IranComNadzor

Is large-scale Internet blocking based on the Iranian model possible in Russia?

The latest wave of protests in Iran, provoked by another economic crisis, is characterized not only by a large number of victims, but also by unprecedented measures to block the Internet. On the one hand, the old partner limited himself to general statements and condemnations with the words of the Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, there is a non-zero probability that everything that happens in the digital space of the former Persia happened thanks to Russian developments.

It is important to make a disclaimer here. Military and economic cooperation between Iran and Russia is an open secret. But given, let’s say, the intimate nature of technological interaction, what specific results were achieved during active contacts between Iranians and Russian officials is unknown. So all that remains is to rely on open sources.

There is also a third party: the delivery of a particular product or software does not equal its commissioning.

Several years ago, foreign media talked about the supply of technologies developed by the Proteus Research and Development Center, among which there are not only Internet traffic control systems, but also the “Safe City” hardware and software complex, which is used in those many outdoor surveillance cameras. So, theoretically, we can assume that at least some of the systems that provide conditional “blocking” of the Internet operate on Russian products. But again, and here a footnote is needed: the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a small state and, despite all its problems, not the poorest state. There are also enough of their own products for control.

Another important note: the role of DPI and Internet traffic control may be slightly exaggerated.

• Firstly, VPN was not canceled at least before the start of mass protests. Moreover, there were versions that one of the major providers of such services was the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

• And secondly, given the speed of data creation and distribution, further complexity of solutions for Internet censorship does not play a fundamental role. Beautiful numbers on the amount blocked - as in the case of Russia - are an internal product of officials, helping to take even more money from the budget for supposedly strengthening control. That is, no matter what happens in reality, at this particular point one should not greatly overestimate the influence of relevant technologies.

One of the tasks faced in such cases is ensuring the operation of government resources and life support systems, such as banks. In Iran, as in Russia, they are trying to solve this through “white lists”, but, apparently, they are a little smarter. And here, quite possibly, the technology of the senior partner could come in handy. Unlike the mythical “Cheburnet,” the national segment of Iran is fully developed, and this, in addition to historical prerequisites, is associated with the very architecture of the Network.

If in Russia the number of registered and not very international highways cannot be accurately counted, then in Iran everything is simpler - these are naturally two channels to the outside world, which, of course, are controlled by the state.

It turns out that to completely isolate the country you only need to press two switches, which are located in the same room. But there is one nuance - radio channels and satellite communications.

With terrestrial infrastructure and cellular communications it’s easier: you disconnect a specific cable and that’s it. With real wireless communication, for example, when the receiver and transmitter are on opposite sides of the border, it is already more difficult. And when it comes to the now ubiquitous Starlink from Elon Musk, even more so. And here, most likely, electronic warfare equipment was used.

There is no exact confirmation, but, as various media reported, the Russian Kalinka complex, which suppresses signals in low Earth orbit, could be used to suppress satellite signals. The Krasukha-4 complex, which has been in service with the Russian Armed Forces since 2009, could be used for the same purposes. But the matter is not limited to this: Iran has its own electronic warfare system - Cobra V8, which works on the same principle as Krasukha.

Let's add to this complexes for identifying terminals, multiply by the aggression of security forces and get a complete picture of how Iran formally blocked communications, while leaving working segments.

From the available leaks we can conclude that satellites, at least in densely populated areas, are unfortunately not a panacea. The range of one electronic warfare system is from 50 to 300 kilometers, which makes it possible to control a large area. And if you consider that we are not talking about an armed conflict, covering the main territories is not a problem.

Free access to Starlink for Iranian protesters was a broad but, as it turns out, futile gesture. A logical question arises: is this possible in Russia, which is slowly but surely turning into an Orthodox version of the Islamic Republic of Iran?

And the answer, to the delight of many, is negative. Both historically and structurally, the country differs from its competitors, and no Chinese, let alone Iranian, experience is applicable here. This does not mean that they will not shut down the Internet, it does not mean that they will not block sites. Everything will just be different.

First of all, in our case, the number of trunk operators with their own interests also plays a role: Rostelecom is a giant, no doubt, but there are other large players. And the architecture of the Network itself: the Iranian intranet began to be created long before the word “sovereignty” was remembered in Russia. And area plays a role - Iran is about 10 times smaller. You can’t get enough of “Krasukh” into such territory. So, if shutdowns continue, it will only be at the level of individual districts and regions.

Well, the current economic situation is unlikely to allow significant innovation. The several billion rubles that Roskomnadzor will receive for a new DPI system based on artificial intelligence look like nothing more than a cut. Of course, the lives of citizens will traditionally worsen, but this will not lead to critical changes. It will not be possible to completely isolate the Russian segment: despite numerous exercises to block foreign traffic. Russia is an order of magnitude more integrated into the external space, but over the years it has not come close to creating a full-fledged intranet. It won’t be “like in Iran,” but we can’t expect an increase in the level of digital freedoms either. No one has canceled the repressions.

The story with Iran has shown: whoever owns the communications controls the situation.

The figures about the victims are leaks without confirmation; the number of victims is still unknown. Details of mass protests are random videos each time that require verification and geolocation. In fact, it’s worth admitting: we have no idea what’s going on there, and it’s impossible to put together a complete picture—it’s still a mosaic of separate sources, each of which may turn out to be dubious. And as it turned out, even 100,000 Starlink terminals, which were allegedly imported into the country in parts, are not a panacea.

As for friendship and partnership, of course, on the one hand, you can feel proud of national products that are in demand in other countries. On the other hand, given that all this policy has only the goals of a dubious present - maintaining the power of specific regimes - it has no clear future.