
Political scientist Alexander Kynev draws conclusions from the events of June 24:
“The first lesson. In the authoritarian regimes in power, which decides to replace in reality electoral legitimacy with a power <...>, there is no good scenario. One large power support <...> is too dangerous, as it makes the leader of the regime completely dependent: in such cases, coups are almost inevitable and the military often replace the military. <...>
One powerful power structure can crush the civil power for itself and with weak democratic traditions in transition regimes <...>. Some power structures monitor others and balance each other, with weakness of other institutions, which is partly inevitable in authoritarian regimes, replacing the usual separation of powers <...> with the separation of security forces.
However, the weakness of the formal institutions of public power can lead to the fact that the competition of security forces can get out of control and turn into an open confrontation. Autocrat cannot eliminate any of the players, since then the general balance will be violated. Institutes are not resolved by the conflict. <...>
The second lesson. Public conflict in authoritarian mode is a sign of weakness, not strength. <...> In a democratic society, appeal to citizens through media is natural. But in the authoritarian regime, the struggle for real power is primarily conducted non -publicly and backstage: making decisions in silence and secrecy only enhances the sacredness and mysterious power of power. Just leaks in the public sphere can disrupt the whole process of lobbyism and decisions <...>. A sharp access to the public in reality looks like a result of a dead end conflict and a gesture of despair, an act of public pressure, which the system is forced to ignore for the sake of maintaining its reputation as a rigid force. <...>
The third lesson. All this is unnecessary proof that the system and the current elite will not just go anywhere, they will not give any power voluntarily to anyone. Conflicts and struggle will be waged within the current government and its groups, no opposition has any significant resources to take part in this. The new system will be born inside the current system and as a result of its internal evolution and nothing else.
<...> The authorities will reduce the influence of too strongly reinforced “radical patriots”, realizing that they get out of control and much more dangerous than quiet and intelligent liberals. Excessively radical figures will be pushed out, resigned, excluded from party lists, disappear from the media, etc.
In the elections, financial sources are less independent of local authorities <...>. The situation in the media is even more monopolized <...>. Gradually, attention will be intensified to domestic policy, which has found in the shadows because of his. ”