
Photo: EPA-EFE/SERGEI ILNITSKY
Recall: when the former cook and former owner of the Wagner PMC Evgeny Prigozhin led his army to the capital, the presidential aircraft, Prime Minister and other officials flew from Moscow. The security forces courageously covered their rear, but - not moving away from the Moscow region. In order not to inadvertently stumble upon Prigozhinsky. There were reports that some parts of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were thrown from the zone of special operations, but to which geographical point they were abandoned and where then divided, it is unknown. Meanwhile, the Wagnerians took Rostov-on-Don, occupied the headquarters of the Southern Military District without a fight and, through Lipetsk, approached Moscow. The Chechen regiment “Akhmat” hurried to them, but something prevented him from relying to the goal. All this happened under the friendly Yernica of some Russians and with a unanimous non -participation of others. Two hundred kilometers from Moscow, everything suddenly ended. In the suppression of the rebellion, not a single power structure could really participate - except for military pilots who died in helicopters shot down by Wagnerians and an airplane.
Putin thanked “all the Russian military” for the suppression of the rebellion, for the “determination and courage” shown at the same time, for “acting clearly and harmoniously” and, as a result, “stopped the civil war”. He thanked law enforcement officers who "stood in the way near the Troubles." The people thanked for consolidation and support: "I did not doubt what the reaction would be." Wagnerovtsev also thanked. Because they stopped rebelling, knocking down only six helicopters and only one aircraft, killing more than ten pilots.
According to the official version, the head of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, agreed with Prigozhin. Prigozhin and his people are allowed to “go to Belarus”, the criminal case of the armed rebellion was terminated. According to the unofficial-successful negotiations somewhere under the carpet was held by the former adjutant Putin, and now the governor of the Tula region Colonel General Alexei Dyumin. It seems that this is the only security officer who could attribute his merit in the suppression of the rebellion, but he refutes it himself.
The main result of all this can be considered an unprecedented strengthening of the Russian Guard. Not the army that lost the Wagnerians who have gone to Belarus and confront the onslaught of the Armed Forces, namely the Russian Guard.
"The work of power structures during a military rebellion can be evaluated as magnificent!" - the commander of the Rosgvardyyans Viktor Zolotov praised himself. It is its structure that now has to become a parallel army. The second in Russia or the first - let's see, but earlier this role was assigned to Prigozhinsky PMC.
“In fact, this is already happening,” remarks the political strategist Abbas Gallyamov. -
The Russian Guard receives heavy weapons, armored vehicles, and this is an element of creating a parallel army.
Two days after everyone moved away from the rebellion, Viktor Zolotov asked President Putin Tanks. In accordance with the Federal Law “On the troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation”, its priority tasks are “participating in the protection of public order, ensuring public security”, the fight against extremism, the protection of “senior officials of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation” and other important objects. How is it without tanks? No way.

During the march of the Wagner PMC for Moscow, the Russian Guard (as it turned out) resisted the rebels with might and main. She just explained Zolotov to TASS to the agency, did it in Moscow, and the Wagnerians did not reach a formidable barrier. If they reached, they would be replied that “any provocation, any rally, if they threatened the country” would be, Golotov, “reflected and suppressed” menacingly.
Summing up the results of the heroic defense of Moscow by the Rosgvardamy, President Putin agreed to equip them not only with tanks, but also with other heavy equipment.
There were reports that the Zolotov department would be transferred to the technique that previously owned by the Wagner PMC. Trophy, that is: winners from the vanquished. It was only incomprehensible: the equipment would be taken from the front and adjusted to Moscow, where he was used to protecting his president Zolotov, or, conversely, the guards would be adjusted to the combat zone. Surely Zolotov was also worried about this question. On the evening of Tuesday, June 27, State Duma deputy Alexander Khinshtein announced that the tanks of the Russian Guard would not receive Wagnerian: she will be allocated from the budget for money for the purchase of equipment “within the framework of the state defense order”. Zolotov will buy tanks in the same way as he used to buy cabbage in the past.
An expert on Russian foreign and defense policy, political analyst Pavel Lusin believes that it does not matter where exactly will take the heavy equipment of the Russian Guard - "he will receive from the storage base or redistribute from the army."
“Not every tank itself is important here, it is or not, it is important here the document on which the tank should be,” Lusin notes. - The document on which the resource is allocated for this. If suddenly doubts about one of the army generals, then you can always give him an order to immediate transfer the tanks of the Russian Guard as part of the previously made decisions.

Thus, it was the Russian Guard who turned out to be a power structure, which most of all benefited from an interrupted rebellion. Political scientist Nikolai Petrov agrees with this: according to him, the events on June 23–24 showed President Putin against which enemy should be arming.
“The rebellion itself shows that the greatest risks today are not associated with external enemies and not with the“ fifth column ”, but with internal schisms,” says Petrov. -And if there is a danger of repetition that military force will once again be used, then such a danger must correspond to the possibilities of those who will eliminate the threat. But let's wait for some real actions, real steps, and not public statements.
Prigozhinsky march showed that the internal enemy may be the one who swore to you allegiance yesterday and promised to be the most devoted “infantryman”. Well, or marching by the arm with another devoted "infantryman".
“Putin saw how an attempt by a military coup might look,” says Abbas Gallyamov.
-Now he understands that some parts at the front can continue to rebel. This often happens when you are conducting an unpopular, protracted war and lose.
As practice has shown, the military can reach Moscow per day or two. In order to withstand it, the Russian Guard, on which Putin, apparently, counts more than on other power structures, must have appropriate weapons. Simply put, Putin is preparing for a military coup.
Pavel Lusin also believes that the Rosgard is armed for a reason. And not out of fear of the “fifth column”, which has long been put to flight.
“Judging by the statements, the strengthening of the Russian Guard will be in contrast to the armed forces,” says Luzin. - The Russian Guard is needed as a fuse from the armed forces.
The Wagnerians were considered, as we heard many times, the most combat -ready units at the front. But not because the prisoners are trained in military affairs better than contractors in the Ministry of Defense. Just Prigozhin did not wait for orders from above to every step and were not related to any rules except his own. Shoot the prisoner, kill your sledgehammer, put outlines, steal from army equipment - yes, please, he was also proud of it.
“The Wagnerians were more motivated and ideologically charged,” says Pavel Lusin. - Well, in addition, they were not constrained by the organizational and bureaucratic restrictions that the regular army has.
The combat effectiveness built on such a principle has the opposite side. She led to the fact that Prigozhin, in the words of Nikolai Petrov, entwined. Putin, who is thinking in his paradigm, had to conclude: if the same wise guy rises at the head of the army, then at the next coup you can not have time to fly from Moscow. And if you don’t put the wise guy, then the “second army of the world” turns into a “second in Russia”. And what to do here? And Putin decides to prepare.
“The transfer of heavy equipment of the Russian Guard says that Putin understands: if he does not provide the military in Ukraine with freedom of action, if he further integrates them in the vertical decision, he will never receive a combat -ready army,” Petrov explains. - But if, on the contrary, he will choose a primacy of effectiveness over control, he must take care of the consequences. So that the next time the military will bury and go to Rostov or Moscow, there was something to oppose to them. In this sense, the Russian Guard, equipped and armed in accordance with the scale of threats, looks logical.
In fact, Putin is arming not so much to the Russian Guard as Zolotov personally. Nikolai Petrov draws attention to the factors of personal sympathy and personal devotion, which the Russian president used to be guided by. This is more important for him than effectiveness.
“In the personalist system, when the leader is also almost completely isolated, when he really communicates with a very limited circle of people, those people who know how to like it when communicating,” Petrov says. - He simply does not have others. And he will rush all the time among 10-15 people, whom he personally knows.
Abbas Galyamov also believes that Putin’s choice is small and the strengthening of Zolotov deserved not brilliant participation in the suppression of the rebellion.
“Putin has no one better,” the political strategist explains. - When he looks at what he has, he understands that he can only count on Zolotov. He created a problem for Putin all the time only once, when he tried to call Navalny to a duel, but after that he no longer did such nonsense. Accordingly, his Putin decides to arm.
During his march, Prigozhin, as we know, demanded the resignations of the defense minister Sergei Shoigu and the head of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. And it seems to him even promised him in exchange for the termination of the rebellion. The names of generals, supposedly friendly Prigozhin and therefore claiming future vacancies, began to flicker in telegram-channels. For example, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseev and Army General Sergei Surovikin. Both at the beginning of the rebellion, through the videos, called to Prigogine, asking to stop.
- Do we know the generals who were friends with Prigozhin? - surprised Pavel Lusin. “I don’t know such people, but it’s pointless to guess here.” It is very easy to confuse friendship with hardware etiquette and actions within the framework of interagency interaction. At the same time, we still have a lot of questions to where there were and what many visible and invisible participants in the events did. Let's see the situation.
But I will be surprised if, after everything that happened in the army, there are no permutations and purges. It will be not only about the effectiveness of candidates, but also about their loyalty.
About their non -participation in political intrigues against the backdrop of a sparkling authoritarian regime.
The choice between loyalty and efficiency, notes Nikolai Petrov, Putin, it would seem, has already been burned. At one time, he at the head of the Ministry of Defense of Shoigu - a civilian man who does not mean anything in military affairs, but from head to toe loyal. Gerasimov, who was waiting for the team from above, set the head of the General Staff to him at every step. In combat conditions, it suddenly became clear that fully controlled troops and troops are effective - these are mutually exclusive things.

It is because of the personal characteristics of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, says Abbas Galyamov, is unlikely to be threatened by the military leaders.
“There are two opposite vectors that drag Putin in different directions,” the political strategist explains. - From the point of view of domestic policy, it is impossible to change Shoigu and Gerasimov in any case: it will be perceived as if Putin bent before Prigozhin. After that, the question will arise who is the main in the country. It turns out that the ministers are taking off and does not appoint Putin, but Prigozhin? This is unacceptable. That is, from this point of view, they cannot be touched. But from the military point of view, one cannot but touch, it is necessary to urgently change: there is a war, and people who send soldiers and officers to death should enjoy maximum authority. But what can Shoigu and Gerasimov have authority now? Prigogine chased after them, called women, and they were hiding, and no one knew where they were. In such crisis situations, Putin has not yet been.
In fact, in the fall of last year, Putin was in a similar situation, although, of course, not so sharp. Then Prigozhin demanded “giving Surovikin” - and he was “given Surovikin”: the general general, for whom the owner of the PMC, was appointed to command the united Russian group in Ukraine. Surovikin significantly frowned in TV, and it turned out that he brilliantly fights with unarmed people. He became famous for the bombing of civilian objects in Syria, and in Ukraine his main achievement was shelling of residential buildings, playgrounds and shopping centers. Another energy infrastructure, so that the civilian at the same time freeze. Surovikin passed Kherson, and three months after his appointment, to Prigozhin’s displeasure, Putin returned to command Gerasimov’s fighting operations.
Nikolai Petrov believes that the personnel permits in the Ministry of Defense will occur, but not immediately, but after some time. According to him, if they are pushed towards Shoigu, then after about six months. And imperceptibly. As a Minister of Defense, he is for Putin, obsessed with Paranoia, it is good that they do not like him in the army, which means that they will not be raped around him. The same can be said about Gerasimov, only he can threaten the resignation soon.
“If Gerasimov had some achievements from the time that he was appointed the main in Ukraine, then they are only in Prigozhinsky Bakhmut,” says Petrov. -And, in general, nothing more. That is, if Putin shows impatience, he may recall that Gerasimov could not cope with any task.
Surovikina again became forgiven to the place of the head of the General Staff, or even at all in the ministers of the defense. In the evening of June 23, he made a video message in which he called for Prigogine to change his mind. True, we do not know where and in what conditions he recorded this. Since then, Surovikina in the public has not seen either alive or in the recording. The New York Times reported that he knew about the preparation of the rebellion and even contributed to him. Evil tongues say that Surovikin is already in Lefortovo. The former editor-in-chief of Echo of Moscow, Alexei Venediktov, wrote in his telegram channel that the general "did not get in touch with the family for three days." This is little like preparation for an increase. However, in Russia it does not happen.

Another candidate for defense ministers call the Tula governor, former adjutant Putin, Colonel General Alexei Dyumin, who is attributed to success in negotiations with Prigozhin.
“In general, Dyumin fits into that concept when a military corporation is headed by an outsider, which makes him loyal Putin, and the army is incapable of consolidation,” says Nikolai Petrov. “But this is, in fact, the same model as with Shoigu.” The very fact of the appointment of Dyumin would mean that the Kremlin continues to reproduce the old and ineffective concept during the war: he is rather afraid of military corporations, which counts on their effective work. I think that this option would be even worse than Shoigu. Unlike Shoigu, Dyumin has no team. His experience in the Ministry of Defense is two months as deputy minister, this is perhaps for a track record.
Theoretically, Putin could produce some more complex castles, moving several security forces from place to place, as in the game “fifteen”.
“But that would be in its pure form of Krylov’s fable“ Quartet, ”objects Nikolai Petrov. “We, of course, are observing her, but not on such a scale.” In addition, Putin simply does not have military leaders whom he could put on the post of Minister of Defense.
Abbas Galyamov agrees that Dyumin is clearly “promoted”, and for a long time and aim more with a sight than to post in the Ministry of Defense. In this, the political strategist sees the participation of different members of the Putin Politburo, starting from the deputy head of the administration, Sergei Kiriyenko and ending with the Kovalchuk brothers - not to the best influential, we recall Putin's friends since the Lake Cooperative.
“Dyumin as a whole has good chances to become Putin’s successor,” Gallimov is sure. - He is the most compromise candidate in elites, moreover, Putin’s personal trust.
But that is why, the political strategist continues, the appointment of Dyumin the Minister of Defense would be a mistake.
“Now he stands aloof from the war and is not completely discredited,” explains Glalyamov. — Если он возглавит Министерство обороны, поражение в войне всё равно будет, неизбежно, но вся ответственность за позорный мир ляжет на него. Шойгу сможет сказать: ну вот, пока я был министром, мы более-менее воевали, хоть и отступали, а пришел этот, и всё посыпалось. То есть репутация Дюмина будет испорчена из-за чужих грехов. Есть и второе обстоятельство: став министром обороны, он будет запятнан кровью. Значит, станет неприемлем как переговорщик и для Владимира Зеленского, и для Запада. А перед преемником будет стоять задача глобальная, этот проект и нужен для того, чтобы перевести конфликт с военных рельсов на дипломатические. Потому что на военных Россия проигрывает. Здесь нужен человек незапятнанный.
Шансы Дюмина стать преемником Путина, а не Шойгу, по словам Аббаса Галлямова, резко выросли именно во время пригожинского мятежа. Раньше речь шла о двух предполагаемых кандидатах: кроме Дюмина, называли еще Дмитрия Патрушева, сына секретаря Совбеза, экс-главы ФСБ и особо доверенного для Путина человека Николая Патрушева.
— Но шансы Патрушева-сына теперь резко упали, — продолжает Галлямов, — в силу того, что его отец полностью дискредитировал себя в ситуации с Пригожиным. Это была его зона ответственности: не допустить подобного конфликта.

Структурой, по которой тоже непременно будут сделаны оргвыводы, Николай Петров считает ФСБ. Если американская разведка, как пишет NYT, знала о подготовке мятежа, если о ней знали украинцы и даже российские генералы, то трудно представить, что чекисты и вообще все, кого курирует Патрушев, просто прохлопали заговор. Единственное, что они сделали, это возбудили уголовное дело о вооруженном мятеже, а потом так же послушно это дело прекратили. Но если грядущие чистки в Минобороны обсуждают повсеместно, то вокруг ФСБ всё тихо.
— Я думаю, что ФСБ сознательно выведена из публичного обсуждения как служба, которая не предохранила страну от такой ситуации, — говорит Николай Петров. — Конечно, по ней выводы тоже будут сделаны, пусть мы и не узнаем об этом в ближайшее время. Потому что Путин зациклен на своей безопасности. А степень его испуга в этой ситуации видна хотя бы по тому, как он, презрев санитарные нормы, вышел на люди и встречался с силовиками, сидя с ними за одним столом, а не в десяти метрах, как обычно. То есть его очень сильно встряхнуло. И ему надо перестроить систему так, чтобы минимизировать риски, с которыми он столкнулся. При этом у него нет возможности начинать какие-то масштабные чистки, иначе обвинять придется людей, от которых он, в общем-то, продолжает полностью зависеть.
Еще одна боевая группа, которая блестяще проявила себя при подавлении мятежа, — это полк «Ахмат». Бойцы Рамзана Кадырова во весь опор мчались сразиться с вагнеровцами, но не доехали. Судя по фото и видео, застряли в пробке.
— Реноме кадыровцев, которое и без того было подпорчено бесконечными тик-ток-войнами, пострадало от этого еще больше, — констатирует Аббас Галлямов. — Неслучайно над ними сейчас смеются, называя Кадырова недоехавшим. Но при этом Кадыров сделал главное: сохранил своих людей. Для него это принципиально важно, потому что не будет кадыровцев — с самим Кадыровым никто не станет считаться ни в Чечне, ни в Москве. А риск положить их в угоду Путину в боях с «Вагнером» был. Кадыров этого избежал. Ну а то, что смеются, бог с ним, придется потерпеть.
Пока мятеж бушевал, казалось, что из этой реальности как-то выпал замглавы Совета безопасности РФ и второй президент Дмитрий Медведев. От него ждали ярких выступлений в соцсетях, а он именно в этот момент замолк.
— Нет-нет, что-то он в твиттере писал, — возражает Аббас Галлямов. — Но Медведев не оказывает сейчас никакого влияния на происходящие в стране события, он просто превратился в еще одного пропагандиста.
И, наконец, сам президент Путин. В тот день, когда начался мятеж, он пропал с радаров — в самом прямом смысле слова: некоторое время любители отслеживали по сайту Flightradar24 президентский борт, удалявшийся от Москвы куда-то в сторону резиденции в Валдае (там, говорят, есть отдельный бункер), но потом исчез и самолет. Как будто на нем отключили транспондер. В полночь на сайте kremlin.ru вдруг появилась видеозапись с Путиным. Он нашел время и место, чтобы поздравить россиян с Днем молодежи. В субботу утром он все-таки выступил на тему мятежа, назвав его ударом в спину. И дальше выдавал в день по обращению к нации, причем каждое его пресс-секретарь анонсировал как еще более судьбоносное.

— Выступления Путина носили настолько гротескный характер, что лишь ухудшали его положение, — говорит Аббас Галлямов.
— Он совершенно очевидно суетился, чувствовалось, что он в истерике, недоволен и тем, как вел себя во время кризиса, и тем, как кризис разрешился, поэтому как-то пытался переиграть.
Вместо того чтобы перевернуть страницу и идти дальше, он возвращался и возвращался в одну точку, меняя только антураж: то он в кабинете, то на крыльце Кремлевского дворца на Ивановской площади, то в телеобращении. Эта его активность носила компенсаторный характер, он всё пытался выглядеть более убедительно.
На практике это может вылиться в общее снижение поддержки Путина. Хотя в цифрах и в результатах опросов это вряд ли выразится.
— В первую очередь речь идет об элитах, — объясняет Аббас Галлямов. — Конечно, будет разочарование в Путине и в системе в целом, и в народе, но радикального падения рейтинга мы не увидим. Люди уже достаточно хорошо определились в своем отношении к Путину, вряд ли можно повлиять на них так, чтобы они изменили позицию на противоположную. Просто его сторонники станут менее мотивированными, более разочарованными, более усталыми. Начнут отмахиваться от разговоров о политике. То есть в этом лагере произойдет демобилизация. Оппозиция, наоборот, воодушевится: они видели путинский позор, они активно обсуждают, как президент якобы бежал из Москвы. Но главное — элиты увидели, до какой степени нефункциональна система. Они понимают, что случившееся — результат некачественного управления. Любая система может столкнуться с потрясением, с сильным внешним врагом, например, и у нее будут проблемы. Но тут ведь не какие-то внешние враги напали, не Ходорковский организовал бунт, не Навальный, не Америка. Это сделал Пригожин — плоть от плоти системы.
Во всех выступлениях, повторим, Путин не уставал благодарить и хвалить силовиков. Можно только догадываться, с каким удивлением они сами это слушали.
— Это люди, которые уважают только силу, а он продемонстрировал слабость, — добавляет Аббас Галлямов. — Теперь он пытается к ним подольститься. Это ему не сильно поможет.