Misuse of Anti-Extremism in May 2022

The following is our review of the primary and most representative events in the misuse of Russia's anti-extremist legislation in May 2022.

Lawmaking

In mid-May, bills terminating the execution of ECHR judgments issued after March 16, 2022 –that is, from the date the Russian Federation was expelled from the Council of Europe – were submitted to the State Duma and adopted in the first reading (in the second reading version the date changed to March 15). Meanwhile, the compensations awarded by the ECHR decisions issued prior to this date will continue to be paid out until 2023. The ECHR had previously ruled that the Russian Federation would cease to be a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights only as of September 16, 2022, and that the court would continue to consider all complaints against Russia pertaining to events that occurred before that date. Moreover, it was assumed that Russia would have to comply with the judgments adopted by the ECHR even if issued after September 16.

In late May, a group of deputies submitted to the Duma a bill to amend the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes and provide for tougher legislation on state security. The bill’s authors have proposed to strengthen the responsibility for mercenarism in Article 359 of the Criminal Code (CC), to punish citizens of Russia with terms of imprisonment up to 20 years under article 208 of the Criminal Code (organization of an illegal armed group) for participation in armed conflicts abroad that is contrary to the interests of the Russian Federation; expand Article 275 CC (treason) to include joining the enemy side during the hostilities that involve Russia; extend the scope of Article 276 CC (espionage) to cover the transfer of information about the armed forces to the enemy committed during the hostilities. In addition, the deputies proposed punishment under the new Article 275.1 CC by terms of imprisonment ranging from two to eight years for confidential cooperation with foreign intelligence services, non-profit organizations associated with them or foreign private military companies. The proposals also include extending the scope of Article 284.1 CC to cover participation in the activities of “undesirable organizations” not only in Russia but also abroad. Finally, the bill proposes punishing public calls to “carry out activities undermining state security” or to obstruct the activities of state bodies undertaken to ensure the security of the Russian Federation under the new Article 280.4 CC with large fines or terms of imprisonment of up to seven years. It is not yet clear what statements will be classified as falling under this norm.

Law Enforcement Practice

Persecution for Statements on Ukraine and the “Special Military Operation”

As in the preceding month, the law enforcement abuses in May often took place in connection to protests against the “special military operation” in Ukraine.

By May 20, 2022, the number of reports under Article 20.3.3 CAO for discrediting the actions of the Russian armed forces and government agencies abroad, which were reviewed by Russian courts, exceeded two thousand. People have been punished for displaying posters, for slogans on their clothes, for statements made during protests or unrelated to any protest actions, as well as for distributing printed campaign materials, for graffiti on walls, etc., and, of course, for online publications. In our opinion, the ban on discrediting the actions of the Russian armed forces and government agencies abroad, introduced into the legislation, constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the right to freedom of expression aimed at suppressing criticism of the official political course.

New criminal cases for repeatedly discrediting the actions of the Armed Forces and government agencies were also opened under Article 280.3 CC. In Blagoveshchensk of the Amur Region, activist Vladislav Nikitenko became a suspect under this article. In March, he was fined under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO in the amount of 45 thousand rubles. After that, he published more than ten Facebook posts on the topic of the “special military operation” of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, and, as a result, a criminal case was opened against him.

Another case under Article 280.3 CC was initiated in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky against local civic activist Vladimir Yefimov. The prosecution is related to his online publications posted after two rulings that had sentenced him to fines under Article 20.3.3 CAO.

Several new cases are related to the facts of demonstrating or shouting pro-Ukrainian slogans.

In mid-May, the Pushkinsky District Court of St. Petersburg detained Ukrainian national Yegor Kazanets, for the “Glory to Ukraine!” graffiti he had placed on a building wall using a can of spray paint. The investigation qualified his actions as vandalism committed on the basis of national hatred (Article 214 Part 2 CC) noting that this slogan was used “as a greeting by the nationalist military formations in Ukraine that conducted their military operations against the Soviet army in 1917–1920.”

A few days later, the Primorsky District Court of St. Petersburg also under Article 214 Part 2 CC arrested local resident Sergei Vasilyev who had placed an inscription “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes” on a playground. According to investigators, Vasiliev wrote this slogan motivated by “ideological, political and national hatred against military personnel carrying out their duty as part of a special military operation” on the Ukrainian territory.

It must be noted that, while Ukrainian nationalists did, in fact, use the slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” it has been used universally in recent years, including as an official greeting in the Ukrainian army and police since 2018. We believe that the slogan, in and of itself, cannot testify to the presence of the ethnic hostility motive (the term “national hostility” is usually understood in this sense in Russia), especially in the context of the “special military operation” on the Ukrainian territory, when this slogan can be used simply to express support for one side of the conflict. We doubt the validity of prosecution for vandalism motivated by political or ideological hatred in principle. In our opinion, these actions represent a form of propaganda associated with the infliction of material damage. Manifestations and even incitement of political hostility per se are not criminalized. Therefore, unless political vandalism is associated with propaganda of violence and xenophobia, the degree of its public danger is not so great as to always require criminal prosecution. If property damage is minor, we believe that the corresponding cases under Article 214 CC should be terminated for insignificance. If a case cannot be dropped but the damage is still relatively small, it might be helpful to introduce an article similar to Article 7.17 CAO covering the destruction or damage of other people's property or to clarify the existing article by adding vandalism that did not cause major damage.

We would like to emphasize that our monitoring includes only the cases when law enforcement agencies charge defendants with vandalism motivated by hatred (Article 214 Part 2 CC), although the presence or absence of this motive in such cases obviously depends solely on the discretion of specific law enforcement officers and not on the circumstances of a particular incident.

In Tyumen, the court placed Vladimir Fofanov under arrest for 14 days under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (propaganda or public demonstration of paraphernalia and symbols of prohibited organizations) for playing the anthem of Ukraine on a piano located near the shipping company office building on Imperatorskaya Embankment and posting the recording on the Internet. According to the report, he was also shouting the slogans of the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People's Self-Defence (UNA–UNSO) and the Right Sector, both recognized as extremist organizations in Russia. Most likely, the slogan in question was, once again, “Glory to Ukraine!” even though it is neither an attribute nor a symbol of any organization.

A similar incident occurred in Arkhangelsk. Igor Veryuzhsky came out to the street holding a poster with certain text in Ukrainian – probably “Glory to Ukraine!” The court interpreted this slogan as a symbol of the Right Sector and fined Veryuzhsky two thousand rubles under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO.

In Vsevolozhsky District of the Leningrad Region, Stanislav Semenyuk, a former lighting technician in the Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra, was detained for removing a white-blue-red flag decorated with a Z-shaped St. George ribbon and the slogan “We do not abandon our own” from the building of the local garden’s union administration and burned it. He became a suspect in the case on the desecration of the national flag (Article 329 CC). According to the federal constitutional law “On the State Flag of the Russian Federation,” the flag consists of “a rectangular panel of three equal horizontal stripes: the top is white, the middle is blue and the bottom is red”; the law also contains its drawing in color. The law does not provide for placement of any other elements on the national flag. Therefore, we believe that flags arbitrarily decorated with extraneous symbols (including the letter Z, the slogan “We do not abandon our own”, and so on) do not represent the state flag of the Russian Federation and are not subject to protection under the criminal law.

Prosecutions for “Rehabilitation of Nazism”

Several cases initiated earlier under Article 354.1 CC were terminated in May due to the expiry of the limitation period for criminal liability. The St. Petersburg City Court made such decisions in the cases of Andrei Amkhanitsky, Pavel Tali, Alexander Zvonenko, Pavel Okulov, Nermin Yusufovich, Anatoly Bykovsky and Leonid Svetlov. In May 2020, all of them uploaded photos of Nazis or Nazi collaborators to the Immortal Regiment Online project website. They were charged under Article 354.1 Part 1 CC (justification or approval of crimes established by the Nuremberg Tribunal) or under Part 3 of the same article (disseminating information about Russia’s days of military glory and memorable dates related to the defense of the Fatherland that expresses clear disrespect for society as well as desecration of symbols of Russia's military glory).

Similarly, the Ulyanovsk Regional Court dismissed the case under Article 354.1 Part 3 CC against N. Samsonov, who, in 2020, uploaded to the site a photograph, which depicted the tank crew of the SS Division Totenkopf.

Two previously unreported similar cases under Article 354.1 Part 3 CC went to court in Tver and Torzhok of the Tver region. Both defendants submitted photos of Nazis to the Immortal Regiment website back in 2020.

The case under Article 354.1 Part 4 CC (dissemination of information on the Internet expressing clear disrespect for society on Russia’s days of military glory) was opened in May against Eduard Scherbakov from Tyumen, who uploaded a photo of Hitler to the Immortal Regiment website in 2022. Shcerbakov is also charged under Article 207.3 CC(public dissemination of false information about the use of the Russian Armed Forces); he is currently in pre-trial detention.

The actions of internet users who sent photos of Nazis and their collaborators to the Immortal Regiment website deserve condemnation but, in our opinion, they are qualified under Article 354.1 CC incorrectly. We believe that the act of uploading photographs of Nazi leaders to a website, even on the eve of May 9, in and of itself, constitutes neither dissemination of any information about the days of Russia’s military glory or memorable dates, nor approval of Nazi crimes unless the photograph in question was accompanied by statements that approved or denied Nazi crimes.

Other types of cases on the rehabilitation of Nazism were initiated in May as well. In Norilsk, an 18-year-old local resident was named a suspect under Article 354.1 Part 4 CC (desecration of symbols of military glory and desecration of the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland, committed on the Internet). He posted two videos that showed the burning of St. George ribbons and called on the audience to do the same. According to the investigation, the detainee is a supporter of the Right Sector recognized in Russia as an extremist organization. In our opinion, a criminal case can be warranted if inappropriate treatment of a certain symbol is associated with the intent to incite hatred, justify violence or spread a misanthropic ideology. We had no opportunity to review the videos that served as the basis for prosecution in this case and can make no judgment regarding the motives of the Norilsk resident. It should be noted that the St. George ribbon is often perceived not as a symbol associated with the Great Patriotic War, but as a sign of support for a “special military operation” or for the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, so rejection of this symbol may have nothing to do with support for Nazi ideology. In addition, in general, it is not clear why people should face criminal prosecution, in the name of protecting abstract objects, such as days of military glory, memorable dates or symbols of military glory, from manifestations of criticism, even if strongly expressed.

In Kaluga, a case under Part 3 of the same article (desecration of symbols of military glory or desecration of the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland) was opened after the arrest of a 22-year-old local resident who had urinated on the Eternal Flame. Although the act of the Kaluga resident was immoral and worthy of public condemnation, the extent of its public danger hardly merits criminal prosecution. Furthermore, in cases of greater public danger, the “desecration” of monuments, even if this term is understood to include actions other than direct damage to the objects, is already punishable under Article 214 CC (vandalism). Article 354.1 Part 3 CC provides for even more severe punishment, which we view as disproportionate in this case. In addition, Russian legislation has never provided a defined list of symbols of military glory. As for insulting the memory of non-specified defenders of the Fatherland, criminalizing the acts defined in such abstract categories is unlikely to meet international legal human rights standards. In cases where an attack targets the reputation of specific veterans, such issues can be resolved through civil proceedings.

It should also be noted that in May the Krasnodar Garrison Military Court started consideration of the criminal case against conscripted soldiers who served on the military base of the GRU Special Forces 10th Separate Brigade near the Molkino farm. In January, they posted as an Instagram story a video that showed one of its authors approaching the monument to the fallen Special Forces soldiers, slapping one of the statues in the face, putting each statue in a chokehold and kicking them. Meanwhile, another video participant asked: “Want to bet you can’t knock him down?” A case under Article 354.1 Part 4 CC was opened against both participants, but the investigation eventually reclassified their actions. Dagir Agaragimov and Amirkhan Ibragimov have now been charged under Article 214 Part 2 CC (vandalism committed by a group of persons).

Also in May, activist Ruslan Akhmetshin from Arkhangelsk was taken into custody after he attempted to leave Russia. The case against him was initiated under Article 354.1 Part 2 paragraph “c” and Article 354.1 Part 4 CC (dissemination of deliberately false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War and dissemination of information expressing clear disrespect for society regarding Russia’s memorable date, committed on the Internet). Reportedly, the case was based on Akhmetshin's VKontakte posts, in which he claimed that the May 9 celebration in Russia was a “vulgar carnival,” “not a day of sorrow, but a masquerade led by hyping bureaucrats.” He also wrote that the USSR and Germany were allies for two years and occupied Poland together. The Investigative Committee decided that the comments about the Victory Day had signs of obvious disrespect for society, and the statement about the USSR and Germany contained “deliberately false information about the unleashing of the Second World War by the Soviet Union and the existence of allied relations between the USSR and Germany.” We are not familiar with the full texts of Akhmetshin's statements. In our opinion, however, neither criticism of the ways of celebrating Victory Day, nor different interpretations or even deliberate distortions of historical facts provide a sufficient reason for criminal prosecution unless they are accompanied by calls for violence, hatred and discrimination. If Akhmetshin's posts contained no such appeals, his actions could hardly be seen as dangerous to the public.

Sanctions for Inciting Hatred

In May, we learned that Rustam Dadabaev was fined 10 thousand rubles under Article 20.3.1 CAO (incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity) back in late April in the Volzhsky District of the Samara Region. The charges were based on the fact that, during the “citizens of the USSR” motor rally, Dadabaev handed out to employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs a leaflet, in which “Soviet deputy” Yuri Slepnyov called on them not to interfere with elections to the “councils of people's deputies.” According to Slepnyov, all the state officials, Ministry of Internal Affairs employees and military personnel who dared to oppose the electoral process were to be viewed as oath-breakers and traitors to the Motherland, subject to trial and possible death penalty under Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. According to experts, the text contained linguistic and psychological signs of incitement to violent actions against employees of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and military personnel of the Russian Federation. We view the sanctions against Dadabaev under Article 20.3.1 CAO for disseminating this text as inappropriate. First, in our opinion, neither law enforcement officers in general, nor any specific subgroup that could interfere with the electoral process can be considered a vulnerable social group protected under Article 20.3.1 CAO. Secondly, we should bear in mind that law enforcement officers must be extremely tolerant of criticism unless it involves a real threat of violence. The threat of future violence based on decisions made by a court that could hypothetically be established by some kind of “restored” government of the USSR is hard to take seriously, especially since the Novokuibyshevsky All-Russian Central Executive Committee (on behalf of which Slepnyov's appeal is being circulated) was never known to be involved in violent actions. We should also add that Slepnyov personally as well as “citizen of the USSR” V. Kudryavtseva had already been fined for disseminating this appeal in the Samara Region.

In early May, Kemerovo opposition blogger Mikhail Alferov was placed under arrest for 13 days under Article 20.3.1 CAO. The case was based on a video posted by Alferov on his YouTube channel. In the video, the blogger spoke about the experience of two Kemerovo residents interacting with the local Center for Countering Extremism (“E-Center”). According to the law enforcement agencies version of the events, upheld by the court, Alferov used the expressions that contained signs of humiliation “on the basis of belonging to a social group of employees of the Center for Countering Extremism, described as persons committing illegal, unlawful and socially condemned actions in the course of performing their official duties.” We believe that Alferov’s arrest was inappropriate, since his words showed no signs of inciting hatred and carried no real threat of violence against the E-Center employees. It is worth remembering that Alferov had been previously convicted under Article 354.1 Part 3 CC and Article 319 CC (insulting a representative of the authorities), and is also currently on trial under Article 282 Part 1 CC (inciting hatred or enmity) for a repeated offense committed within a year. We view the charges brought against Alferov under Articles 354.1 and 282 CC as inappropriate.

A case under Article 20.3.1 CAO was opened in May against blogger Batraz Misikov from North Ossetia who runs the “Sid[æ]mon” Telegram channel, The charges were based on his April post that discussed the initiative to rename Lenin Street in Vladikavkaz in honor of Kaurbek Toguzov, a hero of the Soviet Union. The North Ossetia branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation criticized this idea. Misikov, in turn, criticized the Ossetian communists and noted that “the Russians can rename the entire city of Leningrad” St. Petersburg “in honor of their tsar and his heavenly patron,” but the communists and the state oppose the much smaller initiative in Ossetia. According to a psychological and linguistic expert opinion, the post contains statements “evidencing the propaganda of the superiority of Russians over Ossetians,” as well as “negative emotional attitude towards ‘communists’, ‘communists of Ossetia,’ and ‘the state.’” In our opinion, Misikov's post contained no propaganda of the superiority of Russians over Ossetians and no xenophobic statements whatsoever. On the contrary, the author is convinced that the inhabitants of North Ossetia have the same right to change toponyms in their republic as the inhabitants of other regions have to change theirs. In addition, we believe that communists do not constitute a vulnerable social group in need of special protection from manifestations of hatred, and “negative attitudes” towards the state do not fall under Article 20.3.1 CAO.

In late May, the court sentenced lawyer Nikolai Munsky from Krasnoyarsk to 80 hours of community service under Article 20.3.1 CAO for his Instagram post commenting on the fact that Alexei Navalny's organizations had been recognized as extremist. In his post, Munsky gave a negative assessment of the Moscow City Court, the President of the Russian Federation and the authorities of the Russian Federation in general. Experts concluded that the text contained signs of inciting hostility towards persons “united on the basis of their professional activities in government bodies.” We believe that government officials do not form a social group that needs protection from incitement to hatred. In addition, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation pointed out back in 2011 that media criticism of officials should not, in and of itself, be viewed as an act intended to humiliate dignity, since the limits of permissible criticism are wider for officials than for private individuals. We believe that this argument applies not only to mass media. It is worth noting that Munsky was also fined under Article 20.29 CAO (mass distribution of extremist materials) in March and April for publishing the video “Let’s Remind Crooks and Thieves about Their Manifesto-2002.” He was also placed under arrest for 10 days in April under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (public display of the symbols of an extremist organization) for a post that contained the symbols of the Smart Voting project. We consider these decisions inappropriate as well.

Sanctions for “Disrespect for Authority”

In May, we became aware of three cases filed under Article 20.1 Part 3 CAO for obscene online statements against the country’s authorities. It is worth reminding that, in our opinion, this article is directly aimed at suppressing criticism of the authorities, and allows for inappropriate sanctions. A report was filed against opposition leader Konstantin Okunev from Perm for his critical statements about Vladimir Putin. In the Kursk Region, village deputy Natalya Kulikova was fined 30,000 rubles for her emotional video message. In Yekaterinburg, the former mayor of the city, Yevgeny Roizman, was fined 85,000 rubles for making an obscene comment on Twitter regarding the statement by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and then reposting the same comment as an Instagram story.

Sanctions for Displaying Nazi Symbols

In early May, in Krasnoyarsk, a report under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (public display of Nazi symbols) was filed against local resident Maxim Ganchitsky, who had left a comment on VKontakte under a post about a car rally in support of the Russian army. The comment contained the text “A fascist father is a family tragedy” and a photograph that included a swastika.

In Blagoveshchensk, activist Vladislav Nikitenko was placed under arrest for 15 days for publishing an audio recording of a court session on YouTube in 2016. As a background image, Nikitenko chose an archival photograph of a meeting of the People's Court in Nazi Germany presided by Roland Freisler. The photograph included Nazi symbols.

In our opinion, sanctions for displaying Nazi symbols are justified only when the symbols are used to promote Nazism. However, in the publications made by Ganchitsky and Nikitenko, these symbols were used as a means of political criticism. Nikitenko already spent 15 days under arrest in April under Article 20.3 CAO for his 2015 post that included Nazi symbols and criticized the law enforcement practice under that very article. We consider this earlier punishment inappropriate as well.

We also learned in May that the Dzhankoy District Court of the Republic of Crimea fined local resident Timur Velishaev 1,500 rubles under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO in mid-April for a certain video with prohibited (apparently Nazi) symbols, which he saved on VKontakte in 2015. Judging by the content of Velishaev's VKontakte page, he does not adhere to Nazism or an ideology espoused by any other banned organization, and we are inclined to consider the sanction as inappropriate.

Sanctions against Alexei Navalny and His Supporters

In May, we recorded one case filed under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for demonstrating the symbols of Alexei Navalny's banned organizations. On May 17, the Pskov City Court fined municipal deputy Nikolai Kuzmin one thousand rubles for a photo posted on a social network.

The Yeysk City Court of Krasnodar Krai satisfied the administrative claim of the inter-district prosecutor to recognize Alexander Korovainy, a member of the Yabloko party and an ex-deputy of the Yeysk District Council, as “involved” in the activities of the Navalny Headquarters (banned as an extremist organization). This status leads to a three-year ban on running for any elected office. The claim was based on the fact that Korovainy attended a protest rally in support of Navalny in January 2021 and also took photographs of activists standing in solitary pickets. The local politician denies any organizational, consulting, financial or other connection with the Navalny Headquarters. In his opinion, the decision to recognize him as a person “involved” in an extremist organization has to do with the upcoming elections to the Yeisk District Council of Deputies scheduled for September 2022. Earlier, he also stated that he attended the rally in support of Navalny as a mediacorrespondent of Kubanovosti. In September 2021, the prosecutor’s office already attempted to remove Korovainy from the elections for participating in the rally, as well as for publishing two videos in support of Navalny. At that time, the court dismissed the claim.

The Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), the Citizens' Rights Defense Fund (FZPG) and the Alexei Navalny Headquarters were recognized as extremist organizations on June 9, 2021. The decision came into force on August 4. We believe that there were no legal grounds to ban Navalny's organizations as extremist. We also believe that the amendments banning those “involved” in the activities of extremist organizations from running for office unduly restrict freedom of association and voting rights.

It became known in late May that the Investigative Committee charged Alexei Navalny under Article 282.1 Part 1 CC (creating an extremist community). The case was first reported in September 2021. A bit later, the investigation combined the cases under Article 282.1, Article 174 (money laundering), Article 239 (creation of a non-profit organization whose activity is fraught with inducement of citizens to commit unlawful deeds) and Article 282.3 (financing extremism) into a single criminal case. About twenty of Navalny's associates have already become suspects or defendants in the combined case. We believe that charges under Article 282.1 and 282.3 CC are inappropriate, since we can find no evidence that Navalny's structures were created specifically in order to prepare and commit extremist crimes.

Prosecutions for “Insulting the Feelings of Believers”

In early May, in Kaluga, a magistrate fined Natalya Maslennikova 25,000 rubles under Article 148 Part 1 CC (insulting the religious feelings of believers). In 2021, she posted on Twitter and Instagram her photo with her skirt pulled up and with the Transfiguration (Preobrazhenskaya) Church on the background.

In contrast, a similar case was dismissed by a Moscow court in late May due to the reconciliation of the parties. Dennis Igor Bespalov, Kristina Volkova, Maria Katanova, Roman Maslennikov, Yelena Reznikova, Alexander Reznichenko and Anton Chicherin were tried under Article 148 Part 1 CC for participation in a photo shoot of a model wearing a balaclava, an open coat, a niqab and underwear against the background of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque (a case was initiated when Katanova published a video of the photography session on a social network). According to investigators, the defendants acted with the intent to desecrate the mosque. Muslims, who were the injured party in the case, pledged to forgive the defendants, and the court dismissed the case, despite the prosecutorial objections.

We believe that both cases were initiated inappropriately. SOVA Center opposed the introduction of the clause on insulting the feelings of believers into Article 148 CC, since, in our opinion, this vague concept does not and cannot have a clear legal meaning. As to signs of inciting hatred towards Orthodox or Muslim believers that could entail liability under Article 20.3.1 CAO, the photo and video materials included nothing of this sort. Accordingly, in our opinion, there were no grounds for prosecution against the models, the photographers and other session participants.

Two new cases under Article 148 Part 1 CC were opened in May – one in Crimea and the other one in Krasnodar Krai. According to investigators, a 50-year-old Dzhankoy resident posted on a social network “images and expressions offensive to Orthodox believers.” A 45-year-old resident of Yeysk, according to the investigative committee, in the period from March 2018 to May 2020 posted on his page the images of Orthodox icons “which were modified to add details and texts that changed the original ethical meaning of the icons’ subject matter.” We cannot identify the specific incriminating posts, but we believe that, if the defendants incited hatred towards Christians, their actions could have been qualified under Article 20.3.1 CAO, otherwise the defendants should not have faced responsibility.

Persecution against Religious Organizations and Believers

Muslims

In mid-May, the Southern District Military Court issued verdicts against five alleged supporters of the radical Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir, which has been designated a terrorist organization in Russia. All of them were found guilty under Article 205.5 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of a terrorist organization) and Article 278 CC with Article 30 Part 1 CC (preparation for violent seizure of power). Tofik Abdulgaziev, Vladlen Abdulkadyrov, Izzet Abdullaev and Medzhit Abdurakhmanov were sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment and Bilyal Adilov to 14 years. They will all spend the first five years of their term in prison; the rest of the sentence is to be served in a maximum-security penal colony. Four offenders face an additional punishment in the form of one year of restriction of freedom (one and a half years for Adilov). The defendants in the case were detained in 2019 as part of a large group, primarily participants in the Crimean Solidarity initiative. Subseqently, a decision was made to try them in groups of five; the sentences for the other two groups were issued in March.

We believe that there were no sufficient grounds for banning Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization, since this party was never implicated in terrorist attacks. Thus, we view the charges of terrorism against Hizb ut-Tahrir followers made solely based on their party activities (holding meetings, reading literature, etc.) as inappropriate. In our opinion, the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir preaches the idea of establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate does not, in and of itself, provide sufficient grounds for charging its followers with planning a violent seizure of power in Russia.

As we found out in late May, new criminal cases have been opened in Dagestan under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of an extremist organization) for involvement in the international religious association Nurcular. The suspects were four residents of the republic, who, according to the Investigative Committee, took part in Nurcular’s activities from 2008 to April 2017. We consider the ban against Nurcular inappropriate. It was recognized as an extremist organization in 2008 on the basis of unfounded (according to the ECHR among others) bans imposed on the books of moderate Turkish Islamic theologian Said Nursi for promoting the superiority of Islam over other religions. We also believe that Russian Muslims who study Nursi's heritage do not constitute a single organization. Nevertheless, Nurcular has been banned in Russia specifically as an extremist organization, and Muslims who read and discuss Nursi's books are persecuted as a result.

In late May, a court in Ufa fined Shamsiddin Sizhaev, the imam of the religious group “Makhallya Soglasie-Rizo” 2,000 rubles under Article 20.29 CAO (possession of extremist materials with the intent of mass distribution.) The charges were based on the fact that the officers of the FSB directorate for Bashkortostan found two copies of the book 40 Hadith of Imam An-Nawawi with comments by Mustafa al-Bug and Muhyi Ad-din Mistu in the prayer room. This publication was recognized as extremist in May 2012 by the Sol-Iletsk District Court of the Orenburg Region. In our opinion, there were no grounds for banning these comments on the well-known collection of hadith, since they contained no incendiary appeals or signs of inciting hatred on religious grounds. Therefore, we consider the sanctions against Sizhaev inappropriate.

Jehovah's Witnesses

Persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses continued in May. They are being charged with involvement in the activities of local religious organizations banned as extremist – in our opinion, without proper legal grounds.

We know of six sentences issued in May against Jehovah's Witnesses. Two defendants received real terms of imprisonment. The Tsentralny District Court of Prokopievsk in the Kemerovo Region sentenced Andrei Vlasov to seven years of imprisonment under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC (organizing the activities of an extremist organization). The Pavlovsky District Court of Krasnodar Krai sentenced Lyudmila Schekoldina to four years and one month of imprisonment under Article 282.2 Part 1.1 CC (involvement of others in the activities of an extremist organization) and Article 282.2 Part 2 CC.

Three sentences were issued in Nizhny Novgorod. The Sovetsky District Court issued a six-year suspended sentence to Galina Abrosimova under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC; the Moskovsky District Court issued the same suspended sentence on a similar charge to Maxim Zavrazhnov; the Leninsky District Court issued a three-year suspended sentence to Kirill Evstigneev under Article 282.3 Part 1 CC.

Another verdict was issued by the Metallurgichesky District Court of Chelyabinsk. Pavel Popov received a six-year suspended sentence under Article Part 1 282.2 CC.

Two sentences were overturned. The Krasnodar Regional Court returned the case of Alexander Nikolaev to the Abinsk District Court; he had been previously sentenced to two and a half years in a penal colony under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC. Meanwhile, the court of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug overturned the verdict against Andrei Sazonov, previously fined 500 thousand rubles under Article 282.2 Part 1 and Article 282.3 Part 1 CC, and sent the case to the Uray City Court for a new trial.

In May, we also learned about several new criminal cases against Jehovah's Witnesses.

In Yaroslavl, Anton Kokovin and another resident of the city, whose name was not reported, became suspects under Article 282.2 Part 2 of CC in May.

In Chelyabinsk, a yet-unnamed Jehovah's Witness became a suspect under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC.

Another case under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC was opened in Oryol back in October 2021, terminated and then resumed at the request of the prosecutor's office. Anton Zhurbenko is a suspect in the case.

As it also became known in May, Danil Suvorov from Sochi, previously charged under Article 282.2 Part 1.1 CC, now faces additional charges under Part 2 of the same article.