
On April 1, the Air Force of Israelstruck a missile blow to the Iranian consulate building in Damascus. At least seven people were killed, including the commander of the Al-KudS division of the Islamic Revolution Corps (Ksir), General Mohammad Reza Zakhey and General Mohammad Hadi Hadji Rakhimi.
This blow can be called an important precedent. Prior to this, Israel has repeatedly impressed the objects of Iranian and Right forces in Syria, but never attacked diplomatic buildings. In addition, several high -ranking military were killed, including General Zaji, who led the KSIR forces in Syria and Lebanon. These are the most serious losses for Iran in the Middle East (if you take into account not the number of dead, but their status) after the death of the Al-Kuds commander Kasem Suleimani in 2020.
The blow of Israel in the world was perceived with anxiety - several countries openly condemned it at once, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia and China. The UN Secretary General Antoniu Guterres also made criticism. The inviolability of diplomatic objects remains an important part of international law - and in this aspect of Israeli, not only Iran is concerned.
The Islamic Republic itself has repeatedly violated the principle of inviolability of diplomatic objects. But the last such case occurred for a relatively long time: in 2016 in Tehran, the crowd burst into the embassy of Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Iran never struck the embassy missions or drones. In other words, the Israeli blow turned out to be a landmark to open a new chapter in the Middle East confrontation.
The attack also caused special attention because of the growing international pressure on Israel because of the Gaza war. The actions of the Israeli Defense Army (IDF) are now unhappy not only non -Western countries, but also by the United States. At the end of March, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even refused to send a delegation to America to discuss the operation of the IDF in the city of Rafaha-after Washington did not put a veto in the UN Security Council with a demand to immediately defeat the fire in the gas sector. Thus, a blow to Iran’s consulate is also a signal from Israel to the whole world: the country will solve issues as it will consider necessary, regardless of international criticism.
The long -term confrontation of Israel and Iran occurs in fairly non -standard conditions. On the one hand, the Jewish state is an order of magnitude stronger than Iran in military-technical. On the other hand, it is Tehran that remains the ideological inspirer of this enmity: the slogan “Death to Israel” is an unshakable heritage of the Islamic revolution.
At the same time, the Iranian side understands its weakness well - therefore, it always seeks to avoid a direct collision with Israel and minimize the risk of impact on its own territory. These fears are especially relevant against the backdrop of the crisis of legitimacy in the Islamic Republic, which manifested itself during the Iranian protests of the fall of 2022-and intensified during the elections in March 2024, which took place with a record low explicit of voters and in the absence of alternative authorities of candidates. A possible blow of Israel or the United States may be the reason for inspiring opponents of the Islamist system. Therefore, even with a point hit, a risk of serious internal instability occurs.
On March 1, universal elections were held in Iran to two key authorities at once - to Medzhlis (a single -palatus parliament in which 290 deputies are sitting) and the expert council (88 people). Deputies are elected for four years, and experts - for eight years. The main function of the latter is the election of the spiritual leader of the country in case of its departure . These are the first elections in Iran after large-scale protests of the fall of 2022, the trigger for which was the death of Mahsa Amini, detained for violation of the Islamic Dress code. The main (and quite expected) voting result was a record low in the history of the Islamic Republic of Yavka - about 41% of registered voters. Conservatives won a situation where almost none of the alternative candidates was allowed to participate in the election process.
At the same time, Iran has been working on a strategy for many years, the task of which is to compensate for the imbalance of forces. For this, the country is developing a network of allies, which includes groups and organizations like “Hizballa”, Hamas, Iraqi Khashd al-Shaabi and Yemenic Husites. The goal is to constantly fight with the enemy, without entering into a direct conflict with him. Quasi -state armed formations - proxy - are perfect for this.
This approach is primarily good for the United States. Iran does not strike the Americans, but they are attacked by Iraqi and Syrian groups with Iranian weapons and with Iranian information support. As a result, Tehran puts constant pressure on Washington in the hope that this will force the United States to leave the region or at least reduce its presence. At the same time, all these years, direct confrontation managed to avoid: with the exception of the murder by the Americans under Donald Trump Kasem Suleimani , the United States did not cause direct blows to the Iranian forces.
However, with regard to Israel, this tactic does not work so well. In the last decade, the United States in confrontation with Iran acted almost exclusively reactionary, responding to the pressure of the River forces. Israel does not wait for him to hit him. He himself regularly goes to escalation. The country holds regular cyber attacks on Iran, kills nuclear scientists and military in Iran, and strokes the Iranian military in Syria. That is, in a military confrontation, Israel, not Iran, sets the agenda rather.
Tehran is interested in the struggle with Israel to be conducted by the wrong hands and without excessive excavation. However, now the Jewish state is drawing Iran to a new level of confrontation, striking direct strokes of the Islamic Republic. There is logic in this: in the direct confrontation of Israel is much stronger than Iran. Therefore, instead of competing in the proxy-war, the Israeli side is more distinctly along the path of the “honest battle”-and Tehran has nothing to cover such intentions.
Despite the fact that Iran’s response to a blow to the consulate in some form will certainly be given, a big war is still unlikely. The reason is the pragmatism of Tehran - they well understand that in the war with Israel the advantage will not be on the Iranian side. Therefore, the Islamic Republic seeks to find the same subtle answer: so that everyone can see it-but the conflict does not grow into something more.
Nikita Smagin