The Pokrovsk Dilemma: Experts believe the city is practically lost; the question is whether this can be considered a success for the Russian offensive

The Russian army is close to successfully completing a strategic manoeuvre to capture Pokrovsk. As anticipated, the decisive push came in late autumn. Over the past year, by stretching the Ukrainian Armed Forces across multiple sectors of the front, the Russian command has pursued a dual strategy: encirclement of the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad urban agglomeration on the one hand, and the use of infiltration tactics within the urban environment on the other.

The Ukrainian forces could theoretically continue to counter infiltration by clearing territory, but the threat of encirclement makes such a strategy extremely risky. Most analysts advise Kyiv to accept the loss of the city and withdraw its troops. It is possible this is already underway.

The likely capture of Pokrovsk will be the Kremlin’s biggest military success since the fall of Avdiivka in February 2024. Overall, the Russian army has spent just over a year and a half attempting to take Pokrovsk, the first attempt being in March 2024. According to estimates by British military intelligence, Russian losses killed and wounded during this period amount to around 800,000 personnel. To capture the remaining part of the Donbas, Moscow will need, in the best case, at least another year, and in a less favourable scenario, at least two.

The key question today remains how to interpret the fall of Pokrovsk after eighteen months of Moscow’s military effort – as evidence of the Russian army’s strength, or of its weakness? Volodymyr Zelensky fears that the loss of the city will strengthen the argument that Kyiv should concede the remaining territory of the Donbas to Moscow in exchange for a ceasefire.

This is the question that will dominate the political battle in the coming weeks. Yet one way or another, the likelihood that the capture of Pokrovsk will prove to be the last major operation of this war, at least in its current phase, is quite high.

A year and a half of the Pokrovsk operation

As we anticipated a month and a half ago, late autumn became the moment of maximum escalation of Russian efforts to conclude the 2025 offensive campaign with a tangible result (→ Re:Russia: On The Eve of The ‘Decisive Breakthrough’). The main thrust of the 'decisive breakthrough' was predictably concentrated on the capture of Pokrovsk, and at this point most analysts consider the city’s full seizure by Russian forces virtually inevitable.

The occupation of Pokrovsk, one of the key fortress-cities in the eastern Donetsk region, described by Russian propaganda as the gateway to the Donbas, will be the Russian army’s most significant military success since February 2024, when it took control of Avdiivka. At that time, in March 2024, Russian troops first attempted to take Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, but the operation failed, according to analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). In autumn 2024, the Russian army began a strategic encirclement of the city. Thus, the overall effort to capture Pokrovsk has lasted more than eighteen months.

During the last year of the offensive campaign, roughly one third of all Russian offensive actions were concentrated in the Pokrovsk direction (→ Re: Russia: On The Eve of The ‘Decisive Breakthrough’). Most operations elsewhere were intended to tie down as many Ukrainian forces as possible. Since late summer, the intensity of Russian offensives on those other fronts has decreased, ISW notes, leading to a slowdown in Russian advance in those sectors. This concentration of forces around Pokrovsk has served the dual strategy: on the one hand, Russian troops created the threat of encirclement of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad; on the other, they employed 'infiltration' tactics.

The success of the encirclement strategy was evidently aided by the serial use of guided aerial bombs equipped with improved universal planning and correction modules, capable of striking targets up to 200 kilometres away. In early November, Volodymyr Zelensky stated that up to 50% of all Russian guided bomb strikes were concentrated in the Pokrovsk direction.

'Infiltration,' in turn, is an assault tactic that helps overcome Ukraine’s 'drone wall.' Russia used it earlier in Sievierodonetsk and Bakhmut, but it became a comprehensive approach after the capture of Selydove in the autumn of last year, writes Ukrainian military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets. The manoeuvre requires extensive preparation: Russian forces identify vulnerable Ukrainian positions, where troop numbers are insufficient, morale is low, or logistics are strained. They then specifically target Ukrainian drone operators to secure air superiority. In Pokrovsk, Russia formed specialised units equipped with reconnaissance and strike UAVs to hunt Ukrainian drone operators.

The infiltration itself is carried out by numerous small assault groups acting according to pre-planned scenarios under coordinated command. They launch raids and ambushes on Ukrainian positions (primarily attacking command posts and UAV control groups), aiming to create chaos in the Ukrainian defence system and reduce its ability to respond. According to ISW analysts citing Ukrainian military sources, Russia sends around 100 three-man fire groups into Pokrovsk daily. As a result, Ukrainian drone operators do not have enough time to deploy drones before these groups suppress their positions.

Afterwards, the assault groups attempt to find cover and establish concealed positions in the rear or on the flanks of Ukrainian units. Once the Russian command assesses that the Ukrainian defence in a given sector has been sufficiently disorganised, a third phase begins: forward elements of the main forces advance and establish control over the territory.

Clear or leave?

The first assault groups of the Russian army infiltrated Pokrovsk in July 2025, but in August, the press service of the 7th Corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Airborne Assault Forces reported that the city had been completely cleared. Almost immediately after this announcement, Russian sabotage units reappeared in Pokrovsk, according to Ukrainska Pravda. Sources from the brigades defending the city told the publication that Russian soldiers seemed to 'come up from underground' – they had managed to hide in the city after their initial penetration in July. One Ukrainian drone operator told The New York Times that the Russian saboteurs wore civilian clothing so that they would be mistaken for some of the roughly one thousand remaining civilian residents of Pokrovsk.

In August, information about the problems in Pokrovsk did not reach the public. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on the success of an operation to eliminate a Russian salient near Dobropillia, and only in October did it acknowledge the presence of Russian saboteurs in Pokrovsk. As Ukrainska Pravda notes, some brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine still widely practice submitting ‘whitewashed’ reports on the situation on the battlefield to their superiors.

Poor weather also contributed to the success of the Russian advance, as it reduced the effectiveness of Ukrainian drones. By the end of October, Russian drones had established near-total control of the skies over Pokrovsk, Ukrainska Pravda writes. Russian UAVs took control over most of the logistical routes into Pokrovsk and neighbouring Myrnohrad, just as they previously had with Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region, leading to their encirclement and withdrawal, the publication notes.

Continued efforts to counter Russian infiltration remain possible, and the Russian army is still far from establishing full control over the city. There appear to be supporters of this approach within the Ukrainian leadership. Last week, vague and contradictory reports circulated of Ukrainian special forces being deployed into the city. However, the rationality of such a strategy is questionable in light of the other component of the Russian combined approach – the threat of a complete encirclement of the city.

At this stage, the Ukrainian Armed Forces should withdraw their remaining troops from Pokrovsk, says Michael Kofman, a leading expert on the war in Ukraine, in a commentary for The Washington Post. Although the capture of Pokrovsk will allow Russian forces to expand one of their main axes of advance, it will not cause the collapse of the entire Ukrainian defensive system. Emil Kastehelmi of the OSINT project Black Bird Group also calls for accepting the loss of the city in order to preserve combat-ready forces. He believes that after a year of intense fighting in the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad sector, the loss of these cities will not substantially change the overall operational picture, and that the Russian army will not be able to quickly exploit the Ukrainian withdrawal. Franz-Stefan Gady of the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) believes that the Ukrainian Armed Forces should conduct a tactical withdrawal and establish new, strong defensive positions to the north of the city in order to stabilise the front.

Consequences and conclusions

Pokrovsk has long been described as a key point in Ukraine’s eastern defensive line, control of which would enable the Russian army to advance westwards towards Pavlohrad in the Dnipropetrovsk region and even towards Dnipro itself, writes Newsweek. Oleg Dunda, an MP from the ruling Servant of the People party, told the magazine that controlling the city would also make it possible to lay siege to the fortress cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.

However, military experts note that the conditions that played a role in the fall of Pokrovsk may not be replicated in the next stage. As noted earlier, Russia deployed a grouping of around 100,000 troops to take Pokrovsk. Citing Ukrainian military sources, ISW notes that Russia is advancing at Pokrovsk at enormous cost: to locate Ukrainian drone operators, Russian commanders send untrained soldiers into assaults, and only afterwards deploy trained assault infantry. According to estimates by the British Ministry of Defence, the fighting that resulted in the fall of Pokrovsk cost Russia around 800,000 killed and wounded. ISW analysts write that Russia allocated 'a staggering and disproportionate quantity of manpower and equipment' to capture Pokrovsk, and it is unlikely that it currently has the material or human resources to conduct ground operations of similar intensity and duration elsewhere.

Military expert Kostyantyn Mashovets believes Russian infiltration tactics worked in Pokrovsk, Kupiansk and partially in Toretsk. In the Chasiv Yar area, however, the attempt failed: small sabotage groups were unable to sufficiently disrupt Ukrainian defences or penetrate deeply enough. Furthermore, even successful infiltration does not always result in territory being captured, as was the case during the Russian breakthrough near Dobropillia. ISW notes that the tactic aimed at achieving air superiority proved effective in Pokrovsk largely because the urban environment provided cover and concealment for saboteurs and drone operators – conditions that do not exist in several other sectors where a Russian offensive might follow.

Meanwhile, beyond Pokrovsk, the situation remains tense for Ukrainian forces on several other parts of the front. In early November, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the start of a clearance operation in Kupiansk, Kharkiv region, where he said up to 60 Russian saboteurs remained. However, at the end of October, a representative of the Ukrainian Joint Forces Group, Viktor Trehubov, stated that Russian troops had penetrated the northern part of Kupiansk and might be present in roughly 20% of the city’s districts. Reports of Ukrainian forces being encircled in Kupiansk are currently being denied by the Joint Forces Group.

In addition, the situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces has begun to deteriorate near Kostyantynivka, where, in conditions of rain and fog, Russian assault units have also been gradually infiltrating the city, said Ukrainian military analyst Vladyslav Selezniov in an interview with Ukrainian Radio. The Russian army is also advancing intensively in the east of the Zaporizhzhia region, where, according to Selezniov’s calculations, around 13% of all Russian assault operations are now concentrated.

Despite these local successes, the Russian army has still not achieved a decisive breakthrough in its offensive in 2025, summarises Michael Kofman. The outcome of the war, he says, does not depend on 'who controls Pokrovsk or the next 20 kilometres', but on which proves more unsustainable in the end: Russia’s offensive or Ukraine’s defence. In this sense, he argues, a far more important result of the year is that, despite clearly mounting difficulties in replenishing manpower, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are still holding the line, and appear likely to be able to continue doing so in 2026.

Pokrovsk: trump card or joker?

According to Black Bird Group estimates,in October the Russian Armed Forces occupied a total of 468 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory (398 in September, 430 in August). According to Deepstat's calculations, based on maps from the OSINT project DeepState, Russia occupied 266 square kilometres in October (258 in September, 464 in August). However, these figures now appear largely approximate. Black Bird Group analyst Emil Kastehelmi of Black Bird Group writes that mapping in the areas of the most intense fighting in recent months has become extremely difficult. The very notion of a 'front line' has changed: it is fragmented into separate sectors and has gained greater depth due to fire support operators. The grey zone is expanding in all directions, so satellite imagery and field reports no longer make it possible to determine clearly who controls a given area.

But the difference between 260 and 460 square kilometres is not significant in principle. The operation to capture northern Donbas required two years of continuous offensive effort from the Russian army. The first year was spent approaching the belt of fortified fortress cities (which ISW includes Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka). The second was spent executing the combined manoeuvre to take Pokrovsk. Overall, the task of capturing northern Donbas is only somewhat more than half complete.

Today, however, the key question is what political conclusions will be drawn from the expected fall of Pokrovsk. There are two possible interpretations. The first is that the Russian army holds a military advantage and will continue to press it on the battlefield in the coming years. The second is that this advantage is not so great, and that the gains Russia has made are disproportionate to the losses it has suffered. A third year of offensive operations in Donbas, against the backdrop of sharply worsening economic conditions, could become too costly for Putin and weaken him politically rather than strengthen him.

The capture of Pokrovsk is needed by Moscow to convince Trump that Russia is achieving its objectives in the war and that the full transfer of Donbas to Moscow is the only possible basis for a ceasefire, Vladimir Zelensky said on 28 October. By consistently refusing compromise over recent months, Putin was counting on ending the year with a 'Pokrovsk trump card' to bolster his negotiating position. This is likely also what Donald Trump meant when he recently remarked that 'sometimes the sides have to be allowed to fight it out.' Mykola Bielieskov of the National Institute for Strategic Studies told The Washington Post that, although military considerations point to the need to withdraw from Pokrovsk, the political effect would strengthen Russia’s position, which is why Kyiv hesitates to take such a decision.

Although the public appearance is that negotiations on ending the war are at a complete impasse, the two sides appear to be continuing quiet bargaining over the terms of a ceasefire. Amid the collapse of the Pokrovsk defence, Trump hinted that the sides had 'made significant progress' in finding a formula to end the war. And Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban (who was expected to host a trilateral meeting between Putin, Zelensky and Trump) mentioned that only 'a few unresolved issues' remained in US–Russian talks.

The central question is how to interpret the results of the campaign: does the capture of the city after a year and a half of effort indicate Russia’s strength or its weakness? Trump and Orbán appear inclined to interpret it in Moscow’s favour. If so, in the coming weeks Zelensky will likely face intense pressure. On the other hand, for Vladimir Putin the capture of Pokrovsk may also serve as a convenient moment to announce a pause in military operations on a perceived wave of 'success' rather than in a situation where two years of fighting in Donbas have led nowhere. One way or another, the likelihood that the capture of Pokrovsk will become the last major operation of this war, at least in its current phase, is quite high.