Putin’s Schrödinger's Cat: The West cannot choose between these two opposing views on the war in Ukraine

‘Putin will not stop there’ – does this phrase imply a potential Russian attack on a NATO country if successful in Ukraine, a propagandist cliché or a prescient warning?

Currently, there are two prevailing views in the West regarding the war in Ukraine. The first sees it as an existential challenge to Europe, for which it was unprepared. The limited support provided to Ukraine, the constant caution regarding Putin’s ‘red lines’, and the lack of a proactive stance and resolve from Western countries in their unconditional assistance to Ukraine allow Putin to gain the upper hand and only provoke future escalation from him, demonstrating the West’s weakness.

The second approach tends to view this war more as a regional conflict, positing that Putin has no reason to attack Europe if the Ukrainian campaign ends with certain agreements reached. Proponents of this view believe that politicians urging a perspective of this conflict as existential for the West are thus bringing about a confrontation with Russia, dismissing other options and scenarios. Furthermore, by the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Putin will simply not have the capacity to continue military aggression due to the depletion of military resources.

In turn, a strong faction within the American establishment considers the confrontation with China as existential for the US and suggests focusing as much as possible on that issue. They see Russia as a strategically weak power. From this perspective, the US must avoid escalation and engagement in a confrontation with Russia, as that would only dilute their strength.

The West's strategy regarding Russia and its war against Ukraine is essentially stuck between these two opposing logics – understanding the conflict as existential, which requires accepting the risks and costs of a proactive policy, and viewing it as regional, the resolution of which should be the conclusion of minimally acceptable agreements between the parties and avoidance of actions that could lead to direct confrontation between Russia and NATO.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which has escalated into a protracted war, has placed Western countries, especially Europe, in a dilemma: is this war a local conflict in the post-Soviet space or a prelude to a broader conflict directly affecting Europe and the West as a whole? In the initial phase, after deciding to provide extensive economic and military assistance to Ukraine, the West still regarded the Russia-Ukraine conflict as regional. However, the transformation of Putin's regime during the war, the radicalisation of its rhetoric, the effectiveness of nuclear blackmail, and the partial militarisation of the Russian economy amid Europe's revealed military vulnerabilities have shifted the focus of the discussion. On one hand, politicians and especially military leaders increasingly speak of a direct threat to the West, primarily Europe, from Russia and the unpreparedness of Europe for such a conflict. On the other hand, another segment of the Western community does not view the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as existential for the West and Europe, advocating for minimising its consequences and finding a ‘compromise’ around Ukraine based on existing realities. Is the common phrase ‘Putin will not stop at this’ a propaganda cliché or a prescient warning?

Hawks: an existential threat

Countries bordering Russia provide a clear answer to this question. Finland and Sweden, in the early days of the war, decided to abandon neutrality and join NATO. This step not only marked the largest shift in the balance of power in Europe in the last twenty years but also laid the groundwork for strengthening NATO’s Baltic grouping, aimed at enhancing the security of other Baltic states.

Much later, after the unsuccessful Ukrainian offensive in the summer of 2023, amid disappointment in the effectiveness of the assistance provided to Ukraine, the argument that ‘Putin will not stop at Ukraine’ began to resonate at high political levels in the West. Joe Biden expressed this sentiment, while the defence ministers of Germany and Denmark warned of the threat of a Russian attack on one of the NATO countries. In a similar vein, Czech President Petr Pavel, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and other Western politicians voiced their concerns.

These statements are grounded in a comprehensive view of the Putin regime as an heir to the Soviet Union and a new incarnation of a global threat to Europe and its security, thus representing a genuine existential threat. This perspective is consistently articulated by former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. He argues that if the West does not begin to actively assist Ukraine now – where it is currently ‘forcing Ukraine to fight with its hands tied behind its back’ – it will eventually confront a restored ‘evil empire’. If Putin does not suffer defeat, the countries on the periphery of the former Soviet Union will live under a constant threat, and China will attempt to forcibly seize Taiwan. In this scenario, the situation bears similarities to Europe in 1938, when the indecisiveness of European powers fueled the aggression of the Nazi regime (Donald Tusk perhaps alluded to this by stating that ‘Europe is in a pre-war state’). Failure to recognise the threat as existential today will lead to its realisation in the future.

Recognising the threat as existential marks a transition from a policy of containment to proactive measures that do not rule out the risks of escalation. Johnson calls for granting Ukraine unconditional permission to use available weapons, including long-range munitions. He also advocates for providing Ukraine with sufficient financial support similar to the American Lend-Lease of the last century and for its admission to NATO without waiting for the end of the war. The logic of proactive actions regarding Russia is also emphasised by the renowned retired German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger. He argues that it is time for the West to draw its own ‘red lines’ instead of worrying about those defined by Putin. For example, the West should clearly state that if Russia bombs another civilian building, it will provide Kyiv with Taurus missiles or the US will approve strikes on military targets within Russia. In this case, it would be up to Moscow to decide whether to cross these ‘red lines’ and deal with the consequences. However, having set these lines, the West must be prepared to implement its threats in the appropriate situation. In the reasoning of Ischinger and Johnson, the fear of escalation among Western politicians provokes it, because Putin despises weakness and concessions, respecting only strength.

Doves: a peripheral conflict

Claims that Russia will not stop at Ukraine and that NATO countries face an immediate, albeit not urgent, threat rely on four largely unfounded assumptions, note RAND experts Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe in contrast to the aforementioned politicians. First, there is the assumption that Russia is rapidly restoring its military potential, enabling it to attack NATO in the near future. Second, there is the assumption that NATO's deterrent factor does not apply to Russia due to its leaders' propensity for high risk. Third, the idea is that the organising principle of the alliance's strategy should be countering Russia's opportunistic aggression. Finally, the fourth assumption posits that a ‘victory’ for Russia in Ukraine would embolden the Kremlin, jeopardising NATO's security.

Charap and Priebe believe that Russia's capabilities to restore its depleting military potential in real-time should not be overestimated. Moreover, they argue that the Kremlin has demonstrated through its actions that it is not interested in a fully militarised economy or in militarising society as a whole. It has not compelled civilian industrial capacities to switch to defence production and has not conducted a second round of the highly unpopular mobilisation. Furthermore, the economic pressure of sanctions has yet to reach its peak and will limit the prospects for restoring the military machine in the future.

At the same time, NATO has increased its defence spending by 9.3% in 2023 and by 17.9% in 2024. The alliance is becoming more combat-ready than it was before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Military expenditures by NATO member states exceeded $1.1 trillion in 2023, compared to $74 billion for Russia. As for manpower, NATO countries had over 3.1 million active-duty military personnel in 2022, compared to 900,000 in Russia. Before the war, concerns were raised about Russian capabilities on the Baltic front; however, due to current combat losses, Russia has squandered a significant portion of its military potential in the region. Satellite images from June 2024 showed that 80% of Russian forces and equipment previously stationed along the border with Finland were engaged in Ukraine, and a significant portion of these forces is likely already destroyed.

Russia will undoubtedly continue to pose a significant threat to the alliance. Its high-tech weaponry – anti-satellite, underwater, non-strategic nuclear weapons, etc. – has not been used against Ukraine and remains untouched. However, the global and regional balance of power will remain overwhelmingly in favour of NATO, as Charap and Priebe conclude.

As for NATO's deterrent factor, the RAND experts believe it remains strong. Western arms supplies disrupted Russia's plans for a swift conquest of Ukraine, but the Kremlin has still refrained from direct attacks on NATO countries, limiting itself to operations in the ‘grey zone’: cyberattacks, sabotage, and so on. Furthermore, Russia's obsession with Ukraine does not extend to its neighbours that are NATO members, such as Poland or the Baltic states. There is currently no reason to believe that the Kremlin doubts NATO's resolve to defend against conventional aggression using Article 5 of the alliance's charter.

All this does not mean that new opportunistic Russian aggression is impossible in principle, but there is a difference between considering such a scenario hypothetical and making it a central element of NATO and US strategy planning in Europe.

By focusing on a potential Russian attack, Western politicians are shaping corresponding perceptions within Moscow itself. Research by political scientist Bruce Cronin shows that statements from political leaders can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Wartime calls aimed at situationally mobilising support lay the groundwork for a long-term vision. Planning begins to be structured around it on both sides. By presenting a direct conflict with Russia as inevitable (to mobilise support for Ukraine), politicians are pushing Russia itself to prepare for such a conflict. This scenario could indeed lead to a large-scale confrontation, even though the underlying assumption of Moscow's desire to attack one of the alliance's countries is speculative and emotionally charged.

West against West

From the very beginning of the war, RAND experts have maintained a line of critical perception regarding the Russian threat. This view suggests that the US should focus on countering China, which is likely to take on sharper forms in the future. In this perspective, the conflict with Russia appears as a trap that distracts resources and weakens US positions in the main confrontation, while Russia itself, due to its strategic weakness, does not pose a threat to American leadership (→ Re:Russia: Pigeons or Ostriches?).

This approach, reflected in the analysis by Charap and Priebe, is likely to gain traction if Donald Trump wins the upcoming American elections. It implies an attempt to separate the two conflicts – the Ukrainian and the US-China – of which only the latter is existential for the United States. But is this perspective suitable for Europe?

While in the US, the conflict is clearly felt as predominantly regional, there is no unequivocal view on its nature in Europe either. In a July Eurobarometer poll, exactly 50% of respondents across EU countries identified the conflict in Ukraine as the main challenge for the European Union at the moment. Although this is the top position on the list of challenges (the second is illegal migration at 41%, the third is the environment and climate at 35%, and the fourth is the cost of living at 32%), the 50% mention indicates that it is not a consensus. Around 60% or more of respondents highlighted this challenge in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Luxembourg, Croatia, Hungary, Portugal, Finland, and Sweden. Conversely, in Spain and Austria, only 42-43% pointed to it, while in Greece and Cyprus, the figure was about 30%. In the remaining 12 countries, the significance fluctuated around the 50% mark.

The list of public priorities for EU policy appears even more fragmented: 33% of respondents believe that environmental and climate issues should be prioritised, another 33% point to the problem of illegal migration, 29% consider defence and security issues a priority, and 25% prioritise the war in Ukraine.

The logic of the second approach described above is based on the postulate of the need to avoid escalation and direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. This approach views the Russia-Ukraine war as regional. The logic of the first approach, however, posits that the desire to avoid escalation leads precisely to escalation. The only way to prevent it is to accept its costs and risks in advance, recognising the conflict as existential. Essentially, the West's strategy regarding Russia and the war in Ukraine is caught between these two opposing logics.