Three and a Half Periods of Russian Life in Wartime

Over the course of three and a half years of the 'military operation,' Russians’ social attitudes have gone through several stages of change, completing an almost full circle: from the crisis assessments of their material circumstances in the autumn of 2022, to the economic and consumer boom that peaked in early 2024, and then to a new downturn in the autumn of 2025. The social mood index in October 2025 fell noticeably below the levels of autumn 2022, when the shock of the outbreak of hostilities and the imposition of sanctions was felt most acutely.

Throughout this cycle, the composition of the 'winners' and 'losers' also changed. In the first phase, sanctions and the severing of ties with the West hit resource-rich groups and private businesses hardest. In the second phase, these groups largely recovered and even improved their positions. At the same time, the 'special operation' created conditions for previously depressed and deprived social strata to be drawn into the orbit of social and material success. Moreover, many Russians viewed wartime as an opportunity and a means not only for personal social revenge but also for a broader transformation of the social structure of society.

However, this did not come to pass. From the end of 2024 onwards, social sentiment began to deteriorate once more. The most deprived sections of the population again found themselves feeling the worst. Thus, the shift in Russia’s social structure brought about by the beneficiaries of the wartime economy proved relatively brief and unstable, giving rise to certain frustrations. Participants in the hostilities who had received substantial material rewards also largely failed to convert these gains into stable social status.

It is difficult today to say what the next stage will look like, but it may be assumed that its characteristics will be shaped by a further worsening of the economic situation and social wellbeing, accompanied by a reassessment of attitudes towards the 'special operation' and a devaluation of the perceived benefits of personal participation in it.

Shock and adaptation: those who had more lost more

During wartime, the public’s perception of Russia’s economic and social situation changed and can be divided into several periods. Throughout this time, sociologists regularly asked Russians how their material circumstances had changed over the past year. The ratio of those whose financial situation improved to those whose situation worsened is known as the index of personal material wellbeing. When the shares of those whose situation improved and worsened are equal, the index equals one. When more people report deterioration, it is below one; when more report improvement, it is above one.

The first period, from the very start of the 'special military operation' (SMO) up to mid-2023, was marked, in objective economic indicators, by a surge in inflation, a contraction in GDP, and a fall in real incomes. This trend was reflected in subjective assessments as well. According to surveys conducted by the Foundation for Social Research (FSI), in the first days of the 'special operation,' 17% of Russians said their financial situation had improved, 31% reported it had worsened, and 49% said it had not changed significantly. The index thus stood at 0.54, but within six months, that is by August 2022, it had fallen to 0.38 (see Table 1).

Table 1. Dynamics of assessments of personal financial situation, 2022–2025, % of those surveyed

In other words, during the first six months of the hostilities, the share of those whose situation improved declined, while the share of those whose situation worsened increased. The deterioration in assessments occurred as the economic impact of sanctions grew: the withdrawal of a number of Western companies from Russia, the closure or relocation of Russian enterprises, and the radical transformation of logistics. However, these factors affected social groups in 2022 neither simultaneously nor in the same way.

At the initial stage, those engaged in business felt the decline most acutely, while employees of state organisations were less affected, according to survey data. Residents of the capital, young people, and those with higher education also reported worsening circumstances. Muscovites had always enjoyed higher incomes than other Russians, but by the end of 2022, according to FOM data, a smaller share of Muscovites than the national average said their situation had improved (5 per cent versus 7 per cent), and a larger share said it had worsened (32 per cent versus 25 per cent). Data from the Foundation for Social Research (FSI) likewise indicate that residents of villages and small and medium-sized towns were more likely at that time to report an increase in their incomes.

In other words, in the first year of the hostilities, the material situation of the more resource-secure groups suffered the most, as their lifestyles were hit hardest by the changes (the departure of foreign brands, restrictions on financial transactions, and rising prices for imported goods and travel). They reacted to the announcement of the 'special operation' with greater caution than more deprived groups, such as rural residents, people without higher education, and pensioners. The shift in sentiment was particularly evident in the revision of plans for the near and more distant future.

Less resource-secure groups were less affected by the crisis at the outset of the hostilities, and the rise in wages in sectors connected with the military sphere helped offset the inconveniences that arose. According to the same 2022 FOM surveys, working people were more likely to report a worsening of their situation and one-and-a-half to two times less likely to note an increase in income than those on the periphery of the labour market or outside it altogether (pensioners, students, and the unemployed). On the labour market, peripheral groups were in the most advantageous position during this period.

In the private sector, the number of those affected by the crisis initially expanded rapidly. According to FSI surveys, the index of personal material wellbeing among those employed in this sector fell from 0.49 in February to 0.29 in August, while the average for the sample as a whole stood at 0.38. The degradation of the domestic market at the start of the 'special military operation' had a greater impact on those most closely tied to it, such as workers in trade and services, those employed in agriculture, and, more broadly, those in small and medium-sized private businesses. This was reflected both in quantitative data and in the responses of FSI focus group participants ('All the brands just left Russia. And when the Russian entrepreneurs came in, they immediately set the same wages as everywhere else. So instead of 55 thousand you get 20 and sign for it,' male, 51, 2023).

Somewhat later, pessimism began to spread to less resourceful groups: rural residents, people in small towns, those with lower levels of education, and others. Only among young people and high-income groups did assessments of personal change become more optimistic. At the same time, the fears of a rapid collapse of the Russian economy, widespread in the early months of the military confrontation, did not materialise. Negative assessments of changes in material wellbeing were linked primarily to the sharp increase in everyday inconveniences caused by sanctions. Overall, however, the Russian economy appeared far more resilient to external shocks. The recognition of this, together with the experience of adaptation to the new conditions, became a source of optimism for various social groups.

Budgetary stimulus and the diverging circles of the military economy

The second period of social attitudes began to take shape within the first, when the most economically active groups started integrating into the new system of production, logistics, and distribution chains that had replaced those destroyed by sanctions. Around the same time, a model of a 'commercial war economy' emerged, characterised by a high level of budgetary spending in sectors connected with the hostilities (→ Zvonovsky, Khodykin: A Military Operation That Pays). As a result, as can be seen from Table 1, by early autumn 2023 the index of changes in material wellbeing began to rise gradually, reaching its peak value (0.73) in early 2024.

This trend in self-assessment is supported by economic statistics. In 2022, Russians sharply reduced their consumption, particularly of non-food goods. From the beginning of 2023, retail trade volumes began to grow, reflecting positive dynamics in domestic demand (this process is well illustrated by the Sberindex data on real consumption, based on aggregated information about purchases made with Sber cards; see Graph 1). IBy mid-2023, the level of consumption had returned to its pre-war value in real terms and continued to rise until March 2024. However, with each subsequent period, inflation’s contribution to this growth increased, and from March 2024 real demand began to decline. By July, inflation was already the main factor driving growth in the retail market. Finally, from the beginning of 2025, this growth was almost entirely due to rising prices. This trend was also reflected in the index of material wellbeing: the period of income growth, optimism, and consumer activity in 2023 and early 2024 was replaced by a period of growing pessimism throughout 2025.

Graph 1. Dynamics of household spending on different groups of goods (Sberindex), 2022–2025, 100 = December 2018

From a sociological perspective, within this period of an expanding and then fading economic boom, two subperiods can be distinguished, differing in which social groups experienced the benefits of the economic growth of 2023–2024 (→ Zvonovsky: Financial Situation). In the first stage, roughly from autumn 2022 to autumn 2023, as Russian businesses began to adapt to the new reality, FSI survey data show that those employed in the private sector, including entrepreneurs, reached parity in their assessments of material wellbeing dynamics with public-sector employees, from whom they had previously lagged behind. Thus, this period was marked by the improvement of the private sector’s situation and its integration into activities carried out either in the interests of the 'special military operation', in related industries, or in services aimed at bypassing or overcoming external sanctions.

This was probably also influenced by the state's relaxation of business regulations, a reduction in the frequency and scope of tax audits, a simplified procedure for obtaining licences and permits, etc. Despite the contraction of employment in the private economy in 2022, by 2023 those working there already felt better off than those employed 'by the state'. In addition, substantial budgetary injections into frontline territories and other side effects of the 'wartime economy' meant that residents of these regions rated the dynamics of their material situation more positively than residents of the capitals or areas far from the front.

The second sub-period, beginning around mid-2023, is characterised by the fact that regions previously considered economic outsiders, as well as socially deprived population groups, gained a significant advantage in the redistribution of national income. Large-scale government spending on the production of weapons, military equipment, and related industries prompted a flow of labour into these sectors. Against this backdrop, employers in other sectors were forced to raise wages in order to retain their employees. Together, these factors led to a rapid increase in real incomes (→ Re:Russia: Windfall Revenues) and a rise in lending activity, particularly among those who, having received higher salaries, were now able to service loans. The impulse of the 'war economy' thus spread to an ever-growing number of Russians, including those who had not benefited from economic growth in the 'pre-war' era.

The failed revolution

Many Russians viewed wartime as an opportunity and a tool for a decisive transformation of the social structure. It is telling that, according to FOM data, with the start of the 'special military operation', the share of those who expected the gap between rich and poor to narrow rose from 4–6% to 8–9%, while the share of those fearing a rise in inequality sharply decreased, from 43% to 26–30%. In other words, many Russians anticipated changes in the social structure of Russian society, evidently hoping to occupy higher-status positions under the new circumstances.

Graph 2. Dynamics of expectations of changes in social inequality in Russia, 2008–2024, % of those surveyed

Initially, the dynamics of social and economic change generally corresponded to these expectations. Wartime opened up new opportunities for previously deprived groups and for some economically depressed regions and settlements. As shown in Table 2, in the leading regions in terms of the number of contract soldiers, the highest numbers of consumer and mortgage loans were also issued up to mid-2024. Russians were, in effect, exchanging participation in high-risk forms of social behaviour, for which there was strong state demand, for financial reward and the opportunity to take part in modern forms of consumer behaviour, such as mortgages and credit borrowing. Those who signed military contracts, most often belonging to deprived and depressed social groups, were, as it were, catching up with their compatriots in terms of living standards. They used the 'special military operation' as a means of overcoming their low social status.

Table 2. Correlations between economic indicators and mortality rates in military operations by region, 2021–2024

However, the expected social transformation never occurred. As focus group data from the FSI show, some active supporters of the 'special operation' gradually began to feel disappointed in the authorities’ actions, even though they continued to support the 'SMO': 'On the one hand, the authorities mobilised society, and society became more united. We were ready to do whatever we were told… When the war began in 2022, the SMO, everyone thought that now everything in the country would really change, and people would be different. People mobilised. Everyone was ready. Finally, all those traitors and despicable people went to the West, and those who remained here were the most active, energetic, decent, noble, and intelligent people. There would be order in the country… But it turned out that [only one] old woman in Donbas came out with a red flag… Everything remains the same as it was in the old days. No nationalisation… And despite everything, it’s even worse' (male, 54, focus group, April 2023; see also → Zvonovsky, Khodykin: Continuum of assessments).

The demand to exchange loyalty for state paternalism and access to social benefits went unfulfilled, forming a group of firm supporters of the 'SMO' who were dissatisfied with how it was being conducted and with the authorities’ economic policy. Their expectations of a restoration of a Soviet-style or near-Soviet paternalist system were not realised, creating frustration born of disappointed hopes.

Slowdown and reversal

The third period in wartime social dynamics began around mid-2024, when the peak of positive assessments of personal material wellbeing had passed. From that point onwards, objective economic indicators also began to deteriorate: inflation accelerated, lending contracted, income growth and overall economic expansion slowed. To finance military expenditure, the Russian authorities decided to increase the tax burden on the population. As shown in Table 1, Russians generally view the emerging situation extremely negatively: at no point during the 'special operation' has the share of those reporting a deterioration in their material circumstances been so large – in October 2025, for every one person saying their situation had improved, there were more than three saying it had worsened.

Yet, as in previous periods, it remains just as important to consider which groups feel better than others, and which feel worse. Young people, residents of major cities, those employed in the private sector, and members of higher-income groups still feel better off than most. However, disparities within these groups have sharply decreased. For example, young people continue to assess changes in their financial position more positively than older generations, but the gap between them was wider at the start of 2025. Regional differences have also narrowed: Muscovites now report roughly the same trends in wellbeing as residents of Russia’s provincial towns, whether in frontline or rear areas.

The period of economic growth among peripheral social groups proved very short-lived. Pessimistic attitudes are gradually spreading across all segments of the population, and if the authorities have succeeded in achieving any degree of 'equality' (something sought by many staunch supporters of the 'SMO'), then it is an equality in the growing sense of looming economic problems. At the same time, the groups now feeling the worst off are once again those previously most deprived: residents of small towns, older generations, pensioners, low-income Russians living from paycheque to paycheque, and those with low levels of consumption. Thus, the changes in Russia’s economic structure brought about by the wartime beneficiaries have proved unstable, and those who held privileged positions before the conflict are now regaining them.

From mid-2024, the correlation between the number of war deaths in a region (used here as an indicator of the number of contract soldiers deployed to the 'SMO') and the number of mortgage loans issued became negative (see Table 3). The growth of consumer lending in these regions has also weakened. In our view, this trend reflects broader social processes. Whereas earlier the decision to go to the front, and the associated material rewards, appeared to be a means of changing one’s social status within an anticipated overall transformation of the social structure, such hopes have now largely faded. 'Frontline veterans,' who initially seemed to be in a favourable position and received substantial material benefits, have failed to convert them into lasting social status. Meanwhile, social groups that remained at home have sought to reallocate available resources in their own favour. As a result, a potential contract soldier now understands that his former classmate who stayed behind has a better chance of winning the race for a higher standard and quality of living.

Table 3. Correlations between economic indicators and mortality rates in military operations by region, 2024–2025

Looking ahead to the fourth period

Projecting survey data onto economic dynamics allows us to outline the periodisation of social dynamics during wartime, as well as to identify the social groups that won and lost at each stage.

In the first period, from February 2022 to the winter of 2022/2023, Russians reported in surveys a worsening of their material circumstances, reflecting the fall in real incomes and the contraction of the consumer market.

In the second period, roughly from the second quarter of 2023 to the spring of 2024, the level of personal wellbeing among major social groups recovered. During this time, Russians’ real incomes and spending on non-food goods rose sharply, while unemployment fell to its lowest levels. This period can be divided into two sub-periods depending on which social groups became the main beneficiaries of growth. Initially, entrepreneurs, young people, and residents of border regions gained the most. In the second sub-period, residents of the capital and cities hosting defence industries, those employed in the private sector more broadly, and high-income groups also began to feel better off. The effects of the 'war economy' reached their widest extent.

Table 4. Beneficiaries and losers

The third period began after mid-2024. Inflation accelerated, while the growth in prosperity, which is reflected in rising real consumption, gradually slowed and by mid-2025 had almost completely come to a halt. This was reflected in assessments of material wellbeing, which had already worsened significantly by spring and by mid-autumn reached their lowest level since the beginning of the 'special military operation', meaning they are now lower than at the peak of the initial crisis. At the same time, the 'commercial war' economy, which is based on attracting volunteers in exchange for substantial material rewards, faced a shrinking resource base by autumn 2025.

Today, it is difficult to predict what the next period will look like, but it can be assumed that its characteristics will be shaped by a further deterioration in the economic situation and a reassessment of attitudes towards the 'special military operation', as well as a devaluation of personal participation in it. For a long time, public opinion remained static, defined by the existence of a visible 'pro-war majority' and an 'anti-war minority'. Yet by October 2025, many Russians had begun to acknowledge the problems associated with the conflict: only 7% of those surveyed described the impact of the 'SMO' on their daily lives as positive, while 43% viewed it as negative, according to the most recent survey by the Chronicles project. Recognising the growing difficulties no longer requires any special intellectual effort. However, a real change in public opinion will become possible only when Russians come to see these hardships as an unjustifiably high price to pay for the continuation of the war.