How can the Kremlin attack be beneficial to Ukraine? What if this is a provocation of the Kremlin itself?

We discuss the main versions of what happened with political scientist Kirill Shamiev

On the night of May 3, two drones attacked the Kremlin residence of Vladimir Putin. The president himself was not in the Kremlin at that moment, his press secretary Dmitry Peskov claims. Who exactly organized the attack is unknown. The Russian authorities accuse Ukraine; In Kyiv, they say that they do not attack “neither Moscow nor Putin” - and suggest that this may be a provocation from the Russian Federation. Medusa talked about these versions with Kirill Shamiev-a political scientist, a researcher of civilian relations and an invited researcher of the European Council for International Affairs.

- How believable is the version of the Russian authorities that the Kremlin attacked Ukraine?

- I think this is believable for many reasons. To begin with, this fits into the logic of the murder of Daria Dugina and Vladlen Tatar . These are attacks on very symbolic targets that do not carry any military man and, I would even say, direct managerial significance. These are not some officials of the presidential administration, not propagandists from Channel One, but important-from an ideological point of view-people for the Z-patriotic Russian public.

It seems to me that the political leadership of Ukraine is trying to destabilize the domestic political situation in Russia as much as possible. The liberation of Crimea, publicly declared now, is a big task. It will be very, very difficult to conquer these territories by military if the political power in the Kremlin remains as strict as it is now.

[But] Who remained in Russia [after the outbreak of war]? Many are a displeased Z-public, while others are under pressure from the state. That murders, that symbolic attacks are another irritation [those who support the war]. Another symbol that Vladimir Putin is losing. This is a shame - both for the FSO guarding the Kremlin, and for Vladimir Putin.

The second point is a Ukrainian reaction. They never directly take responsibility, but according to the comments of [Ukrainian officials], the media shows that the reaction is agreed.

In addition, in recent days we have seen several attacks on the railway infrastructure [in Russia], failed attacks on the electrical infrastructure. There was also a drone attack on the oil depot in Crimea, which supplies fuel for military equipment. In my opinion, the counterattack [of the Ukrainian army] has already begun. This can be called a forming phase.

[These] attacks occur not only to the infrastructure that is important for the front, but also in the depths of the Russian rear. They force the Kremlin to redirect part of the air defense systems into the country, thereby reducing the saturation of these systems at the front. Given the paranoia of the Russian government, such a symbolic goal [like the Kremlin], it can be expected that even more air defense systems will appear in Moscow. What does that mean? So, at the front there will be even fewer, which Ukraine wants to achieve.

- The fact that the first videos with smoke over the Kremlin appeared at night, but it was widely known about the attack only during the day, does not force you to doubt this version?

- This argument a little forces me to doubt my first hypothesis, but it is not enough to abandon it. I would say that my confidence fell from the original 70% to 65%. When the data still appears, perhaps everything will have to be reviewed again.

-Do you see any benefit for the Kremlin in this situation? Can he use it to “rally” Russians? Or maybe explain the future attacks of Ukraine? Or prepare an information field before a counterattack?

- I have no data, but it seems to me that there is such an attack on the Kremlin ... Moreover, the Senate Palace, where Vladimir Putin had a meeting on February 21 [2022] with the Security Council. This attack, in my opinion, is more frightened by people: Moscow and the Kremlin are not safe, something continues to go wrong.

Can it rally people? The cohesion mechanism is not clear to me. Where to rally further? State resources control everything. All who do not agree are repressed.

-But can this be, for example, another reminder from the authorities, that there is a struggle, as they say, with “fascist Ukraine, NATO and the whole world”-and you need to rally, do not worry about electronic summons and go to fight?

- Yesterday and today [May 2 and 3], the “State Services” sent letters with a reminder of a fire in the house of trade unions in Odessa [in 2014] - such things work for unification at the human level (“a terrible crime”, “many died a terrible death”). This also fies the rhetoric that the Kremlin uses about the "fascist" Ukraine. A degree of hatred in some people rises.

But the attack on the Kremlin ... This is an infrastructure object that is important [only] from the point of view of the symbols of Russia. I'm not sure that he will bear such a meaning.

- Then I will add that now propaganda covers the attack also as "an attempt to kill the president."

- Of course, this is important for the patriotic public. Plus, this is also the legitimization of a possible answer. Because it will be necessary to answer something. Probably once again - missile strikes in the cities of Ukraine (also important from a symbolic point of view).

In addition, this [can be emphasized] for the international audience - the president himself [tried to attack]. This will not be an argument for everyone, but for part of the public abroad, I think, can also work.

Why is it partial to me in part to agree with this version [that the Kremlin itself organized the attack to unite Russians]? I would understand if the president’s support was just as high, but without repressiveness [in the country]. And now, in the conditions of repression, it’s hard for me to say how much this support is supervertative, and not from the series: “I do not want to get on the head,” “I don’t want to lose work” and “we are attacked, we must stay of the president.” This is a different type of electoral support than true support based on ideology, charisma and electoral procedures.

- How can the West can react to this attack?

- The West is very wary of such blows and does not support them. The farther from Russia, the more they do not like attacks on important objects, because the theory is still important there that if you completely overdo it, Putin will begin to bomb everyone with nuclear weapons.

In East European countries, they do not agree with this absolutely - for example, in the Baltic countries, Poland. Their position is that Putin is already dangerous, and therefore it is necessary to put pressure on him. I think they can support the Ukrainian authorities that any goals are legitimate if they are connected with the war in Ukraine.

- Is it possible to wait for another round of escalation? And what can wait for us further?

“To be honest, I don’t know where to escape further.” On the one hand, Russia has already escalated as much as possible. On the other hand, technical capabilities are now limited. A lot of losses of equipment, lack of ammunition. It can be seen how the intensity of missile shelling and their quality decreased.

Attacks on nuclear infrastructure are yes, escalation. But this is the transition of the war to the new stage. I am of the opinion that if any nuclear weapon is used, then the United States will somehow avenge the Kremlin for violating taboos.

-It seems that this attack makes it impossible to talk about any negotiations . Is that so? Is it possible to assume then that there can be a certain group of military people who disagree on negotiations?

- Ukraine stated that there would be no negotiations with Putin, for a long time. Therefore, this attack here does not change their position.

As for Russia, this war has no clearly set goals. This is a weak and strong place. On the one hand, it is difficult to achieve clearly set goals, on the other, any relative defeat can be served as victory. When the goals are not clear, the space for the dialogue is greater.

From my sphere of competence to study the Russian army, it seems to me that the military leadership will be one of the first to lead for the end of the war. Colossal costs, a huge amount of losses: equipment, personnel. Many problems have been identified. And according to those [research] data that already exists, the Russian military leadership could not be very much and according to the beginning of the so-called “special military operation”.

Talked by Christina Safonova