
Nikol Pashinyan. Photo: Era
- Pashinyan is not the first to declare that he was ready to recognize Karabakh by the territory of Azerbaijan. Why did this cause such a reaction in Armenia now? How serious is it that it was still?
- Pashinyan made this statement completely officially, it sounded in parliament. And it was suggested by the upcoming meeting, which will be held in Moscow on May 25, with the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The statement that Pashinyan is ready to agree to the signing of a peace treaty, according to which Karabakh would become part of Azerbaijan, is one of the reference points of this agreement, so he had to confirm this to the Moscow meeting. Moreover, this follows from the Alma-Ata declaration of 1991, which is referred to by both parties. Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize their territories as of the signing of this declaration.
Why now such a stir arose, I do not really understand. For those who monitor the process, there is nothing sensational here. I think that those who Pashinyan’s words are given the opportunity to sharply start an attack against him, calling him a traitor to the interests of the Armenian people, a usurper of power, and consolidate not only the Armenian politics and Armenian society, but also a foreign Armenian diaspora. And try to use this to shift him from the post of prime minister.
- They will succeed, do you think? On one side of the scales - this is the desire to shift Pashinyan, on the other - the world, people will cease to die. And Pashinyan’s rating is quite high.
- And what is his rating?
- In the last elections, his party, if I am not mistaken, won with the result of 53%, and this was after the war.
- Probably, you can refer to the rating confirmed in the last election ...
- Even if it is no longer relevant, then the opposition represented by the “former”, Sergey Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, is definitely hated in Armenia. Will they be able to shift Pashinyan now?
- My short answer is not. But the point is not even in his ranking. Those who want to shift it are not able to offer an alternative to the character of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, which Pashinyan prepares.
-The fact of the matter is that they will not have a world differently.
- Therefore, previous attempts to demolish Pashinyan were not successful. Yes, it’s clear that
People are tired of the war, from the constantly hanging Damoklov sword of its renewal. And Azerbaijan all the time demonstrates that he is ready to start it at any time,
When it seems to him that the pressure on Armenia is insufficient, that it is still resting. Do not forget that Azerbaijan considers himself a winner in a 44-day war, deciding after the war of the 1990s, that he intends to receive all dividends from this victory and is ready to use all methods, including the military. And most importantly, he does not hide it.
- But there are conditions in which Pashinyan is ready to subscribe to such a peace agreement: guarantees of Armenia’s security, guarantees of its territorial integrity, and so on. Azerbaijan will subscribe to this?
- You very accurately indicated these nervous moments, just did not agree.
- Yes, another condition is a guarantee of compliance with the rights of Armenians Karabakh.
- That's right. And if you continue to talk about it, now Baku, unlike previous times, when he refused any contacts with Stepanakert, insists: since this is already a thing that has already been solved, since Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, then the Azerbaijani authorities will somehow agree with their population. With his Armenian population of Karabakh. Directly. And the Armenians of the Metropolis should no longer participate in this. This, of course, is not enough to guarantee the rights of the Armenian population of Karabakh. And Yerevan, of course, will insist on the more stringent conditions of compliance with these rights. I think that without contacting a fairly significant international guarantors, the case will not be decided.
As for those provisions that you called the first, they are really the most significant. In my opinion, the main incentive leading Yerevan to sign a peace treaty is the desire to protect the country from attempts by the annexation of the territory by Azerbaijan. This is confirmed by Armenian leaders. That is, there must be strict guarantees of inviolability that Baku must give. It is Baku, and not some external sponsors or other structures. Because it is known: in recent years, Baku has been using force regardless of external sponsors and allies of Armenia. It is this Regulation on the guarantee of inviolability on the part of Baku should be, according to Yerevan, one of the elements of a peace agreement.
- All this happens against the backdrop of a war in Ukraine, which Russia once gave guarantees of territorial integrity. And there were even external allies that signed under such guarantees. If Azerbaijan subscribes under such a condition, can Armenia believe him?
- You can, of course, look for analogies between different international documents, such as the Budapest Memorandum, which Moscow considers not fully binding the document ...
- Moscow, of course, says that this is a memorandum - and nothing more.
- Yes, it was not ratified, although now it is already the past stage, yesterday's snow.
- There is still a completely ratified agreement on the border with Ukraine of 2003, Putin signed. That is, you can say "yesterday's snow" about any document?
- You ask whether to believe or not to believe. Does Armenia have another way out?
-A certain final solution to the issue is offered by Armenia by its Western allies. And Russia offers a different way out: to hang the situation for some time, let it hang.
- Then we must go to the topic of the CSTO. As long as Armenia remains a member of the organization, this connects her hands, she cannot provide herself with military guarantees from Western countries. The CSTO agreement prohibits participants without coordination with partners to place a military infrastructure of third countries on their territory.
Suppose Armenia will be able to leave the CSTO. And this is not a very simple procedure, it takes some time. But if this happens, then her hands will be untied, she will be able to receive military infrastructure.
And then this infrastructure, according to Yerevan’s confidence, which are already fed by promises from Western partners, can serve as an additional guarantee of the inviolability of Armenia. But! But without obligations from Azerbaijan itself, no document about this will be a really guarantee.
- Is Russia beneficial in principle that the conflict is resolved in any way - while preserving Karabakh, with the loss of Karabakh? The war is over, the world has been signed - Russia, in theory, must take its peacekeepers, that is, to get out of the region generally. She wants a peace treaty to be signed on May 25
- It is already known that no document will be signed on May 25. Firstly, Pashinyan said about this, eliminating all sorts of illusions. Yes, no one expected this from negotiations on May 25. This document will not be signed earlier than the end of summer - beginning of autumn.
- Let it not on May 25, even if in September, at any time. Russia generally wants a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan to be signed?
- Russia, of course, in the case of signing this document will lose grounds for the placement of peacekeepers in Karabakh. At least for the reason that Aliyev has already stated: since Karabakh becomes the territory of Azerbaijan, he will not allow the military of third states there. This means that the mandate, which provides for the peace of peacekeepers there until 2025, will be canceled. This will, of course, cause serious damage to Russian influence in the region.
True, do not forget that the 102nd military base of Russia in Gyumri remains. But in fact, you are right: the freezing of the conflict would be much more responsible for the interests of Moscow than its decision. Unless, subject to the confirmation of the role of Moscow as the main peacekeeper. Namely, this is the case.
This stage of negotiations in Moscow, it seems to me, is nothing more than an attempt by Yerevan to save the face of Russia, who considers himself the chief negotiator and the main peacekeeper, at least on the basis that it was during the mediation of Russia in 2020 that the war was discontinued. Russia believes that everything should continue to follow the patterns that were determined by tripartite agreements with the participation of Russia.
But the train of this peaceful process is leaving. And he leaves west. Either Russia will be given the opportunity to jump into some last car of this peaceful process, or Russia is out of work. Overboard. But no one, I think, is not needed. What is important for us - checkers or go? We need peace, and let Russia be one of the guarantors of this world, although he will lose its eternal desire to demonstrate its influence to a certain extent. It is to demonstrate, "hold the flag." This was and remains the main desire of Russia throughout the space of the former Soviet Union.

- How can this role of Russia as the main peacekeeper can be legally fixed so that this in practice affects the future world in the region, safety, and so on? Well, they will tell Putin that he is the main one. How will this prevent one side of attacking the other if she wants it?
- And this is a question of diplomacy. I think that in the interests of the real world to provide Russia with a share of responsibility for preserving the world. Otherwise, according to the examples known to us in Moscow, there will be those who want to put sticks in the wheels with this peaceful process that goes without Moscow.
- Why is Armenia this role of Moscow? Pashinyan has already said a hundred times that Armenia wants to leave the CSTO. Why should they remain in the organization if the world is signed, and the role of Russia is fixed formally and without CSTO?
- The exit from the CSTO is not the only opportunity for Yerevan. This is their request. Yerevan can achieve some concessions from Moscow regarding the requirements put forward by him, in particular, that Moscow politically described the annexation of Armenian territory by Azerbaijan. Moscow did not do this, and this was the reason why Armenia refused to sign the final document of the CSTO. That is, it can be a request. Moscow may make concessions to preserve Armenia in the CSTO. And there is a certain intrigue in this: how Moscow will react. Note that the latest reactions to Pashinyan’s statements about the CSTO were very careful and not too categorical. Dmitry Peskov said about this: we, they say, will work with partners, we will discuss. That is, Moscow demonstrated some readiness for a compromise.
- What is the compromise? What kind of concessions can it be?
- Let's start with the very last case: so that Moscow gets from Azerbaijan unlocking the Lachinsky corridor. Until now, she has not been able to do this, demonstrated her powerlessness. She can begin to press more strongly on Azerbaijan. And this can serve as such a preventive demonstration of readiness by Azerbaijan to conclude a contract. True, then this will no longer be the influence of Moscow, but the good will of Azerbaijan.
- Exactly. Then how can Moscow blur Yerevan?
- I don't know.
Maybe he will say that Russia is finally ready to put Armenia weapons. Which has long been promised
And for which, according to Yerevan, about $ 200 million was paid.
- Well, what weapons? Here is the situation "who would give it themselves" ...
- I don't know. Don't know.
- If Russia went to these “concessions” earlier, if she had otherwise behaved in the war for Karabakh, if she showed herself to be a reliable ally of Armenia, would Pashinyan in principle have to raise the question of the surrender of Karabakh, about the exit from the CSTO?
- Yes, from the very beginning from Russia they expected that she would more radically stand up for the CSTO ally, according to the charter of the organization. But to solve a consensus in the CSTO, and it could not be there. Among the partner countries there are at least three that have a much warmer relationship with Baku than with Yerevan, these are the countries of Central Asia. And this once again showed that the CSTO is an incompetent organization, if we are talking about resolving conflicts between the former republics of the Soviet Union.
The bilateral assistance of Russia, apparently, was also recognized as inappropriate, since this would mean the loss of Azerbaijan as an object of Russian influence in the region, and this would be extremely undesirable for Russia.
- Maybe just the second? And then, if you say to the Armenians about the consensus in the CSTO, they will laugh and answer that everything Russia decides there.
- This is not entirely true. There are binding documents, bypass them, if she wanted to act on behalf of the CSTO, could not. It could only be about bilateral actions.