The Spoils of an Unreliable Alliance: How Russia has benefited from the Iran-Israel conflict and what it stands to lose
At first glance, the Iran-Israel conflict offers the Kremlin considerable benefits. Oil prices have risen, some weaponry originally intended for Ukraine has been diverted to the Middle East, and Russia’s missile strikes on residential areas in Kyiv have been pushed out of the headlines by news from Tehran and Tel Aviv.
However, the Kremlin’s greatest prize so far has been the conversation between Putin and Trump, during which the Russian president offered to mediate in the de-escalation of the conflict. This role significantly broadens the agenda for direct contacts between the Kremlin and the White House, pushing the Ukrainian issue into the background, and allows the Russian leader not only to shed the image of an unapproachable aggressor, but also, to some extent, to return to the top tier of global realpolitik.
Moscow's main asset in the Iran crisis has been its position as Tehran’s 'unreliable ally,' willing to offer only moral, not political, technological, or especially military, support. This posture of mediating neutrality largely explains President Trump’s reluctance to exert pressure on the Russian leader over Ukraine or to tighten sanctions against Moscow in recent months. Unlike the previous administration, Trump and his team view the Iran issue as their primary concern.
However, if Iran proves unwilling to escalate, oil prices are likely to resume their gradual decline, and the short-term price spike will have only a limited effect on the Russian economy. At the same time, the American administration’s capacity to impose economic pressure on Russia would expand.
Moreover, the Israeli strike on Iran demonstrated the high effectiveness of a new type of military conflict based on long-range, precision-guided missiles, drones, robust air defence systems, and strong intelligence capabilities. Elements of Israel’s strategy bore a striking resemblance to Ukraine’s own attacks on Russian strategic aviation. Israel’s remote warfare with Iran points towards the kind of tactics that represent the most promising direction for the development of the Ukrainian military’s strategy to contain Russia.
The benefits of an ‘unreliable alliance’
At first glance, the Iran-Israel war brings several clear advantages for the Kremlin.
First, it means higher oil prices. For the first time in months, oil quotes have at least approached the zone the Russian government had hoped for when preparing its 2025 budget. Brent has held above $70 a barrel for several days. Although prices have already pulled back slightly, June will certainly improve the figures for Russian budget revenues.
Second, the escalation is leading to the transfer of weapons previously intended for Ukraine to the Middle East. At the beginning of June, it became known that American forces in the region would receive detonators for anti-drone missiles that had previously been earmarked for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Third, the shift in attention to the Iran-Israel conflict and the events unfolding there reduces the world's sensitivity to what is happening in Ukraine. The effect of Russia's strike with cruise missiles and ‘Shahed’ drones on Kyiv last night, which killed 15 people and destroyed an entire entrance to a residential building, is being diluted in global media by the mutual rocket attacks between Iran and Israel.
Finally – and for now, this appears to be the Kremlin’s most significant gain from the Iran-Israel conflict – Vladimir Putin has offered himself as a mediator in efforts to de-escalate the situation. This, according to Trump, seems to have received tacit approval. It is unlikely, however, that Putin stands to gain any major accolades from this: if a deal with Iran is struck, Trump will no doubt claim the credit for himself. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the key benefit lies in the opportunity to engage directly with Trump while pushing the Ukraine issue into the background. From the perspective of the US administration and Israel, Putin’s involvement as a mediator is meant to guarantee his neutrality, i.e. his refusal to provide any military or political assistance to Iran.
Indeed, Russia is the only country capable of supplying Tehran with air defence systems and fighter jets. Up until the outbreak of the current conflict, negotiations were ongoing between the two countries regarding the delivery of Russian S-400 systems and Su-35 aircraft. In fact, in January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a treaty on strategic and comprehensive partnership. During the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Iranian-supplied Shahed drones played a crucial role in helping Russia, which had fallen behind Ukraine in the drone race. Theoretically, Tehran might now expect reciprocal aid in its time of need. However, the honourable role of mediator that Putin is now pursuing rules out any weapons supply to either side in the conflict.
In the future, Moscow hopes to play another advantageous role in any Iran deal. Russia has repeatedly offered to supply Iran with enriched uranium for civilian nuclear energy after it abandons its own production.
In any case, the recognition of Russia’s special role in the de-escalation of the Iran-Israel conflict marks a major breakthrough for Putin. With Trump’s help, he not only sheds the image of an isolated aggressor but even reclaims a place in the top league of global realpolitik. (Following the outbreak of hostilities, Putin managed to speak not only with Trump but also with the Iranian president, Netanyahu, and Erdoğan.) This amoral transformation has already triggered protests from European leaders – Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz – yet from Washington’s perspective, their voices carry little weight. Trump’s early departure from the G7 meeting in Kananaskis under a vague and likely fabricated pretext is a clear indication of this (earlier during the summit, Trump had lamented Putin’s exclusion from the G8, a remark that was a pointed jab at the other participants, who regard isolating and containing Putin as a top political priority).
One way or another, Russia’s position as Iran’s 'unreliable ally', willing to offer moral support by condemning Israeli strikes, but refusing technological, political, or especially military assistance, remains the Kremlin’s main trophy in this military conflict.
A ‘good cop’ for Putin?
However, there is also a downside to all these apparent benefits.
The impact of the Iran-Israel conflict on oil prices is likely to be limited and will not reverse the broader global trend of decline. The oil market is currently in surplus, and OPEC+ countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, are hurrying to ramp up supply in an effort to reclaim market share lost during the period of voluntary cuts (→ Re:Russia: Three-Way Fork). Therefore, the current price effects are expected to be short-lived, with prices returning to a steady downward trajectory. This view is shared by Bloomberg energy analyst Javier Blas and by analysts at Goldman Sachs.
A serious threat to the global energy market would arise if Iran attempted to block the Strait of Hormuz, through which around 25% of global oil and liquefied gas exports pass en route to their destinations. A prolonged closure of the strait would cause immediate turmoil in the global energy market. In that case, oil prices could soar to $100 or even $130 per barrel, according to JP Morgan's most alarmist scenario. Although some lower-ranking Iranian politicians have hinted at the possibility of blocking Hormuz, the likelihood of this being realised remains low. Should Iran attack oil tankers in the Gulf, it would likely prompt retaliatory strikes on its oil infrastructure, which would be a relatively simple task, given the weakened state of Iran’s air defences and air force. Even partial destruction of this infrastructure would risk sparking greater internal unrest at a time when the ayatollahs’ regime is already critically weakened and demoralised.
As for Iran’s own oil industry, the country produces 3.3 million barrels per day out of a global total of roughly 102 million, of which 1.3 to 1.6 million go to China, its sole official buyer. Even if these volumes were to disappear from the market, they could be relatively quickly replaced by other suppliers (including Russia). For Iran itself, however, such an outcome would be a dead end.
Against the backdrop of only minor gains from higher oil prices, the best-case scenario of conflict de-escalation presents Russia with broader, long-term 'oil-related' threats. Should the Iran crisis be resolved, it could weaken Russia’s standing with the American administration. Unlike Biden’s administration, Trump and his advisers have treated the Iran issue as their top priority, and more important than the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This likely contributed to their pragmatic stance towards the Kremlin. Contacts with Putin regarding the Ukraine situation, while yielding virtually nothing in terms of resolving the war, laid the groundwork for what has amounted to Putin’s effective neutrality in the Iran-Israel conflict.
Over the past three months, Trump has used every possible excuse not to tighten sanctions against Russia (→ Re: Russia: Three Hundred Days in Search of a Silver Bullet). In recent weeks, with arguments running thin, Trump simply asked the Senate not to consider the Graham-Blumenthal bill on tightening sanctions on Russian oil exports. At the same time, the US blocked a proposal by its G7 partners to lower the oil price cap on Russian crude to $45 per barrel. The Israeli attack on Iran casts further light on the rationale behind this strategy. Simultaneous pressure on two major oil suppliers risked serious market destabilisation, leading to a spike in petrol prices and inflation in the United States.
As long as the Iran situation remains tense, Moscow need not worry about new tools of pressure targeting its oil exports. But if the markets 'digest' the Iran issue and return to a downward trend, the Graham–Blumenthal bill may get the green light. In that case, Trump is likely to revert to the 'good cop' role he currently plays in the Iran-Israel conflict. Developments are unlikely to follow the hard-line course favoured by European leaders and hawks in the US Senate, but the American administration’s room to manoeuvre against the Kremlin will expand. Whether this will be used to support Ukraine or for other purposes remains an open question.
Thus, despite the short-term windfall from the Iran-Israel war, Russia’s long-term position in the global oil market looks vulnerable, and perhaps even more so than during the previous phase, when Western interest in pressuring Iran bolstered Moscow’s appeal as an informal partner for Washington.
The new face of war: can Ukraine use Israel's experience?
There is, however, another consequence of the undeclared war between Israel and Iran. In effect, Israel has demonstrated to the world what a new type of military conflict looks like. Its four main pillars are long-range precision and ballistic missiles, drones, air defence systems, and intelligence. The desired effect is achieved through their combination, writes military expert Doug Livermore in the Atlantic Council. This enables the attacker to weaken the enemy’s air defences with a first strike, then decapitate its military leadership, target key assets, and, through its own air defence systems, mitigate the destructive impact of any retaliatory attack. The synergy of these four components makes it possible to inflict unacceptable damage or partially disarm the adversary without even engaging in direct ground confrontation. For this reason, such a conflict largely neutralises the advantage of having a larger land army.
The fact that Israel’s operation against Iran partly employed the same methods used by Ukrainian forces to strike Russia’s strategic aviation is no coincidence. Israel’s remote warfare with Iran has showcased the very strategies that represent the most promising direction for the development of Ukraine’s army and its approach to deterring Russia. Analysts also note that Ukraine’s ability to preserve its air defence systems in the early phase of the conflict, and thereby deny Russia air superiority, was crucial in preventing defeat and dragging the Russian army into a grinding positional war, in which it has advanced at a glacial pace and at enormous cost. On the other hand, over the past year to eighteen months, Ukraine has consistently expanded its aerial operations in Russia’s rear – operations that have already formed a new front in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The threats to Russia from this vector are likely to grow.
From this perspective, it is of less importance whether the Russian army manages to capture 4,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory before winter, as it did last year, or 8,000. What matters is how far Ukraine can advance in that time in building and developing the components of this new type of warfare. While its capacity in this regard is limited by political decisions made in Washington and European capitals regarding the supply of missiles and air defence systems to Kyiv, certain avenues remain open for strengthening its own arsenal. These include, in particular, establishing and expanding joint production of missiles with European partners, or independently, and developing innovative drone and counter-drone technologies. According to President Zelensky, Ukraine is also close to serial production of ballistic missiles. Of course, Russia’s economic capabilities far exceed Ukraine’s, which will be reflected in the missile standoff and the clash of drone fleets. However, the continuation of sanctions against Russia will constrain its potential in the high-tech sector, whereas Ukraine has opportunities to deepen military cooperation with its European allies.
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Ultimately, the balance of gains and losses for Russia from the Iran–Israel war will depend on whether Iran is sufficiently weakened to agree to a deal, or instead finds ways to escalate the conflict. In the former case, once oil markets stabilise, Russia will again find itself vulnerable in terms of its export revenues; in the latter, it will seek to extract maximum benefit from its position as Tehran’s 'unreliable ally'.