State Capture: Trump’s methods of undermining American democracy follow the blueprint of Putin and Orban and have a high chance of success

Donald Trump’s first term in the White House in 2017 mobilised the US establishment to defend democracy and the values at the core of American politics. However, the radical revision of many of these principles and the fierce assault on the state bureaucracy to force its complete loyalty at the beginning of his second term have been met with surprising passivity.

Trump is unlikely to change the US Constitution and establish a classic dictatorship. But he will not need to. In undermining democratic institutions, he follows the well-established patterns of competitive authoritarianism, or authoritarian populism, whose most prominent early 21st-century examples include Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

This strategy involves expanding presidential power and gradually capturing the state by subordinating other institutions. Rewarding bureaucratic and business loyalty while selectively persecuting opponents and the media allows for the disorganisation and weakening of public resistance to de facto autocratisation, which, at least initially, unfolds without radical changes to the political system.

The chances of this strategy’s success are further bolstered by the long-standing erosion of American democracy and trust in it within the US itself. The biggest obstacle to state capture may not be the institutions of American democracy but rather Trump’s relatively low popularity and the deep polarisation of American society. In this context, it will be difficult for Trump to create the illusion of overwhelming majority support, which such regimes often rely on.

A new autocracy

Donald Trump's opponents express horror at the claim that he threatens American democracy and could dismantle it within his four-year term. His defenders, Trump-firsters (Trump commentators), counter that his rise to power is itself a manifestation of democracy, and despite his abrasive rhetoric and behavior, the real objectives of his actions are generally quite rational. These include limiting government bureaucracy and the 'woke tyranny,' returning to the principles of American freedom, adopting a pragmatic and de-ideologised approach to international relations, and encouraging business.

According to a YouGov poll conducted on 20 February, 41% of Americans believe that Trump can be called a dictator, while 45% disagree, and 14% are 'unsure' whether this label applies. Among Democrats, 68% consider the former president a dictator, compared to 11% among Republicans. Among independents, opinions are split at 40% versus 42%. Trump is more likely to be viewed as a dictator by African Americans and Latino Americans, at 46% and 50%, respectively.

Paradoxically, both sides of the debate on Trump’s alleged dictatorship are mistaken. The decline of democracy in the modern world is not characterised by the replacement of democracies with rigid 20th-century-style dictatorships but rather by their gradual degradation into competitive authoritarianism. This trajectory of political evolution appears to be the most likely future for Trump’s America. It is even more probable given that Trump’s first term lulled many Americans into a false sense of security. Democracy is in greater danger than at any time in modern US history, political scientists Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Way, who coined the term and describe the phenomenon of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (→ Levitsky, Way: Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War), wrote in an article for Foreign Affairs.

Trump is unlikely to implement constitutional reforms that would formally legalise dictatorial institutions in the US, but that is not necessary for democracy to erode. Competitive authoritarian regimes restrict actual freedom while maintaining electoral procedures, formal freedom of speech, and highly selective, targeted repression. At the same time, the abuse of executive power for political purposes gradually shifts the balance of power and transforms the structure of society itself. Modern autocrats do not abolish or formally alter existing institutions – they capture them.

Competitive authoritarian regimes include most of the autocracies that have emerged since the end of the Cold War, including Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, and contemporary regimes in El Salvador, Hungary, India, Tunisia, and Turkey. Their numbers continue to grow (recent examples include Georgia under the shadow rule of Bidzina Ivanishvili). Even democracies with long histories are not immune to this trajectory.

How it is done: the road to super-presidentialism

The picture of executive power expansion and institutional capture outlined by Levitsky and Way is all too familiar to the citizens of modern Russia, Hungary, or Turkey. The primary tool in this process is, at first, a politicised and weaponised bureaucracy. Government officials – over 2 million of them in the US – determine whose taxes undergo extra scrutiny, which organisations receive exemptions, which universities get accredited, and which companies secure licenses, contracts, subsidies, and financial assistance. New autocrats, having risen to power through elections, begin their rule by purging state institutions under the banner of fighting corruption and inefficiency. This was done by Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Chávez in Venezuela, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Narendra Modi in India, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Fiery denunciations of the old elite, which resonate with less educated and less economically secure segments of society, are a crucial part of this strategy. For this reason, some scholars have characterised these new forms of authoritarianism as authoritarian populism. However, rather than increasing efficiency, these purges teach bureaucracies to be politically loyal.

This is not America's future — it is already its present. The notion of the deep state, which Trump frequently invokes, allows him to frame a powerful enemy of the common good ('American greatness') and justify replacing demonised career bureaucrats with personally and ideologically loyal yet incompetent commissars. Once key institutions like the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the IRS are filled with loyalists, Trump can use them to persecute political opponents, co-opt civil society and the press, and shield his allies.

In traditional dictatorships, regime critics are typically accused of political crimes such as treason, incitement to rebellion, or undermining state security. Modern autocrats, however, more often target their opponents with allegations of common crimes like corruption, tax evasion, or defamation.

Trump has repeatedly stated his intention to prosecute his electoral opponents, including Liz Cheney, who sought the Republican presidential nomination, as well as lawmakers who served on the House committee investigating the 6 January, 2021, attack on the Capitol. The new FBI director, Kash Patel, not only called for the prosecution of Trump’s 'enemies' but even published a book listing them. Within the first month of the new president’s administration, at least 75 professional Justice Department attorneys and high-ranking FBI officials, who typically retain their positions across administrations, either resigned or were removed from their posts, according to Reuters.

The cost of public resistance for Americans will significantly rise in this environment, warn Levitsky and Way. Trump could very well direct the IRS to target Democratic Party donors and companies that fund civil rights organisations. Critical media outlets will likely face massive defamation lawsuits and pressure on their owners. A few high-profile attacks on Trump’s opponents will make many more cautious. Typically, selective repression and corporate pressure are enough to silence dissenters or at least soften their voices. This chilling effect is a defining feature of societies undergoing a shift toward competitive authoritarianism.

At the same time, the executive branch will use its leverage to reward politically friendly individuals and businesses by granting them access to government contracts and other privileges. This is precisely how authoritarian leaders in Hungary, Turkey, and Russia secured business loyalty. If corporate leaders conclude that it is more beneficial to avoid financing opposition candidates or investing in independent media, they will adjust their behavior accordingly. Those who resist will lose market share.

In essence, this is already happening in today’s America. Those who once criticised Trump are now rushing to demonstrate their loyalty to the new political order and the new president personally. Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Toyota each donated $1 million to his inauguration—twice their previous contributions. Nearly all major American media outlets – ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, and The Washington Post – are controlled by large parent corporations. For example, The Washington Post is owned by Jeff Bezos, whose largest company, Amazon, competes for major federal contracts. Meanwhile, Los Angeles Times owner Patrick Soon-Shiong sells medical products regulated by the FDA. Ahead of the 2024 presidential election, both decided to withdraw their newspapers’ support for Kamala Harris and exerted pressure on them.

The trajectory taking shape bears such a striking resemblance to Vladimir Putin’s early 2000s approach that some accuse Trump of attempting to 'Russify' American politics. In particular, public law professor William Partlett writes about this in an article published in The Conversation: like Putin, Trump seeks to expand presidential power to the level of royal power by neutralising all checks and balances. Some scholars, including Partlett himself, call this model of autocracy ‘super-presidentialism’.

The Erosion of Democracy and the Limits of Populism

However, the erosion of American democracy did not begin on the day of Trump’s inauguration. Over the past decade, the United States has lost nine points in Freedom House’s Freedom Index. In 2014, with a score of 92 out of 100, the US ranked alongside leading European democracies; by 2024, it had fallen below Argentina and was on par with Romania and Panama, scoring 83 points. A similar decline is reflected in the Liberal Democracy Index by the V-Dem Project: in 2014, the US scored 0.85 (on par with Finland) but by 2020, the score had dropped to 0.73, trailing Finland by 11 points.

Trump’s supporters argue that he himself was the target of politically motivated persecution by the previous administration, which manipulated the press and state institutions, while President Biden pardoned his own son before leaving office. Gallup polls show that public satisfaction with American democracy in recent years has hovered between 28–35%. In the 1980s, it was around 60%, and in the 1990s, about 50%. Trust in American institutions has already been significantly undermined, making it easier for Trump to seize and subjugate them.

According to Levitsky and Way, American democracy survived Trump’s first term largely because he lacked the necessary experience, team, and strategy, and because his ambitions were restrained by other Republicans. Today, however, Trump fully controls the Republican Party. Despite dissatisfaction, his opponents remain silent, fearing electoral defeat if they challenge him. American democracy is unlikely to withstand a second Trump term – in the sense that it will no longer meet the standard criteria of a liberal democracy, Levitsky and Way conclude.

The United States, however, still has several factors contributing to its resilience. American institutions are stronger than those in Hungary, Turkey, and other countries with competitive authoritarian regimes. Hungarian political scientists Bálint Madlovics and Bálint Magyar (the latter is the author of the concept of the ‘mafia’ state as applied to Orbán's rule) write about this in an article for Foreign Affairs. While noting the striking similarities between Orbán’s and Trump’s strategies, they express hope that Trump will not succeed in subjugating the entire state apparatus. An independent judiciary, federalism, a bicameral legislature, midterm elections, and a strong two-party system could help limit the extent of autocratisation.

In this context, bipartisanship appears to be a particularly crucial factor. Leaders of competitive autocracies typically create the illusion that they have overwhelming public support. In a system with a stable two-party structure, achieving this is much more difficult. During his first term, Trump had one of the lowest approval ratings in history. The beginning of his current term follows the same trend: a month after his inauguration, Trump's approval rating is five points higher than it was in February 2017, yet still lower than that of any newly inaugurated US president since 1953, Gallup notes. Trump not only has the largest partisan gap in approval ratings between Republicans and Democrats but also one of the lowest approval ratings among independent voters (37%). The absolute record low was also held by Trump in 2017, at 35%. By comparison, all other presidents at this stage had approval ratings between 49% and 69%.

However, competitive authoritarianism is a deceptive phenomenon as its emergence, especially in the early stages, is often imperceptible to most ordinary people and is deeply infused with populism. Yet it takes root quickly, strengthening the anti-democratic potential of both the oligarchy and bureaucracy while creating a powerful circle of beneficiaries. The erosion of American institutions is not just a looming threat but an ongoing process – the only question is how far it will progress in the coming years.