A costly compromise

Can conditions for ending the war in Ukraine be found to satisfy both sides?

Despite Donald Trump’s clear determination to forge a peace deal in Ukraine by hook or by crook, the details of a supposedly leaked “100-day plan” to end the war have led experts to question whether its requirements are even theoretically possible.

On the first day of his second presidency, Trump reiterated his intention to meet face-to-face with Vladimir Putin, saying that while he knew that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wanted “to make a deal”, he wasn’t so sure about the man who started it in the first place, adding in an unscripted aside that by allowing the war to continue, Putin was effectively “destroying Russia”.

Less than a week later, Ukrainian news outlet Strana.ua published the supposedly leaked blueprint of a “100-day plan” to end the war in Ukraine, which provided for trilateral talks between Trump, Zelensky and Putin to be held in late February or March, a ceasefire to be announced by Easter, the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Russia’s western Kursk region, and an international peace conference to be held by late April with a peace declaration to be made by 9 May.

Other conditions of the reported deal included a Ukrainian commitment not to join NATO and for Kyiv to end all “military and diplomatic efforts” to regain its sovereign territories currently under Russian occupation.

Kyiv immediately dismissed the plan as fake, while Moscow did not comment on the supposed leak at all. Throughout the week, Ukrainian officials continued to dismiss reports of potential negotiations beginning in the spring, with Andriy Kovalenko, the head of Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation, saying on 27 January that while there was “a whole galaxy” of articles in the media about when the alleged peace talks would start, none of them were true.

On the same day, independent newspaper Ukrainska Pravda quoted intelligence chief Kirill Budanov as saying that Ukraine’s existence would be threatened unless “serious negotiations” did not begin by this summer — a statement that made headlines in Ukrainian media but was promptly denied by Ukraine’s military intelligence.

“I can’t imagine who Putin and Zelensky will appoint as their representatives. Or will Putin negotiate in person? I doubt he’ll meet Zelensky, but he may meet Trump.”

While for Putin, meeting with a US president after three years of almost total ostracism from the international community is a clear win, Trump has far less to gain from in person talks, political analyst Dmitry Oreshkin points out, noting that an alternative way to begin talks would be to form negotiating groups that can interact directly or through intermediaries, as happened during the ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas.

Suggesting that the most likely outcome of talks would be “a lousy compromise for both sides”, Oreshkin stressed that by entering talks, Kyiv would at least be able to rule out Ukraine’s total defeat: “They still have their army and statehood, the front line is being defended, they are retreating, but they’re still fighting. This is not a defeat.”

That said, Zelensky has admitted that Ukraine “lacks the strength” to restore its 1991 borders, despite its oft-repeated commitment to doing so, meaning that it’s virtually inevitable that some parts of Ukrainian territory will remain under de facto Russian control without being formally recognised as Russian by Kyiv.

There are “plenty” of similar examples in the world of territories with limited recognition, such as Northern Cyprus, which is recognised only by Turkey, and the Kuril Islands, ownership of which is claimed by both Russia and Japan, Oreshkin added.

While it’s still hard to say what concessions might be demanded of each side, Trump is likely to play a key role in influencing Putin and Zelensky to accept contentious proposals, Oreshkin said.

Trump’s contradictory statements on Ukraine thus far were likened by political analyst Vladimir Pastukhov to “a squid releasing ink to hide itself in a dark cloud” and thus ensuring that neither side feels secure.

Regardless of whether Trump has a plan or not, he does not particularly care about Ukraine as a state at all, Pastukhov added — “if it were up to him, he’d give it to Putin at a premium”, but he does understand that what happens in Ukraine is likely to set a precedent for China’s inevitable move to take back Taiwan at some future date, which will have ramifications for US domestic politics.

The war in Ukraine could become “a vulnerability” for Trump in the midterms next year — which is one reason why he has his own “red lines” and is determined to avoid the “weak Trump ceding Ukraine to Putin” narrative at all costs, Pastukhov continued, meaning that an “Afghan scenario” in which Putin’s control would extend to the whole of Ukraine through a proxy government he controls is out of the question.

Discounting Zelensky’s fantasy of “defeating Putin on the battlefield” due to its sheer unlikeliness, the two most likely remaining options are a so-called “German” scenario, in which Russia retains control over it areas of Ukraine it has already occupied while the rest of the country remains independent and in the Western camp, with both sides “armed to the teeth” and with Kyiv abandoning its NATO ambitions; or an “Austrian” scenario, in which, like Austria at the end of World War II, Kyiv’s foreign and domestic policy as well as the size of its army would be subject to outside control and it would be forced to declare itself a neutral state.

“The question is, what price will Putin demand for peace?” Pastukhov says in summary. “It’s already fair to say that many won’t like the price of peace.”