A roll of the dice

Ukraine’s surprise incursion has opened a front on Russian territory, but the operation carries significant risks

Like our earlier reports on the combat situation in Ukraine, this article takes stock of the recent developments on the battlefield based on open-source information. Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and our detailed military analyses are part of our commitment to objective reporting on a war we firmly oppose.

Our map is based exclusively on open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect available evidence and determine its geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process. Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old.

Key updates as of August 10, 2024

On August 6, several Ukrainian brigades, supported by air defense systems and a drone operator regiment, crossed the Russian border into the Kursk region at points both west and east of the Sudzha border crossing. They captured the crossing itself the next day, with dozens of border guards surrendering. Ukrainian troops encountered only weak resistance from Russia’s “border cover regiments” — light infantry units formed last year to defend against raids by Ukrainian special forces. These regiments, partially composed of non-mobilized conscripts, weren’t equipped to face regular troops numbering in the thousands and armed with heavy equipment. As a result, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) were able to advance 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) or more on the first day of the offensive in two directions west of the city of Sudzha.

In the first days of the offensive, it quickly became evident that Russia didn’t have sufficient reserve troops in the Kursk region to repel such an attack — something Ukrainian intelligence likely knew in advance. The Kursk region falls under the responsibility of the Russian army’s “Sever” operational group, which has been embroiled in heavy fighting in the northern part of Ukraine’s Kharkiv region since May 2024. There were indications that a reserve force for the group, the 44th Army Corps (officially created in 2024 in Luga, Leningrad region), was being finalized in the Kursk region. Throughout the summer, pro-war Telegram channels posted recruitment ads for the corps. However, it appears that the brigades and division intended to form its backbone were never fully established, and some of the newly formed units were likely sent to the Kharkiv region to reinforce “Sever,” which had suffered heavy losses.

The AFU attempted to push “Sever” troops out of the Kharkiv and Vovchansk areas and back across the border, aiming to free up eight to 10 brigades that the Ukrainian command had deployed there in May as reinforcements. However, this effort was unsuccessful. Ukrainian intelligence, though, seems to have identified vulnerabilities along Russia’s border in other areas. This opened the door for an operation that, according to the Ukrainian command’s plan, is likely intended to force “Sever” to ease its pressure near Kharkiv, potentially enabling the AFU to push the group back into Russia.

However, it’s clear that the ideas behind this operation are somewhat shaky, and the operation itself carries significant risks. The brigades involved were pulled from the front lines during the spring and summer to be replenished with personnel and equipment. Meanwhile, on the front lines — especially in central and southern Donbas — the AFU is clearly facing a severe shortage of troops, forcing them to slowly retreat. Russian forces in Donbas have moved closer to logistics hubs that are crucial to the Ukrainian army’s defense. If the AFU fails to secure a foothold in the Kursk region, exploit the crisis in the “Sever” group to defeat it near Kharkiv, and then quickly redeploy freed-up reserves to Donbas, this could lead to a major defeat for the Ukrainian army in the east of the country.

Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and we are committed to reporting objectively on a war we firmly oppose. Join Meduza in its mission to challenge the Kremlin’s censorship with the truth. Donate today.

Kursk region, Russia

After breaking through west of Sudzha and capturing the village of Sverdlikovo, the AFU formed two groupings. One advanced northwest, likely intending to secure the newly established foothold from the Korenevo side, where Russian forces might gather for a counterattack. On the first day of the incursion, the AFU captured several villages west of Sverdlikovo: Zelenyi Shlyakh, Leonidovo, Lyubimovka, and Novoivanovka. They either did not plan to advance further or were halted by Russian airstrikes and the arrival of initial reserves. In any case, the AFU lost several pieces of equipment here.

The second grouping bypassed Sudzha from the west, occupying the western outskirts of the city and quickly reaching the village of Malaya Loknya. From there, part of the troops — mainly mobile light infantry groups — turned east, encircling Sudzha from the north. They reached the Sudzha–Kursk highway, where they attempted to cut off supplies to Russian troops (border guards and infantry from the same “border cover regiments”).

By the end of the third day, judging by all available open-source videos, the AFU had gained control of the western outskirts of Sudzha (Goncharovka, Zaoleshenka) but not the city center. The highway to Kursk wasn’t entirely blocked physically, but it was under fire control (including small arms fire) and monitored by kamikaze drones.

The AFU’s “western” grouping held its positions along the Lyubimovka–Novoivanovka line, while the “northern” grouping operated north of Malaya Loknya. The pause in the offensive appears to be due less to increased resistance from Russian reserves and more to the advancing troops becoming separated from their rear lines, which are still on Ukrainian territory. The artillery and drones used by Ukrainian forces have an effective range of about 10 to 15 kilometers (about six to nine miles), which is exactly how far they’ve advanced from the border to the northwest and north. On August 9, they began moving artillery into the Kursk region (judging by open-source videos, several units were hit by Russian airstrikes and long-range Lancet kamikaze drones). This indicates that the AFU have not yet reached the positions outlined in their operational plan.

What happens next will depend on the reserves both commands can muster for the operation. The AFU will need additional forces to advance further or even to secure their current foothold. The Russian army, on the other hand, will have to build a new grouping from scratch to try to push Ukrainian troops out of the Kursk region. The fighting could drag on, much like it has in the Kharkiv region. Meanwhile, the Russian command doesn’t yet need to halt its offensive in Donbas. It can redeploy troops from other parts of the front in Ukraine, such as the eastern bank of the Dnipro River or the Zaporizhzhia region.

Toretsk, Ukraine

The Russian army is continuing its advance on Toretsk in central Donbas. The satellite settlements of Druzhba, Pivdenne, Pivnichne, Zalizne, and Niu-York are almost completely captured, and Russian troops have reached the spoil tips of the mines just outside the city. Ukrainian troops positioned between Zalizne and Niu-York, who are defending fortifications built since 2015, are now at risk of being surrounded.

Ukrainian forces in Niu-York are attempting to counterattack, but if the situation doesn’t change in the coming weeks, they’ll likely have to retreat southwest of Toretsk. If Toretsk falls, Russian forces could advance toward Kostiantynivka and Chasiv Yar from the south, with Chasiv Yar already under attack from the east.

Pokrovsk, Ukraine

Russian forces continue to advance along a broad front, with the main axis of the offensive following the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk railway. The pace of the offensive has accelerated in recent weeks. Russian troops are close to capturing another significant AFU stronghold near the village of Zhelanne, located along the railway. Further north, they’re approaching the key village of Hrodivka, which shields Pokrovsk from the east.

If this rate of advance continues, Russian forces will reach Pokrovsk and the nearby city of Myrnohrad in early fall. At that point, even before the fighting begins, these towns will no longer be able to function as the main logistics hub for the AFU in central and southern Donbas. This leaves the Ukrainian command with little time for offensives in the north of the country — substantial reinforcements are urgently needed near Pokrovsk.

Meduza is careful in working with data, but mistakes are still possible, and perhaps even inevitable. If you spot one, please let us know by sending an email to reports@meduza.io. Thank you!