Halling Victory

Alexei Makarkin in the Bunin & Co telegram channel argues what the results of a VTsIOM survey about the USSR contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany can say:

“A VTIIMA survey, dedicated to Victory Day, showed that the perestroika and post -Soviet narrative, connecting the huge losses of the Soviet people with the fact that the Stalinist leadership was not considered the victims, and the Soviet command was weak and inappropriate, was currently localized as part of a sharply reduced numerically westernized part of society.

Under a strict condition - the ability to choose only one response about the causes of losses - the option denouncing the Stalinist leadership, chose 12%, and the Soviet command - 4%. In the amount of 16%. In 2001, respectively, 25 and 12% in the amount of 37%, that is, more than a third of the company. Even in 2016, that is, after the accession of Crimea and a sharp cooling of relations with the West-20% and 7%-that is, in the amount of 27%-more than a quarter of respondents.

The narrative about the weakness of the command was always significantly less popular-both in perestroika, and in the 90s the state contrasted Stalin Marshal Zhukov <...>, and then the popular thesis that the victory was won contrary to Stalin did not contradict a positive assessment of the activities of the Soviet military leaders. Now the idea of ​​the error of the command is completely marginalized.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the thesis that the USSR could win without the support of the allies dominated even in 2001 - then 76% of Russians supported it, even more than now (66%). The idea that in the coalition wars the allies historically were a burden for Russia at best, and at worst - a threat - dates back to the pre -war years. <...>

During the post -war struggle with cosmopolitanism, this idea sharply intensified - and the positive “interrupted” the anti -Hitler coalition of wartime. <...> In society, the idea that they did not know how to “really” fight and were ready to betray the USSR, which the archetypal Stirlitz prevented.

<...> Among Russians from 18 to 24 years old, the majority (albeit insignificant) believe that without allies the USSR would not have won <...>, among the 25-34-year-olds, supporters of the Soviet approach are somewhat prevailing (50 to 41%). For comparison-in a generation of 45-59 years, 74% believe that without the British and Americans it would be possible to do. ”