Transnational Repression by the Russian Federation: Threats, Tendencies, Solutions

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s use of transnational repression (TNR) has expanded dramatically in scale and reach. A mass exodus from Russia — approximately 900,000 people, representing the largest political migration since the 20th century — has triggered new security and legal challenges. Initially seeking refuge in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, many dissidents have since relocated to the European Union, bringing the risks of repression into the EU itself.

While acts of violence still occur, Russia’s methods have become increasingly covert, administrative, and digital. This shift creates new challenges for EU member states, whose sovereignty, legal systems, and democratic frameworks are being tested by authoritarian interference.

Assessment. Between 2022 and 2024, the average annual number of TNR cases increased by four to eight times across fifteen destination countries, including Armenia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Spain (Annex 5). The increase has been particularly sharp in Russia’s near abroad, including Georgia, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, which have become the primary locations for Russian-led TNR activities. Notably, within the EU, Poland has emerged as one of the most affected member states. While case volumes inside the EU remain moderate, the trend is clear. Incidents have been also recorded in Italy, Spain, and Romania — all new additions to the list of affected countries. This expansion highlights the EU’s growing exposure to foreign authoritarian repression.

Russian tactics have shifted accordingly. Denial of Entry prevents access to safe territories, while Denial of Services blocks access to essential rights such as banking, placing exiles in precarious legal and economic positions. These measures erode protections for political refugees. At the same time, digital repression — including spyware, covert surveillance, and abuse of legal frameworks like Interpol — directly challenges EU sovereignty and undermines trust in European legal standards.

In parallel, state collaboration in certain regions has intensified. Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have demonstrated significant cooperation with Russian security agencies, often facilitating unlawful detentions and forced returns of exiles. These actions not only endanger individuals in transit but also create unsafe corridors that push dissidents further toward EU territory.

Despite steps to address foreign interference, transnational repression remains insufficiently integrated into the EU’s security and human rights policies. Divergent national approaches, inconsistent legal recognition of TNR methods, and limited protection mechanisms have created exploitable gaps, exposing individuals and institutions to persistent risks.

Policy Implications. Addressing transnational repression is essential to defending both human rights and EU sovereignty. Russia’s use of legal, bureaucratic, and digital mechanisms to target dissidents within the Union constitutes foreign interference and undermines core democratic principles.

The EU should adopt a harmonized legal and policy framework to define TNR and recognize new tactics, including Denial of Entry and Denial of Services, as legitimate grounds for international protection. Asylum and residency procedures should be adapted to prevent politicized deportations and extraditions.

A dedicated EU-wide mechanism for monitoring TNR cases should be established, as current data relies solely on civil society and nonprofit efforts and remains fragmented. Systematic collection is critical to understanding the scale of the threat and developing responses.

In parallel, partnerships with civil society and nonprofit organizations should be deepened to enhance early warning systems and victim support. Finally, the EU must strengthen safeguards to prevent abuses of legal and digital infrastructure, including improved oversight of intelligence-sharing agreements and data privacy protections.

Conclusion. Russia’s campaign of transnational repression has become a European challenge. As it spreads westward and adopts more covert tactics, it threatens both individuals and the sovereignty of EU states. A coordinated and robust policy response is urgently required to protect European democratic values, sovereignty and maintain the Union’s role as a place of refuge for those fleeing authoritarian persecution.

Failing to anticipate and address the growing threat of transnational repression leaves EU member states exposed to a particularly insidious form of authoritarian interference — one that strikes at the very core of legal sovereignty and political freedom. As Anstis, Al-Jizawi, and Deibert (2023) note, this phenomenon reflects a fundamental clash between competing conceptions of sovereignty. In democratic systems, sovereignty is closely tied to the obligation to protect rights and uphold the rule of law within national borders. By contrast, authoritarian regimes increasingly view sovereignty as the prerogative to exercise control over citizens regardless of where they reside. This extraterritorial logic, often justified in the name of regime security, legitimizes practices such as cross-border surveillance, legal manipulation, and forced returns — actions that directly undermine the legal order and security of host countries, including EU member states. The Council of Europe has underscored the seriousness of such threats, emphasizing that they directly attack the rule of law.

Therefore, transnational repression must be recognized not only as a human rights violation, but also as a strategic effort by authoritarian regimes to impose their sovereignty beyond their borders. While the issue has gained increased attention — including through a recent PACE report and the appointment of a dedicated rapporteur — a significant gap persists between recognition and implementation. Without targeted and coordinated policies, victims will remain vulnerable, and the EU’s core democratic principles and institutions will continue to be tested.