
Photo: Era
The counterattack of Ukraine ceased to be a forecast, but became part of the myth, turning into a political phantom that lives its own life, without intersecting with reality. In this capacity, it turns into a self -retreating prophecy, capable of creating an alternative reality itself. This, in my opinion, is a danger today.
To begin with, it is enough to say that in the current state of affairs on the fronts, where the positional war has been going on mainly for a month, we can only talk about the counterattack on the counterattack when it comes to interception of the initiative in the Bakhmut area. In all other cases, we should talk about the Ukrainian offensive, and this is a significantly different matter. With a counterattack, there is an opportunity to take advantage of the fact that the enemy is “revealed”, upon occurrence you must “open” you yourself, providing the enemy with the opportunity to use this. That is why the offensive is always a cost -made thing and, most importantly, more risky than a counterattack.
Since the fall of last year, when Ukraine successfully carried out two offensive operations, taking advantage of the lack of a stable front line in Russia, the situation has changed qualitatively, and now this stable front line is. Accordingly, the new offensive operation will be associated with much greater risks than last year, and will require much larger resources. It is important to note that while talking about the new Russian offensive, not silent until mid-February, somehow fell silent. That is, a chronologically discussion about the Ukrainian offensive, for some reason called counterattack, replaced the discussion about the Russian offensive, but the Russian media, controlled by the government, is soloed in this discussion, and the “peacekeepers” of the Prigozhin type and the corps of Russian “military commissars” set the tone.
There is a persistent feeling that Ukraine is provoked to an offensive, and not only from Russia.
Continuous leaks appear in the Western press about the need to conduct a successful offensive as a test, which must be passed in order to receive admission to the next semester (military training). And although these rumors are immediately refuted, the sediment remains. And in the Ukraine itself, the expectations of a big offensive, which will quickly end the war, grow by exponent. The authorities are partly for them to navigate, but partly herself warms them. Together, it grows up in the desires, which, having begun to move from the mountain, turns into the very very self -retreating prophecy.
Can a Ukrainian offensive be successful? Why not? We saw how it happens, and we can well see more. But from the point of view of general logic, taking into account the current nature of the war, the balance of power and other factors, a great offensive creates increased risks for Ukraine. It is at the time of the offensive that the Ukrainian army may turn out to be the most vulnerable. I think those who are supposed to be in the leadership of the Armed Forces are perfectly understood without clues. The problem is, however, that a lump of desires flying from the mountain may prevent them from making a rational and balanced decision. Political priorities can be arranged differently than the military, and this can lead to serious problems.
At the strategic level, the situation looks even more difficult. In fact, we are talking about a fork: a long resource war for exhaustion, where Ukraine is more vulnerable by definition, as it should be based mainly on external resources that are provided to it on not quite understandable and transparent conditions, or a large -scale offensive operation, where there is too much and at once. This is a difficult choice that requires courage and wisdom. And in any case - wide support from the society.
I am not in the position of a person who can prompt Ukrainians, what choice they should make in this situation. But I consider it extremely dangerous and provocative to push them in one direction or another, including multiplying high expectations relative to the coming offensive. Among other things, this is a war of nerves. The one who has the first one can not stand the nerves risks losing everything.