
Israeli analysts called the four reasons that prevented the armies and security services to prevent the invasion of the militants of the radical Islamic group of Hamas in Israel, writes the New York Times newspaper with reference to several unified representatives of the Israeli government.
These conclusions are preliminary, the newspaper emphasizes. One of the main reasons for Israel’s unpreparedness to attack was the inability of Israeli intelligence services to monitor the lines of the ties of the Hamas militants. Only shortly before the attack did they try to warn the army authorities about unusual activity on Hamas communications lines, but this warning remained unnoticed.
The second reason was an excessive electronics rate to observe the situation on the border with the gas sector. In recent years, the number of soldiers deployed along the border with gas was reduced. On the border, numerous surveillance cameras, sensors and remotely controlled machine guns were installed. However, before the attack, the militants with the help of drones destroyed the mobile ties, practically depriving the Israeli army of access to this equipment, which allowed them to cross the border unnoticed in thirty places.
The third reason was the operational error of the military command, which located the leadership of the border division at the same base, which was captured by Hamas militants immediately after the start of the attack.
The fourth is a willingness to take for a clean coin intercepted statements of the leaders of the militants, that they have no plans for an attack on Israel. Most likely, Hamas members knew that their conversations were listening and misleading the Israeli special services.