"Crocus" according to the instructions

Why Russia is not ready to defend against cheap terrorist attacks

The terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall is primarily a cheap terrorist attack committed by non -professional. And this means that such terrorist attacks are extremely difficult to prevent, especially in a country where special services are engaged in completely different.

Let's figure it out. The white “Renault” stopped at the Crocus at 19:55. In the concert hall, terrorists appeared at 20:03, after eight minutes, and after another ten minutes, at 20:13, they left. After that, fast and firefighters quickly reached the hall, but the special forces rode for more than an hour. All this time, people were burning, but they didn’t let anyone into the building.

Here two questions immediately arise.

The first is the fire state of the "crocus". Araz Agalarov is one of the Russian developers closest to the court, and he built Crocus, in fact, as a replacement for the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Agalarov’s dream was that all major concerts for the days of law enforcement agencies were held precisely in Crocus, and this really actually happened.

On the one hand, such a concentration of shoulder straps per square meter involves a serious fire extinguishing system. On the other hand, no one canceled the Russian “maybe”, and how it was in the “winter cherry” and in the “lame horse”, we remember. According to the investigation of "agency",
Three of the four evacuation stairs in Crocus were locked
. There are many eyewitnesses who tell how the doors were chopped with an ax, but I have not yet seen
not one who talked about the work of the automatic fire extinguishing system
. Here, however, we will wait for the final data.

But it is quite clear that the firefighters in the building were not allowed for more than an hour until the fighters of special forces arrived. All this time the building was burning freely, and there were no longer terrorists there.

This leads us to the second question.

The terrorists left the building at 20:13. The assault on the building began about an hour later. In any case, in telegram channels
Messages about this began to appear around 21:35
. In the building they heard shooting again. Special forces, obviously, acted on the basis that terrorists could still remain in Crocus.

Until the arrival of special forces arrives in the building - neither police officers, nor firefighters, nor doctors were allowed. This was probably the case according to the current instructions. The logic of such an instruction is understandable. But what if terrorists remained in the building? But what if they captured hostages? But what if they mined the territory?

Then, any non -professionalist who entered the building risks not only himself, but also hostages. A fireman is another hostage, and he can provide terrorists who set on fire to a way to escape. But what if they take a gas mask from him and will hide in him? And even a policeman risks not only himself. He risks that terrorists in response to his attempt to heroize will begin to shoot hostages.

Another thing is that we see a huge hole in these instructions. All of them are designed to capture hostages-as in Nord-Ost or Beslan. When an hour or two, before the special forces arrived, does not play a critical role, and the terrorists sit, hiding in hostages, and put forward the requirements. Such a terrorist attack requires great training and convinced fanatics. There are not many such people. They can be tracked.

But this attack is completely different. He cost a penny. All that is needed for him is a few redone carbines, the purchase of a Bausch “Renault” and a few cans with something that burned very well (it was a special mixture, we do not know). The terrorists shot people, set fire to the building and ran away.

And think about it: while the building was burning, and the special forces rode, there was not a single boss who would decide to cancel the instructions. Which would be oriented in the situation and decided: what kind of instruction is there, what special forces, people are burning.

Here another question arises.

How did it happen that in an hour the special services did not guess that there are no more terrorists in the building? After all, the hall was stuffed with cameras. Where were they withdrawn? What, the staff threw the entire video surveillance system and fled due to the fire?

Well, but then, obviously, given the scale of digital surveillance in Moscow, it would be reasonable to have the opportunity to transmit a signal from such cameras to another place where it can be analyzed without panic.

It was enough already at 20:14 to look at the cameras in the Crocus to understand that they were no longer shooting in the hall, and there is a fire.

One way or another, this attack puts all civilized societies - not only Russia - before a completely new degree of terrorist threat. To arrange on September 11 (an attack on New York and other American cities in 2001), terrorists learned to fly for many months. To run into the building and pour a bucket of gasoline there, no preparation is needed.

The difference between an expensive terrorist attack, which requires a long preparation of performers, and a cheap terrorist attack of non -professionals is understandable. This is the same difference that between an exclusive product and cheap consumer goods produced for a penny. Israeli sources claim that the theme of fire in terrorist chats appeared after October 7th. Before that, the fire was not discussed. And how “winter cherries” and “lame horse” are burning across Russia, we know.

This attack is cheap, like FPV drone. Alas, cheap terrorist attacks, in contrast to piece attacks, can be put into mass production.

And the last.

In response to a terrorist attack in Crocus in Russia, mass raids and deportations of migrants began. Thousands of people who have not had the right, at one moment were deprived of their usual life, means of existence and a place in which they sometimes worked for more than a dozen years.

Suddenly it turned out that there were no agents among these people, and what they think about is unknown.

However, in fact, the problem of monitoring the homogeneous groups of the non -automatic population has been facing humanity for a long time, since the time of Assyria and Babylon, who used to resettle huge groups of the population taken to their territory.

And do you know what they did even in Babylon? They simply gave this population to self -government and asked the head of self -government.

All reasonable states continued to do the same. For example, in Singapore in the 20th century, when there was a danger of Islamization of the Malay community, they did not at all introduce their agents into this community. The Singapore Security Service simply worked with the leaders of the community and imams of large mosques. As a result, they themselves helped prevent several terrorist attacks, including one when Islamists
planned to blow up the diplomatic missions of Western countries
And even tons of ammonia fertilizers have already been brought for this.

Migrant communities in Russia are powerless and often atomized. We will not give universal arguments now. It is clear that in Russia now, no one will listen to them in the atmosphere. But here you have an argument from the field of security. Let the migrants self-organize, while asking the leaders of the communities, and the leaders of the communities will be interested in the first to notice something suspicious. They will do it much more reliable than any implemented informants. And migrants in exchange will receive at least some voice, law and representation.

The author’s opinion may differ from the opinion of the editorial office.