The state media holding RT (Russia Today) is trying to obtain a legal monopoly on the Russian term for “foreign agent.” The television network trademarked “inostranny agent” in 2020, and late this spring it moved to patent its shortened form, “inoagent.” In October, RT’s lawyers sent a claim letter to a small brand that put the words “innostranny agent” on a t-shirt. The Moscow-based Feelosophy Store had launched a line merch in support of Meduza — and it’s just one of many small companies that have brought out foreign-agent themed products to express support for NGOs and media outlets blacklisted under this label. If Russian courts side with RT, only the state-run television network will be able to sell t-shirts, keychains, stickers, and other products featuring this term. That said, some lawyers believe that RT’s intellectual property rights could be disputed. To find out more, Meduza takes a deep dive into RT’s quest to privatize this repressive “brand” created by the Russian state.
In an article for Foreign Affairs, scholars Michael Kimmage and Michael Kofman say Russia is willing to fight to reverse Ukraine’s pro-Western drift, and the West needs to articulate its redlines and potential military role to give Kyiv “full awareness of the geopolitical reality.” Russia’s current “force posture” is “well outside the normal training cycle” and suggests that an invasion could occur soon but not imminently (likely not with the aim of conquering the whole country, but either to divide Ukraine in two or impose a new settlement on Kyiv to reduce its Euro-Atlantic integration).
Moscow’s redline in Ukraine has shifted from membership in NATO to “opposing the growing structural Ukrainian defense cooperation with [Russia’s] Western adversaries.” Russian faith in a political solution to Kyiv’s drift has vanished along with all cooperation with the Zelensky administration, just as Moscow has gained leverage over Europe in the gas market and as the Biden administration has tried to pivot from challenging Russia in Europe to countering China globally, reducing Ukraine to “a secondary interest within a secondary theater.”
Russia seeks a regional order where Moscow has equal say on security outcomes in Europe. The United States has been “visibly absent from the diplomatic process” here, and Washington needs to realize that its reputation is on the line (again), not to mention the prospect of a major war on European soil. Washington should make the consequences of an invasion clear to Moscow, which requires closer “anticipatory coordination” with America’s European allies and could ideally raise the expected economic and political costs of military action for Russia enough to lower the odds of war. Additionally, Washington must tell Kyiv (“privately and candidly”) what to expect militarily from Uncle Sam, so Ukrainian leaders “can operate with a full awareness of the geopolitical reality.”
In an article published at the Carnegie Moscow Center (available in English, but not yet in Russian), director Dmitri Trenin says Vladimir Putin is now relying on Russian military maneuvers as the Kremlin’s primary signaling medium to the West about tensions in Ukraine.
Trenin recalls the lack of de-escalation by Kyiv and the West in the region, referring to HMS Defender incident in the Black Sea in June, Ukrainian legislation denying “indigenous community” status to ethnic Russians, and legislative steps to leave the Minsk accords, Kyiv’s use of Turkish-made drones against separatists, an increased NATO presence, and U.S. strategic bombers allegedly flying within 13 miles of Russia. Trenin acknowledges that the Putin administration has “responded,” as well, allowing Donbas residents to vote in Russia’s fall elections, allowing government purchases of Donbas produce, ceasing coal deliveries to Ukraine, questioning Ukrainian statehood, and amassing troops. Trenin compares Kyiv’s military integration with NATO to Cuba’s alliance with the USSR, saying Putin or “any Russian leader” will “seek to prevent such anchorage, using whatever means they have at their disposal.”
Trenin says Putin currently hopes to “exploit the fruits of military deterrence that Putin is busy organizing” around Ukraine, vying for another summit with Biden. In the meantime, the risk that one side might try to “test whether the other side is bluffing” could lead to disaster.
In an article for Politico that provoked outrage from many Ukraine commentators on social media over the weekend (see Christopher Miller’s summary of the responses), political scientist Samuel Charap says Washington has untapped influence over Kyiv “to push for progress on the Donbas conflict,” pressuring Ukraine’s leadership to implement promises under the Minsk II agreement (unpopular concessions that he says could be undone later if Russia doesn’t reciprocate). Charap’s recommendations are based on the notion that America’s deterrence capacity in the region is limited: “the Biden administration should accept the unsatisfying reality that it will likely not be able to coerce Putin to de-escalate if he is determined to act.”
Critics accuse Charap of ignoring Ukrainian agency in his policy recommendations, but he argues that “the reality is that Ukraine depends on political, diplomatic, economic, and military support from the West, and particularly from the United States.” He admits the unpalatability of “pushing the victim to do the aggressor’s bidding” but notes that Russia has demonstrated its willingness to go “way further” than the West in Ukraine, meaning that Washington’s best shot at averting a war it likely won’t fight is to exert influence over Kyiv.
In a study of Russian youth attitudes for Carnegie Moscow Center, a research team led by Andrey Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov gathered a total of six focus groups in three cities (Moscow, Yaroslavl, and Bryansk), assembling two groups in each location, one comprising 18–25-year-olds and the other 30–35-year-olds. The project was designed, in part, to test speculation that a supposedly liberal-leaning, relatively oppositionist new generation of Russians will challenge the current regime’s grip on power. Kolesnikov and Volkov attribute the “myth” that young people drove pro-Navalny protests in January and February 2021 to the Kremlin’s own propaganda, arguing that the authorities used this narrative to depict the Navalny movement as an illegal enterprise, thus justifying a police crackdown. At the same time, however, the narrative betrayed the Kremlin’s own concerns about “losing” the next generation.
On Monday, November 22, Tatarstan became the first Russian region to require commuters to present QR codes documenting either vaccination against COVID-19 or a past diagnosis in order to access public transportation. And although local authorities tried to spread the word about the new rules ahead of time there was still some confusion. In the regional capital, Kazan, which is home to around 1.3 million people, huge crowds gathered at some bus stops as drivers and conductors checked QR codes before letting passengers on board.
In November, Russia’s prosecutor general filed a lawsuit to liquidate Memorial International — Russia’s oldest and most authoritative human rights organization. Memorial was accused of violating Russia’s legislation on “foreign agents” by failing to include the required labels on its materials. Almost all of Memorial’s alleged violations were reported to Roskomnadzor, Russia’s federal censorship agency, by the FSB’s Ingushetia office. Meduza explains why that particular office has played such an important role in this story, and whether its complaints against Memorial are at all justified.
☢️ Tomorrow in history: 15 years ago on November 23, 2006, Russian defector and former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko died in London from poisoning by polonium-210. In the 2021 case Carter v Russia, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia was responsible for his death and ordered the country to pay 100,000 euros in damages to his widow.
Yours, Meduza