Translated material
Year of stabilization
Andrey Kolesnikov, Nikolai Petrov, Vladislav Inozemtsev: How did Russia adapt to war?
Sergey Medvedev: We begin to summarize 2023. If last year, the 2022nd, was the year of shock, the beginning of the war , the first defeats, then the 2023rd became the year of adaptation and stabilization. The regime coped with the main challenges - the failure of the blitzkrieg, Western sanctions, mobilization. He coped with the rebellion Prigozhin . On the threshold of the 2024th, he is ready for Putin’s re-election and for a long war. What are the reasons for the stability of the regime? How long can Putin maintain stability and wage war?
Political scientist Andrei Kolesnikov is with us.
Putin outplayed everyone again? Apocalyptic forecasts have not come true. The regime is stable, ready for elections, Western sanctions practically do not work, the economy is growing.
Andrei Kolesnikov: Both stability are fragile, and the elections are not elections, and the economy is growing due to state investments in the military-industrial complex. Behind each achievement of Putin are losses: losses of normal development, loss of economic health, loss of emotional health of the population. Even those citizens who support the regime, not so much approve of what is happening as they justify it for themselves.
Yes, a certain state ideology has already been formed - students study the foundations of Russian statehood, schoolchildren - history in the interpretation of Medinsky and Torkunov. But do they remember those cliches that are imposed on them? Or do they treat this in the same way as we relate to scientific communism and the history of the CPSU? I think it happens differently, nevertheless, it still brings up a double consciousness rather than Dubolomov, the faithful soldiers of Putin, although everything is going on to this.
Both stability are fragile, and the elections are not elections, and the economy is growing due to state investments in the military -industrial complex
Sergey Medvedev: But these losses are somewhere later, beyond the horizon of Putin’s life. If you look in the near future, then there are no such especially critical faults and problems, there are no crises.
Andrei Kolesnikov: Yes, and this reflects the political situation, and the mood of the population, and the willingness to accept everything that goes from above, but with one reservation: if the authorities do not even physically involve the population in the trenches. If it involves, it is difficult to say that it will, although, maybe the population will swallow this. But it would be better to avoid this. Now there has been a fragile balance that suits everyone: one side can not think about the war, the other side is thinking intensively about it, but in every possible way shows that it is for the world, go to VDNH and watch our achievements: here is artificial intelligence, here you have talented children, but nuclear physicists will make an amazing weapon that will win everyone.
Sergey Medvedev: Andrey, you and Denis Volkov published an analysis of the mood of a society called "House in a Swamp". The house stands on a toxic swamp, but inside it is warm and comfortable, if you don’t look out of the windows and convince yourself that you live not in the swamp, but on the outskirts of some beautiful forest. Is this a metaphor for a certain encapsulation of Russian consciousness?
Andrei Kolesnikov: Yes, this is a metaphor for what is happening in political life, but also a metaphor for how the mood of the population is arranged. In the middle of the swamp, it can move in any direction. The wind can blow it to the right or left, or it can start letting some bubbles, including the bubbles of discontent, or inflate some kind of unexpected bubble: meet Prigozhin in Rostov with open arms and so on. But in general, this is a swamp, which, by and large, does not care what is happening, if only they would not touch it.
Sergey Medvedev: You have a good expression - "learned indifference." That is, people deliberately let into this indifference, close from information that can destroy this fragile inner world?
Andrei Kolesnikov: Yes, this is such a self -propression with attempts to deceive themselves. Here the boss said that we were attacked: probably, they were attacked, no matter how absurdly it sounded in a modernized society, in large cities, which are European, where giant European money is invested. For some reason, they also attack us, investing this same money! “But they know better there,” they know better, ”so often people say focus groups.
Ideology brings up a double consciousness rather than Dubolomov, faithful soldiers of Putin
There was such a category of people in the 40s during the occupation of Paris by German troops. They were called "people who are waiting", in Russian-"Zhduna." Here is a significant part of this population sitting in a swamp, waits for how it ends. Prigogine would come - Okay! - Let this boss be. Someone else would have come-well, it's okay, this one will be. Are we for the world? Of course, for peace, we are a peaceful nation. Are we setting the world by the method of ruthless military operations? How else to install the world? And live, and fine. And the fee for continuing a calm life is a ballot. In March 2024, he paid a ballot, photographed, sent a direct boss, and you can go to the cinema, to the store, to the market - everything is fine.
Sergey Medvedev: In your study, you write: the problem is that the Russian, post -Soviet person could not tear himself away from the state, self -identify, and be subject to. He remained the object of state guardianship, but did not turn into a subject of politics and even his own life.
Andrey Kolesnikov
Andrei Kolesnikov: A person privatized, on the one hand, as a consumer, and on the other hand, people did not become citizens. In this part, a person remains the property of the state, in fact, this is a serf. This dependence on the state of the essential part of the population gives such an effect of Zhdun, the effect of indifference, the effect of the swamp. Homeland is a state, which, of course, is not so, but for many it is.
Sergey Medvedev: Homeland is fate, Putin is fate, war is fate. Russian man is a man of fate. Kovid showed that people accept external circumstances as fate. They also accepted the war, like Covid, like fate. "Who is destined to die - will die." They also go under Avdeevka.
Andrei Kolesnikov: Of course, the second pandemic is political: everyone has infected, and you can’t do anything about it. You can only somehow adapt to the infection, be treated, there is really no vaccine of this, or rather, it is: you yourself explain that everything is right, I am healthy. This follows from the inability to influence events or from the fact that a person convinces himself that he is not able to influence events. As a result, this mass self -concretion leads to the fact that resistance is almost impossible.
Sergey Medvedev: How do people relate to repression?
The house stands on a toxic swamp, but inside is quite warm and comfortable
Andrey Kolesnikov: I would say not bad. The Levada Center had questions: "Do you support the state of the state to pursue foreign agents?" A year ago, the figure was small, now it was already running in 50%: "Yes, we support, because there are people who want evil to our country." Another question: "How do you feel about people who have left the country to avoid military mobilization?" - Two -thirds are bad, although they themselves would not want to go anywhere, but since the person escaped, he behaved not in accordance with the norms of society. Socially approved behavior - to go to the slaughter, like a ram, with the words: "is right or not right, but this is my country."
Sergey Medvedev: It turns out that as the war turned into the main national project, people are increasingly rally around the state, around the idea of identity, confrontation of the outside world.
Andrei Kolesnikov: Yes, this happens, but mainly in marshy regime, rather passive than active. It is more about passive conformists, which, however, can easily be transformed into active and aggressive if the state wants that.
Sergey Medvedev: Passive support is probably the optimal regime for stabilization and consolidation, to continue the regime of war and authoritarianism?
Andrey Kolesnikov: Of course! We see Putin dealt with his opponents, what happened to Prigozhin , with Strelkov . Even if it is better than passive loyalists than excessively active.
Sergey Medvedev: A completely new fascism of a demobilized nation is obtained. This is some new social contract.
Andrey Kolesnikov: Yes, and he suits both sides. I would say that this is hybrid totalitarianism: it is not completely total, but it is no longer authoritarianism, because it is not enough to remain silent - you need to confirm your loyalty, sometimes give your body. This is a half -mobile society, it is not completely mobilized, it does not want it to be the Kremlin.
Sergey Medvedev: Nikolai Petrov , political scientist, invited researcher of the Science and Politics Fund in Berlin, joins us. Power seems more consolidated than before. Is that so?
This is hybrid totalitarianism: it is not completely total, but it is no longer authoritarianism
Nikolai Petrov: Yes, and no. Prigozhinsky rebellion showed that the system is very rigidly arranged. She is ready to quickly and quite effectively respond to well -known calls if the program is laid in it. But when she encounters something new, she falls into a stupor for a while, which we saw. And then the most interesting here was what lessons from the rebellion the Kremlin would extract. In a situation of war, Prigozhin, as an exception, gave a lot to concentrate in their hands, and, indeed, some success was achieved in Ukraine, but they had to pay for this as they paid for it. Actually, the Kremlin’s choice was this: either to continue to use this experience and endow some figures with additional resources and hope for some efficiency, or to avoid what was done in relation to Prigozhin. We see that the system decided to maintain a non-very effective military leadership and status quo, that is, the rate on the status quo is made, and while it justifies itself.
Nikolai Petrov
Sergey Medvedev: Are there any threats from the elite?
Nikolai Petrov: I think yes, and not related to some kind of split on important ideological issues. It is logical to expect increasing competition among elites for reducing resources. A significant increase in the cost of war, redistribution of finances in a new adopted budget means that there are beneficiaries, and there are people who were surrounded. Then this process will intensify. The sanctions are slow, but they act. The budget stops growing as before.
Sergey Medvedev: There is a good Russian word - "stabilism": stability, which is very doubtful.
We are joined by Vladislav Inozemtsev , economist and political scientist, doctor of economic sciences. Did Russia really show unexpected stability?
Vladislav Inozemtsev: In general - yes. I myself was not sure of such Putin's successes. The only thing I was practically confident in the last spring is that the European oil embargo and oil products is destructive for Europe itself, and Russia can do it quite because there are alternative markets. On the other hand, in the West, in recent years, a very strange idea of Russia as a country where the economy is fully controlled by the Kremlin has developed, everything is nationalized, actually revived by the USSR. In fact, the Russian economy is either private or acts as if it were private. It was the Western recipes that were used by Russian reformers in the creation of a market economy based on private business, and led to the fact that this economy was much more stable than the Soviet one.
There is the word "stabilism": stability, which is very doubtful
Sergey Medvedev: Is there a trend from the market towards the Soviet militarized economy?
Vladislav Inozemtsev: No. In a market economy, the transition to military rails has completely different consequences than in a national economy. In fact, now the government is trying to find as much money as possible and give it to the defense complex to obtain a large number of military goods. This is a completely market demarche.
Moreover, in the USSR, where the wave behind the wave was mobilization during the Great Patriotic War, where there was a huge army and in relatively peacetime, we remember how much soldiers received in military service. And we can compare this with how many mercenaries are paid at the front and, so to speak, mobilized. In fact, the Kremlin created an absolutely market hired army under which the market military -industrial complex is subject to. I see no chance of this system to collapse in the coming years.
Vladislav Inozemtsev
Sergey Medvedev: Can this provide growth?
Vladislav Inozemtsev: This growth is largely ineffective. It will always be lower than an increase in budget expenditures. Yes, we increased budget expenditures for military needs by 5 trillion rubles - this is now approximately 3.5% of GDP. As a result, for the year we get 2.8% of growth, that is, we increased the infusion of money into the economy - the economy has grown as much. And how could she not grow up?! This is not completely stolen money. They went to the real sector. And even if they are stolen, they cannot be taken to the west now, they still go to the domestic market.
In this context, yes, more money will be given, there will be more growth, but it will not appear out of nowhere, will not become self -supporting. The budget will close - and the growth will disappear. And first of all, those who are somehow connected with the military -industrial complex, and, of course, military personnel and members of their families, benefit from him. As for the whole society, it may even partly lose, because against the background of this increase in the money supply, prices are growing. But the share of the losers and their intention to oppose the system are insufficient so that it is subjected to any corrosion.
Sergey Medvedev: And the military economy was able to compensate for the effect of sanctions?
Vladislav Inozemtsev: Firstly, deliveries through third countries go. There is an amazing story that over these two years, hundreds of millions of dollars were purchased by military products from Ukraine through the UAE. If our Ukrainian colleagues themselves carry out the sanctions that they ask for the whole Western world about, what then to talk about then?
The Kremlin created a market hired army, under which a market VPK is subject to
Secondly, I think that such a number of high-tech weapons that could be produced before the war, of course, will not be produced. But the problem is that, as I understand it, the tactics of Russian troops on the Ukrainian front are to "beat them in number." Yes, even if we have more old tanks and less accurate missiles, but we have a lot of anti -personnel mines to be secured from the Ukrainian offensive, but there is no particular shortage of military personnel: they will kill these - new ones will come, we will raise the salary. Again, even Russian mobilized say that Ukrainians do not lead artillery fire for several days. Apparently, the problem with shells is now more with Kyiv than that of Moscow.
Sergey Medvedev: We conclude that the system is stable, torn, concreted and can continue as much as Putin will live?
Vladislav Inozemtsev: Absolutely! At the beginning of the war, I said that not Putin would end this war, but the one who replaces him.
Sergey Medvedev: The sanctions practically did not work?
Vladislav Inozemtsev: They worked, but in what context? Around May 2022 it was said: sanctions are introduced in order to stop the war in Ukraine. Approximately from May, both the American and European official structures have adopted a completely different wording: these are sanctions in response to ... there is a violation of international law, it should not be with impunity. In this regard, sanctions are valid. They show the whole world that Russia is a land country. And now she really falls out of so many international processes. Yes, Russia is now a completely different country than before the war. This is a country, without which the world learns to do and learn very soon. But the sanctions, from the point of view of the warfare tool, were hopeless initially.