Architects of Chaos Theory

How pro-Kremlin pundits use geopolitical turmoil to explain away Russia’s war against Ukraine

Vladimir Putin’s vision of a “multipolar world” has been a keystone of Russia’s foreign policy ever since he delivered his infamous Munich speech in 2007. Asserting that U.S. dominance is in decline and that Russia is destined for a special role in the new international order, this concept helps explain Putin’s repeated calls for a “new Yalta” and regular railing against the “collective West.” But according to political analyst Anton Barbashin, it fails to account for Russia’s concrete actions on the world stage, particularly when it comes to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As Barbashin wrote in a recent article for Riddle Russia, pro-Kremlin pundits have gravitated towards another, more malleable concept to help make sense of Putin’s foreign policy moves over the last decade. Known as Chaos Theory, it posits that the “old world” is gone for good, unmanageable chaos reigns, and that it’s every country for itself — that morality is out, military power is in, and war is the new normal. For more insight into what Chaos Theory reveals about Russia’s approach to international relations and its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Meduza deputy editor Eilish Hart spoke to Anton Barbashin, the editorial director of Riddle Russia.

Seen through the lens of Russian propaganda, a “multipolar world” seems inevitable — if not practically upon us. In the meantime, however, it’s only natural that chaos reigns in international relations. That’s what pro-Kremlin pundits associated with Russia’s Valdai Discussion Club argue, at least.

Political analyst Anton Barbashin noticed Chaos Theory gaining traction among Russian foreign-policy thinkers in the late 2010s, just a few years after Moscow annexed Crimea and sparked a war in Ukraine’s east. Prominent experts from the Valdai Club — a Kremlin-controlled think tank known for hosting President Vladimir Putin at its annual conference — have been elaborating on this concept in their reports ever since. “They had gotten disillusioned with the idea of ‘soft bipolarity,’ where they saw the United States and China as the two ‘big poles,’ and everybody in between sticking to one side or another,” Barbashin explains. “They cited numerous changes to how the world is governed and, in their opinion, there was no pattern.”

As Barbashin noted in a recent article for Riddle Russia, the Valdai Club’s commentary mainly serves to justify the Kremlin’s existing foreign policy rather than challenge it. In that spirit, Chaos Theory advances the notion that geopolitical turmoil is an inevitable step on the road to the “multipolar” global order of Putin’s dreams — one in which power would be distributed more or less evenly among a few big players that dominate within their own spheres of influence. “Multipolarity is an ideal,” Barbashin says, comparing it to the Soviet Union’s goal of building a Communist society. “Russia has been trying to get its own zone of influence for quite some time. The war in Ukraine is part of that story, but we’re not there yet. Though they are convinced that we’re moving towards that kind of configuration.”

With this in mind, Valdai pundits frame Russian aggression as a way of adapting to the intervening chaos, a reality they believe cannot be controlled. Operating on the assumption that the old “rules of the game” no longer apply, states are left with military might as the only guarantee of survival and stability. As a result, they contend, war becomes the status quo.

Asked what Chaos Theory reveals about Russia’s military objectives in Ukraine, Barbashin says it helps explain the Kremlin’s willingness to violate pre-existing international agreements and legal norms. “It makes no sense to refrain from using ‘whatever force necessary’ because this is what actually makes new rules and defines if you are capable of being a great power,” he says, following this line of thinking. “If you change the rules based on […] the ‘realities on the ground,’ then you will have the chance to promote your own rules, and others will have to adapt and accept it.”

Putin’s recent comments on U.S. efforts to negotiate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine drive home this very message. Speaking at a summit in Kyrgyzstan in late November, he warned that Russia is prepared to continue seizing territory by force so long as Kyiv rejects its ceasefire demands. Putin then reiterated this stance during a televised meeting with senior Russian defense officials on December 17. “The goals of the special military operation will undoubtedly be achieved,” he maintained. “If the opposing side and its foreign patrons refuse to have a substantive discussion, Russia will achieve the liberation of its historic lands by military means.”

Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and we are committed to reporting objectively on a war we firmly oppose. Join Meduza in its mission to challenge the Kremlin’s censorship with the truth. Donate today.

Barbashin sees no contradiction between Chaos Theory, which posits that the “old world” cannot be restored, and Putin’s penchant for making historical claims to Ukrainian territory. Selectively referencing Russia’s Imperial and Soviet history, he explains, not only offers a sense of continuity but also creates a vision of “restoring” what should have been. “Folks in Moscow […] look at how Russia’s relationship with the West developed after 1991 and essentially conclude that those rules no longer apply because it was actually the West that broke all the rules,” Barbashin adds. “So, in their reasoning, it’s not Russia that struck the first blow — it was them, and Russia is responding.”

Putin himself said as much during his annual Direct Line call-in show last Friday, when he flatly denied Russia’s responsibility for human casualties in Ukraine. “We don’t consider ourselves responsible for people’s deaths because we didn’t start this war,” he insisted. Putin later claimed that Moscow would not embark on any new “special military operations” so long as the West “treats us with respect.” At the same time, he has remained adamant about Russia’s desire to continue talks with the United States. During the same press conference, Putin deemed Trump’s efforts to negotiate “completely sincere” and even claimed that he had “practically agreed” to Trump’s proposals during their August summit in Alaska.

The way Barbashin sees it, Putin’s conciliatory tone toward the Trump administration is in no small part due to its leader’s own willingness to upend decades of American foreign policy. “[Kremlin officials] quite openly congratulate Washington on taking the approach that it does, recognizing that the United States is no longer the main backer of the order that existed in international affairs since 1991,” he notes.

With the Trump administration eager to “make a deal” on Ukraine and restore business ties with Russia, Putin has made clear that he now sees Europe as his main obstacle. However, as Barbashin points out, the Russian president also appears to believe that it’s only a matter of time before European politics swings in his favor, too. Indeed, Putin said just last week that Europe’s current leaders will eventually lose power, thus rendering dialogue with Russia “inevitable.”

In Barbashin’s view, Kremlin officials genuinely welcome the possibility of restoring cooperation with the U.S. — or any other big player, including the European bloc. “If Russia’s interests are respected, it’s all good,” he says of the Kremlin’s thinking. At the same time, Moscow tends to write off states that it views as “smaller” players, he adds.

This tendency is on full display in Putin’s dismissive attitude towards Kyiv, despite Russia’s failure to overrun Ukraine in 2022 and the fact that its forces are still fighting to seize all of the Donbas after nearly 12 years of hostilities in the region. But with top officials and commentators telling Putin what he wants to hear, it seems safe to assume that he faces little to no internal pressure to change tack. “It’s a feature of any autocratic regime: the political leadership takes decisions, then the subordinates have to justify those decisions and come up with explanations,” Barbashin says. “You basically have people reassuring each other that they’re doing the right thing, because criticism as such is not present.”

In a similar vein, the Financial Times reported on Monday that flawed briefings from Russian generals are fueling Putin’s belief that he can win the war outright. Citing positive reports from his generals, Putin said during last Friday’s call-in show that he is “simply confident” that Russian forces will achieve “new successes” on the battlefield “before next year.” “Our troops are advancing along the whole frontline,” he claimed. “The enemy is retreating in all directions.”

As for what Chaos Theory foreshadows for Russia domestically, Barbashin says that its proponents offer a surprisingly “honest” view of the degree to which Putin’s regime is acting without constraints. Having deduced that universal values no longer exist, morality has no place in foreign policy, and there’s no such thing as “the right of history,” these pundits reason that the Kremlin is now free to take whatever measures it deems necessary to ensure stability at home. Otherwise, its adversaries may seize the chance to intervene domestically. “Repressing or targeting dozens, hundreds, or thousands of people is not an issue if, in their logic, it provides security,” Barbashin underscores.

That said, it’s important not to overstate the degree of influence these foreign-policy thinkers have on Russia’s political elites. In the absence of open debate, their analysis largely holds up a mirror to Russia today. “It’s essentially a service that the community of experts and commentators provides to the state, defined by the existing reality and their perception of what would be welcomed […] and fit the state narrative,” Barbashin concludes. “Essentially, what would Putin like?”

Written by Eilish Hart