Оригинал материала
Galina Kozhevnikova. Summer 2007: Xenophobia and Anti-extremism before the Big Elections
Edited by Alexander Verkhovsky
Manifestations of Radical Nationalism : Violence : Anti-Semitism : Vandalism : Spontaneous Mass Conflicts : Activities of Organized Right-Wing Groups : Xenophobic Actions by Pro-Kremlin Groups
Counteraction to Radical Nationalism : Efforts by NGOs and Civil Society Activists : Lawmaking : Criminal Prosecution of the Right-Wing Radicals
Excessive and Unfounded Actions against Extremism
Appendix
SUMMARY
The summer of 2007 witnessed many diverse developments in the sphere of ethno-nationalist activity and efforts to counteract it. We observed consistent trends in all developments related to ethno-nationalism. As to countermeasure, efforts remain inconsistent, and positive developments are sporadic. However, for the first time in a long while, we have seen more positive events than negative.
Skinhead violence is as intense as in the past, and right-wing radical groups have increased their efforts in a number of areas, apparently keen on provoking riots and replicating the Kondopoga events in other Russian regions.
On the other hand, for the first time in recent years, we can assess new amendments of anti-extremist legislation as positive rather than negative. Moreover, for the first time since the adoption of the Law on Combating Extremist Activity, a list of extremist materials was published as provided by this law. In addition, the suppression of xenophobic propaganda visibly improved. The prosecution of racist violence continued; moreover, for the first time a court officially found - in the case of Timur Kacharava murder - a neo-Nazi motive in the crime.
Unfortunately, authorities continue to enforce anti-extremist legislation against the political opposition and even against non-affiliated independent individuals, yet still condoning xenophobic rhetoric and practices of organizations loyal to the current political regime. We conclude that the pressure against right-wing radical organizations observed this summer does not mean that the government has changed its attitude towards xenophobic manifestations, but rather that pro-governmental organizations are competing with "outsiders" for the use of the nationalist resource in anticipation of the electoral season which began in early September.
MANIFESTATIONS OF RADICAL NATIONALISM
Violence
The summer of 2007 demonstrated a slight decline in xenophobic violence. The overall number of victims in June and August of 2007 was at least 136, including 8 who were killed. In the same period of 2006 there were 189 victims, 18 of them killed. However, we need to note that the 2006 statistics include the casualties of the blast attack in Cherkizovo Market (13 killed, 53 wounded), so we cannot claim that conventional types of racist violence decreased. Rather, such crimes are now rarely covered by the media [1].
However, we note that for the first time in years there was a real reason for skinheads to slow down their activities - the arrest of Format 18 neo-Nazi gang leader Maxim "Tesak' Martsinkevich in early July.
The hotbeds of violence continue to include Moscow (36 victims, including 2 deaths), and St. Petersburg (6 victims, including 2 deaths). In addition, two attacks reported this summer - against a camp of ecologists outside Angarsk and against the villagers of Kytsigirovka - dramatically increased the number of casualties in Irkutsk oblast (at least 48, including 1 death). Racist incidents affecting at least 395 people and killing 40 have been reported in 35 Russian regions this year.
A high-profile crime this summer was a neo-Nazi attack against a tent camp of radical ecologists outside Angarsk on 21 July. The attack was well-planned: early in the morning the attackers who had come to Angarsk from several neighboring cities armed with metal rods and other injury-causing devices reached the camp located outside the city and shouting neo-Nazi slogans battered the campers. One of the ecologists, Ilya Borodayenko, died a few hours later, and another victim spent more than six weeks in hospital [2]. The local law enforcement authorities arrested most of the suspected attackers, some of whom were open about their membership in ultra-right gangs [3]. In the week following the attack the campers were attacked two more times.
We can also mention an attack against Valentina Uzunova, staff member of the Kunstkamera (museum of curiosities) in St. Petersburg and a well-known expert in hate propaganda cases. All circumstances of the assault suggest that the perpetrators sought to cause maximum public resonance. They attacked V. Uzunova on 19 June outside the home of her late colleague Nikolay Girenko killed by neo-Nazi in 2004. On the next day, Uzunova was expected to testify in a trial against Vladislav Nikolsky who was charged with anti-Semitic propaganda; her notes and documents she had planned to use in her testimony were in her bag stolen by the attackers. It was not the first attack against Nikolay Girenko's colleagues - in November 2006, Dmitry Dubrovsky, another well-known expert, was assaulted.
Both attacks - in Irkutsk and in St. Petersburg - confirm the assumption that Russian media avoid reporting on neo-Nazi crimes. Only the boldest, most outrageous and demonstrative incidents get covered. However, neo-Nazis seem to remember that in 2006 inappropriate coverage by the Russian media effectively promoted skinheads by raising the profile of their leaders, and therefore many seek to make the news whenever they can. While the public is obviously used to numerous daily racist attacks, the ultra-right invent new ways to engage public and media attention. In mid-August, a video showing a killing of two men (assumed to be a Tajik and a native to the Caucasus) was posted on the web. There is no agreement as to the purpose of the video and whether the killing was real, but its authors succeeded in engaging public debates for at least two weeks and caused a comeback of the ultra-right to the limelight. [4] On the other hand, some neo-Nazi were actually scared of the publicity, and their fear resulted in less frequent racist incidents afterwards.
Speaking of xenophobic violence, we note that in contrast to previous years, there was barely any reporting of clashes on the Airborne Troops Day on 2 August - even though some clashes must have occurred anyway. The only official report was that of drunk ex-troopers having attacked a Moslem store in Perm, but there were unofficial reports of riots and attacks against :non-Russians; on 2 August in other cities. We did not include them in our statistics, however, because we could not verify the unofficial data.
Anti-Semitism
The number of anti-Semitic attacks soared in the summer of 2007 unexpectedly and without apparent causes. Normally, Jews are rarely attacked by the neo-Nazi just because they are not easily identified among other people in the street. Three Jews were affected by racist violence in 2004, four in 2005, and four in 2006, besides the synagogue attendance (nine persons) affected by A. Koptsev's attack. We know of two anti-Semitic attacks in the first 5 months of 2007 causing four victims, and of at least six victims of four incidents in June and July 2007.
An attack against religious Jews in Ivanovo on 11 June had the greatest resonance. A group of skinheads armed with knives and broken beer bottles assaulted members of the local Jewish community, including an elderly leader of the community and the Ivanovo rabbi. A few people were injured - one of them, a bystander who rushed to the victims' rescue, was seriously stabbed.
Two incidents were reported in Moscow; in one of them a victim was pushed into a heating system collector and survived by sheer luck.
Another, totally outrageous case which had nothing to do with skinheads occurred in Kutulik, Irkutsk Oblast, where a policeman :disliked; a Jewish name of a female reporter who was staying at the same hotel and put his pistol against her head yelling anti-Semitic offenses and threatening to kill her. Fortunately, he was overpowered and disarmed.
On 13 June in Murmansk, graffiti which read Jew and Death to Yids appeared in the hallway of an apartment building, with an arrow pointing to the door of an elderly woman's flat. It is common to see Death to Yids written on walls in Russian cities, but only in rare cases specific people are targeted and threatened in this manner.
Vandalism
Other manifestations of anti-Semitism, such as vandalism and dissemination of xenophobic leaflets, continued as before. Vandalism targeting Jewish sites and buildings is more frequent than attacks against other targets: of 14 incidents documented this summer, four targeted Jewish sites, three targeted Moslem sites, two were anti-Orthodox (plus an attack against an Orthodox Christian congregation mistaken for Jehovah's Witnesses), and one attack targeted a Protestant prayer house. The remaining three incidents were mass actions by neo-Nazis who painted offensive graffiti in the streets of Russian cities.
In total since the beginning of this year, we have documented at least 49 acts of vandalism with explicit religious or neo-Nazi motives, including 13 anti-Semitic, eight anti-Protestant, six ideologically-motivated, four anti-Orthodox, and three anti-Moslem incidents.
Spontaneous Mass Conflicts
The summer of 2007 was marked by a major conflict, apparently spontaneous, with an ethnic hate motive.
On the night of 17 to 18 August 2007, the villagers of Kytsigirovka, Irkutsk Oblast, were massively attacked and beaten. As in most such incidents, the fight was preceded by an apparently insignificant conflict: a few drunk young men from neighboring communities attempted to enter the premises of a local shelter for children and adolescents and "meet the girls." The incident resulted in fighting; the attackers, some of whom were injured, left, but promised to come back with :reinforcement; and get even.
On 17 August, around 11 p.m., some 50 men came to the village in two trucks - reportedly, from the neighboring villages of Zady, Kapsal and Bulisa, Ekhirit-Bulagat District (former Ust-Ordynski Buryat Okrug). They were armed with bats, sticks and nailed boards. Getting off the trucks, they split into two groups and closed in on the village from the two ends of the main street; they cut off the street lights and attacked everyone they encountered on the way, regardless of age and gender. According to witnesses' reports, the attackers yelled that the villagers :lived in [the attackers'] land, and [the attackers] have beaten them before, are beating them today, and will beat them in the future.; They also threatened to burn down the village. Following these reports, Irkutsk Mayor Igor Naumov said that he believed the riot to be motivated by ethnic hatred.
At least 20 people were injured as a result of the hour-long attack; some had to be hospitalized with multiple injuries (including cerebral-cranial and spinal injuries) and bruises.
There are a few notable things about this conflict.
Firstly, in contrast to many recent scenarios, it obviously did not involve any organized, ideologically bound nationalist groups. The shouting of nationalist slogans reveals the racist motive, but does not support an assumption that the attackers were a consolidated, ideologically committed gang.
Secondly, the allegedly :racist motive; of the fighting was mentioned by the local government, but did not result in a strong media reaction. Moreover, the local media reported the events in a manner that concealed the hate motive. A witness statement insisting that the attackers yelled racist offences was only covered once by a regional TV channel, which also revealed that most villagers were Slavs. This indirect evidence (eventually removed from the published transcript of the TV report) suggests that Buryat nationalists were behind the attack.
The failure to report what actually happened in this case illustrates how potentially harmful the adoption of a draft law expected to be considered by the State Duma may be, which will prohibit any indication of the victims' and perpetrators' ethnicity in crime reporting [5]. Withholding this information may result in rumors and panic and provoke even more conflicts.
And finally, the events revealed a typical behavior of local political elites who refused to make objective comments and failed to launch a public inquiry into the incident, but instead completely denied the ethnic aspect of the conflict and blamed the media for stirring up anxieties - even though the media, as mentioned above, were, if anything, over-cautious.
Activities of Organized Right-Wing Groups
Preparation for Elections
In summer, preparations for the parliamentary election campaign were underway.
The center-stage scandal unfolded around the registration of the ultra-right Great Russia Party led by State Duma member Andrei Savelyev who made extensive use of litigation urging for criminal prosecution of journalists and experts for alleged libel and incitement to hatred every time they described his organization as ultra-nationalist and himself as racist; this simple strategy engaged public curiosity and secured frequent media coverage of the party and its leaders. In particular, Savelyev's announcement of a criminal libel case involving one of the SOVA Center's publications caused some public agitation; the case was soon dropped, but the promotional effect had already been achieved. [6]
On 24 July 2007, the party was denied registration for merely formal reasons - the most cynical of them being that the party's founding documents were inconsistent with the Law on Political Parties (to remind the reader, the party's organizing committee emphasized on many occasions that their written program had nothing to do with the party's real goals and objectives and had simply been copied from that of the Fair Russia, a registered political party). [7]
Nevertheless, at least one registered political party - Gennady Semigin's Russian Patriots - was willing to admit some of the Great Russia activists on its party lists. [8]
Sergey Baburin's Popular Union declared that it was prepared to put members of another ultra-right group (not affiliated with the Great Russia) on its party lists. In addition to Albert Makashov (previously elected from the Communist Party lists), Baburin offered to adopt the Russian All-National Union (RONS) leader Igor Artyomov and ex-LDPR member Nikolay Kuryanovich [9]. Roman Golovkin of the Russian National Bolshevik Front (RNBF) joined Baburin's campaign team. In addition, in the summer of 2007 the Popular Union formed a rather exotic coalition with Yedinenie (former party turned NGO) led by General Petrov; at least one regional leader of the latter group had been convicted under art. 282 for anti-Semitic propaganda.
But in fact, both parties' chances of getting into the State Duma are slim.
Provocation of Riots and Public Actions
The summer 2007 events demonstrated once again how skillfully the right-wing radicals, particularly DPNI, can build on their prior experience of provoking riots. Having once discovered a working model, the ultra-right now apply it whenever they can, using as a pretext any conflict ending in serious injuries or death and involving persons of more than one ethnicity.
A fighting incident is then presented as an interethnic conflict and :outrageous behavior of non-Russians who seek to exterminate ethnic Russians." The community is flooded by right-wing radical activists (particularly DPNI members) from neighboring cities and even from Moscow; walls of buildings are covered with provocative, discriminatory leaflets (anti-Caucasus, anti-immigrant, etc.). The nationalists organize a "popular gathering" which does not require official permission, as opposed to a meeting or a rally. In case of a death, they link the "popular gathering" to the funeral ceremony, where they can build their propaganda on emotions associated with loss and grief. They use the DPNI web forum to coordinate their actions. They then get the :popular gathering; to adopt a pre-written resolution followed by riots and clashes with police.
We note, however, that they have not yet been able to implement this scenario in full since the Kondopoga events, because the police and local administrations are aware of their tactics and have been successful in preventing the violence.
The biggest incident of this type occurred in Stavropol Krai between May and June 2007. On 24 May, a common fight rapidly turned into a mass conflict causing interethnic tensions, panic and rumors alleging "dozens of Russians killed by Caucasus natives,; attempts to set fire to buildings and sites whose owners were natives to the Caucasus, etc. [10] The situation became worse when two students were killed on 3 June, allegedly by :Caucasian men.; The rumors around the killings were similar to those in Kondopoga at the time of the conflict: in Kondopoga, they featured :ritual mutilation - cut-off ears;; in Stavropol, the rumor had it that the victims' heads were cut off. Local ultra-right groups mobilized, supported from the outside, in particular by DPNI and RONS, whose leaders Alexander Belov and Igor Artemyev headed for Stavropol to participate in a mass meeting scheduled on 5 June.
Admittedly, the Stavropol authorities expected these developments and took vigorous measures to avoid violence. Riot police units were reinforced and emergency services alerted (in particular, we should mention the firefighters' prompt response to arson attempts). Ultimately, the authorities were able to control, albeit with difficulty, the aggressive mob coming from the explicitly racist meeting. A few cars were damaged, but even more destructive riots were prevented. At least one activist of the local RONS chapter was arrested and faced charges of incitement to racial hatred. To reduce tensions, the authorities used unlawful methods - field-tested during prior incidents - in particular, they detained DPNI leader Alexander Belov on his way to Stavropol.
Even though the Stavropol authorities prevented the conflict, their conduct was inconsistent. Firstly, as in most such incidents, they attempted to hold on to the information about preparations for the conflict, which immediately caused panic and rumors. When official information about the conflict became available it was already too late; the rumors had already spread. Secondly, the police obviously lacked clear instructions for how to respond to the ultra-right's unexpected conduct, particularly at the peak of the conflict. Thus, the local RONS leader was arrested amidst statements that participants of a car race organized by RONS' nationalist competitors, a local ultra-right neo-pagan group, would be involved as volunteers in patrolling the city streets to maintain order [11]. At the same time, there was an attempt to present the Stavropol events to the public as actions of "a professional hand which has done a lot of evil deeds in Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, and now seeks to "help" Russia." The above raises a suspicion that the real reasons and masterminds behind the riots will never be identified, and therefore, similar events may occur in the future [12]. Moreover, :voluntary patrols; initiated as a by-product of the conflict may result in the emergence of ultra-right paramilitary units closely collaborating with law enforcement authorities.
The June 2007 events in Stavropol were the biggest :success story; of the ultra-right groups seeking to transform local conflicts into racist riots.
However, just as was the case after Kondopoga, the ultra-right did not stop after succeeding in one city. On 21-22 June they attempted to provoke mass fighting in Manezhnaya, and then in Slavyanskaya Square in Moscow. Unfortunately, only the DPNI story of the origins of the conflict has been reported on: according to DPNI, on 21 June, a group of young "Caucasian men; were dancing lezginka (a Georgian dance) in Manezhnaya Square, causing "patriots" to harass them, followed by an agreement to meet the next day for a larger brawl.
On 22 June, the police, aware of the planned fight, prevented a clash in Manezhnaya Square, but then the two clashing sides agreed to move to Slavyanskaya Square, virtually in front of the Presidential Administration offices. From this moment on, an alternative description of the events is available, which, unfortunately, failed to be reported by the mainstream media. While according to DPNI, :Caucasus men armed with metal rods; attacked the :unarmed Russians,; some witnesses claim the opposite: the ultra-right were the first to attack (apparently joined by some participants of the homophobic picket across the street), while the Caucasus youth fought back, apparently having picked up fragments of metal pipes in a nearby construction site and using them as weapons [13]. The number of victims is unknown (except for one bystander who was hit accidentally). DPNI, however, widely publicized their efforts to rescue their arrested :fellow combatants; from police stations.
Regardless of how accurate the media coverage of events in Slavyanskaya Square was, the fighting, as expected, failed to provoke a mass conflict. Moreover, even though the law enforcement and political elites are generally tolerant of ultra-right groups, fighting in front of the Presidential Administration premises was clearly off limits. Even if, indeed, on the following few days police selectively stopped young men who looked like Caucasus natives to prevent more clashes, the right-wing radicals also faced consequences, although somewhat later. The best known consequence was the arrest of the Russian skinheads' idol, leader of Format 18 gang Maxim 'Tesak' Martsinkevich, although he may not have been directly involved in the fighting. His arrest showed that the right-wing radicals' conduct was pushing the limits of what the authorities were willing to tolerate: Tesak was on the federal list of wanted suspects for his appearance in the Bilingua Club in February, where he attempted to disrupt a political discussion by yelling neo-Nazi slogans. However, as it is usually the case, for a while no one cared to search for him. During the trial of the anti-fascist Alexander Rukhin's murder case, Tesak was seen outside the court building; some people identified him to the police, asking to arrest him, but the officers refused to act. However, the authorities found and arrested him promptly - within a few days - after the fighting on the 22 June. Access to his website and to the blogs of some people involved in the fighting in Manezhnaya Square was blocked.
Three weeks later some follow-up fighting was reported in Zelenograd outside Moscow, but it appeared to be a weak aftermath of the Stavropol and Slavyanskaya Square events, and it led nowhere. Afterwards the right-wing radical activity dwindled. They attempted a comeback towards the end of August on the anniversary of Kondopoga, but the authorities were prepared and acted preemptively. In particular, on 30 August, DPNI leader A. Belov was forced to get off the train on his way to Kondopoga and then arrested for five days for insulting a police officer.
The ultra-right did not organize any noticeable public actions in the summer of 2007; in fact, they did not need any: the events in Stavropol and other places provided enough publicity for them.
The only other event we would like to mention was the international conference "Europe and Russia: New Perspectives" - a direct continuation of the forum :The White World's Future; that took place in 2006. Keynote speakers, again, were David Duke (US) and Guillaume Faye (France); just as in past years, the racist event failed to stir any serious protests in the Russian society. The conference venue was provided by the Union of Russian Writers chaired by Valery Ganichev, member of the Public Chamber.
Competition for the Media Space
We have observed another aspect of right-wing radical - particularly DPNI - activity related to their efforts to provoke mass interethnic conflicts.
In a situation of governmental control over mainstream media and the authorities' tendency (which is probably a knee-jerk reaction) to withhold information about events with a xenophobic component, DPNI increasingly acts as the only source covering these events. However, rather than reporting an event, they construct their own version of it. Common fights and interpersonal conflicts, or even failed ultra-right attacks are presented by DPNI and affiliated communication channels as "major interethnic clashes", :terror acts targeting the Russian people; etc. In the absence of alternative coverage, they create a certain informational context which persists even after the real story is eventually disclosed.
In particular, during the post-Stavropol hysteria, some media reporters were briefed on alleged "interethnic clashes; in Omsk, but the reports turned out to be distorted descriptions of several unrelated interpersonal incidents [14]. Indeed, a well-respected mainstream paper, lacking reliable information, published a panicky, untrue story under a xenophobic headline - Migrant Workers Run Amok and Beat Omsk Residents [15].
The role of DPNI as self-appointed :newsmaker; is further illustrated by a story around a violent incident which occurred on 20 July in St. Petersburg. According to DPNI, some :Caucasus men; attacked some :Russians; - but the police called to the scene only arrested the :Russian; fighters. Then some DPNI :patriots; headed to the police station to rescue their arrested "comrades; (rather than abstract :Russians;) and picked a fight with the police (to note, it was for the first time that DPNI dared to be so bold) resulting in the arrest of one DPNI member in addition to those already in custody. The DPNI version of the events had already been reported by the media, when the true story was revealed: in fact, the :Caucasus men; had come to the defense of an acquaintance - a police officer attacked by six drunken men. However, the absence of immediate accurate coverage - just as in the Omsk "conflict; or in the Slavyanskaya Square incident - made all the difference. The initial (favorable to DPNI) version of the events was reported by the media and remembered by the public. On the one hand, these stories reaffirmed the xenophobic sentiments already shared by many people who feel surrounded by aggressive aliens, and on the other hand, they portray DPNI as influential with the police force and capable of getting their :comrades in combat; released from police custody. This, in turn, encourages people who tend to have problems with the law, to join DPNI ranks.
Two other episodes worth mentioning involved the Eurasian Youth Union (ESM) which used mass media channels to accuse Valery Tishkov, director of Ethnology Institute, of espionage under the pretext of ethnological monitoring, and Sergey Mitrokhin, Moscow Duma member of Yabloko Party, of incitement to racial hatred. Of course, both campaigns led nowhere (other than a potential court action that Tishkov and/or Mitrokhin may take against ESM), but they stirred a broad reaction and provided some free publicity.
Xenophobic Actions by Pro-Kremlin Groups
The right-wing radical groups were not alone in their xenophobic campaigning in the summer of 2007.
The authorities' tolerance of homophobic violence on 27 May 2007 [16] led to more tension and violent incidents. On 12 June 2007, Georgievtsy Youth Movement co-chaired by State Duma staff member Stepan Medvedko - even though the movement had no prior record of xenophobic actions - announced that they would :purge; Ilyinsky Square in Moscow by ousting the gay men who frequented the place. [17] It was obvious from the start that Georgyevtsy would not stop at violence and provocations [18]. The law enforcement failed to respond to the action, which was immediately joined by the ultra-right. At least one violent attack by a Slav Union member against a gay man near the Plevna Heroes Monument was documented. As mentioned above, members of the self-appointed anti-gay patrol got involved in the fighting between the right-wing radicals and young Caucasus men in Slavyanskaya Square on 22 June [19].
It was only after the fighting that the Georgievtsy picket was stopped, and then the authorities blocked access to the square under the pretext of long-term reconstruction work.
The Mestnye Movement patroned by Moscow Oblast Governor Boris Gromov continued to stir a strong public reaction.
In end-June, they announced an Illegal Taxi campaign ostensibly to suppress illegal private taxis. However, their promotional materials were explicitly racists: they showed a blonde Slav-looking woman refusing a ride from a taxi driver looking like native to the Caucasus region; the caption was "We're not going the same way." The accompanying leaflet referred to the Ivannikova case (a female Moscow resident stabbing to death a rapist who happened to be an Armenian) - this case was extensively exploited by DPNI in 2005 [20].
A scandal broke out in July: a few high-ranking officials independently urged the prosecutor's office to review Mestnye's campaigning for incitement to racism. However, one of the officials - Moscow City Duma speaker Vladimir Platonov - withdrew his request after three days, explaining that the organizers had revised their promotional materials (which was blatant disinformation; the campaign materials, without any changes whatsoever, can still be found on Mestnye's website). The law enforcement failure to respond to an explicitly racist campaign, as well as V. Platonov's maneuvers, confirmed once again that suppression of xenophobic propaganda in Russia has little to do with its public danger, but everything to do with loyalty to the current government.
In turn, allowing the perpetrators to go unpunished causes Mestnye's xenophobic actions to continue in a systematic manner. [21]
On 29 August, they staged another campaign - No to Sects in Our Land - resulting in at least one violent attack motivated by religious hatred. A few hours after their action, on the night of 29 to 30 August, an Orthodox Cultural and Educational Center - which the attackers mistook for a Jehovah's Witnesses' Center - was broken into, and two staff members were beaten.
COUNTERACTION TO RADICAL NATIONALISM
Efforts by NGOs and Civil Society Activists
In July 2007, a round table Xenophobia in Russia and Germany was held in Moscow. The event was co-organized by the Henrich Boll Foundation, the SOVA Center, and the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, and patroned by the Presidential Human Rights Council as part of the St. Petersburg Dialogue. The round table featured presentations by politicians and researchers from Russia and Germany who discussed identity policies in both countries, the issues of freedom of expression vs. xenophobic propaganda, and the challenges of immigrant integration.
A violent attack against a camp of environmentalists outside Angarsk stirred a wide response by anti-fascist leftist youth in numerous Russian cities. Pickets and other events in the memory of Ilya Borodayenko - a young man killed by the attackers - were held in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, Tyumen, Vladivostok and other Russian cities.
It is important to mention that a Moscow soccer club, Spartak, faced sanctions for racist behavior of its fans. On 11 August, during a game in Samara against the local Krylya Sovetov, Spartak fans displayed a racist banner offending Krylya's player, dark-skinned Brazilian Wellington. Even though racist offences are common during soccer games in Russia, this incident, for some reason, stirred an enormous public reaction (possibly, because a racist murder video was posted on the web at the same time). The Moscow Spartak was fined 500,000 rubles. It was the first known sanction for racism enforced by the Russian Football Union, even though the RFU has been a member of FIFA for years, bound by an obligation to punish teams for such incidents. However, we do not see any reasons for anti-racist practices to continue in a systematic manner.
Lawmaking
On 12 August, a new series of amendments were adopted to improve the anti-extremist legislation of June-July 2007. For the first time in years, the amendments had some positive as well as negative potential, even thought they failed to remove the fundamental defects of the law, and in some ways made them even worse.
The amendments were adopted as a result of some serious editing applied to the original draft law authored by members of the United Russia Party, the Fair Russia Party, and LDPR. The original draft - subjected to a major revision - was introduced in the State Duma in February 2007; it was explicitly repressive and targeted political opposition [22]. Following a series of negative comments, it was redrafted for the second reading to a point of total transformation into a new text which eventually became law in a couple of months [23].
The law substantially shortened and improved the definition of extremist activity removing some - albeit not all - dangerous inconsistencies, which is the main positive thing to be said about the new text.
Somewhat controversial is a new provision making political or ideological hatred, or hatred against a certain social group an aggravating circumstance applicable to all crimes, and a qualifying characteristic in a number of criminal articles. Such a broad understanding of "hate motives" may be justified, but its broadness may easily lead to abusive enforcement. It appears inappropriate that anyone mentioning an organization which has legally been found extremist must also mention the fact that it has been found extremist [24]. We find particularly dangerous the amended art. 213 ("hooliganism') of the Criminal Code, warranting up to five years of prison even for petty offenses (formerly treated under the Code of Administrative Offenses) involving racial, political or other hate motives; this provision may easily be enforced against participants of any street action [25].
Criminal Prosecution of the Right-Wing Radicals
Violence
In the summer of 2007, at least four trials took into account the hate motive in convicting a total of 16 people for racist violence (two trials in St.Petersburg, one in Belgorod and one in Yekaterinburg).
In total, at least 15 trials [26] convicted 38 offenders in similar cases since the beginning of this year (three were sentenced to more than 15 years, three - between 10 and 15 years, three - between 5 and 10 years, 11 - up to 5 years, two were fined, one was referred to compulsory medical treatment, and seven received probational sentences).
The most notable were the two trials in St. Petersburg: a repeat hearing of the Congolese student murder case, and the trial of skinheads charged with killing anti-fascist Timur Kacharava.
The Congolese student murder trial ended on 19 June; a few days before, a jury brought a guilty verdict against the four defendants. They were sentenced to prison terms between 7 and 14 years. To remind, it was a second trial of the case, ending in a non-guilty verdict the first time; the Supreme Court overruled the non-guilty verdict and ordered a retrial. Why the initial verdict was dumped is unclear; but in our opinion, one of the reasons was that the jurors had received threats from neo-Nazis. Security concerns with regard to participants of such trials were raised once again this summer, after a female suspect of another racist killing - that of young Tatar D. Zainullin - who actively cooperated with the investigators, was brutally beaten, and the attackers demanded that she withdraw her prior testimony.
Another landmark event was the trial of seven offenders charged with assaulting two anti-fascist students - Timur Kacharava (who was killed) and Maxim Zgibay - in November 2005 in St. Petersburg. Here, just as in the Moscow trial of Alexander Rukhin's killers, the ideological motive of violence was obvious. On 31 July, a jury found all defendants guilty on all counts, including a finding that the attack was motivated by :hatred against anti-fascists as a social group." The actual killer was sentenced to 12 years of prison, but the rest got away with astonishingly mild sentences - three were sentenced to terms between two and tree years, and three others received probational terms. Nevertheless, it was a landmark trial, where the court formally recognized that a neo-Nazi ideology - rather than racism - was the motive of the crime (which did not affect the punishment, because the trial occurred before the adoption of amendments described above) [27].
The above-mentioned cases were the only notable developments in the prosecution of crimes committed by the ultra-right; we did not observe any other positive changes. Moreover, while the rate of convictions for hate crime used to double in previous years, this year (even though it is not yet over) we can clearly see that the rate of convictions will remain the same or grow only slightly, which is a cause for concern, because skinhead crimes continue to escalate.
Propaganda and Campaigning
In contrast, authorities are increasingly active in suppressing hate promoters. In the summer of 2007, eight people were convicted for hate propaganda: two in Novosibirsk, and one each in Vladimir, Krasnodar, Moscow, Ryazan, and Samara. However, even though the number of convictions has increased (a total of 19 as of this writing, compared to just 17 over the entire year 2006), some of them are controversial.
On the one hand, two hate offenders - in Novosibirsk and Krasnodar - were convicted for their web publications, which confirms that there is no need to adopt a separate anti-extremist law to suppress cyber crime. On the other hand, both convictions concerned postings on web forums, which is disturbing; even though forums [28] are a public space for expression, individual comments posted on such forums hardly merit a definition of serious public campaigning - given particularly that those who target postings on forums and blogs increasingly seek to limit freedom of expression, rather than suppress extremist propaganda (see below the section on Excessive and Unfounded Actions against Extremism).
We continue to see high-profile hate promoters escape punishment, as was the case with Alexander Aratov, whose lengthy trial ended on 20 July 2007 in a probational 18-month sentence. This punishment is highly unlikely to discourage the veteran radical Russian nationalist from xenophobic campaigning. A publishing group which Aratov founded but formally resigned from directing, continues as before, and provoked a new scandal in early September by displaying its offensive books at the International Book Fair in Moscow (as it has been done before twice).
Interestingly, in a case in Ryazan, prosecutors urged for 12-month probational sentences without any other sanctions for local RNE leaders, but instead the court banned the defendants from membership in RNE and from taking executive-level jobs for five years. While a ban on membership in a specific group may be an unusual punishment, it was a real sanction, as opposed to a virtual probational sentence.
The leader of the Yekaterinburg chapter of the Popular National Party (NNP), lawyer Sergey Kotov, was sentenced under art. 282-1 of the Criminal Code (:organization of an extremist community;) and it is the seventh instance that we know of in Russia where this article was enforced against right-wing radicals since it was added to the Criminal Code in 2002. Unfortunately, it is unclear from the trial reports whether the NNP chapter was found extremist - or the "extremist community" in question was an unnamed group of skinheads convicted in Sverdlovsk Oblast in 2006 under the same article, which had been inspired by Kotov, in the court's opinion.
In addition, in June 2007, a group of cemetery vandals was convicted in Voronezh Oblast, and the racial hate motive of the vandalism was recognized. One of the perpetrators, who had vandalized a Jewish cemetery twice within a few months, got away with a probational term, while another one, already on probation, was sentenced to two years and a month in the settlement colony.
Extremist Materials
On 9 August 2007, for the first time since the adoption of the anti-extremist law five years ago, a federal list of judicially established extremist materials was published as required by the said law. While the list is far from complete (it lacks at least one third of the materials which our Center knows to have been found extremist by courts), we cannot overestimate the importance of the publication, as it takes away a pretext often used by hate promoters that they did not know about the ban (however, they can always use another loophole and republish the offensive material, because the ban only affects a specific publication). We hope that the Federal Registration Service responsible for publishing updated lists will do so regularly.
The list contains 14 titles, among them a Nazi film, a neo-Nazi music album, Al-Wahhab's treatise, and right-wing radical print propaganda, mostly neo-pagan.
Courts continued finding certain materials extremist. In end-August, these included publications in Divisia and Izhevskaya Divisia papers which triggered the conviction of Mikhail Trapeznikov under art 282 back in 2004.
Other Measures of Counteraction
Other measures designed to counteract hate propaganda were undertaken in the summer of 2007 by the prosecutor's office and the Federal Service for Supervision over Mass Communications and Preservation of Cultural Heritage (Ros-svyaz-okhran-kultura [29]). Notably, we have not heard of any successful preventive activity by either police or local administrations in 2007.
In summer, reports of prosecutorial efforts to fight extremism, including offenses by ultra-right groups, were published, but the dates of such sanctions or specific offences which triggered the sanctions are unclear from the reports.
A report produced by the St. Petersburg City Prosecutor's Office is more informative than others; it reveals, in particular, how many investigations into hate offences are ongoing in the region, and even more importantly, that the St. Petersburg Prosecutor's Office had warned the local RNE chapter against extremist activity. As long as the warning had not been challenged in court, the City Prosecutor asked the Prosecutor General's Office to open proceedings and find the entire RNE an extremist organization. However, as opposed to NBP recognized as extremist by a judgment effective on 7 August 2007 (see below), it may be impossible to recognize RNE as an extremist group nation-wide in a similar manner, because it has not been a solid organization for quite a while: numerous dwarfish groups calling themselves :RNE; may have nothing to do with one another or may even fight among themselves over various things, including ideology.
Of particular interest is the prosecutorial oversight over anti-extremist enforcement by local administrations during the period under review. It is unclear whether this oversight was part of their routine work or whether it was triggered by the Kondopoga events and similar disurbances in other regions. Anyway, we had not heard of such prosecutorial practices before 2007. But now we know that in the Far Eastern Federal District alone between 2006 and 2007 (May inclusive) the prosecutorial offices warned at least 31 local officials and disciplined three for failure to take administrative measures for preventing extremist offences. In an unprecedented judgment, the Khiloksky District Court in Chita Oblast satisfied the Chita Prosecutor's request and found unlawful the local self-government's inaction and failure to enforce anti-extremist and anti-terrorist legislation with regard to a riot targeting Azeri in Kharagun in 2006 (in fact, everything the Chita Oblast Prosecutor's Office did to investigate the conflict merits the highest praise [30]).
Rossvyazokhrankultura continued to be as active as before. In the summer of 2007 they issued approximately 18 :anti-extremist; warnings to mass media, of which we find only one - a warning to Izvestya for publishing Gengis Khan, Reveal Your Pretty Face, an article by D. Sokolov-Mitrich - to be unfounded. Notably, in 2007, two papers received each two warnings against extremism from Rossvyazokhrankultura - Buzuluk-based paper For Our Faith, Tzar and Fatherland, and Yuri Mukhin's Duel. The latter challenged the warning in court (as it had done before), but lost once again. However, judicial proceedings to order Duel's liquidation - initiated by the agency back in 2006 - are taking too long and are yet far from completion, while the paper continues to circulate.
EXCESSIVE AND UNFOUNDED ACTIONS AGAINST EXTREMISM
Unfortunately, inappropriate anti-extremist enforcement practices continued.
In particular, authorities continued to harass the Krasnodar Yabloko Party chapter for alleged :extremism.; In end-May, the Krasnodar Krai Prosecutor's Office warned the organization against extremism for dissemination of books by prominent political scientist Andrei Piontkovsky (which also triggered an FRS inspection). The party challenged the warning in court, and in June 2007 the first instance court overruled the absurd prosecutorial warning. However, on 14 August, a higher (Krai-level) court upheld the original warning [31]. At the same time, in Moscow, proceedings were launched to find Piontkovsky's books extremist. In particular, it means that the regional Yabloko Party chapter, under the current law, may be banned from regional elections scheduled in March 2008. In fact, banning the party from elections appears to be the only reasonable explanation of the :anti-extremist; warnings for selling a book freely sold in many other Russian cities.
The most significant event this summer was certainly the entry into force of a judgment banning the National Bolshevik Party as an extremist organization. To remind, the Moscow City Court passed the judgment on 19 April, but the party was not provided with the text of the judgment - in clear violation of the procedure - for months, and received it in mid-July. They found from the judgment that the party had been found extremist for three episodes; two of them - occupying a polling station in Moscow Oblast and disrupting a session of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly - involved minimum violence, but the court never looked into the use of violence, relying exclusively on prosecutorial findings, while the third episode - publications in Para Bellum paper back in 2005 - are irrelevant, because the authors (indeed, convicted under art. 282 for the publications in question), had not been members of Limonov's NBP for a long while, and the party had publicly disowned them and denounced their conduct [32].
However, on 7 August, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment, and it came into force, making anyone acting or speaking on behalf of NBP criminally liable under art. 282-2 of the Criminal Code.
Authorities also maintained their pressure against individual activists, accusing them of extremism.
They continued to target Mari activist Vitaly Tanakov, unfairly, as we believe, convicted at the end of 2006 under art. 282. In summer, a court found his brochure The Priest Speaks extremist. However, at the end of September 2007 the judgment was overruled by the Supreme Court of the Marii El Republic.
On 17 August, a court in Nizhny Novgorod toughened the sanctions against leader of the Russia-Chechnya Friendship Society (by now liquidated) Stanislav Dmitrievsky: should he commit any administrative offense, he will violate his probation and go to prison (to remind, in 2006 S. Dmitrievsky was convicted under art. 282 [33]). This judgment means that he can no longer participate in any public action unsanctioned by authorities.
Our hopes that the Komi Republic Prosecutor's Office would be reasonable were frustrated; in August they charged Savva Terentyev under art. 282 for posting a negative opinion about police in a blog.
In Oryol Oblast, proceedings under art. 280 were opened against a local pensioner charged with extremism for making a negative statement about Governor Stroyev in a public meeting.
No one doubts the absurdity of such accusations, but the :anti-extremist; judgments are issued, and their targets suffer the consequences.
Official pressure against mass media continues. In end-August, Rossvyazokhrankultura warned Izvestia paper for publishing an article by Dmitry Sokolov-Mitrich about discrimination of Russians in Yakutia; we believe, however, that the article contained nothing to warrant such a serious sanction. Anyway, Sokolov-Mitrich's article was at least controversial, whereas a warning against the use of a swastika symbol in an anti-fascist cartoon is clearly absurd. However, the St. Petersburg Chas Pik paper lost their court challenge on 5 July. Of course, no one believes that Chas Pik, not to mention Izvestia, will be closed, but there are now formal grounds for closing them as "extremist" papers.
In contrast, Zyryanskaya Zhizn harassed by North-Western Office of Rossvyazokhrankultura for pronouncements made by others [34] won the case in court: on 5 June 2007, the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic declared all claims against the paper ill-founded on the merits, as well as on formal grounds, and denied the request to liquidate the paper.
Last summer, it became more clear than ever that :anti-extremist; harassment of civil society activists does not have to be formally legal; a court may well declare the charges ill-founded after a while, but we do not know of a single case where bureaucrats and law enforcers responsible for the abuse were punished.
Thus, since spring, the law enforcement authorities adopted an arbitrary practice of confiscating (allegedly, to review them for :extremism;) entire print-runs of papers prepared for distribution during public events. They return the papers in a few months, outdated.
It happened, for example, with Vperyod, Petersburg! paper officially registered as a mouthpiece of the Other Russia coalition. On 31 May, law enforcement authorities confiscated the entire print-run - 120,000 copies, "to review them for extremism," and returned the papers on 29 June. Attempts to hold liable those who confiscated the print-run have so far been unsuccessful.
On 29 July in Moscow, just before a strike at Avto-VAS, a car plant, authorities confiscated—again, for an :extremism; check - the print-run of Workers' Democracy, a paper produced specifically for the event.
In contrast, in Arzamas, local activist Dmitry Isusov successfully challenged the law enforcement conduct in courts on a number of occasions. On 20 June, he won non-pecuniary damages of 500 rubles for an unlawful :anti-extremist; confiscation of 100 copies of the oppositional Na Krayu paper. However, none of the officials responsible for the abuse were punished.
Similarly, prosecutorial officials in Oryol escaped punishment for issuing a number of :anti-extremist; warnings to local activists G. Sarkisyan and D. Krayukhin, who successfully challenged the warnings in court.
The impunity of officials, even though their actions may be found unlawful, perpetuates the abusive practices.
Translated by Irina Savelieva
APPENDIX
Appendix 1. Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks between 2004 and 2007 (by city)
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 (before 31 August) | |
| Killed | Beaten, wounded | Total victims | Killed | Beaten, wounded |
| Moscow | 17 | 62 | 79 | 16 |
| St. Petersburg | 9 | 32 | 41 | 4 |
| Abakan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Archangelsk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Astrakhan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Barnaul | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Belgorod | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Birobidjan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Blagoveschensk | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Bryansk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Vladivostok | 5 | 9 | 14 | 0 |
| Vladimir Oblast | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| Volgograd | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Vologda | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Voronezh | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Ivanovo | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Izhevsk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Irkutsk Oblast | 3 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| Yoshkar Ola | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Kazan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kaliningrad | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Kaluga | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kirov | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kostroma | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Krasnodar | 2 | 32 | 34 | 1 |
| Krasnoyarsk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Kurgan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Курск | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Lipetsk | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Maikop | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Murmansk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nizhny Novgorod | 1 | 5 | 6 | 4 |
| Novgorod | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Novosibirsk | 2 | 12 | 14 | 1 |
| Omsk Oblast | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Oryol | 0 | 8 | 8 | 0 |
| Orenburg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Perm | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Petrozavodsk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pskov | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Rostov-on-the-Don | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ryazan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Samara | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| Saratov | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Sverdlovsk Oblast. | 1 | 7 | 8 | 6 |
| Smolensk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Stavropol | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Syktyvkar | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Tambov | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Tver Oblast | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Tomsk | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Tula Oblast | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Tyumen Oblastt | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 |
| Ulan Ude | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ufa | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Khabarovsk | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cheboksary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chelyabinsk | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 |
| Chita Oblast | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Yaroslavl Oblast | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 49 | 218 | 267 | 47 |
Appendix 2. Consolidates Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks in 2004-2007
(by season)
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 (по 31 мая) | |
| Killed | Beaten, wounded | Total victims | Killed | Beaten, wounded |
| Winter (December/January+ | ||||
| February/no date [35] ) 9(0/9/0) [36] | 25(0/22/3) | 34(0/31/3) | 11 (3/7/1) | 74(14/54/6) |
| Spring | 12 | 79 | 91 | 5 |
| Summer | 16 | 20 | 36 | 7 |
| Autumn | 9 | 80 | 89 | 23 |
| Total за год | 49 | 218 | 267 | 47 |
| Приме-чания | In addition, we know of 13 killings of homeless people where the law enforcement authorities suspect an ideological (neo-Nazi) element. | In addition, we know of 5 killings and 4 beatings of homeless people, where the law enforcement authorities suspect an ideological (neo-Nazi) element. | In addition, on 27-28 May 2006, in Moscow alone, skinheads and other homophobes battered at least 50 gays. We also know of 7 killings and 4 beatings of homeless people, where the law enforcement authorities suspect an ideological (neo-Nazi) element. The statistics include 13 deaths and 53 other casualties of the blast attack in Cherkizovo Market on 21 August 2006. | Except the gays - victims of skinhead attack on 27 May 2007. |
| We also know of 3 killings of homeless people where the law enforcement authorities suspect an ideological (neo-Nazi) element. |
Appendix 3. Consolidates Statistics of Racist and Neo-Nazi Attacks in 2004 - 2007
(by category)
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007(по 31 мая) | |
| Killed | Beaten, wounded | Killed | Beaten, wounded | Killed |
| Total | 49 | 218 | 47 | 417 |
| Including | ||||
| Dark-skinned people | 1 | 33 | 3 | 38 |
| People from Central Asia | 9 | 23 | 16 | 34 |
| People from the Caucasus | 15 | 38 | 12 | 52 |
| People from the Middle East and North Africa | 4 | 12 | 1 | 22 |
| People from Asia-Pacific Region (China, Viet-Nam, Mongolia, etc.) | 8 | 29 | 4 | 58 |
| Other people of "non-Slav appearance; | 2 | 22 | 3 | 72 |
| Members of youth subcultures and leftist youth | 0 | 4 | 3 | 121 |
| Others (including ethnic Russians), or not known | 10 | 57 | 5 | 20 |
Appendix 4. Statistics of convictions for violent crimes with a recognized hate motive, 2004-2007 (before 31 August, inclusive)
| Number of convictions | Number of offenders convicted | including probational sentences or release from punishment | |
| 2004 | |||
| Moscow | 4 | 11 | not known |
| St. Petersburg | 2 | 10 | 4 |
| Vladimir Oblast | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Voronezh | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Novgorod | 1 [37] | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 9 | 29 | 5 |
| 2005 | |||
| Moscow | 2 | 4 | 0 |
| Moscow Oblast | 4 [38] | 14 | 0 |
| St. Petersburg | 2 | 10 | 4 [39] |
| Blagoveschensk | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| Vladivostok | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Volgograd | 1 | 7 | 0 |
| Екатеринбург | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Lipetsk | 1 [40] | 4 | 0 |
| Murmansk | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Perm | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Tambov | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Tyumen Oblastt | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| Total | 17 | 56 | 5 |
| 2006 | |||
| Moscow | 5 | 11 | 1 |
| Moscow Oblast | 3 | 18 | 4 |
| Altai Krai | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Belgorod | 1 | 11 | 1 |
| Voronezh | 1 | 13 | 7 |
| Jewish Autonomous Oblast | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Yekaterinburg | 3 | 8 [41] | 0 |
| Kaluga Oblast | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Kostroma | 2 | 7 | 5 |
| Nizhny Novgorod | 4 | 6 | not known |
| Novosibirsk | 1 | not known | not known |
| Oryol | 2 | 6 [42] | 24 |
| St. Petersburg | 3 | 10 | 4 |
| Ростов-на Дону | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Saratov | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| Tomsk | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Ufa | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 33 | 109 [43] | 24 [44] |
| 2007 январь-31 августа) | |||
| Moscow | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| St. Petersburg | 2 | 11 | 3 |
| Belgorod | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Voronezh | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| Yekaterinburg | 2 | 8 | 0 |
| Kaluga | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Krasnoyarsk | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Omsk | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Северная Осетия | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Stavropol | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Syktyvkar | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Tambov | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Ярославль | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 15 | 38 | 7 |
Appendix 5. Statistics of convictions for hate propaganda in 2004-2007 (before 31 August inclusive)
| Number of convictions | Number of offenders convicted | в т.ч. условно или освобождены от наказания | |
| 2004 | |||
| Izhevsk | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Novgorod | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Novosibirsk | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 2005 | |||
| Moscow | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Yekaterinburg | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Kemerovo Oblast | 4 | 4 [45] | 1 |
| Kirov | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Нальчик | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Novgorod | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Oryol | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Syktyvkar | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Khabarovsk | 1 | 1 | 0 [46] |
| Total | 12 | 15 | 6 |
| 2006 | |||
| Moscow | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Moscow Oblast | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| St. Petersburg | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Астраханская область | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Yekaterinburg | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Kemerovo | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Kirov | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Krasnodar | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Novgorod | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Samara | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Saratov | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Syktyvkar | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Chelyabinsk | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| Ярославль | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Total | 17 | 20 | 7 |
| 2007 (январь-31 августа) | |||
| Moscow | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Владимир | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Вологодская область | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Kaliningrad | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Kirov | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Krasnodar | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Kurgan | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Novgorod | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Novosibirsk | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Республика Коми | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Ryazan | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Samara | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Sverdlovsk Oblast. | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Stavropol | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Ульяновск | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Chelyabinsk | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 19 | 21 | 10 |
=============================
[1] An assumption confirmed by our analysis of sources of such information. Most of them are websites or unofficial media, or resources closely related to ethnic communities (e.g. the first report of Damir Zainullin's murder in St.Petersburg was posted on a Russian-language Tatar portal; the attack against Dzhafarsadykh Abbasov was reported by Azeri media, etc.)
[2] He was released from the hospital in end-September.
[3] As of September 2007, 18 people have been arrested as suspects. Charges were brought under part 4 art. 111 (intentionally inflicting serious damage to health which is life-threatening and caused the victim's inadvertent death) and part 2 art. 213 ("hooliganism') of the Criminal Code.
[4] In our opinion, if not the video, then at least subsequent related statements (a mythical National-Socialist Party of Russia claimed responsibility for the killings and made a rather far-fetched declaration of being the :combat unit; of Dmitry Rumyantsev's National Socialist Society - followed by NCO's statements denying any links with the group, and by other contradicting comments) revealed internal conflicts and competition among the ultra-right - a rather heterogeneous community.
[5] However, the law will probably be dumped; it has been criticized by the United Russia Party (even though the Moscow URP launched it in the first place), and then two hearings, due on 13 September and 1 October, were canceled.
[6] About a dozen journalists, experts and editorial boards were targeted by prosecutorial and police checks.
[7] In September 2007, the party was denied registration again on similar grounds.
[8] On 13 September 2007, the Russian Patriots and A. Savelyev acting on behalf of the Great Russia signed a formal pre-election agreement. The first electoral coalition - Rodina/Russian Patriots - was set up. // Russian Patriots Party website. 2007. September. Subsequently, both official leaders of the Great Russia - A. Savelyev and S. Pykhtin - were included in the party list.
[9] In September, in addition to Artemyev and Kuryanovich, more than a dozen explicitly ultra-right candidates were added to their list.
[10] By various estimates, between 40 and 200 people were involved in the fighting. One person was killed.
[11] In March 2007, the relations between Orthodox and neo-pagan ultra-right groups in Stavropol worsened, followed by mutual accusations of being provocateurs and traitors, and then a neo-pagan priest was attacked and beaten by RONS members.
[12] The level of bureaucrats' competence in analyzing the situation is reflected, in particular, in the establishment of an Advisory Council on National and Ethnic Relations - the name alone reveals that the bureaucrats have a rather vague idea of what they are dealing with.
[13] On 22 June, clashes between natives to Caucasus and Russian nationalists occurred in the center of Moscow//Anti-war movement. 2007. 23 June. (www.voinenet.ru/index.php?aid=11903).
[14] The Omsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office verified the information published on websites of the Russian media about riots in Omsk //Official website of the Omsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office. 2007. 20 June (http://www.prokuratura.omsk.ru/2006073.html). (www.prokuratura.omsk.ru/2006073.html).
[15] See details in: Galina Kozhevnikova. Dragon's Teeth. // Grani.Ru. 2007. 15 June
[16] To remind, another attempt was made on that day to hold a picket against homophobia in Moscow. Its participants (including members of the European Parliament) were beaten by right-wing radicals, but the police did little to prevent the beatings.
[17] Another co-chair of the movement, Yegor Ovchinnikov, made a statement prior to the march making it clear that Georgievtsy were prepared to use violence against the opposition.
[18] On 16 June 2007, the picket participants were beaten by unidentified attackers.
[19] One person was killed; the overall number of victims is unknown.
[20] In August 2007, the same movement unleashed an extremely aggressive :anti-sectarian; campaign, resulting in at least one violent attack motivated by religious hatred.
[21] In September, a scandal broke out when Mestnye were involved as agents-provocateurs by the Federal Migration Service (FMS), and FMS chief Konstantin Romodanovsky said publicly that he would cooperate with the Mestnye, even though he knew that they were similar to DPNI.
[22] State Duma members seek to toughen punishment for extremism // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2007. 16 May (http://www.xeno.sova-center.ru/45A2A1E/932B888).
[23] Adopted by the State Duma on 6 July, approved by the Federation Council on 11 July, and signed by the Russian President on 26 July 2007.
[24] The ban on mentioning names of groups found extremist has led to numerous alternative interpretations of the NBP (National Bolshevik Party) acronym, from Never to Be mentioned Party to Now our Battle will Persist.
[25] See a detailed analysis of the draft law in: Alexander Verkhovsky . Anti-Extremist Legislation and Its Enforcement // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2007. 10 September (/racism-xenophobia/publications/2007/09/d11533/).
[26] These statistics do not include a case in Yaroslavl where a perpetrator was sentenced for attempted blood-vengeance killing.
[27] The verdict and sentence for the killing of another anti-fascist - Alexander Ruykhin in Moscow, also passed in the summer of 2007 - failed to recognize this motive officially, even though it was mentioned unofficially.
[28] Except, of course, web forums which are an integral part of radicals' websites used for coordination of their actions; but again, rather than persecute an individual member, it would be more logical to address the website materials in their entirety, or better - to look into the activity of the site owners.
[29] Before May 2007 - Rosokhrancultura.
[30] In September the investigation was completed, and the case files of 32 defendants were sent to court.
[31] The final judgment came on 2 October.