A war of attrition

Meduza shares an updated combat map with the latest developments in Bakhmut and southern Ukraine as the war enters a new phase

Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Meduza has adopted a consistent antiwar position, holding Russia responsible for its military aggression and atrocities. As part of this commitment, we regularly update an interactive map that documents combat operations in Ukraine and the damage inflicted by Russia’s invasion forces. Our map is based exclusively on previously published open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect reports already available publicly and determine their geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process.

Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old.

Key updates as of 12:00 p.m. GMT (8:00 a.m. EDT) on July 20, 2023

In the month and a half since the start of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, the Russian command has decided that it no longer needs to passively wait for new attacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Russian forces were previously limited to individual attacks by small forces in the directions where the Ukrainian army has remained on the defensive. Now, Russian attacks in different directions are synchronized, with steadily increasing forces. It’s possible that Russia’s defense ministry no longer fears that the AFU will carry out a large, unexpected attack, except for in the south of the country or in the Bakhmut area. Now, high-intensity combat is taking place all along the front lines, from the border with Russia in the Kharkiv region to the suburbs of Kherson.

All these local offensives, launched by each side at different points along the line of contact, are clearly not pursuing ambitious strategic objectives. But all together they are part of the next phase of the war of attrition. Both sides hope that this summer, they will be able to drag each other’s reserves into a battle aimed at destroying as much enemy equipment and manpower as possible. And when the forces on one side of the front run low, it will then be possible to concentrate properly and think about their own offensive, which can change the strategic situation.

The red dots show recent events, and the gray dots show earlier events. Black indicates the approximate contact line as of the last update; the red and blue areas mark places occupied (since early September) by Russian and Ukrainian forces. Clicking on them will provide additional information. Air strikes are marked with a special icon, ground operations with dots. Click on the point on the map to pull up source links.

Southern Ukraine

The AFU continue to try and get through the five to six kilometer-wide (3.1 to 3.7 mile) area separating their positions from Russian fortifications — Russia’s so-called first line of defense. This is a “no man’s land” filled with mines, with the occasional Russian anti-tank missile system and small village garrison. The Ukrainian army still hasn’t been able to get through to the end of it.

To the west of the Zaporizhzhia region (on the banks of Dnipro river), the AFU have liberated two villages, Lobkove and Piatykhatky. They haven’t been able to advance further into the Russian army’s fortified points in neighbouring Zherebyanky, located to the southwest. Daily attempts to move out of Piatykhatky in this direction have not yet produced results. For unknown reasons, the AFU command have not tried to change the direction of the main attack. It is possible that the decision has been made, since there was movement of Ukrainian troops right to the shore of the Dnipro River, between Ukrainian-controlled Kamianske and Russian-occupied Vasylivka.
In the direction of Orikhiv. After six weeks of combat, AFU units, with major equipment losses, were able to pass through 7-10 kilometers (4-6 miles) separating them from the AFU forward positions in the village of Robotyne. The change of tactics led to the main successes: the AFU’s armored vehicles were no longer used for breakthrough attempts, but rather function as “taxis” for the infantry, delivering reinforcements and ammunition, and evacuating the injured. Soldiers move on foot from the armored vehicle drop off point to rear positions, slowly taking all new forest belts on the road to Robotyne. This allowed for fewer losses of armored vehicles, compared to June (though the losses still continue). At the same time, Ukrainian artillery and drone operators are working toward the destruction of Russian equipment in the rear positions and supply convoys. Russian artillery is attempting to answer in kind. It’s clear that this tactic doesn’t involve deep breakthroughs. The opponents are draining each other in battles for each forest belt, in hopes that the other side’s forces are exhausted faster than their own.
The Velyka Novosilka area. In June, the AFU liberated several villages in the Mokri Yaly river valley, but weren’t able to move further through this strip. They were met with minefields, anti-tank missile systems, helicopter-launched missile strikes, and garrisons in the two villages of Urozhaine and Staromaiorske. For the AFU to move further, they needed to capture the heights to the west of the river valley. And they did, liberating the village of Rivnopil at the start of July. After, Ukrainian troops moved several kilometers further south and reached Staromaiorske from the northwest. However, it looks like the assault on the village, which started this week, has not yet been successful. Armored vehicles, which brought infantry to the outskirts of Staromaiorske, came under Russian artillery fire.

Bakhmut

The AFU have launched a new attempt to break through Russian positions to the north and south of Bakhmut. The attack to the south almost succeeded. Ukrainian units were able to get out of the large fortified area (built before the Russian invasion) on the hills near the village of Klishchiivka. The fortified area had been taken in an assault. Part of the AFU have, however, come under massive artillery fire by Russian forces and experienced major losses (several direct hits on Ukrainian positions were recorded on video). It’s not yet clear if Ukrainian units were able to gain a foothold on the outskirts of Klishchiivka. An AFU victory in this battle can open up a path toward the southern region of Bakhmut and to the track that connects the city with the Luhansk region.
To the north of Bakhmut, the AFU have tried to take the villages of Berkhivka and Yahidne, but they weren’t able to secure the new positions. Ukrainian units retreated, having ended up under massive artillery fire. The Ukrainian command has continued attempts to “chew through” Russian defenses, specifically in Berkhivka and Klishchiivka. To do this, they are attempting to neutralize Russian artillery strikes on their rear positions. Judging by dozens of videos, the AFU are using a whole range of weapons, from kamikaze drones to HIMARS missiles.
Overall, the number of forces involved near Bakhmut continues to grow. The Russian command continues to transfer reserves to Berkhivka and Klishchiivka (visible on the frontlines in the south of Ukraine, where the Russian army has continued to hold defensive positions without using tactical reserves). The units which have replaced Wagner Group in the direction of Bakhmut have become a hodgepodge of the airborne forces and the motorized rifle brigade from the self-declared “LNR” and the Western Military District. Fighting together with them are battalions from different private military companies and prisoners recruited by the Defense Ministry.

Other directions

In mid-July, Russian forces again attacked the entire northern part of the front, from the state border to the forests near the Siverskyi Donets river. It’s true that it doesn’t looks like an offensive with one operational design. Instead, it looks like a series of local attacks, initiated at the same time but not coordinated.
To the north of Kupiansk, where an important AFU logistical center is located, Russian forces from the Western Military Command are advancing. According to messages from the Russian Defense Ministry, they were able to capture the Movchanove railway station. No evidence of this was provided, and it’s important to remember that, as early as winter, Russian troops were seen in the village of Lyman Pershyi, several hundred meters from the station. In any case, if there is any advance in this area, then it is very modest.
Further to the south, there are battles for a different railway station — the Kuzemivka station and the neighbouring village of Novoselivske, which the AFU liberated after heavy fighting in the winter. Now, Russian forces, likely “stormtroopers” from among the recruited prisoners, are trying to again capture Novoselivske, located at the heights key to controlling the region. Russian forces were definitely able to capture the Kuzemivka station (advancing several hundred meters). Nothing else is known about their progress.
Russian troops have advanced in the direction of Svatove. They were able to cut across the small Zherebets River (it’s not exactly clear when) and gain a foothold one kilometer (less than a mile) deep on its western bank. Judging by video footage, the AFU have mounted counterattacks against this foothold. Since the forces involved are small, the foothold hardly carries an immediate operational threat for the Ukrainian army on its own.
Even further south, in the area of Torske and the Kreminski forest, large numbers of Russian forces have resumed their offensive, though they haven’t made it too far yet. They were able to capture a few openings in a huge forest near the Siverskyi Donets River and have advanced several hundred meters to Torske, where an important AFU passage is located across the Zherebets River.
It’s clear that the goal of these local attacks is not to destroy Ukrainian defenses (there are too few forces participating in the offensive), but rather to neutralize AFU reserves that could be transferred to Bakhmut, where a relatively successful Ukrainian offensive is already developing. In the winter (when Wagner Group forces attacked Bakhmut) the Russian command already adopted similar attacks to weaken the defenders, but unsuccessfully. The AFU have still been able to transfer reserves from the north, strengthening those defending Bakhmut. It’s unlikely that this idea will work. For this, the Russian forces have to engage many more forces in the attack (which they likely don’t yet have). The situation can change by the fall, if the Russian command will be able to create and arm a new combined-arms army and army corps (as planned).
The Russian command is trying to distract the Ukrainian troops from combat in the south of the country. Offensives to the north of Avdiivka and Marinka (in the Krasnohorivka region) were organized for that purpose. In both cases, after the initial success and capture of AFU positions, Russian units came under massive Ukrainian artillery fire, just like Ukrainian units in Bakhmut and Robotyne. The situation in both directions is unclear.
Finally, the AFU seem to have decided to “revive” the last relatively calm section of the front and has started attacking to the south of Vuhledar. It’s not yet clear whether these attacks will develop. Here, the advantage for the AFU could be the Vuhledar’s proximity to the area of fierce fighting near Velyka Novosilka. These attacks can be coordinated, making it difficult for the Russian command to organize its defense.
The overall form of the AFU offensive and Russia’s counter effort increasingly resembles the winter campaign, when the Russian army immediately tried to advance in several different directions with relatively few forces. Overwhelming the Ukrainian defense with these multiple “pinpricks” didn’t work, and the war took on the form of a battle of attrition. As is now clear, neither side was able to completely drain their opponent.

The data points reflected in the combat map above are typically at least 48 hours old. Meduza is careful in working with data, but mistakes are still possible, and perhaps even inevitable. If you spot one, please let us know by sending an email to reports@meduza.io. Thank you!

Translation by Sasha Slobodov