Authoritarian Dysfunction: The anti-migrant campaign demonstrates the deepening divide between the pragmatic and ideological-propaganda directions in Russian politics

The authorities are pursuing an anti-migrant campaign with obsessive persistence, which has become one of the defining trends in Russian domestic politics in 2024. The Duma is passing laws that worsen the situation for labour migrants and expand the scope for law enforcement abuse, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is increasing the volume of administrative prosecutions and inspections, border guards are restricting migrants' entry into Russia, and regional authorities are limiting access to the labour market.

The anti-migrant hysteria appears completely irrational against the backdrop of acute tension in the Russian labour market, where the structural shortage of labour is exacerbated by the emigration and conscription of at least 2% of the workforce.

The campaign was initially a response to the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall and was designed to camouflage the failure to prevent the terror threat. Xenophobic slogans and initiatives have naturally fit into the framework of nationalist militarism, which has become almost the official Russian ideology since the start of the war against Ukraine. Local authorities are actively involving nationalist groups in the anti-migrant campaign. The rise in Russians' concerns about migration issues in public opinion surveys seems more like a result of the state campaign rather than its cause.

While irrational given the acute labour shortage, the anti-migrant campaign makes sense in the context of nationalist-militarist mobilisation and clearly demonstrates the widening gap between the ideological-propaganda and pragmatic directions of Russian domestic policy.

Anti-migrant frenzy

On 10 September, the Tajik embassy in Moscow advised its citizens to 'temporarily refrain' from travelling to Russia due to the ongoing 'heightened control regime for foreign nationals' at the Russian border (as noted by The Moscow Times). A previous similar warning was issued by the embassy on 27 April, when, in response to the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall, which Russian authorities attributed to Tajik citizens, a campaign of pressure on labour migrants was launched in Russia.

In the issue of Re: Russia Papers devoted to the aftermath of the events at Crocus City Hall (→ Re: Russia: The Aftermath of Crocus City Hall), we discussed the paradoxical response of Russian law enforcement to the authorities' failure to heed direct warnings about the attack (indicating the probable location of the attack) through intelligence channels. Post-factum raids and pressure on the migrant community have little impact on preventing terrorist attacks but lead to a reduction in the flow of labour migrants – at a time when the shortage of labour has become a macroeconomic problem for Russia.

Nevertheless, the authorities continue their anti-migrant campaign with obsessive persistence, which has become one of the defining projects in Russian domestic politics in 2024. In July, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that over the past six months, 1.7 million protocols were issued against foreign nationals (compared to only 2 million for the entire year of 2023), 65,000 people were deported (compared to 110,000 for the entire year of 2023), and entry into the country was banned for 120,000 people (compared to 170,000 for the entire year of 2023).

Russian regions are racing to impose restrictions on migrant work in certain sectors. By August, there were already 30 such regions. In the Krasnoyarsk Territory, 85 types of activities were banned, and in Novosibirsk – 35. The most paradoxical restriction appears to be the ban on working as a taxi driver, despite the widespread shortage of drivers and the rapid rise in service prices. The Duma boasts that it is currently considering 25 bills regulating the status of migrants, including a ban on entry to Russia with families.

Two new regulations that significantly worsen their situation have already been enacted: the visa-free stay period has been reduced from 180 days to 90, and the new 'expulsion regime', unlike 'deportation', allows for the deportation of migrants without a court decision, at the discretion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This 'regime' also involves the creation of a special register of violators of requirements for foreign nationals, a list that goes far beyond formal grounds (such as 'expired residence permits'). For example, the list requires avoiding 'actions aimed at urging the adoption, amendment, or repeal of laws or other normative legal acts of Russia', as well as respecting 'traditional Russian spiritual and moral values' and 'observing the requirements against... distorting the historical truth about the feats of the Soviet people in defending the Fatherland and their contribution to the victory over fascism'. Inclusion in the register entails significant restrictions on rights (such as not being able to change residence, leave the region of stay, acquire property, marry, etc.). Surveillance using technical means may be established for individuals under the 'expulsion regime'. In other words, police have been given a powerful tool for formal and informal pressure on migrants.

The anti-migrant frenzy appears completely paradoxical against the backdrop of the acute labour market tension in Russia. Relocation, mobilisation, and military recruitment have pulled more than one and a half million workers from this labour market, which is experiencing a structural shortage of labour (relocated – about 500,000, active military group – about 700,000, plus killed and severely wounded), representing at least 2% of the employed population. According to the head of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, 75% of enterprises complain about the lack of labour. By the end of the 2020s, the labour market deficit may reach 2 to 4 million people, with the lower end of the range clearly not accounting for the 'war effect' – the upper part of the range should be considered the basic forecast. Meanwhile, migration from CIS countries is the only significant source of compensation for the decline in the labour market.

Synergy of nationalism

The anti-migrant campaign has, on one hand, as we noted, manifested as an example of 'authoritarian dysfunction' – an attempt to show the public effective control over the issue of labour migrants in a situation where glaring facts (such as the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall) indicate that this control is either absent or ineffective. On the other hand, it gains its own momentum from escalating xenophobia. For example, an unnamed police colonel reported at a departmental meeting in Dolgoprudny that the ministry's leadership had tasked them with 'lightening' the Moscow region to prevent it from being 'darkened' by migrants.

The anti-migrant campaign appears to be a natural extension of the militaristic-nationalist ideology of the war in Ukraine. The Sova Center notes in a report that the authorities have begun involving veterans returning from combat zones in the campaign. For instance, Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako announced the creation of a unit of veterans from the Special Military Operation to 'ensure safety and order,' including to 'put the newcomers in their place'. Nationalists are now not only helping to find illegal migrants and those who have received Russian citizenship but have not registered for military service, but they are also checking the legality of businesses and taxis owned by migrants, according to another review by the centre. In the spring, plans were even announced to train ‘mobile groups’ of far-right activists, who will be trained at a training base for ‘special operation’ fighters in firearms, basic combat skills, tactical work with UAVs, and so on. The stated goal of this training is to assist the police in combating crimes committed by migrants and those who ‘rock the boat’. In August, raids on the workplaces and residences of migrants, according to Sova, took place in Moscow, several cities in the Moscow region, St Petersburg, Kolpino in the Leningrad region, as well as Yekaterinburg, Maloyaroslavets, Novosibirsk, Pervouralsk, Samara, Saratov, Surgut, Nevinnomyssk, Chelyabinsk, and Kopeysk in Chelyabinsk region.

Against the backdrop of state-sponsored xenophobia, the radical part of the nationalist spectrum – autonomous cells oriented toward street violence – has become more active. In the first five months of 2024, these groups, according to Sova, carried out 133 attacks – ten more than in the entire year of 2023. Besides raids and attacks, nationalists are actively spreading xenophobic content on social media, aiming to stir discontent with migrants among the moderately inclined population. As a result, the scale of xenophobic hate speech on social media has sharply increased and complements the 'sanitised' xenophobia of official media, as noted in a report by Riddle.

Causes and consequences

At the same time, there is no clear evidence that the state-level campaign is a response to the increase in bottom-up xenophobia. Sociologists Vladimir Zvonovsky and Alexander Khodikin noted in an article for Re:Russia that the level of xenophobia in Russia, according to mass surveys, remained at a long-standing and relatively moderate level even immediately after the terrorist attack.

In the list of issues troubling Russians, the topic of 'migrants' was mentioned by 24% of respondents at the beginning of 2024 (a similar level was observed at the beginning of 2022 and in 2014). However, in the August survey, this figure soared to its highest level with one in three respondents mentioning it. This surge is likely due to the media's anti-migrant campaign by the authorities (as has happened in previous episodes: the topic of migrants gains attention on television and triggers a spike in anti-migrant sentiments). This view is partially supported by Alexander Verkhovsky, head of the Sova Center, who lists four reasons for the ongoing campaign: 1) populist pandering to anti-migrant sentiments among the population, 2) involvement of loyal nationalists in cooperation with the authorities, 3) strengthening of official nationalism, portraying Russia as a 'besieged fortress' not only from the West but also from the South, 4) genuine desire to improve migration control effectiveness after the terrorist attack.

‘What problems in our society worry you the most?’ Response: ‘Influx of newcomers, migrants’, 2013-2024, % of those surveyed

Pressure on migrants and systematic violations of their rights, and the noticeable treatment of them as second- or third-class individuals, and the maintenance of high levels of xenophobia in society constitute part of a 'vicious cycle' of social issues for many Tajik citizens,write Stephen Wayne and Noah Tucker in a survey published on the Ponars Eurasia platform. Citizens of Central Asia in Russia are part of the world's second-largest migration flow (the largest being from Latin America to the US). In Tajikistan, most families send at least one man to work in Russia and depend on his income. They face three threats: Islamists seek to use them as suicide bombers; Russia treats them as second-rate labour and cannon fodder; and human traffickers view them as commodities for their ‘business’. All this creates a conducive environment for the radicalisation of some migrants who come under the influence of terrorist networks. Thus, pressure on migrants may, in no small measure, be as much a measure that increases terrorism as an anti-terrorism one.

In any case, the anti-migrant campaign is in obvious contradiction with the pragmatic goals of economic policy. While tracking migration flows is quite challenging, data suggest that in 2023 there was a trend toward a reduction in the flow of labour migrants to Russia (→Re: Russia: The War and Labour Market). The problem is also that, amid the ongoing diversification of migration flows and decreasing attractiveness of Russian citizenship (likely related to being sent to the front), the most skilled labour migrants will choose alternative destinations (→ Re: Russia: Authoritarian Dysfunction).

Thus, the anti-migrant campaign, irrational in the context of an acute labour shortage but logical in the context of nationalist-militarist mobilisation, clearly demonstrates the widening gap between the ideological-propaganda and pragmatic directions of Russian domestic policy.