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Armada Sunset: Soviet and Russian tanks suitable for restoration and repair will run out in 2025
The actual number of old Soviet and Russian tanks at storage bases had decreased by half by the end of 2024 compared to the beginning of the war in Ukraine, OSINT investigators established through satellite imagery analysis. The count dropped from approximately 7,300 to 3,500 tanks. However, this does not mean that the Russian defence industry has this many tanks available for repair and restoration.
Newer and better-conditioned tanks were selected in the early stages of the war. As a result, the rate at which tanks were taken from storage bases halved by 2024. By the end of the year, researchers estimate that no more than 500 tanks in relatively good condition remained. Restoring the others poses a significantly greater challenge and would take much more time.
In 2023, thanks to old stockpiles, the Russian defence industry appeared to be able to compensate for extremely high losses in armoured vehicles. However, this level of replenishment could no longer be achieved by 2024, and by 2026, this method of replenishing the tank arsenal will be virtually exhausted.
This means, among other things, that Russia will need more time and resources to prepare for a new war, including those needed to build new tank factories.
The endless columns of Russian tanks moving along Ukrainian roads during the first days of the invasion were intended, as in Georgia before, to symbolise Russian might and the futility of trying to resist it. However, it seems they will instead become a symbol of the decline of the tank armada and the prolonged end of the tank era in the history of the Soviet and Russian military machine.
Depletion of tank fields
Having analysed satellite images of Russian tank bases, a group of OSINT investigators has determined that since the start of the war, the Russian military and defence industry have effectively used up about half of their stock of old Soviet and Russian tanks. Based on high-resolution satellite images taken in late 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024, the total number of tanks in storage bases at the end of 2021 was 7,342, 6,870 at the end of 2022, 4,666 at the end of 2023 and 3,517 at the end of 2024. Thus, in the first year following the invasion of Ukraine, approximately 530 tanks were withdrawn from storage; in 2023, about 2,200 tanks were removed; and in 2024, the number dropped to 1,150 tanks. In total, approximately 3,825 tanks have been withdrawn (it should be noted, however, that these calculations only account for open central storage bases – tanks may also be stored at mobilisation and repair bases, tank repair factories, warehouses, and under shelters, as one investigator, Covert Cabal, has pointed out).
At first glance, it seems paradoxical that the rate of tank withdrawals from storage sharply declined in 2024, even as the Russian military conducted its most active offensive operations. However, the paradox has a simple explanation: initially, more modern tanks in good condition, requiring minimal or minor repairs, were removed from storage. As these were depleted, increasingly older and less reliable tanks had to be used, and the withdrawal rate became more constrained by repair and renovation capabilities.
According to researchers, roughly 280 tanks currently in Russian storage can be reactivated relatively easily. The remaining 3,250 tanks either require significant repairs or can only be used for 'cannibalisation,' meaning dismantling for spare parts. This situation will severely limit the supply of older tanks for frontline needs in the coming year. The investigators did not detail the specific criteria used to classify the condition of tanks (a detailed breakdown is provided in the table below).
Of the 24 largest reserve bases included in the study, 13 were completely or almost completely emptied by 2024. Before the war, these 13 bases held 1,283 tanks. At the start of the invasion, Russian storage bases housed tanks from eight Soviet and Russian models across three tank generations. Naturally, the newer tanks – T-80 and T-90 models – were prioritised. Before the war, there were 1,760 of these tanks in storage (30% of all reserves). Now, only 284 of these remain. Notably, there are no T-90 tanks left at all (Russia's main battle tank, introduced in 1992), compared to 112 in storage before the invasion, likely having been used in the war’s first year. Second-generation T-72 tanks (produced from 1974 to 1990) account for 1,342 of the remaining tanks (38%), of which only 170 are in good condition. Slightly more than half of the remaining tanks (1,890) belong to the first postwar generation – T-54/55, T-62, and T-64 models – but only about 109 of these are considered combat-capable. In total, Russian storage bases currently hold approximately 450 tanks suitable for use after repair, adjustment, and re-equipping.
A similar picture can be observed with regard to other types of heavy equipment. If there were 6,934 BMP infantry fighting vehicles in storage before the war, only 3,668 (53%) remain, with three-quarters in poor condition. Of the nearly 3,800 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), only 2,400 are left (roughly two-thirds of initial reserves), with more than three-quarters unfit for combat. The greatest losses were seen in the 'Motolyga' (MT-LB multipurpose light armoured transporter), with only 404 units remaining by 2024 – just 11% of the pre-invasion total.
The decline of the armada
Despite the incredibly high losses of tanks and armoured vehicles in 2023, the Russian army seemingly managed to replenish them using storage bases. However, by 2024, the pace of replenishment had sharply declined, and 2025 is expected to be the last year in which the restoration of old vehicles will serve as a significant source for the tank arsenal.
According to the annual report ‘The Military Balance’ by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2022, the year of the invasion, Russia possessed 2,700 tanks ready for use – a figure also cited by the RAND Corporation in one of its analyses. Meanwhile, according to the OSINT project Oryx, as of mid-January 2025, the Russian army had lost 3,698 tanks in Ukraine (2,629 destroyed, 157 damaged, 378 abandoned, and 534 captured by Ukraine). However, Oryx only counts losses documented by photo or video evidence, meaning the actual number is likely significantly higher, as noted on their site. Another resource, WarSpotting, which maintains its own database of documented material losses, has counted 3,228 destroyed Russian tanks as of mid-January 2025. The official Ukrainian estimate of Russian losses is roughly three times higher – 9,780 tanks lost as of 15 January – but this figure appears implausible.
As evidenced by the above calculations, at least 3,850 old vehicles were withdrawn from storage for repair and modernisation. However, a significant portion of these may have been used for ‘cannibalisation’.
Western analysts differ in their estimates of the pace at which Russia has replenished its tank arsenal, partly due to confusion between counts of new and refurbished tanks. Military expert Dara Massicot believes that tank and armoured vehicle production in Russia has reached a plateau, as only Uralvagonzavod produces new tanks. Before the war, the plant produced around 40 T-90M tanks annually, according to IISS expert Michael Gjersstad. By his estimates, production of the T-90M at the facility rose to 60–70 units per year in 2023 and could exceed 90 units annually by 2025. Additionally, Massicot notes that prior to the war, Uralvagonzavod supplied around 96–125 refurbished tanks annually to the military, but this figure likely increased to 200–250 in 2024. Furthermore, old tanks are repaired and modernised at the Omsktransmash factory and the 103rd Armoured Repair Plant in Chita. In 2023, the Russian government-affiliated Institute for International Political and Economic Strategies estimated their repair capacity at 250-300 vehicles per year.
In turn, the Ukrainian OSINT-project ‘Viyyskoviy Vishchun’ estimated in April 2024 that Russia was supplying about 100 tanks per month to the front line – 15–20 newly built and the remainder refurbished – roughly 1,200 tanks annually. This aligns with Western military estimates of new tank production at approximately 200 units per year, a figure cited by UK Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin. Finally, the Russian Ministry of Defence reported in 2023 that 1,500 tanks had been delivered to the troops. Thus, the Russian defence industry likely produced around 200 new tanks and refurbished about 1,000–1,200 old ones in 2023. However, satellite image analysis indicates that such rates were unlikely to be sustainable in 2024. The quality of remaining old tanks had deteriorated significantly, leading to longer repair times even with unchanged repair capacity. This explains the halving of tank withdrawals from storage.
It seems likely that tanks already under repair will be reactivated in 2025, while the pace of further withdrawals from storage will again drop by half. By 2026, if the war continues, the influx of refurbished tanks into the Russian army will likely cease almost entirely. Even if active combat ends in 2025, these estimates underscore the difficulty Russia will face in rebuilding its tank strength for a future war. This will require the construction of new tank factories and an entire production chain for essential components.
The endless columns of Russian tanks advancing on Ukrainian roads in the first days of the invasion were intended, as in Georgia in 2008, to symbolise Russian power and the futility of resistance. Instead, they are likely to become symbols of the decline of the tank armada and the prolonged end of the tank era in the history of the Soviet and Russian military machine.