Missile Imbalance: why Ukraine is losing the energy war

On the eve of winter, the Kremlin is launching a new crusade against Ukraine’s energy sector. Alongside the offensive 'on the ground', it is intended to deliver a decisive blow in the war of attrition and break Ukraine’s will to resist. This campaign was planned and prepared in advance, taking into account the mistakes of previous years.

The main instrument of the 'energy' offensive remains combined missile-and-drone attacks, which this year involve two and a half times more drones and a sharply increased share of ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s current arsenal of air-defence systems is wholly insufficient to counter this massive assault.

By mid-November, the Russian army had made considerable progress with its new strategy, which combines three objectives: the systematic destruction of generation and grid infrastructure in the eastern part of the country; inflicting significant damage on the Burshtyn energy island in the west, which has surplus capacity; and destroying the infrastructure that supports Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, potentially forcing reactor shutdowns.

Ukraine already faces the threat of the hardest winter in all the years of the war and is virtually defenceless against further strikes. At the same time, the effectiveness of Ukraine’s retaliatory campaign against Russian energy infrastructure appears markedly lower. In October, the number of Ukrainian counterstrikes on Russian oil facilities actually fell, while Russia has so far managed to avoid serious consequences from Ukrainian attacks thanks to additional capacity and imports of Belarusian petrol.

But the main reason for the lower effectiveness of Ukraine’s counterstrikes is the shortage of adequate means of attack – long-range missiles that the Ukrainian army could use in combined operations.

The absence in Kyiv’s arsenal of both sufficient air-defence systems and adequate means of counterattack is currently the main reason why Ukraine is losing the energy war, which could in turn lead to defeat in the ongoing war of attrition.

In the autumn of 2025, the Kremlin launched yet another crusade against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. It is clear that it was planned and prepared in advance, taking into account the mistakes of previous years, and was intended, alongside the battlefield offensive, to deliver a decisive year-end blow to Ukraine in the war of attrition.

The heightened intensity of this autumn’s combined missile-and-drone strikes is driven by a significant increase in the number of drones used. In September–November 2024, according to our calculations based on data from the Massive Missile Attacks on Ukraine project, Russian forces launched an average of 67 drones per day; in the autumn months of this year, 167. Meanwhile, the intensity of missile launches has changed only slightly: from 6.1 per day last autumn to 6.8. However, the share of ballistic missiles has risen sharply this autumn, becoming another crucial component of Russia’s energy offensive.

Graph 1. Missile and drone strikes on Ukraine in the autumn of 2024 and 2025, average number of strikes per day

The effectiveness of Ukrainian air defence systems has significantly decreased: according to ABC News, in October, less than 80% of Russian drones (the lowest figure since the beginning of the year) and 54% of missiles were intercepted. However, according to the authors of the Monitor Luftkrieg Ukraine report, the share of intercepted ballistic missiles was far lower, at around 15% (it was about 40–50% in the summer and nearly 20% in September). At the same time, the number of ballistic missiles launched by Russia has more than tripled compared with the previous month (to 108; according to experts from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), to 148). The main factors contributing to the decline in effectiveness were the modification of the Russian Iskander-M and Kinzhal missiles, which are now capable of performing evasive manoeuvres in the final stage of flight (→ Re:Russia: War in the Air), but mainly the increase in the number of ballistic missiles used in attacks and the chronic shortage of interceptor missiles for Patriot systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, as well as the shortage of the systems themselves. In early November, Ukraine received three new systems from Germany, but earlier Ukrainian authorities stated that they needed ten. Ukraine's Western allies and the US claim that they do not have any spare systems, and that their production will take a long time.

In turn, Russia, having significantly increased its arsenal of ballistic missiles, has begun to use them more often to attack targets that are not protected by Patriot or SAMP/T systems, writes OBOZ.UA, in order to increase the destructive power of its strikes. At the same time, the Ukrainian investigative project TEXTY notes that in recent months Russian missiles have particularly often struck energy facilities in eastern Ukrainian regions closest to the front line or to the Russian border. The main targets are key electrical substations, the destruction of which knocks out whole chains of settlements. Ukrainian energy experts claim that Russia is acting in line with a new strategy of the comprehensive destruction of both generation and transmission infrastructure, with the aim of dismantling the entire eastern sector. Moscow has analysed the limited impact of its attempts to freeze Ukraine over the past three winters and is now trying to implement a new tactic.

According to The Insider's calculations, from 1 August to 16 October Russia struck 28 Ukrainian energy facilities. In October the largest attacks occurred on the 10th, 22nd and 30th; on the 30th, 653 drones and 52 missiles were used, targeting four major thermal power plants at once: Dobrotvir, Burshtyn, Kalush and Ladyzhyn. Around 30 drones and 20 missiles reached their targets.

An equally powerful strike was launched on the night of 7 to 8 November. More than 450 drones and 45 missiles were launched, 32 of which were ballistic or aeroballistic, said Yuriy Ihnat, a representative of the Ukrainian Air Force command, on the Kyiv 24 channel. Ukraine’s Energy Minister, Svitlana Hrynchuk, said that 'it is hard to recall even at the beginning of the war such a number of ballistic missiles directly targeting energy facilities.' According to her, the most difficult situation was in the Kharkiv, Poltava, Donetsk, Sumy and Chernihiv regions.

The facilities of the Centrenergo company were hit the hardest, losing all of its generation capacity. This company operates two power plants – the Trypilska TPP in the Kyiv region and the Zmiivska TPP in the Kharkiv region – both of which have been shut down. DTEK's Prydniprovska Thermal Power Plant, Kremenchuk Hydroelectric Power Plant, gas and oil sector enterprises and others were also shelled, writes Ekonomichna Pravda. As a result of the autumn energy offensive, Ukraine’s energy sector has suffered a critical blow. 'Almost all generation east of the Dnipro has been destroyed, including the Zymyniv, Kharkiv-5 and Chernihiv thermal power plants,' says Ukrainian energy expert Olja Kosharna.

An important component of the attack was strikes on nuclear-plant substations, at Khmelnytskyi and Rivne; both were forced to reduce output. Russia is thus attempting to influence, indirectly, the operation of nuclear power plants, which it cannot attack directly and which remain a key stabilising element of Ukraine’s energy system.

Ukraine's military energy balance and Moscow's strategy

The destruction of Ukraine’s energy sector is a long-term strategy for Moscow and a key element of the war of attrition. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), at the start of the invasion Ukraine’s total electricity generation amounted to 38 GW, but by the end of 2022 it had been halved. This happened largely because Russia occupied Ukraine’s largest generating facilities, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (6 GW), the Zaporizhzhia thermal power plant (2.8 GW), the Vuhlehirsk power plant (3.6 GW) and the Luhansk power plant (1.4 GW), writes the Kyiv Post. Having thus undermined the country’s energy potential, Russia has continued to carry out targeted strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure throughout the years of the invasion.

One of the most difficult heating seasons for Ukraine’s energy sector since the start of the war was 2024/25, when Russian attacks caused electricity shortages of up to 2–3 GW at peak hours, according to Brookings experts Maciej Zaniewicz and Danilo Moiseenko. In total, at the beginning of the current heating season, Ukraine’s electricity generation amounted to 17.6 GW, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy.

Graph 2. Available electricity generation capacity in Ukraine, 2022–2025, GW

At present, Ukraine has been living under electricity blackout schedules for about a month, which can last up to 15–17 hours a day, writes the BBC Ukrainian Service. Restoration of destroyed generating capacity is proceeding slowly. According to IEA estimates, in the few months before the 2024/25 heating season Ukraine managed to restore only about 3 GW, and before the current season roughly half that amount. In winter, repairs to energy facilities are particularly difficult, as they require additional outages at a time of heightened demand. One way or another, this means that widespread power cuts will persist throughout the current heating season.

A complete energy collapse is, however, unlikely. Ukraine’s energy balance depends to a considerable extent on three operational nuclear power plants located in western and central Ukraine (Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and South Ukraine), which together provide 7.7 GW, the IEA notes. At the same time, to maintain the necessary level of consumption, electricity imports will need to increase.

In fact, despite the damage caused to its electricity sector, Ukraine exported 635,100 MWh of electricity in September 2025 and remained a net exporter of electricity over the last four months, according to the Kyiv-based energy think tank Dixi Group. However, in October, Kyiv was forced to increase imports to 353.9 GWh, which is 2.5 times higher than in September, Dixi Group adds (Ukraine mainly imports from Hungary – 180 GWh, Poland – 80 GWh and Romania – 76.9 GWh). In November, these figures may rise even further: the attack on the night of 8 November cost the energy system at least 1 GW of generating capacity, Ekonomichna Pravda reports.

Electricity exports and imports became possible thanks to the fact that back in 2002, Ukraine created the Burshtyn Energy Island, synchronised with its western neighbours (Burshtyn TPP, Kalush TPP and Tereblya-Rikska HPP), while the rest of Ukraine’s power system still remained integrated with Russia and Belarus. It was disconnected from that system on the night of 24 February 2022, a few hours before the invasion; on 16 March Ukraine connected to the pan-European ENTSO-E grid. Ukrenergo became a full member on 1 January 2024.

The Burshtyn energy island and nuclear generation remain the main pillars of Ukraine’s energy system, and will very likely prevent an energy collapse this winter as well. However, the autumn crusade aimed to inflict critical damage on generation and distribution networks in eastern Ukraine, while also striking the Burshtyn energy island and testing a method of hybrid attacks (according to the expression of Razumkov Centre expert Volodymyr Omelchenko) against Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. The damage already inflicted on Ukraine’s energy sector is extremely significant and, although Ukraine will not be entirely bled dry in energy terms, the open question is how Kyiv will cope with this blow politically. And this constitutes yet another key dimension of the war of attrition.

Why is Ukraine losing the energy war?

Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure began to intensify from August this year. By striking oil refineries as well as transport and storage facilities, Kyiv sought to disrupt Russia’s chains of oil delivery, storage and processing (→ Re:Russia: Petrol Hook). However, in October and November the intensity of Ukrainian attacks began to decline: in August Ukraine carried out a total of 20 strikes on oil infrastructure, in September 40, in October 18, and in the first half of November 12.

Graph 3. Dynamics of strikes on Russian oil infrastructure facilities in 2025

In October, the Ukrainian Armed Forces most frequently struck targets in Crimea (five attacks on oil depots and terminals). For the first time, a facility in the Moscow region was hit – the Kol’tsevoi oil-products pipeline. As part of a strategy of repeated strikes, the Ryazan oil refinery, with a capacity of 17–18 million tonnes per year (6.5% of Russian refining), was hit for the seventh time this year in October. After yet another strike in November, the plant suspended operations. The Saratov refinery was attacked for the sixth time this year in November and, according to Reuters, completely halted primary processing. Finally, the 14 November strike on the Sheskharis transshipment complex in the port of Novorossiysk led to the suspension of oil pumping and exports. According to Reuters, this even caused a slight disturbance in global oil prices.

Based on the results for August and September, petrol supplies to the domestic market may have fallen by 17%, according to our calculations. Petrol shortages were felt in many Russian regions. According to an October survey by the Chronicles project, 20% of respondents listed it among the pressing problems that concerned them. The government resorted to emergency petrol purchases from Belarus and developed an anti-crisis package (→ Re:Russia: Petrol Hook). However, by late October domestic petrol prices had stabilised, and reports of shortages had all but disappeared from the news agenda.

The main factors behind the stabilisation of the situation were the start of the seasonal decline in consumption and, probably, the utilisation of excess capacity in Russian oil refining, according to anonymous sources at Reuters in the Russian oil refining industry. According to currently available data from Rosstat, however, output in petroleum-products manufacturing fell by 6.3% year-on-year in August and by 4.2% in September. This is extremely unusual for this time of year: refining almost always increases in August. Similar declines were seen only in 2020, during the COVID lockdown and a period of extremely low global oil prices.

The effect of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refining is undoubtedly accumulating. In particular, they have most likely already led to a significant depletion of spare capacity, previously estimated at just over 20%. In addition, constant and costly repairs will ultimately be passed on to prices or place an additional burden on the budget if the government decides to increase compensation to oil companies in order to keep prices stable. However, this damage is incomparable to the destruction of major Ukrainian thermal power plants.

In November, Ukraine attempted to expand the list of targets for its energy counteroffensive. According to the Agency's calculations, since the beginning of November the Ukrainian Armed Forces have carried out at least eight strikes on Russian power facilities, including the Kostroma power station, Russia’s third-largest thermal power plant (3,720 MW), generating 1.5% of Russian electricity. However, such strikes have not yet led to systematic blackouts, though a higher level of outages is noticeable in Russia’s regions bordering Ukraine. According to estimates by Novaya Gazeta Europe, since the start of the year there have been 467 cases of damage to Russian power lines caused by drone attacks. But this figure is entirely insignificant: local incidents in the grid unrelated to external interference number in the thousands each year.

For Ukraine to significantly increase the retaliatory damage caused by its attacks, it must increase not only their intensity but, above all, their destructive power, which is the key measure of effectiveness in a war against the enemy’s infrastructure. In other words, the limited effect of Ukraine’s energy counteroffensive is determined by the near-total absence of a missile component, which makes it insufficient by definition.

The balance of power in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict is constantly shifting. As soon as one side gains the upper hand in a particular domain, by outperforming its opponent in innovation or in scaling up its application, the situation turns in its favour. This happened when the delivery of Western air-defence systems deprived Russia of air superiority, or when Ukraine managed to outpace Russia in creating mass drone forces. At the current stage, Russia’s mass production of drones, guided aerial bombs and missiles (especially ballistic missiles) has turned the tide of the war against Ukraine.

Russia has a significant advantage over Ukraine in offensive capabilities in the energy war. According to BBC estimates, Russia’s production of ballistic missiles may have increased by two-thirds over the past year. Meanwhile, Ukraine has neither sufficient air-defence systems for protection nor enough strike capability to mount a comparable offensive response. Ultimately, this is what determines Russia’s current advantage both in the air–energy war and in the wider war of attrition.