Alexey POLUKHIN, editor-in-chief of Novaya
Following Otkritie, B&N Bank comes under the control of the Banking Sector Consolidation Fund. Formally, this is a new mechanism for financial recovery, although in essence, of course, it is nationalization. In Russia, this word has a persistently negative connotation, because it usually means the expropriation of successful businesses against the will of the owners for political reasons. In this sense, the takeover of Yukos by Rosneft can be considered nationalization, although formally the mechanism there was completely different: the liquidation of the company and the sale of its assets at auction. Direct nationalization was the return of a controlling stake in Bashneft to state ownership (however, the shares did not remain in this status for long and soon went to the same Rosneft). In the cases of Otkritie and B&N Bank, everything is different from the point of view of business owners. They admit that they themselves lost. If Vadim Belyaev does this very restrainedly, then Mikhail Shishkhanov in an interview with RBC says directly: “The business model that I chose for the development of my banking structure turned out to be a little aggressive, and this model worked in a growing market, or at least in a stable one, but not in a falling one. And what happened happened -
the market began to fall, a business risk materialized. As an entrepreneur, I fell into this business risk. But I am convinced that there are no political goals to nationalize the banking system.” There are two interesting accents here. Firstly, Shishkhanov says that his business model has stopped working in a falling market, thereby stating that the country is in a state of economic crisis. While, according to official data, we are briskly pushing off the bottom and emerging from the recession. Secondly, he says that the nationalization of the banking sector is not politically motivated. But the fact is that this is not a tactical, but rather a strategic decision, that is, public policy, which
financial sector is determined and implemented by the Central Bank. This is what is important: partial nationalization of the banking sector in a crisis is, in general, a normal practice, which the authorities of countries with market economies have repeatedly resorted to. In particular, in the early 90s, the authorities of first Norway and then Sweden nationalized the largest banks amid problems with the exchange rate of the national currency. And after some time they sold them again. The Swedes repeated this trick in 2008–2009. After the legendary Asian crisis, which resulted in a default in our country in August 1998, South Korea also nationalized the largest banks. By the way, you can read about all this in detail in the work “Strategies for exiting the banking crisis: international experience,” which was published in 2009 under the authorship of Ksenia Yudaeva, then director of the Center for Macroeconomic Research of Sberbank of the Russian Federation, today the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank. The United States followed a slightly different path after the mortgage crisis of 2007–2008. The Federal Reserve implemented a policy of “quantitative easing”, under which all banks received huge amounts of liquidity at almost zero interest rates. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance aggressively increased debt. That is, banks could borrow cheap money from the Fed and buy bonds with a higher yield from the Ministry of Finance. This scheme, of course, looks more market-based, but in essence, taxpayers will have to pay for the rescue of the banking sector, since the public debt is ultimately covered from taxes. By the way, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, before making the final decision on the reorganization of Otkritie, also pursued a policy of “quantitative easing,” but targeted and in “manual control” mode. As a result, Otkritie’s debt to the regulator exceeded a trillion rubles, but this could not save it. Because the problem was not a temporary liquidity shortage, but rather the shortcomings of the business model, which Shishkhanov, in particular, spoke about. Most large private banks are included in financial and industrial groups and lend to the businesses of their owners. This, in fact, has always been the case, but if since 1999 the economy as a whole has been growing, coping with the shock of 2008–2009, then since 2013 it has been stagnating. There are fewer and fewer projects capable of generating profits sufficient to service loans, and the solvency of the population is also falling. We are in fact living in a crisis, so private banks are either going bankrupt or coming under state control. Whether we see a reversal, and if so, how soon, depends on the overall design of the state's economic policy in the next election cycle.
We are in fact living in a crisis, so private banks are either going bankrupt or coming under state control