“Victory is for the state, not for the people”

Sociologists talk about how Russia came to terms with the war and waited for a leader with the slogan “Peace!”

In the summer of 2023, the majority of Russians pushed the war out of their consciousness, data from independent sociologists show. Despite the feelings of fear and helplessness, the life of the population in regions of Russia far from Ukraine has stabilized, and as long as there are no personal victims or losses in the families, a decision has been made not to think or talk about the war. Because war is considered an elemental force on which there is no chance to have any influence.

In order not to miss new texts from “Layout”, subscribe to our telegram channel

The text is based on survey data from the Chronicle project and the ExtremeScan agency in 2022 - 2023, as well as on a qualitative study conducted jointly by the Public Sociology Laboratory, ExtremeScan and the Chronicle in November 2023.

Normalization. “As long as my Rostov is not bombed, I consider the situation stabilized”

In 2023, after the recession of 2022, Russia came to its senses, flows of alternative imports began to flow, the economy largely switched to a war footing, arms production volumes increased, and the army, after the riot and death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, got rid of the disorganizing elements of dual power.
The autumn conscription was much tougher than usual, but at the same time it was covered significantly less in the media.

It is obvious that the displacement of reality has become both part of the Kremlin’s agenda and one of the tactics of the presidential campaign. Just remember in what reduced form the topic of war was raised on the last direct line with the president. The American Institute for the Study of War writes that Vladimir Putin will avoid the topic of war against Ukraine during his election campaign in 2024. Instead, he will focus on Russia's supposed stability and criticism of the West. The topic of war will only be raised if there are serious successes at the front.

The public consciousness responds to this with relief. People living in Russia themselves are looking for positivity and rationalization: in focus groups they operated with such concepts as the inevitability of war, the lack of alternatives for the president, the return of primordially Russian lands, “you can’t retreat once you’ve started,” “there are advantages,” import substitution, the development of domestic producers.

About 20% of Russians turn out to be beneficiaries of the war due to the expansion of the military-industrial complex, contracts in the army, indexation of salaries of security forces, employees of the largest state corporations. This factor also prevents the understanding of the essence of war as aggressive and violating all international norms and rules. The vast majority, having not received material benefits, still came to the idea that “you have to live somehow.” As a result, judging by the results of our research, the war has been pushed to the periphery of Russians’ perception to such an extent that it seems that it does not exist .

If since the summer of 2022, in various social groups - in the family, at work, with neighbors - the habit of remaining silent about the war has appeared, so as not to discover differences in views, then at the end of 2023 people are silent more naturally, because these conversations can be done without - the war does not affect the daily life of most people. The threat of mobilization looms, but they have learned to perceive it as inevitable, especially since it is happening somewhere on the periphery.

Those who suffered from the war, lost loved ones or lost health, still remain in such a silent minority that they do not influence the general mood. The “uprisings” of military wives are so far aimed at fighting for “decent” conditions, payments and the return of loved ones from the front. The lack of a repressive response to these protests leads to a gradual radicalization of demands. But there are no visible groups sympathizing with this movement.

At the same time, the number of mobilized, wounded and killed on the front line is growing, and discontent is spreading. In eight focus groups, there was not a single discussion where they talked about how a neighbor, friend, husband, relative is fighting or has been to war, injured or even killed. There are practically no positive stories of a military career. The short course is this: I came, brought money, but it’s not enough, I have to go to fight again. Or it turned out that there was nothing to do in civilian life - there was no work, and there is no one. Or that the promised money was not paid. He returned mentally ill. The family sent for money - in the end they had no husband, no money. These stories are visible in quantitative survey data and focus groups, but are not yet visible en masse.

Among the factors that concern respondents, “special military operation” ranks third after health, their own and that of their loved ones, and income. This is the ranking of significant factors influencing the personal lives of respondents.

In addition, Russians’ information interest in “SVO” is decreasing. According to Mediascope, in March-December 2022, the share of viewing programs about politics and news in minutes grew quarterly by 18 - 27%, and since March 2023, this share has already fallen by 6 - 8%. According to ExtremeScan, in September 2023, almost 60% would not like to receive more information about the war, not only from state media, but in general.

Future. “You can’t count on anything or expect anything”

Available data in Russia on the topic of anxiety, depression and ways to deal with them shows that avoiding thoughts and conversations about war is the most widespread reaction. The war has finally become a background that does not always affect everyday life, but it significantly influences reflection on one’s existence and radically changes the perception of the future .

One of the focus group participants says: “I believe that in two years it will be worse, and this is correct, there will be improvement through deterioration, so that society does not think about how to kill, how to deliver these suitcases of bread because of inflation. The government must destroy itself in order for there to be dismantling. It shouldn't be good. There is no other way out, good, even with a settlement agreement. The advantage of an authoritarian regime is that it assembles quickly and acts quickly. Democracy takes a long time to reason, but life is unfair.”

Anxiety can be suppressed and negative thoughts can be avoided, but a reliable indicator of mental health is planning for the future. And in conditions of war, people avoid making plans or thinking about the prospect of several years - the anxiety is too great.

Focus group participants agreed that their planning horizon had shrunk from several years to a period of several days to six months. And at the beginning of the war, these same six months were the expected duration of the war. Planning your own life in Russia now turns out to be a luxury that only optimists try to cling to:

“...there is always the thought that yes, everything can change, but I still plan, because when you lose all your supports, then life becomes a little meaningless, and the only way to cope with this stress and continue life is to continue planning, and just keep in mind that I am an adult, I know how to make decisions, I know how to think, look at the situation, I can figure it out, I can change the plan.”

The locus of control has radically changed - this is a concept in psychology that characterizes the ability of an individual to attribute his successes or failures only to internal or only to external factors. Respondents to the groups say that they have lost a sense of control over their own lives .

“The world is very unstable, and apart from my personal plans and some approximate vectors, I don’t really have anything to count on. And that at any moment everything can turn upside down and with the same probability remain exactly the same. And you can’t count on anything, and you can’t expect anything.”

Some of them complain that “when life is about survival, there is no time for plans.” That is, refusing to discuss the war out loud and accepting it as bad weather does not lead to a decrease in anxiety or the ability to predict events in one’s life.
Increasingly, the future of Russians is hidden in the fog of war, because it depends entirely on its completion. And a war can have two outcomes: victory or defeat.

Victory. “It is for ‘them’, for the state, not for the people”

At the level of state objectives, victory for our respondents comes down to one degree or another of conquering new territories. Surveys show that the topic of the value of territorial expansion is significantly overheated among Russians. One of the main motives for expanding territories is the desire to move the “line of contact” away from Russian territory and create a buffer zone, populating it with migrants from Ukraine .

To distract respondents from propaganda narratives, we ask what personal benefits victory would bring to respondents. Most respondents do not expect any personal benefit from victory. “Victory” is for “them,” for the state, not for the people.

A stable majority are those respondents who do not expect any personal benefit from Russia’s victory: 56% in the summer of 2022 and 53% in September 2023 .

So, in the fall of 2023, 53% do not expect any personal benefit from victory, 12% found it difficult to answer. That is, 65% do not see anything positive about Russia’s possible victory in the war. We divided the specific answers given by 35% of respondents into two parts: some personal benefit and a benefit for the state.

Personal benefit was voiced in 17% of the entire sample; the main meaning of the answers comes down not simply to the establishment of peace, but to a return to the previous, pre-war life. The main “national-state” narrative of victory (also 17% of the entire sample) is associated with symbolic values. “We will be winners. We will have a proud awareness that we are not just like that, but “We are Russian - what a delight.”

Victory in people's minds looks like a symbolic abstraction, a nuclear part of national identity. "Russians do not know defeat." “We... need one victory, one for all, we won’t stand up for the price.”

This complex is rooted in the cultivated super-value of victory in the Great Patriotic War. Propaganda rhetoric increased the share of those who believe that “SVO” is similar in nature to the Second World War, from 24% in February 2023 to 30% in October 2023. And the number of those who say that these wars are not similar has decreased from 64% to 47% . The war dragged on too long, and therefore its association with the Great Patriotic War is useful for propaganda - it reconciles with the lack of hope for its speedy completion. Apparently, this line of war apologetics will become stronger. Already at the end of November, Vladimir Putin, during the World Russian People's Council, for the first time called the war in Ukraine “national liberation.”

In order not to miss new texts from “Layout”, subscribe to our telegram channel

The inevitability of war. "Geopolitical matters..."

An important component of this parallel is the confidence of 58% of respondents in the inevitability of a “special military operation”, and therefore a fair, defensive nature of the war for Russia, as in 1941-1945.

Among those who believe war is inevitable, 78% support “SVO” (58% for the entire sample).

The strong correlation between support for war and the belief in its inevitability indicates that inevitability is the main rationalization of one’s own support: “...now there is a historical turning point on the planet - all these matters are geopolitical. It's inevitable. Putin always said: if a fight is inevitable, you have to strike first.”

Some respondents argued that the beginning of the “special operation” was the aggression of Ukraine: “They wanted to cross the border. They wanted to. We didn't allow it. Yes, and they started, the war could have happened, everything could have happened on our territory, the Russian Federation.”

And even those respondents who have a negative attitude towards “SVO” and therefore do not believe in the defensive nature of an inevitable war, in groups explain about another subject of inevitability. “Inevitably, yes, in view of the muck of the organizers of this system, who wanted to do all this. That they need this war, the redistribution of property, cuttings, to retain power, to get into the history textbook as a restorer of lands.”

The topic of inevitability evokes active discussion, apparently because it is a subject of reflection. And at the same time, this topic causes irritation and annoyance, repression and rejection of thoughts about how war could have been avoided.

Defeat. “Everyone will return from the war and the bloodshed will stop”

In wartime research, care must be taken to formulate questions in a neutral and safe manner, not only because of the risks to respondents, but also to enhance the authenticity of the responses. It is difficult to come up with a direct question about how respondents feel about Russia’s potential defeat in the war, that is, one that would meet the conditions of the respondents’ safety and the accuracy of the answers.

One of our questions turned out to be the most appropriate: “Will you support or not support Putin’s decision to withdraw troops and move to peace negotiations, despite the unachieved goals?”

This formulation in the Chronicle and ExtremeScan surveys is the most relevant to the topic of defeat. This is a defeat, described in a relatively soft form acceptable for the perception of respondents, consisting of four elements:

1. The withdrawal of troops from the territory of Ukraine in the near future.
2. Transition to peace negotiations.
3. Goals not achieved.
4. But this is Putin’s decision, which means the situation is not defeat, but a strong-willed end to the war, which is psychologically more acceptable for respondents.

In September 2023, there was a ratio of 40% to 41% of those who would or would not support such a decision by Putin (19% found it difficult to answer). In October, the share of those who are not ready to support stopping the war fell to 33% . The groups aged 18–29 and those aged 50 and older contributed to this reduction.

It is likely that this is the reaction of conscripts and their parents to the autumn conscription. In the generation of “parents” 50 years and older, anxiety over the month increased by 16% (from 42 to 58%). Of course, the conscription is not the mobilization of a year ago, but its harshness, raids, delivery of summonses in public places, and most importantly, the high probability of being stuck at the front, lack of rotation, could not help but affect the mood. And it is likely that this significant decrease is temporary, as was the case in the fall of 2022 after the announcement of “partial” mobilization.

This question reacts sensitively to events and changes in the external background. At the end of January, the indicator of unwillingness to withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine increased again. In our opinion, this was the result of the “materialization of the enemy”: in November-January, shelling from the Ukrainian side became more intense and spread far into the territory of central Russia.

However, just two weeks later we received an unprecedented result - a sharp drop in the indicator of unwillingness to stop the war (to 31%) and for the first time in a year the level of willingness to support peace increased significantly (to 49%). And again, the probabilistic interpretation of this is that the indicators could have changed so radically in connection with Boris Nadezhdin’s campaign, first to collect signatures and then to defend them. This process was accompanied by active public anti-war rhetoric. For a short time, people felt that there was space to think and talk about peace.

The withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (despite unachieved goals) is the most obvious sign of defeat in the war. This event is closely related to the forecast (and fears) that in this case Ukrainian troops will come to Russian territory. This was believed in the spring of 2023: 56% in Russia, and in the border zone - 69%.

However, the open-ended question “How will the withdrawal of troops affect your life or the life of your family?” two-thirds name positive consequences, and only one-third say negative ones. “Return from the war, the return of those who left, the bloodshed will stop, psychological relief, open borders, economic improvements” versus “The deterioration of the economic situation and the continued threat to Russia.”

The remaining respondents, more than half of them, believe that the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Ukraine will not affect the lives of their families in any way. At the same time, we see a big difference in the forecast of the impact on the lives of all Russians and the personal lives of the respondents themselves. 34% of respondents say that the lives of all Russians will not change in any way, and that the lives of their own families will not change in any way - 54%. This can be explained by the gap between the general propaganda perception of the war and one’s personal place in it.

“This is not our war,” was the refrain in the focus groups. 37% are convinced that the withdrawal of troops will have a bad effect on the lives of Russians in general (12% - “positive” and 34% - “will not have any effect”). That is, somewhere out there, at the level of the entire country, the withdrawal of troops is a risk of worsening the lives of all Russians, but for oneself personally the risks are assessed much lower. Just like the other side of the coin: a possible victory for Russia will not bring good in its own life.

That is, the majority (53%) believe that Russia’s victory in the war will not bring any personal benefit and the majority (54%) believe that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine will not in any way affect their lives and the lives of their families. It turns out that the war and its consequences are a parallel reality .

The withdrawal of troops in itself is, of course, a frustrating factor. Respondents to the qualitative study expressed fears that Ukrainians would come to Russia “to take revenge, since a lot of evil has been committed against Ukraine.” This is not the first time this motive has arisen in research. And the fact that the share of respondents ready to support Putin’s decision to withdraw troops did not grow throughout the year and remained at 40% suggests that such a scenario remained too uncertain to be easily accepted. And only the special situation of the public campaign of an anti-war presidential candidate led to an increase in this figure to 49%.

There is also a motive for the unjustification of war if no goals are achieved: “What do you mean, the troops will leave?! So many victims! If he finishes, then it will all be meaningless.” “Go to the end once you’ve started” is a popular refrain we hear in surveys: “Even if it’s a mistake, it’s better to be a winner so you don’t get judged.”

Negotiation. "I need security"

And yet, respondents see the end of the war and a return to peaceful life as the main consequence of the withdrawal of troops. Calmness, the cessation of anxiety and fear for loved ones, fear due to the threat of mobilization - a common persistent theme in focus groups. Economic recovery, lifting of sanctions, the ability to travel are other desirable common areas.

Fears of humiliation of the country, the arrival of Ukrainians, the burden of reparations are also heard, but in November 2023 there are incomparably fewer of them. Some respondents in the groups spontaneously spoke about reparations as a forced inevitability.

The repertoire of answers to the question of what respondents would include in the conditions of peace negotiations is small. As with polls about a Russian victory or the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine, ideas about what to talk about at the negotiating table are rather vague. The main ideas for inclusion in the peace agreement: the security of Russia, the creation of a buffer zone, Ukraine’s non-entry into NATO. Overall a defensive concept.

As for territorial claims, here too the wishes mainly boil down to a return to the status of the beginning of February 2022. That is, the war turns out to be a meaningless campaign . Most statements fit into the preservation of Crimea and the independent status of Donbass, the possible holding of a referendum in the occupied territories for free expression of will.

We also did not hear larger-scale territorial claims against Ukraine at the focus groups. In September 2023, in a telephone survey, only 27% called “all of Ukraine” primordially Russian territory.

Russian soldiers advancing on Kyiv, according to representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, carried their dress uniforms in their backpacks for the May 9 parade in the center of Kyiv. Respondents in the paradata of this period sometimes mentioned the Victory Parade in Kiev among their goals.

Periodically, respondents, speaking about the transition to peace negotiations, add formulations related to victory: “speak on our terms”, “what matters to me is the fact on what terms.” “I will not agree to simply withdraw the troops. I wonder under what conditions they will be withdrawn? I need security." Again, “victory” here means security, not expansion.

World. “The whole country is waiting, first of all, for the war to end”

Whatever numbers sociologists receive on issues of support for the war, military budgets, mobilization, condemnation of draft dodgers, and even support for Putin’s decision to withdraw troops, ending the war is now a popular topic among respondents in focus groups. The ending of “SVO” generates enthusiasm and consensus in group discussions. This could be a victory, freezing the conflict, peace negotiations - open defeat of Russia is not allowed.

However, according to the general opinion, it makes no sense to count on this within six months: the war has become protracted and “will not end soon.” Therefore, the end of the war is a very desirable, but unrealizable event .

The respondents do not have much hope for Putin regarding stopping the war, nor do they have any great hopes for the emergence of an alternative to him: “Where will a second candidate equivalent to Putin come from, or a third, or any candidates other than Putin, where will they come from? These are the top people, the elites will decide among themselves who will be president, and that’s all.”

People are oppressed by the lack of alternative elections and visible repressions, according to the results of work with focus groups. In November 2023, they did not even allow the appearance of a public and political figure who publicly opposed the SVO. The respondents were confident that there are enough people with such sentiments in society; they themselves would like to end the war, but in the current situation, “at best, such people will not be given the opportunity to speak openly and participate in elections.”

“Candidates who are against the SVO will simply be deleted,” “If they give it airtime, then yes. But this is unlikely. And if they don’t give it, then there will be no point”, “But it seems to me that [such a person simply] will not be allowed”, “If Putin lives to see this time, then this will not happen. If he doesn’t live, then he will.” But the demand for an end to the war and a change of power in order to stop the war, despite the hopelessness of this idea, does not decrease .

During Yevgeny Prigozhin's rebellion last summer, significant shares of respondents felt interested, hopeful and even inspired. Paradoxically, people were ready to perceive Prigozhin as a potential peacemaker, so much so did they want the war to end . Even after several months of the rebellion, in November 2023, they recalled it: “There was a feeling that there was a chance for an overthrow. Because something like this, even rude, I am against brute force even in such moments, but then there was a feeling that there was a chance for some change.”

Conclusion from qualitative research: “There is a palpable yearning for competition, the audience in general is very keen to see alternatives, but at the same time recognizes their physical absence, as well as their weak relevance in the current historical context. It seems that the appearance of a strong and independent figure can calm this melancholy - but no one believes in such an event.”

In the ExremeScan electoral study from February 1 to February 7, 2024, 53% of Putin’s electorate named a truce with Ukraine among the desired events, while only 34% believe that Putin will implement this. 91% of Nadezhdin’s electorate want a truce, 93% believed that if Nadezhdin became president, this event would occur.

Some of the more radical respondents said in November that they themselves would be ready to support a politician who has a program, a plan of action and openly opposes the war. Unexpectedly, a massive positive reaction to the nomination of Boris Nadezhdin confirmed this readiness.

Infographic: El
Cover and illustrations: Lida Kurnosova.

You can support “Layout” from any country in the world - it is still safe and very important. We really need your support now. How to help us →