From the book “Who defeated the USSR: “hippies” or “yuppies”? The generation of the seventies between freedom and consumption"
In the continuation of the bestseller “How We Lived in the USSR,” Dmitry Travin talks about the generation born in the 1950s and 1960s - about the people who ultimately buried the Union. We are publishing an excerpt about how market mechanisms normalized and began to undermine the Soviet system from within.
All of us, since February 24, 2022, have found ourselves in the face of advancing barbarity, violence and lies. In this situation, it is extremely important to preserve at least the remnants of culture and support the values of humanism - including for the sake of the future of Russia. Therefore, the editors of Gorky will continue to talk about books, reminding our readers that there is still a place for thought and fiction in the world.
Dmitry Travin. Who defeated the USSR: “hippies” or “yuppies”? The generation of the seventies between freedom and consumption. M.: New Literary Review, 2026. Contents

The writer Daniil Granin pointed out exactly when the consumer society began to corrupt Soviet ideological standards. “When I first found out in 1968 that a surgeon in a hospital was “charging” for an operation, I didn’t believe it. And everyone around didn’t believe it. So this doctor is a freak. Monster. Then it turned out that they “take” it in other hospitals. The process was gradual. I found out what they take for admission to the institute, they take it for diplomas. They hire teachers, they charge at the district housing departments for a warrant, for an exchange, they charge for a ticket to a sanatorium. Attitudes towards wealth have changed. It became prestigious to have luxurious furniture, diamonds, a top-brand car, a dacha - in a word, to be rich. Dressing is not just fashionable, but being in the “company”. The previous neglect of everyday life, communalism, everything was a thing of the past, it looked like failure.” The writer’s observations are interesting because he is not an expert in either the economic or criminal sphere. Granin noticed a new phenomenon precisely when it began to catch the eye of the average person. Bribery, which was still hidden in the “folds” of the Stalinist system, has now become accepted as normal by wide sections of the population. It is not surprising that one of the areas of activity of Yuri Andropov, who headed the KGB at precisely this time (1967), was the fight against corruption.
The Soviet non-market system was supposed to be seemingly non-corrupt. But upon closer examination, it turned out that the tempting benefits were quickly changing the mentality of the Soviet apparatchiks. Anatoly Chernyaev, an employee of the CPSU Central Committee, once visited a high-ranking GDR partyocrat. The guest discovered a two-story house with a garden, living rooms, bedrooms, offices, a cellar, a garage, and children's rooms. There are televisions and tape recorders everywhere, which by the standards of the 1970s was by no means as affordable a thing as it is now. The Soviet apparatchik had nothing of the kind. Even in comparison with the “brotherly socialist countries,” our nomenclature in terms of wealth lagged far behind. What can we say about comparison with the life of the Western elite! “How oppressed, dark and cramped we live!” - the well-earning writer Yuri Nagibin wrote in his diary after a visit to the house of a major Hungarian director, where he saw high ceilings and wide windows through which cherry tree branches with ripe berries burst. Even on a tourist trip in 1989, I was impressed by the private houses of Dresden, located within walking distance from the center.
The nomenklatura differed greatly from the people in terms of access to various kinds of goods, but in terms of standard goods purchased for money, they were completely inferior to those who had the corresponding status abroad. As the revolutionary generation left the scene, envy of the “bourgeois” began to gnaw at our elite more and more. By the 1970s, the revolutionaries were completely gone and envy reached its climax. The nomenklatura began to reach out for money. Corruption was greatly limited by the fact that in the absence of a market, even money could not buy everything you wanted, but those who had the opportunity to use their official position for personal gain tried not to miss the chance. It would be a grave mistake to assume that the participation of officials in business affairs appeared only in the 1990s. The nomenklatura in the 1970s actively adapted to the rules under which they were not required to do much, but were given as much as was more than enough for them by the standards of a closed society.
The structure of Soviet corruption was complex, from the collection of petty bribes to the formation of large underground fortunes. Moreover, these fortunes were often formed by the collection of money by superior persons from inferior persons. For example, a policeman on duty at an Intourist hotel “did not notice” the scammers who were carrying out currency transactions, and for this he received from them a sum per day that was almost half of his official monthly salary. The policemen who were on duty in places of mass blackmail earned money in the same way. At the same time, naturally, they had to share with the authorities in order to continue to maintain the “bread and butter”. Another example is business executives who had access to scarce goods. They shared their income with a variety of superiors, from the immediate to the party, as well as the police. The third example is bartenders who had low earnings, but were forced to pay the jackpot for their own bosses and people from the organizations that control their activities.
Traces of the fortunes of high-ranking persons were sometimes discovered. One day, the head of the KGB of Georgia, who personally controlled the list of people going on an expensive cruise around Europe, crossed out from it a person whom he considered a swindler. A certain secretary of the district committee immediately refused the trip. It immediately became clear who was supposed to pay for the travel of this nomenklatura. Chernyaev wrote about how the district committee secretary could support speculators. He knew of cases where employees of various government agencies put close people at the top of the list for purchasing a car. This was not done disinterestedly. The car was then resold, and the nomenklatura received his share. Due to the terrible shortage of cars, a car at resale cost in the early 1970s about twice as much as when purchased from the state after a long wait in line.
Diplomats and others who frequently crossed the border had another way of promoting speculation. When the delegation traveled abroad, the state exchanged rubles for foreign currency. The nomenclature makers did not even spend this currency to purchase the deficit. The embassies gave them receipts from Berezka stores instead. And if the goods sold at Beryozka were not needed by the nomenklatura, the check was resold at a speculative price. Thus, when traveling abroad, an official could double the amount of money exchanged for currency in three days. And if he also received permission to exchange rubles for foreign currency without restrictions, the possibilities for enrichment turned out to be virtually limitless.
Part of the money earned from such “foreign trade” operations went to the top, as in the cases of police officers, business executives and bartenders. Galina Vishnevskaya described how Minister of Culture Ekaterina Furtseva “fed” from touring artists:
She preferred to take in currency, which I can testify myself: in Paris, during a tour of the Bolshoi Theater in 1969, I put 400 dollars in her hand - my entire fee. I just gave her a bribe so that she would let me go abroad under my own contracts (otherwise it also happened: my contract, but another singer is traveling under it). I was covered in sweat from excitement, but she calmly, habitually took it and said: “Thank you...” She had her own “prospector” artists, who in those years often traveled abroad and with her death disappeared from the world stage. After the end of the tour, such a prospector went around all the actors “with a hat”, collecting 100 dollars “for Katya.”
It was possible to take money not only from those who went to concerts, but also from those who wanted to leave for good. One pop singer could not obtain permission to emigrate to Israel. But as soon as he sold his dacha to the Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolai Shchelokov, the problems disappeared, and the artist went to the Promised Land. By the way, the housing of the minister and his relatives was equipped at the expense of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And a certain high-ranking official from the State Concert preferred to take "greyhound puppies" from a foreign impresario - the organizer of the performances of our stars. A bill for sewing expensive suits regularly came to his office, and he paid for everything. Look, instead of a star they will send God knows who from the USSR - and as a result there will be no concert fees. But here’s the problem: the corrupt official had to wear the same gray, shiny suit to work. Modestly. In Lenin's way. One can imagine how the poor fellow was burdened by these “Leninist” moral standards, how he dreamed that someday the “soviet society” would collapse and he could show the world all his expensive suits, all his wife’s diamonds and other signs of prosperity.
However, if in the capital corruption was more or less disguised, then in some regions the nouveau riche almost no longer hid their wealth. This was especially true of the Krasnodar region, which was headed by a person close to Brezhnev, Sergei Medunov. When his associate, regional committee secretary Anatoly Tarada, was transferred to Moscow as deputy minister, he transported crystal and carpets to his new apartment by truck. This party member earned his money by providing protection for the shadow economy of the region. By the way, it is important to note that not only bribes and kickbacks, but also gangster protection of business began at the same time. “Liberal” bandits took only 10% of profits from underground producers, which greatly contributed to the development of entrepreneurship.
It is surprising that in this system, according to the estimates of the Soviet police themselves, only 3-4% of bribe-takers were identified. But sometimes it was enough just to look at the lifestyle of representatives of the nomenklatura, and everything became clear. But the state was in no hurry to ensure justice. Corruption permeated the entire system of Soviet power. The difference was in scale. In order not just to secretly buy imported suits, but to provide protection for an entire region, you had to be a person close to Brezhnev. The cheerful Leonid Ilyich, of course, could not officially authorize the general theft, but he turned a blind eye to the tricks of his friends. Therefore, law enforcement agencies could not target everyone. Moreover, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was headed by Shchelokov, who himself was a great lover of life. When they finally searched the minister’s apartment, they confiscated 124 paintings - Savrasov, Benois, Kuindzhi... In general, property and money accumulated in an amount that the average person would have to earn for two hundred years.
Some “ulcers of capitalism” could even become a unique element of the planned system. For example, in the second half of the 1980s, when currency prostitution began to actively develop and the police were required to fight this phenomenon “alien to socialism,” a mechanism of administrative bargaining arose, very reminiscent of the one described in the book “How We Lived in the USSR.” Every morning, by prior arrangement, another “moth” appeared at the police station, confessed to the sin committed at night and handed over a small amount of currency. The policeman took an explanation, drew up a report, confiscated the money, and the girl went to rest before the next night shift, saving the bulk of her income. The policeman reported on the work done. The state received foreign currency. Everyone was happy. Subsequently, the police also negotiated with the bandits. They had to maintain relative order in the city so that ordinary residents and tourists would not suffer, and the police would turn a blind eye to the income the bandits received from prostitutes.
However, even corruption in the Ministry of Internal Affairs could not be compared with the situation in some republics - for example, in Uzbekistan or Azerbaijan. Appointment to government posts there was sold for a lot of money. Then these expenses were compensated by bribes from subordinates. And when appointing rectors, the costs of purchasing a position were offset by collecting fees from applicants. “Prices for admission to college are on the fence,” artist Rolan Bykov noted in his diary when he arrived in Baku in 1979. In Uzbekistan, under the “master” Sharaf Rashidov, corruption was complemented by false statistics about the scale of cotton production. As a result, the state, unable to verify the actual volumes of production, paid Uzbekistan for unharvested cotton, and the money received (hundreds of millions of rubles) was distributed in one way or another throughout the entire power vertical of the republic.
Some researchers of Soviet corruption noted that in the Brezhnev system it was actually a substitute for economic reforms and was encouraged from the very top. In general terms, we can agree with this. Top-endorsed corruption is a market in which the elite can consume capitalistically but work socialistically. There were many who wanted to encourage this approach. But it should be borne in mind that the leadership of a country at a turning point could not be united on this issue. Some leaders already lived by bourgeois values, others tried to bring back the past, others turned a blind eye to corruption if it did not go beyond “reasonable” limits, while others attacked corrupt officials, but not for the sake of protecting socialist norms, but for the sake of strengthening their own nomenklatura positions in the struggle of various clans. Mass acceptance of corruption dominated rather among the youth elite, who no longer accepted communist norms. The Komsomol nomenklatura from the generation of the seventies learned from their fathers how to make money. She did not invent corruption, but only strengthened and spread the existing practice. The 1970s sought to legalize underground business and make everything secret explicit. Komsomol members began to travel around the world, acquire property, keep a fig in their pockets and prepare for an era in which this fig could be shown to the system that fed them. The youth combined “vocality, assertiveness and loud declarations of “loyalty” to the party with rare cynicism and bare practicality, with unbridled careerism and sycophancy.”
Actress Elena Proklova, sitting at the Komsomol congress, observed the real picture of what the youth elite represents. This picture was very different from the one that was presented to the people through the TV box. “The delegates—who were snacking on a sandwich, who were playing in a sea battle, who were solving crossword puzzles, who were looking for pretty women around the hall... Lord, what about the fate of the country, the bright path of its young generation?” Everything was already clear to the seventies about the fate of the country. They did not hope to pull out of the quagmire what their fathers and grandfathers had plunged into it. The people of the seventies wanted to decide their own destiny and provide, if not a bright, then at least a slightly illuminated path to personal well-being.