Hand and "good son"

Why Russia should only have a democratic future, and not the one that it predicts from different angles. Opinion of Vladimir Pastukhov*

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The 30th anniversary of the Russian Constitution in Russia was celebrated silently. As in a silent movie - there is an action, but there is no sound. Only at the very end, as in the film “Actor”, the heroes gained a voice, and the metaphorical appeal of Alexander Bastrykin sounded from the screen “Return to the place of the 6th article” (he put on this proposal in an exquisite form-to consolidate ideology in the Constitution, prudently not clarifying which).

Unlike Russia, in the West, the Russian Constitution was noisily recalled: several iconic events took place there at once, where the past of Russian constitutionalism tried to somehow link with his future. I admit honestly, it seemed to me that this was not always smooth. One of the reasons, perhaps, is that the public position of many key speakers on the topic does not always coincide with a non -public consensus that has developed in their midst is a situation that does not surprise the Russian person at all.

But before identifying this consensus and my attitude towards it, I will allow myself a short offtopic in the form of a small autobiographical story, which, however, is directly related to the topic of today's constitutional discussion both in place and in time.

Unhappy application

In those distant years, when the Constitution of post -communism was born in the flame of burning Russian parliamentarism, my good senior comrade was an invited researcher in the center of Woodlon Wilson, now recognized in Russia as an undesirable organization. So I learned about the existence of this wonderful Think-Tank, which in those years, one might say, was in the Russian elite both desirable and even desirable. On the advice of a friend, I also wrote a grant application, filling out the corresponding questionnaire by hand, since I did not have a computer then.

As a topic, I outlined the following: "The cultural and historical conditionality of Russia's return to the authoritarian development of development in the era of post-communism." About six months later, I still received an answer, which briefly said that the declared topic seems untimely and irrelevant.

I was 30 years old, what could I feel? I felt the same as the young Okudzhava, who was booed at his first concert in Moscow. And, like him, I gave myself the word that I will never ask grants and will never come to the center that has rejected me. And I fulfilled the promise half. Applications for grants, I really did not submit anymore, but I arrived in Washington 30 years later. But for this there was a good reason - I came to say something opposite to the fact that was written in that unfortunate application:

Either post -communist Russia will be democratic, or it will not be at all.

Authoritarian consensus for Russia

I understand that the second of the options I identified (the collapse of Russia) today many in Europe, primarily the eastern one, will not be upset. But I assure you that this is a serious misconception. This, in my opinion, will be a catastrophe of an epic scale. As my son loves to say: “Given the size and weight of the body of the rhino, its myopia inherent in him is not his problem, but the problem of others.” I can rephrase this comic slogan in relation to our case as follows: “The decay of Russia, given its scale and a lot of weapons accumulated by it, is not so much its problem as the problem of the surrounding countries, both close and distant.”

The spreading Russia is flowers. The decaying Russia is berries. By the way, most likely - radioactive.

There is not a very high, but tangible probability that the world in the case of the decay of Russia will receive civilizational Chernobyl, which will fill Europe with social isotopes, the half -life of which will be equal to the entire 21st century. However, in the question of the collapse of Russia, as I understand it, in the USA and in the West, there is still a certain non-public consensus-there are not many people who really dream of it in the expert community. But on the question of how to prevent this breakdown to, if there is a consensus, it is very strange.

As far as I understand, dominant, although not advertised, today is the view that Russia has been created for authoritarianism and there can be no other.

There is no transparency in this matter. At the "partyets", where the liberal public gathers, everyone is drowned for democracy in Russia. But it is worth closing the doors, and the discussions move to the corridors or banquet halls, like speakers who have just advocated for the bright democratic future of Russia, they admit that only the “hard hand” can stop the worst and, by the way, Putin, of course, is not the worst thing.

I think that if Putin had reported a slice of these expert assessments, he would be surprised and flattered. That is, I was just late with my application for 30 years. Now the topic would be, of course, recognized as relevant.

In the so-called “decision-making centers”, if Dmitry Medvedev’s terminology is used, the rate is not at all on what he is afraid of-the dismemberment of Russia-but to long-term preservation of the regime and even greater centralization of power after Putin’s departure in the hands of some “our bitch son”,

Unstable utopia

I want to immediately notice that the buckets of children in Russia will never be their own for the West, because not a single son of a bitch will survive today in Russia without a war with the West. “Bitch Children” and “War” are a comprehensive lunch.

Putin's authoritarianism was inevitable. But he recovered after the Gorbachev-Ultsin revolution as an expanded, decadent authoritarianism, which is not capable of reproduction.

That is, we are dealing with the last and highest stage of decay of Russian imperialism, which is characterized by very high instability.

I will use comparison from the pharmaceutical business. Those who have encountered this know that one of the biggest problems in creating the medicine is the stability of the tablet. You can create a very effective active substance, but it will break up to parts earlier than it comes to consumption. Putin is an effective, but unstable medicine.

This stage of authoritarianism is characterized by a high instability of the system that cannot exist without war. I will give another metaphor. All in memory of difficulties with the use of Pfizer vaccine from Covid, for the stability of which a refrigerator needed a refrigerator at the first stages. So, Putin's authoritarianism is such a vaccine from a revolution, for the stability of which a special “combat” authoritarianism is needed. At this stage of Russian history, he very quickly falls into an armed confrontation, the exit from which sooner or later will be a revolution. And from the revolution, the exit either into collapse, or even more expanded authoritarianism in bad infinity.

I had a temperamental client who dismissed the secretary every few months, and I had to solve problems with them as a lawyer. Once I came to him and said:

“Houston, we have a problem. Each next secretary is worse than the previous one. ” Now I want to say that from this moment on, each next Russian dictatorship will be worse than the previous one.

Unlike many, I believe that the point is not in Putin, but in the centralized system of power, to which everyone continues to pray both in Russia itself and in the West. And this vicious circle can be broken only by offering an alternative to a super -centralized model of a political system.

Ideas for a future constitution

The consensus of regional bureaucracy and local elites standing behind them should be opposed to the traditional dominance of the Moscow bureaucracy.

Today, Russia is arranged as a hut in which everyone lives in one room, divided into honeycombs, controlled by a plowman, based on a squad (gang) from strong men.

This hut must be turned into an apartment building and make a civilian condominium from it, controlled by representatives of tenants. This is a goal that, I think, can be provided with various constitutional means. The main thing is not to lose sight of it.

The only thing I would like to notice about the means of achieving this goal-I do not think that somewhere we will find a suitable precedent, since the historical and cultural conditions of modern Russia are unique. We will have to invent the “knee” method. We need to learn not to mechanisms, but to understand the basic principles, which will then have to be applied creatively. The main quality that will be in demand among the builders of future Russia is the ability to imagine, the ability to represent and create something that has never happened before.

Personally, I see a narrow place of constitutional construction in the current regional structure, which has not changed in general terms since the time of Catherine the Great. You cannot turn the hut from almost a hundred non -viable honeycomb into condominium. Therefore, the honeycombs must be enlarged to the size in which they become similar to the "federal apartments" from which the state can be built from below. But to touch the current honeycomb means to turn the hive with wild bees. Here in this I see the main constitutional dilemma. It can be described by a well -known linguistic incident with a comma: "You can’t leave it." No one knows where to put the comma right.

In my opinion, it is possible to solve this problem by the “constitutional overlap” by adding another grid from subregions to the existing grid of the regional structure-something like Governor-General or federal districts, but endowed with constitutional legal personality. There can be from 15 to 25 such new subjects in Russia, and a large existing metropolis can become each system -forming. Moreover, if the regions are still closed to the upper house of the parliament (conditionally-the Federation Council), then the subregions can be closed to the Senate (conditionally-the State Council).

Thus, we will get a non-trivial two-layer federation with a three-fascinated de facto parliament, where each of the layers will be divorced by its political functions. At the same time, the Third Chamber can play the role of a collegium of electors, who elects the president, which, in turn, is not the head of the executive branch, but a political arbitrator, stabilizing relations between various branches of power.

This, of course, is just an illustration of the thesis that today's forced dream of the constitutional mind is able to give birth only to monsters. Perhaps and most likely, completely different solutions will be found. But one thing is undoubted - today we must begin to think about what the political system of Russia will be in the inevitable future.

Legend about the "top map"

In the end, I want to recall one instructive story from the recent past. There is an apocrypha, told by Vitaly Nayshul, about how the idea of voucher privatization was born. This idea appeared as part of the games of the mind of young dreamers, who in the late 70s, when the USSR seemed eternal, thought that it would be necessary to simulate the transformation of state property into private. Well, just like that, just in case. And when a revolution suddenly happened - perestroika - it turned out that there were no other ideas except this. In such cases, as Nayshul said,

The map that lies on top wins on the table. So Russian constitutionalists today should think about their map and put it on the table in advance.