A New Start: Regional policy and regional nomenklatura in Russia in the fourth year of the ‘SMO’

In the second half of 2024 and the first half of 2025, the Kremlin turned its attention back to regional policy after a pause taken during 2022–2023. The pace and nature of personnel rotations suggest that new approaches may prove even harsher than before. This is evidenced by near blanket 'purges' of the administrative elite in several regions where governors were replaced.

In a recently published article on Re:Russia, entitled ‘Regional elites in the era of the ‘Special Military Operation’, leading expert on Russian regional politics Alexander Kynev analysed how the political and managerial landscape of Russian regions has transformed over recent decades, and how the new governance model has steadily dismantled the cohesion of regional elites formed during the early post-Soviet period. This new text discusses the main trends in the dynamics of regional governance and the rotation of administrative elites in the regions over the past three years.

With the onset of what is officially referred to in the Kremlin as the 'Special Military Operation', the rate of rotation both within the gubernatorial corps and the regional administrative elite sharply declined. Moscow put the usual personnel reshuffle process on hold at both the federal and regional levels in 2022–2023. In contrast to the earlier period, when an average of 13 governors were replaced annually, only five governors were changed in each of those years. Meanwhile, the rate of turnover in regional administrative leadership dropped from 37% in the preceding period to 26%.

However, from the second half of 2024, the situation began to shift: from July 2024 to June 2025, 13 governors were replaced, and the turnover rate returned to 32%. The Kremlin has not only overcome its previous hesitancy and caution regarding personnel decisions but is also testing new, tougher strategies.

A second significant trend is the infiltration of the regional administrative elite by 'SMO participants', career military personnel or administrators who had worked in the 'new territories'. While the actual numbers of these individuals entering the managerial nomenklatura are not especially large, it is clear they are becoming an increasingly visible part of the administrative elite. Their presence and ambitions are, in many respects, becoming a new political constant, Kynev writes.

Hold and start: the dynamics of administrative elite rotations in the regions

How has the management of Russia’s regions evolved in recent years against the backdrop of the 'special operation'? What has been happening with their administrative elites? It is worth emphasising that the use of the term 'administrative elites' rather than the more familiar 'regional elites' seems more accurate, highlighting their essential difference from the 'regional elites' of the 1990s. Today’s regional-level 'administrative elites' lack the rights and powers held by their 1990s counterparts and are more akin to managers appointed by the 'centre' to administer territories, rather than representatives of these territories to the centre, as was previously the case.

Nowadays, they are periodically rotated officials, among whom the proportion of 'outsiders' (or ‘varangians’) is relatively high. Their appointments to respective positions are increasingly coordinated by governors with federal ministries. Finally, with rare exceptions, administrative elites no longer rely on local economic resources, regional clans, or financial-industrial groups as in the 1990s. Instead, they tend to interact with the local top management of federally integrated corporate structures. As a result, in most regions today, the long-term internal cohesion and mutual cover-ups that characterised the regional elites of the 1990s are largely absent.

Monitoring of changes within the composition of regional administrative elites was carried out by the author using the methodology outlined in the book 'Who Governs Russia’s Regions and How' (see also the methodological note to this text, which explains, in particular, who is included in the top tier of the regional administrative nomenklatura). The statistics on the administrative stability of the upper stratum of the regional nomenklatura clearly show that the key factor prompting 'spikes' in turnover was the replacement of governors. These changes, according to the 'domino principle', lead to further personnel shifts: deputy governors, ministers in specific portfolios, often also the heads of regional capital administrations, and at times even regional parliamentary speakers. At the same time, the scale, nature, and even timing of these rotations can vary significantly, pointing to specific political circumstances and objectives being pursued either by the new appointees or directly by the Kremlin.

Since measurements began in 2015 and up to 2022, the index of stability within the regional administrative elite never dropped below 31%. In other words, in the year preceding each data point, no less than 31%, and on average 37%, of senior regional officials lost their previous positions. The peak years for personnel turnover were 2018–2019, when a large-scale replacement of governors took place, replacing them with so-called technocrats, that is mid-ranking federal officials dispatched to the regions (deputy ministers, department heads, senior managers of state corporations, etc.). The 2018–2019 period can therefore be seen as another stage in the reconfiguration of the regional governance system and regional nomenklatura, associated with the arrival of Sergei Kiriyenko in the Presidential Administration.

With the onset of the 'special military operation', indicators of personnel movement – both gubernatorial replacements and regional elite rotations –plummeted. During the first year, from January to the end of December 2022, just 31% of the top tier of regional nomenklatura were replaced, down from 36% in 2020–2021. Thereafter, movements declined even further and the personnel system nearly ground to a halt. The few reshuffles that did occur were almost entirely driven by necessity (pressure from law enforcement agencies, illness or retirement, or a strong personal desire by an official to step down). Between July 2022 and July 2024, the stability index dropped to 25.5%, almost half again lower than the average for 2016–2021. This trend shifted only in the second half of 2024, with the year ultimately closing at a rotation rate of 32%. Similarly, while the average number of governors replaced annually during 2016–2021 was 12.5, only five were replaced in both 2022 and 2023, the lowest figures since 2013. In contrast, 13 replacements occurred in 2024 (including two in the Kursk Region alone), indicating a return to roughly normal levels.

Dynamics of gubernatorial and administrative elite rotations in the regions, 2016–2025

The decline in the intensity of personnel rotations at the regional level (which, incidentally, was also observed at the federal level → Petrov: Children, Chaebols and Adjutants)is evidently the result of a combination of interrelated factors. The Kremlin’s main focus shifted towards more pressing matters, that is issues of armament, recruitment, sanctions, and foreign policy, pushing 'administrative churn' and the bureaucratic agenda of 'domestic politics' to the periphery. Equally relevant appears to be the Kremlin’s desire, under conditions of political and economic emergency and high uncertainty, to avoid changes that inherently carry the risk of destabilising regional administrative apparatuses. Lastly, the uncertainty surrounding political and economic prospects extended to the regional ruling elite itself, resulting in a self-imposed pause in personnel movements 'until the situation clarified'.

By all appearances, 2024 became the point at which both the Kremlin and the nomenklatura had fully adapted to the 'new normal', which now presented clearer rules and trajectories. Uncertainty had eased, while the economic outlook and the initial preparations for the 2026 Duma elections revived the Kremlin’s interest in regional politics. Accordingly, the rotation of the regional nomenklatura, which had been 'put on hold' during 2022–2023, is returning to 'normal'.

Another likely factor behind the acceleration in administrative reshuffles in 2024 was the build-up of administrative fatigue over the preceding two years. Bureaucratic work under emergency and 'high-stress' conditions, abrupt shifts in all plans, the tightening of restrictions and risks – from being unable to go on holiday to certain destinations, to excessive interference and control by the security services – along with self-censorship in both behaviour and speech, all contributed to mounting fatigue and professional burnout. Many experienced mid-level administrators were, under such conditions, relieved to move into less demanding and politically neutral roles.

Overall, it can be said that the average annual rotation rate of senior regional officials, at 36% across the entire period from 2016 to 2025, is high. It suggests that few senior regional officials in Russia hold the same post for more than three years. This level of churn is consistent with the Kremlin’s 'managerialist' approach to regional governance.

Individual approach: nature and characteristics of rotations

The majority of recent personnel movements have occurred in regions where governors were replaced, namely the Vologda, Kursk, and Samara regions, and Khabarovsk Krai. Conversely, where new governors were 'natural successors' to former heads who had been promoted (e.g. Kemerovo and Tula Regions), large-scale reshuffles of the nomenklatura did not occur. Furthermore, the redeployment of 'mobile managers' sent to support new governors triggers personnel shifts in both the regions they leave and those they enter, leading to significant changes in the 'teams' in both locations. For example, when Alexander Chepik moved from his role as Prime Minister of Karelia to take up the same post in Kursk Region under newly appointed Governor Alexander Khinshtein, it led to substantial changes in Karelia’s government, which was restructured under the new premier. Murmansk and Chelyabinsk Regions were atypical cases, where governors entering their second terms nonetheless substantially reshaped their administrations.

In today’s Russia, the appointment of governors proceeds in two stages: first, the president removes the sitting governor and appoints a new 'acting' one. That appointee then organises elections in which they are triumphantly elected. Typically, the newly appointed acting governor leaves the inherited administration largely intact, and only after the official election begins the main wave of personnel changes, usually unfolding over a period of three to nine months. If all goes well, the personnel situation then stabilises until the next gubernatorial replacement.

However, this sequence was disrupted in several regions during the 2024 cycle. In Vologda, Kursk, Samara Regions and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, almost the entire top tier of the regional nomenklatura was replaced following the appointment of new governors, often with the active involvement of external personnel or 'parachuted managers'. In Vologda Region, this process was accompanied by public conflicts; in Kursk and Samara, it was accompanied by the arrests of regional government officials (in Kursk, even the former governor and his deputy were taken into custody; in Samara, arrests of mid-ranking officials continued following the detention of the former prime minister). In all three of these regions, heads of municipalities are now being replaced en masse, and in some parts of the regional administrations, a second wave of reshuffles is already underway. In Chukotka (population 47,700), the number of deputy governors rose from the usual three or four under former Governor Roman Kopin to 13 under new Governor Vladislav Kuznetsov as of 1 January 2025.

Overall, there is a trend towards the renewal and rejuvenation of staff. In early 2025, long-serving deputy governors for finance – Vyacheslav Kuzin in Vladimir Region and Vyacheslav Shcheglevatykh in Lipetsk Region – retired after holding office since the early 1990s, having outlasted all regional governors in their tenures. New appointees are mostly aged between 30 and 50 and are often second- or third-tier officials from other regions, willing to relocate in pursuit of career advancement.

These new administrations are composed almost entirely of civilian professionals. A rare exception is the 'rebellious' Khabarovsk Krai, which protested in 2020–2021 against the arrest of its popular governor, Sergei Furgal. Since May 2024, the region has been led by former Deputy Prosecutor General Dmitry Demeshin, and the new administration features a significant number of individuals with security or military backgrounds, which reflects the continued deep mistrust from the federal centre towards the Khabarovsk elites. In Stavropol Krai, three out of nine deputy chairpersons of the regional government come from the security services.

The total number of top regional administrators is gradually growing (an increase of 10% over five years). The proportion of 'outsiders' (‘varangians’) within the top tier of regional administrations is also slowly growing, from 26% in 2020 to 29% in 2025. Though modest, this growth reflects a trend toward the normalisation and wider adoption of the 'mobile management' model in regional governance. Among governors themselves, the proportion of 'outsiders' now stands at 55%, which is 47 out of 85 regional heads.

Trends in the size of the senior regional administrative elite and the share of ‘outsiders’, 2020–2025

New trends: elements of the ‘party model’ and ‘heroes of the SMO’

While the primary trend in regional governance remains the continued 'verticalisation' and 'managerialisation' of the regional bureaucracy, certain new developments can be observed that point to a possible strengthening of the 'party' toolkit in regional management. There is a gradual, if nominal, increase in the practice of requiring parliamentary approval for appointments to executive posts at the regional level (in line with the expansion of this practice at the federal level, as declared in the 2020 constitutional amendments). Given the total dominance of United Russia in regional legislatures, this procedure does not currently pose a threat from the perspective of the executive vertical. Rather, it is perceived as a normative enhancement of the role of party structures. However, under different political conditions in the future, the situation could evolve.

A characteristic example is the Altai Republic. Previously, according to the republic’s constitution, the State Assembly approved the appointments of deputy prime ministers and the finance minister. But in April 2025, constitutional amendments were passed introducing the post of prime minister of the republic, whose appointment, along with those of deputy ministers and cabinet members, would now require parliamentary approval. This change is linked to the appointment in 2024 of a complete 'outsider', Andrey Turchak, as governor. The introduction of a regional premier enables the governor to become a more explicitly political figure, delegating economic and other routine matters to the 'managerial' premier. This development also reflects a broader trend: similar prime ministerial posts have been reinstated in two other republics – Komi and Chuvashia. Oleg Nikolaev of A Just Russia, who became head of Chuvashia in 2020, initially headed the government himself. However, ahead of new elections and in need of greater support from local elites, he reinstated the post of cabinet chair and appointed his government deputy, Sergey Artamonov, a member of the United Russia regional political council presidium, to the role.

Another important trend directly reflects new political realities and a shift in the Kremlin’s personnel policy. Some regions have introduced special deputy governor or deputy prime minister posts dedicated to overseeing the reconstruction of 'sponsored' territories in eastern Ukraine. Elsewhere, regional and federal officials who previously worked in the administrations of the 'new territories' are returning with promotions to gubernatorial or vice-gubernatorial positions. Among the governors, this includes the previously mentioned governor of Chukotka, Vladislav Kuznetsov, who served as first deputy chair of the LPR’s government (prior to which he was vice-governor of Kurgan Oblast); Vladislav Khotsenko, former chair of the DPR government; and his successor, Yevgeny Solntsev, who have respectively become heads of Omsk and Orenburg oblasts (the former previously worked at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the latter in the Russian Railways system). Irina Gekht, who led the Russian-appointed government of the Zaporizhzhia region and was formerly first deputy governor of Chelyabinsk Oblast, became governor of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Among vice-governors is Nikolai Tsiganov, previously involved in the construction sector in Leningrad Oblast, who served as minister of construction for the DPR and was appointed vice-governor of Leningrad Oblast in March 2024. Thus, bureaucrats who have served in the 'new territories' are increasingly becoming political figures.

Another personnel elevator has emerged with the appointment, starting in late 2024, of participants in the SMO, professional military officers, to regional administrations. These individuals are assigned specially created roles, such as deputies for security and liaison with law enforcement, or supervisors for patriotic education, sport, and youth policy. Such appointments fall under the 'Time of Heroes' personnel programme. For example, in Kaluga Oblast, professional military officer Alexander Shlyapnikov, a graduate of the programme who has served in the armed forces since 2003, was appointed deputy governor in December 2024, responsible for public safety and interaction with security services. In Lipetsk Oblast, SMO veteran and local native Roman Balashov became vice-governor in November 2024, overseeing mobilisation preparedness, sport, and youth affairs. At present, their powers are limited to the narrow and largely symbolic scope of these specially created roles. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that some of them may eventually become part of the new administrative elite.

In addition to the promotion of professional military personnel through the 'Time of Heroes' programme, assignments to the SMO zone remain a mark of career advancement for the traditional bureaucratic nomenklatura. In Kursk Oblast, former deputy governor and ex-mayor of Kursk Viktor Karamyshev was a candidate for a Federation Council seat. However, the appointment ultimately went to Alexey Kondratyev, who is associated with the 'Redut' PMC and a 'Time of Heroes' graduate, and who, despite his SMO credentials, is in fact a career politician (he previously represented Tambov Oblast in the Federation Council in the late 2010s). It is worth noting that the share of 'SMO participants' is growing not only in regional administrations but also in the Federation Council, regional parliaments, and local councils.

Although the numerical presence of SMO participants and those who worked in the 'new territories' in the administrative elite is still relatively modest, it is clear that they are becoming an increasingly visible segment of the governing class. Their positions and ambitions are increasingly shaping a new political constant.

Conclusion: signs of a new era?

In late 2024 and the first half of 2025, following a pause during the first two years of the war, domestic politics returned to the centre of attention for the federal authorities. This shift is driven by the need to adapt the regional governance system to new circumstances and the altered 'quality' of the political regime, as well as by the approaching federal elections of 2026. Federal election cycles have historically triggered intense rotation within the regional nomenklatura, sparking widespread personnel reshuffles and structural reconfigurations. They also mark the emergence of new trends in regional politics. In this context, the notably abrupt and, in some cases, contentious personnel changes linked to the appointment of new acting governors in Samara, Kursk, and Vologda oblasts appear to be a test run of tougher new practices in regional management. These moves have certainly left an impression on the regional bureaucracy, while the Presidential Administration closely monitors how political and business elites, and public opinion, respond.

At the same time, under pressure from the Kremlin, there is a growing trend towards incorporating direct participants in the SMO and officials seconded to the 'new territories' into the regional administrative elite. For both groups, this aspect of their biography introduces certain risks and limitations (being placed on sanctions lists, travel restrictions to most countries, future constraints on certain professions, etc.), which also serve as a firm foundation for their political identity. This new cohort of the Russian bureaucracy can be divided into several subgroups. On the one hand are regional officials who served temporarily in the SMO zone or in the 'new territories'. Their career prospects are broader, thanks to their greater professional competence and experience. The second group comprises career military officers or 'ordinary' citizens with no previous administrative background who participated in the SMO. For them, the system is creating special posts and offering symbolic representation, without granting them real influence over actual governance. Still, their currently latent political ambitions may grow over time, posing potential risks and challenges to the traditional administrative elite.

Methodological explanation

According to the methodology used, a nominal list of the senior regional nomenklatura is compiled twice a year – as of 1 January and 1 July – along with a chronology of changes in its composition over the preceding year.

The regional nomenclature covered includes: governors and chairmen of regional governments;

The scope of the regional nomenklatura covered includes: governors and chairs of regional governments; deputy governors and deputy chairs of regional governments; regional finance ministers and chiefs of staff of regional administrations (if they are not already counted among the deputy governors or deputy premiers); speakers of regional parliaments; and the heads of regional capitals; and in the cases of Moscow and Leningrad oblasts, the heads of the three largest municipalities were originally used.

Administrative stability is calculated based on the frequency of replacements of key regional and local officials during the year preceding the reference date. That is, for the count as of 1 July of the current year, the period from 1 July of the previous year is assessed. For the count as of 1 January, the period assessed is from 1 January to 31 December of the previous year.

The stability index is calculated as the ratio of dismissals and new appointments to the total number of officials at the specified level in the region at the beginning of the period. Certain changes are excluded from the count, such as a shift from ordinary deputy to first deputy, from acting deputy governor to full deputy governor, changes in job titles, and so forth. The dismissal of one official and the immediate appointment of another to the same position are counted as a single unit. However, the dismissal of a deputy governor and the abolition of the post, followed several months later by the creation of a different deputy governor role with a new portfolio, are counted as two separate units.