As Russian provocations intensify, the Baltic states are focusing on long-term border defence plans

As Russia sinks ever deeper into its war against Ukraine, hybrid threats against EU countries have intensified. Cyberattacks on airport infrastructure, drone flyovers and violations of airspace by Russian aircraft have become increasingly frequent. With Russian military incursions creeping ever closer, Poland and the Baltic states have assumed the position of Europe’s exposed frontier.

Defence discussions have abounded in recent years, focusing on anti-drone walls, “dragon’s teeth” — concrete obstacles designed to stop advancing tanks — and more. But what will this cost the countries bearing the brunt of building it?

Forcing the EU’s hand

A fresh wave of hybrid activity has swept over Europe this autumn, seeing a swarm of drones enter Polish airspace, reconnaissance drones appear in Denmark, Norway and Germany and two further such drones cross into Lithuania. These incidents were designed to unsettle rather than inflict real damage, according to Lithuanian military expert Vaidotas Malinionis.

Vladimir Putin is putting on a tough front to appear strong among the domestic elite in light of a lack of clear success in Ukraine, but NATO states “understand very well that it’s all a bluff”, Malinionis noted. Putin is trying to show he is attacking NATO — but it’s more “brazen behaviour and escalation” than a real attack, with Russian officials publicly denying involvement, he continued.

Last June, the leaders of Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania called for the construction of a defence line along the EU’s external borders with Russia and Belarus, which has been dubbed the Baltic Defence Line.

From Malinionis’ perspective, Russia’s hybrid warfare actions produced the opposite results, uniting European nations around defence discussions rather than sowing discord. Harsher responses to airspace violations are now the norm, new defence plans are being drawn up, and resources are being allocated to improve defence capabilities.

Malinionis admits that EU countries were slow to react to the Ukraine invasion, but things are picking up. In Lithuania, a Rheinmetall plant for the production of 155mm artillery ammunition is about to commence operations. In any case, Malinionis doesn’t anticipate large-scale Russian attacks in the near future, noting that the country needs three or four years to recover following the end of the Ukraine war — whenever that may be.

The significance of defence structures and preparedness cannot, however, be underestimated. Poland has built barriers along the Belarusian border. Latvia has proposed swamp restoration to create a natural defence. Lithuania intends to create a training system for drone operation.

Last June, the leaders of Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania called for the construction of a defence line along the EU’s external borders with Russia and Belarus, which has been dubbed the Baltic Defence Line. But what exactly does it entail?

“It is a multi-layered system of technical measures and means that includes devices for detection, identification, destruction and deterrence,” says Malinionis. “And also offensive capabilities, so that in event, say, of a build-up of forces near NATO borders, we have the capacity to react quickly.”

Some elements of the Baltic Defence Line are visible, such as the “dragon’s teeth” which have appeared on the border of Russian exclave Kaliningrad, near the Lithuanian town of Panemunė.

Russia has forced the EU’s hand into reallocating substantial resources to its eastern flank — and Russian threats are now being taken seriously, even if they amount to mere provocations.

While some have been dubious of the initiative, suggesting that the Nemunas River opposite the Russian city of Sovetsk offers sufficient deterrence, you can never be too careful, Malinionis notes. In case of a ground invasion, Russian troops may set up a pontoon crossing, like they did in 2022 in northern Ukraine as they moved from Belarus towards Kyiv, he says.

The most important thing, in his opinion, has already happened: Russia has forced the EU’s hand into reallocating substantial resources to its eastern flank — and Russian threats are now being taken seriously, even if they amount to mere provocations.

According to Malinionis, joint operations with Ukraine to counter drone attacks are already underway: they are being studied, monitoring systems and electronic warfare tools are being implemented and mobile units are being deployed.

A marathon, not a sprint

Lithuania has repeatedly affirmed its plans to increase defence spending to 5-6% of GDP, which sound ambitious. But how realistic is that economically?

“Our country was one of the first in the EU to allocate 2% to defence back in 2019,” Lithuanian economist and MP Jekaterina Rojaka explains. “To practically double defence spending was a politically difficult decision. But since then, we’ve only raised the bar, and last year we spent 3.11% of GDP.”

Rojaka believes that Lithuania is already implementing a large-scale plan to strengthen defences and does not intend to take any steps backwards. But this will require a “restructuring of priorities” she admits “including spending cuts, tax changes and taking out loans”.

In Rojaka’s opinion, the main reserve for increasing defence spending lies in Lithuania’s economic growth, which exceeds the EU average. “In 2025, GDP growth is expected to reach 2.6%–2.8%.”

Tax increases are inevitable, Rojaka admits, but she insists that defence spending is a direct investment in national security and economic growth.

The main challenge is that defence spending is projected for the long term: it’s a marathon, not a sprint, and Lithuania is relying on external loans. In September, the European Commission granted Lithuania more than €6 billion, using the new Security Action for Europe loan instrument.

Tax increases are inevitable, Rojaka admits, but she insists that defence spending is a direct investment in national security and economic growth.

Sceptics warn, however, that defence spending can lead to negative outcomes, citing the example of Romania in the 1960s–1970s, which tried to build a nationwide network of bomb shelters. This led to a rapid rise in debt, and the plan to erect defences never fully came to fruition.

“That’s why joint European projects are so important,” Rojaka emphasises. “Standardised procurement and financing reduces the debt burden. It also enables us to clearly formulate our goal, and stay within debt and budget deficit limits. It’s difficult, but achievable.”

Preparation is key

Aliaksandr Klachko, a Belarusian who fought for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2022–2023, has real combat experience, having guarded a crossing in Lysychansk and fought in the battles for Bakhmut, both in eastern Ukraine.

He managed, with great difficulty, to persuade Lithuania to grant him asylum, having to stage a protest outside the central office of the Migration Department. In Belarus, at least 10 politically motivated criminal cases have been opened against him, including for treason and mercenary activity, which is how Alexander Lukashenko’s regime labels his participation in the war on Ukraine’s side.

When Russia’s full-scale invasion began, Ukraine rapidly changed its legislation so that “foreigners who saw the Russian army as an enemy could take up arms,” Klachko explains. “But in Lithuania, they seem unable to understand who is the enemy and who is a friend.”

One of the reasons why the Russian army has failed to capture all of Ukraine, Klachko says, is the country’s vast territory. The Baltic states, however, have “virtually no chance” without NATO’s protection in case of a Russian invasion, he admits.

However, it still remains up to the people and their willingness to defend their countries, Klachko notes. “NATO will not defend those who surrender without a fight.”

Klachko describes Putin and Lukashenko’s regimes as “street thugs who respect only strength”, meaning that they will not attack a “well-prepared state” and will stop once their victims bite back. Defence preparations, therefore, are key, and EU countries should learn from the lessons of 2022, when they sat around doing nothing for too long, he says.

One of the most critical actions a state should take in the event of large-scale aggression, Klachko says, is evacuation: “Ukraine’s experience has shown that war zones are no place for civilians. People should be evacuated quickly and calmly. Several alternative routes should be prepared, including by sea. People should clearly know what to do if, for example, the route to Poland is cut off. If they have a car, they should know where to drive. If they don’t, they should know which station to board a bus or train at.”

“Dragon’s teeth”, bomb shelters and anti-tank ditches, in his view, are secondary to the need for preparation and knowledge. Once a war becomes prolonged, weapons and technology become more important.

“Whereas artillery used to be the queen of the battlefield, drones are now the gods of war,” Klachko stresses. “Technology can prevent personnel losses. Ukraine already uses robotic systems that deliver precision fire, carry out mine-clearing and perform other tasks.”

Should the protests have succeeded, neither Kyiv nor Vilnius would have had to fear Belarusian involvement in the Russian aggression.

Klachko adds that Lithuania still has a few years to build a reliable defence system, but that the will to act decisively must be there, mentioning the lack of firm stance taken by Europe or Ukraine in support of Belarus’ 2020 protests, which were brutally quashed by Lukashenko’s regime backed by the Kremlin.

Should the protests have succeeded, neither Kyiv nor Vilnius would have had to fear Belarusian involvement in the Russian aggression, he notes. “But unfortunately, my country is now occupied, and it happened without a single shot being fired.”

This article was first published by Novaya Gazeta Baltic.