The tactics of the split

Freezing on foreign policy fronts, collective West and global south

Russian foreign policy, if it is briefly formulated, is now trying to solve the five main problems:

• Provide the foreign policy cover of hostilities.

• To ensure a course to create an alliance of the territories opposing the collective West and the states of the so -called global south, to impose it on the neoanticolonial agenda and, if possible, become the leader of this alliance.

• To divide the world into “friendly” and “unfriendly” Russia of the state and, relying on the first group, to create new “rules of the game” in return for those that, as they say in Moscow, are imposed by the world by the United States and their allies in NATO.

• To prevent erosion of Russian influence in the former space of the USSR, among other things, has become a consequence of obvious distance, or even rejection of the military operations of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, albeit, who is carefully mixed from the partners in the CIS.

• Strive to maintain their influence as a former superpower in the Middle East.

The solution to the first problem in the last six months has clearly acquired the nature of obscuring the Kremlin’s goals in conducting his own.

Putinskoye “We did not start this war, but we will finish it” becomes the leitmotif of the entire propaganda rhetoric of Moscow.

“Historical” substantiations of the Kremlin’s claims to the southeastern territories of Ukraine, according to them, belonging to the “Russian world”, are enshrined in Russian legislation. A similar quasi -bark wrapper of the main results of two years becomes the original topic for the practical activities of Russian diplomacy, accusing at best of Russophobia, and of the worst of the attempt on the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation (which threatens criminal prosecution), or in intervention in Russia's internal affairs of all those who disagree with such interpretation both within the country and beyond.

A significant help for Russian diplomacy in solving the first problem was to interview Putin to American journalist Karlson, which was planned as an educational program for the Western audience in explaining the Kremlin goals in Ukraine. It was also simply obliged to convince the Western public of the peaceful aspirations of the Putin leadership. But everything went around the drainage when this Carlson, after the interview, expressed his attitude to what he heard from Putin, who justified the beginning of his.

It should be recognized as an effective tool of Russia's foreign policy on the Ukrainian Front in the last six months to use the narrative of Kyiv’s refusal of a peace agreement with Moscow, allegedly paraapidized in negotiations in Istanbul at the end of March 2022, but torn due to the pressure of Boris Johnson, who was then the British Prime Minister. However, this did not eliminate the main problem of Russian diplomacy - the inability to overcome the total distrust of the West to the aspirations of Moscow, which look like a threat of military expansion. Even if we take into account a certain share of the exaltation of Western politicians using this topic in domestic politics, one must call a spade a spade. The largest failure of Russia's foreign policy was the inability of its actors to evaluate the consequences of the entry of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine and the accession of several of its regions to Russia. Evidence of this failure was the entry into NATO before neutral Sweden and Finland, which looks like the main result of the second half of 2023. The use of Moscow Hungary and Turkey did not help as a ram that breaks the unity among the members of the bloc on the issue of reception of new members. All this was done de facto transformation of the Baltic Sea almost into the NATO inland Sea.

The attempt to rally BRICS countries around the axial idea of ​​Moscow was not too successful - to resist the United States and the West as a whole. Sensitive was the refusal of the new President of Argentina Havier Miley from joining Brix, the refusal of the largest banks in China to cooperate with Russian structures in order to avoid secondary sanctions by the United States, the willingness of India to replace Russia as a supplier of Armenia’s weapons.

Finally, the most important event of the second half of last year was the war in the Middle East between Israel and terrorist groups in the gas sector, which began after an unprecedented massacre, arranged on October 7, Hamas in the south of Israel. Russia tried to become an intermediary in negotiations on the liberation of the Israeli hostages captured by the Hamas terrorists, including several Russian citizens with double Russian-Israeli citizenship. As a result, three Russians were released, but this turned out to be the only success of Russian diplomacy, which made a bet on loyal relations with Hamas, whose leaders visited Moscow several times over the past six months.

Welcome relations with the Palestinian terrorists did not help Russia return the influence it in the Middle East, which was obliged earlier, the policy of equidistance to the warring parties, Israel and the Palestinians.

The result of Moscow made by Moscow became sharply worsening her relationship with Israel. This led to a noticeable change in Jerusalem's policy in relation to Ukraine. Strictly withstanding neutrality in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict was replaced, even with a moderate, but quite clearly verified support of Kyiv, up to intentions to put him critical Israeli systems of early warning about missile attacks. One way or another, but Israel was in the same system with the West that supports Ukraine in its confrontation between Russia. It is difficult to call this result successful for the Russian foreign policy in the Middle East ... A evidence of this was an obviously barren attempt to be in the role of the Supreme Mediator in the Interpolistine Reconciliation, undertaken at the end of February in Moscow.

Finally, in the last six months, a categorical refusal of Armenia for Russian guarantees for security in its permanent military conflict with Azerbaijan, both through double -sided relations and within the framework of the CSTs, is a member of which is Armenia, has become a serious test of the strength of Russian positions. The west stated by Yerevan in search of new guarantors of his security, the rate on the supply of Western weapons, primarily French, is extremely painfully perceived by the ruling Russian elite. As in the case of degradation of Russia's relations with Israel, the sharply increased distrust of Moscow by Yerevan is perceived by the Russian leadership primarily from the point of view of geopolitical damage suffered by Russia. The interests of national security, in this case, Israel and Armenia, which Russia today is not capable of providing, excite it less than the obvious, albeit different -made, drift of these countries towards the West.

A certain compensation of these failures of Moscow’s foreign policy is stabilized by its relations with the countries of Central Asia, despite the western desire to weaken Russian influence on the region.

The threats of secondary sanctions for cooperation with Russia in the implementation of parallel imports of suction goods remain a very sensitive risk in the foreign economic activity of the countries of the region. Nevertheless, the undoubted success of Moscow has become an agreement reached in recent months on the supply of Russian gas to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with the subsequent expansion of gas transit further to China.

After March 17, it is not necessary to expect radical changes in the foreign policy of Russia. The most important task will be to ensure the inviolability of the territorial expansion of the country according to the results of military operations in Ukraine. The demonstration of determination in the implementation of these tasks will be carried out by both military means and a sophisticated information war using special equipment similar to the fact that they were found in the case with the “wiretap” of the conversation of German generals. The task of Russian diplomacy will be to deepen the schism among the Western allies of Ukraine, achieved by special services. As for Ukraine itself, the concerns of diplomats, as well as propagandists, should become delegitimation of Vladimir Zelensky, whose presidential powers expire in May of this year. Military pressure on Kyiv can be carried out as part of military threats from the south. To this direction, the artificially disperse the problem of “protecting the Russian -speaking population of Transnistria”, which is pressure from Chisinau, is attached to this direction.

In general, Moscow’s desire to “freeze” the situation in the Ukrainian direction can be dominant until the results of the US presidential election are known on November 5.

In the South Caucasus, the actions of Moscow, it seems, will look secondary in relation to what the main actors in the region, including Turkey and Iran, will undertake. In its current state, Russia can hardly afford any proactive measures to protect its interests there. At Kon-the Russian military presence in Armenia, the 102nd military base of Russia in Gyumri, not far from the border with Turkey, as well as Russian border guards guarding this border.