents requires special caution and specially low -fat tools and systems. The instructions for the treatment of hydrogen peroxide say that when organic oils, metal chips and sawdust, copper and lead parts, dirt, dust and other objects, a turbulent process of overflow of peroxide begins, which is accompanied by a large release of heat and ends with an explosion.
<Therefore> degreasing torpedo tools, air hoses and technical air systems is carried out annually under the supervision of a ship commission and is drawn up by an “act of verification and degreasing of technical air pipelines”. In the existing “act of verification and degreasing of the technical air pipelines” of the Kursk nationwide dated December 15, 1999, the signatures of members of the ship commission and the commander of the submarine are false. It follows from this that on Kursk for a long time the technical air systems were not operated* and did not degrease. During this time, particles of dust and organic oils accumulated inside the pipelines of technical air, and the smallest particles of dirt, lubricants and villings of rags could get into portable air hoses. Thus, the replenishment of the Air Force Air Tank of the Cross-Wasodic Torpedo> on August 11, 2000 was made by unpeeled air, and all the dirt from air pipelines and hoses, which accumulated over many years of their inaction, got into the air tank.
On August 11, 2000, after replenishing the Air Force through dirty pipelines and hoses, the unheard of air from the air tank of the torpedo could not enter the oxidizing agent reservoir. When a practical torpedo is 65–76 PV on the rack, the locking air valve is closed on it, and safety devices are installed on the air turmeric crane. That is why the “fat” torpedo behaved quietly until August 12, 2008, when the preparation for torpedo shooting began. It was after loading into the torpedo apparatus <and opening the air valve> an uncontrolled reaction of hydrogen peroxide decomposition began inside the torpedo ... "
In addition to the conclusion of Vice Admiral Ryazantsev, Ustinov reported to Putin about numerous violations committed by the leadership of the Northern Fleet and the Russian Navy in preparation for exercises. In the course of the investigation and the government commission, a number of design shortcomings were revealed, which influenced the fact that the explosion in the torpedo compartment led to the death of the entire command staff of Kursk and the submarine lost control. All these violations were in a direct causal relationship with the death of the cruiser and crew members. As for the search and rescue operation, its chronology, crossed by the investigation with the leading documents of the Russian Navy, obviously proved: in August 2000, the military did not tell the president a word of truth, and he broadcast their lie to the whole country.

The composition of the crime was evident. The guilty of the deaths of 118 members of the Kursk crew - too. But Vladimir Putin made a decision on the death of Kursk to the court not to bring.
He called the Commander -in -Chief of the Russian Navy Vladimir Kuroedov, showed him preliminary conclusions of the investigation. After that, Kurozedov personally compiled a “shot list” of 14 senior officers (including five admirals) of the Northern Fleet and the Main Staff of the Russian Navy. It was their December 4, 2006, Putin resigned "for serious omissions in organizing the daily and combat-combat activities of the fleet." The word "Kursk" in the order of Putin did not appear.
However, the most important perpetrators of the disaster settled down well: the former commander of the SF Vyacheslav Popov became a senator, and the former chief of staff of the SF MOCHAL MOTSAK was the first deputy of the president’s plenipotentiary in the NWFO.
On June 28, 2002, investigator Arthur Egiev issued a decision to refuse to institute criminal proceedings “in connection with the lack of causal communication in the actions of officials of the Russian Navy and the death of the Kursk April and its crew”. The resolution was based on two examinations falsified a month before the end of the investigation. The forensic medical examination claimed that the 23 submariners lived in the 9th compartment for only 4.5–8 hours, and even if the search and rescue operation began on time, no one would have been saved. The second examination conducted by the main navigator of the Russian Navy, Sergei Kozlov, came to the conclusions that the SOS signals, which were recorded on August 13 and 14, sent unidentified persons from an overwhelming ship that was outside the area of the exercise in which Kursk died.
At the same time, 5 out of 14 audio cassettes disappeared without a trace from the list of material evidence, which during the search and rescue operation were recorded by all noise and knocks from Kursk. In particular, three audio cassettes recorded by the acoustics of Peter the Great were not transferred to the experts, and two recorded by the hydroacoustic station of the Mikhail Rudnitsky rescue vessel. It is possible that it is on these cassettes that there are knocks “SOS. Water ”, about which the Minister of Defense Sergeyev and Vice Admiral Mozak spoke. And it is possible that the knocks recorded on these five missing cassettes indicate that the submariners lived in the 9th compartment until August 15.
The relatives of the dead submariners did not want to recognize the victims for a long time and recognized only when they personally turned to Putin.
But the investigators did not want them to get acquainted with the criminal case, and therefore, as soon as the relatives were recognized as the victims, the Kursk case was classified. The lawyer of the victims of Boris Kuznetsov managed to declassify him only through the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In 2002, the lawyer of the victims appealed the decision to refuse to institute criminal proceedings. But the theme of Kursk was no longer interested in Russian society: there was not a single journalist at the trial except the correspondent of Novaya Gazeta.
All Russian courts refused the relatives of the dead, and then lawyer Boris Kuznetsov appealed on behalf of the father of Captain-Lieutenant Dmitry Kolesnikov to the Strasbourg court.
In 2009, the ECHR communicated the complaint “Kolesnikov against Russia” and tried to contact the applicant’s lawyer. Toislessly - a far -fetched criminal case was instituted against Kuznetsov’s lawyer, in connection with which he was forced to flee Russia and ask for political asylum in the United States. The lawyer lost contact with his applicants to Kursk. Therefore, the ECHR came to the applicant himself - the novel by Dmitrievich Kolesnikov, a military sailor in retirement (Dmitry Kolesnikov continued the family dynasty).
Roman Dmitrievich abandoned his complaint in the Kursk case and explained it to me like this: “... with this lies, with corruption, no one is fighting with theft, although the president and prime minister make very beautiful statements. And now I will go and will fight this? To show me a finger, they say, Don Quixote was found?
Of course, everyone understands that it was a lie, that they did not save, that everything was sold and squandered in the fleet for a long time ... And this is all scheduled in a criminal case.
And at the same time, the decision is made: to close the case. The reason is the hopelessness of our system. On the other hand, Putin could make the court take place and there would be an objective analysis. The fact that they lied to him when they reported that everyone was saved there, and he listened to this business, and believed, and remained in Sochi ... He was reported so much. But the fleet had nothing to do with the collapse! And at the beginning of his presidential career he could understand the Kursk case. But he made another decision. He, apparently, had completely different plans for the future of Russia and his personal future. ”
... Captain-Lieutenant Dmitry Kolesnikov was buried in the famous Seraphim's cemetery Peter, where entire generations of naval sailors rest. But the grave of Kolesnikov differs from all graves in this cemetery. Roman Kolesnikov forbade to knock out the day on the tombstones of his son, on which the investigation buried 23 submariners surviving after the explosions. His son was still alive on August 12! And when he died, the investigation did not establish for political reasons. Therefore, on the grave of the lieutenant captain simply it is written: "August 2000."
In the preparation of the article, the materials of the book “Kursk. 20 years later, "captain of the 1st rank, co-founder of the Public Organization" St. Petersburg Club of Suggesters and Veterans of the Navy "Igor Kirillovich Kurdin.
Under the text
In the fall of 2022, in Ukraine, Danis Ishmuratov, the son of Michman Fanis Ishmuratov, who served in the Kursk Premier League, died in Ukraine. Danis went on his contract.Earlier, he told reporters that he dreamed of having seven children and continuing his father’s naval career. Nothing came true. With his mother, he was the only son.