They haven't even started yet: What new sanctions Russia should expect and why they are unlikely to stop Putin

Speaking of further means of exerting pressure on Russia, “conventional” approaches have nearly outlived themselves. In the unlikely instance that the tenth sanctions package includes nuclear energy restrictions, it would be as much of a shot in the foot as the pressure on Gazprom that drove up gas prices in 2021-2022. Rosatom builds its power plants mainly on loans from the Russian government or Russian banks, and therefore, does not attract any foreign currency into the country (and the nuclear fuel it exports is mostly mined in Kazakhstan). The rest of the proposals regarding the next package are just as useless in terms of impacting Russia’s economy. Similarly to how it played out with diamonds, the measures imply restricting the purchase of particular goods from Russia but not their export to this country.

I believe we have reached a stage when only reverse trade and financial restriction can pack a punch. It’s all the more true considering that many countries, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, the UAE, and Turkey, benefit greatly from circumventing Western export sanctions rather than complying with them. As unprofitable as it may seem, European countries and the US would be well advised to stop exporting anything to Russia altogether. The Europeans need to adopt an analog of the US Trade with the Enemy Act (1917), and the US would do well to extend its main provisions to the Russian Federation. This could open a whole new chapter in sanctions policy. Such restrictions would deprive Russia of access to a wide range of essential goods, from seeds for the seemingly “sovereign” agriculture or vaccines for livestock and poultry to hops for beer brewing or starter cultures for fermented dairy products (paradoxically, neither is produced domestically).

In parallel, it would be practical to stop conducting dollar and euro transactions with any Russian banks, finalizing the country’s transition to yuan, the Kremlin's much-beloved currency. Furthermore, the West should do everything possible to block Russia’s access to all Western social networks and Internet services. Western countries could probably establish a Compensation Fund for companies registered in their jurisdictions to cover a significant portion of the losses from these companies’ complete withdrawal from Russia. It is no secret that most companies that announced their “departure” from Russia are still present in the country or are laying the groundwork for a possible return. Such a move would make it possible to ignore the Kremlin’s orders preventing foreign companies from selling their Russian assets. Subsequently, the West could demand that the Russian government cover the fund's expenses as a condition for restoring international business relations.